cating oil, left on an uninclosed lot, was not an attractive nuisance, so as to render the owner of the lot liable for injury to a child, caused by an explosion occasioned by the act of another child in pouring something explosive into the can and dropping lighted matches into it.

212. Oil mill.

The owner of an oil mill is under no general duty to exercise care to make it safe for children coming thereto without invitation, authority, or allurement. Stamford Oil Mill Co. v. Barnes (1910) 103 Tex. 409, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1218, 128 S. W. 375, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 111.

213. Old rags.

In Kalman v. Cohen (1916) 203 Ill. App. 597, a complaint alleging that defendants possessed a building in which they stored old rags and old papers; that the doors of the building were open; that children of tender years were, to defendant's knowledge, accustomed to enter the building and play among said papers and rags, and that while plaintiff's decedent, a child of six, was playing there, the rags and paper caught fire from a spark from a locomotive engine or from a blast furnace in the neighborhood, and he was burned and thereby lost his life, was held not to state a cause of action, where there was no allegation showing that the deceased was attracted into the building from the street or from the premises where his parents lived, and it appeared that there was nothing dangerous to children about the old rags or paper.

83, 149 N. W. 760, under heading, "Ponds."

217. Painter's scaffold. See "Scaffold."

218. Passenger cars.

Injury to child playing on, see Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Popp (1894) 96 Ky. 99, 27 S. W. 992; Reary v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. (1888) 40 La. Ann. 32, 8 Am. St. Rep. 497, 3 So. 390, under heading, "Standing cars." 219. Paving stones.

Fall of, see Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew [1913] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 398, 82 L. J. K. B. N. S. 258, 77 J. P. 137, 57 Sol. Jo. 127, 29 Times L. R. 124, 108 L. T. N. S. 4-C. A., under heading "Unstable equilibrium."

220. Percussion caps. See "Dynamite caps."

221. Phosphorus.

In Williams v. Eady (1893) 10 Times L. R. (Eng.) 41, a school master, keeping a boarding school, who left a bottle containing a stick of phosphorus in a place to which boys had access was held liable for an injury to one of them who was injured by an explosion of the phosphorus while another was tampering with it.

222. Pile.

Of girders, see "Iron girders."
Of iron rails, see "Iron rails."
Of logs, see "Logs."

Of lumber, see "Lumber pile."

Of poles, see Jaworski v. Detroit Edison Co. (1920) 210 Mich. 317, 178 N. W. 71, under heading, "Poles.”

Of sawdust, see "Sawdust pile."
Of stone, see "Stones."

Of materials, enabling child to scale wall fencing pond, see Horsburgh v. Sheach (1900) 3 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 268, 38 Scot. L. R. 197, 8 Scot. L. T. 321, under heading, "Ponds." 223. Pipe.

See also "Cement pipe."

In O'Hara v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (1912) 244 Mo. 395, 148 S. W. 884, the turntable doctrine was held not to apply to an injury received by a child crushed by a rolling gas pipe, 24 feet

Of railroad depot, see "Railroad depot."

Dropping down of, see Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr (1877) 83 Pa. 332, under heading, "Unstable equilibrium.”

A railroad company is not, under the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, bound to provide against injury to children at play on the platform of a third person, adjoining its right of way, by the swinging door of a passing car, both for the reason that the platform is on another person's premises, and for the reason that neither the nature nor location of the platform is such that it can be said that the railroad company might reasonably have expected that children Would be allured and attracted to it.

St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Jackson (1910) 96 Ark. 469, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 980, 132 S. W. 206.

In Murrell v. Smith (1910) 152 Mo. App. 95, 133 S. W. 76, it was held that a street fair association which had constructed a platform some 4 or 5 feet above the ground, without any barriers around the open space beneath, on which free exhibitions were given, was bound to know that the space under the platform would be resorted to by children, so as to render it liable for the death of a child who was underneath the platform when it collapsed under the weight of a crowd which had climbed upon it to watch an exhibition.

229. Poisonous berries, See "Berries."

230. Poles.

Guy wires from, see "Guy wires." Injury to child climbing pole by coming in contact with electric wires, see Hurd v. Phoenix Co. (1918) 7 Boyce (Del.) 332, 106 Atl. 286; Edwards v. Kansas City (1919) 104 Kan. 684, 180 Pac. 271; Grube v. Baltimore (1918) 132 Md. 355, L.R.A.1918E, 1036, 103 Atl. 948; Znidersich v. Minnesota Utilities Co. (1923) 155 Minn. 293, 193 N. W. 449; Robertson v. Rockland Light & P. Co. (1919) 187 App. Div. 720, 176 N. Y. Supp. 281, under heading, "Electric wires."

In Robertson v. Rockland Light & P. Co. (N. Y.) supra, it was held that a telephone company was not liable for injuries sustained by a boy climbing on an electric power company's pole, standing in close proximity to a telephone pole, both of which were equipped with steps, on the theory that the proximity of such poles constituted an invitation to boys to engage in a climbing contest:

In Simonton v. Citizens Electric Light & P. Co. (1902) 28 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 67 S. W. 530, it was held that an electric light pole having spikes driven into it, commencing near the ground, to be used by the employees of the defendant in climbing the pole, was not an attractive nuisance, so as to render the defendant liable for injury to a boy of seven,

who climbed upon the pole and fell off.

In Jaworski v. Detroit Edison Co. (1920) 210 Mich. 317, 178 N. W. 71, defendant, being desirous of erecting some poles for its electric wires, deposited three poles side by side between the sidewalk and curb in the street, and placed on top of them another pole, which was curved slightly near the center, so that, as it lay on the others, it could be easily swung in either direction. The boys of the neighborhood began to swing it and use it as a teeter, and lost control of the pole, which rolled into the street and onto another boy, who had stopped to watch them. It was held to be a question for the jury whether the poles were so carelessly and negligently piled as to be attractive to children, and whether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that children in the vicinity would be likely to play with them and might be injured in so doing. It is to be noted that the injured boy was in the street, where he had a right to be, and was not meddling in any manner with the poles.

In Burroughs v. Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (1923) 109 Or. 404, 220 Pac. 152, it was held to be a question for the jury whether a telephone company was negligent in leaving abandoned telephone poles on vacant property not belonging to it, where children were accustomed to play, so as to render it liable for injuries sustained by one in consequence of a pole rolling over. The court distinguished Riggle v. Lens (1914) 71 Or. 125, L.R.A. 1915A, 150, 142 Pac. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1083, and Haynes v. OregonWashington R. & Nav. Co. (1915) 77 Or. 236, 150 Pac. 286, on the ground that the children there injured were trespassers, while in the case at bar they were not, saying: "In the case at bar, the defendant, by its servant placed its poles not upon its own property, but upon vacant property used by children as a playground, and abandoned them; and this child, playing about these poles or climbing upon them, should not be deemed a trespasser upon defendant's property.

The child did not invade the inclosed or any premises of the defendant."

231. Ponds.

Proximate cause of drowning of child in pond, see Thomas v. Anthony (1913) 261 III. 288, 103 N. E. 974, reversing (1913) 179 Ill. App. 463; Linnberg v. Rock Island (1907) 136 Ill. App. 495, s. c. on subsequent appeal in (1910) 157 Ill. App. 527, in IV. j, supra.

The weight of authority is to the effect that the attractive-nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds,-at least, where there is no unusual danger.

In Blough v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (1920) 189 Iowa, 1256, 179 N. W. 840, 20 N. C. C. A. 219, it is said that an analysis of the decisions in which a body of water has been held to be an attractive nuisance shows that in each there was some artificial feature other than the mere water and its location, rendering the place peculiarly dangerous to children, such as the floating apron in the reservoir in Price v. Atchison Water Co. (1897) 58 Kan. 551, 62 Am. St. Rep. 625, 50 Pac. 450, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 392; the sewer trough on piles in Kansas City v. Siese (1905) 71 Kan. 283, 80 Pac. 626; and the floating logs and planks in Pekin v. McMahon (1895) 154 III. 141, 27 L.R.A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114, 39 N. E. 484.

But rafts or logs are not always to be regarded as converting a pond into an attractive nuisance, as the cases herein reviewed show.

In 20 R. C. L. title "Negligence," 85, it is said: "Ponds, pools, lakes, streams, and other waters embody perils that are deemed to be obvious to children of tender years, and, as a general proposition, no liability attaches to the proprietor by death resulting therefrom to children who have come upon the land to bathe. skate, or play."

And in Trogila v. Butte Superior Min. Co. (1921) 270 Fed. 75 (C. ̊C. A. 9th C.), it was said that it would be both impracticable and unreasonable to extend the doctrine of the Turntable Cases to pools and pounds and running streams.

But in Capp v. St. Louis (1913) 251 Mo. 345, 46 LR.A.(N.S.) 731, 158 S. W. 616, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 245, it was held that the conditions necessary to liability under the doctrine of the Turntable Cases are not necessary to hold a municipality liable for the death of a child, drowned in a dangerous pond in a public park, where it had a perfect right to play.

However, in Hastie v. Edinburgh Magistrates [1907] S. C. 1102, 44 Scot. L. R. 829, 15 Scot. L. T. 194, a municipal corporation was held to be under no obligation to fence an artificial pond in a public park, so as to prevent young children from falling into it.

In Trogila v. Butte Superior Min. Co. (Fed.) supra, one who, by damming a small stream to furnish water to supply a mill, had created a pond in which children were in the habit of swimming, was held not liable for the drowning of a boy of eleven, where the pond contained nothing in the nature of a hidden peril.

In Pastorello v. Stone (1915) 89 Conn. 286, 93 Atl. 529, where it was held that the owner of a mill, who knew that children were accustomed to play on its lands near a pond, and that they sometimes fell into the water from the side of an unrailed bridge and roadway maintained by it, and who had not forbidden them to play there, was not liable for the death of one who was drowned, it was said that even had the attractive-nuisance doctrine been accepted in Connecticut, the facts were not such as to bring the case within that doctrine.

In Sullivan v. Huidekoper (1906) 27 App. D. C. 154, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 63, 7 Ann. Cas. 196, it was held that the attractive-nuisance doctrine was not applicable to render liable the owner of a parcel of land in a city upon which the construction of a street had caused a pond to form, in which children were accustomed to play, for the drowning of a ten-year-old boy therein, although no effort had been made by the owner to drain off the water, or to fill in the depression, or to fence in the pond, on the ground that the element of an unknown, concealed, or 36 A.L.R.-15.

hidden danger was absent, that the likelihood of accident was small, and the difficulty of guarding against it great. The court said: "The danger of children who go to swim in ponds and other bodies of water is remote, and accidents are comparatively of rare occurrence. To hold an owner of real estate upon which there is a body of water liable for the accidents that may happen to children while trespassing thereon would be to place upon them an unfair burden. The danger is, one that cannot be guarded against without considerable expense or inconvenience. The cases holding that there is no duty upon the part of a real estate owner upon whose land is a pond or other body of water, to keep his land safe for trespassers, even when those trespassers are children, seem to us to be founded upon and supported by reason and common sense. The primary duty to guard and protect a child against patent and unconcealed dangers devolves upon the parent, and not upon a stranger. These cases, while approving the socalled 'turntable' doctrine, distinguished between attractive and dangerous machinery and ponds and other bodies of water attractive to children, and not free from danger.

We do not consider that the appellee was negligent in not taking steps to prevent the trespassing upon her land by boys of such age as plaintiff's intestate. To hold landowners responsible under such circumstances would be to impose upon them an oppressive burden, and shift the care of children from their parents to strangers. Every man who has been brought up with the freedom allowed to American boys knows that you might as well try to dam the Nile with bulrushes as to keep boys away from ponds, pools, and other bodies of water."

In Blough v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (1920) 189 Iowa, 1256, 179 N. W. 840, 20 N. C. C. A. 219, it was held as a matter of law that a railroad company was not liable for the drowning of a five-year-old child in an unfenced pond on a railroad right of way,

formed by the accumulation of water in a borrow pit, about which children habitually played, there being nothing about the place to render it more attractive than, or to enhance the danger over the attractions or dangers of, natural ponds or streams of water.

In Schauf v. Paducah (1889) 106 Ky. 228, 90 Am. St. Rep. 220, 50 S. W. 42, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 73, the owner of property on which there was a gravel pit which had become filled with water was held not liable for the drowning therein of a seven-year-old boy who, in pursuit of a bird, waded beyond his depth, there being no secret danger, such as a great depth of water near the bank.

A wall and the pond which, as a dam, it helps to form, when considered together, although attractive to children, cannot be regarded as a nuisance, when located upon private property to which children are not invited. Von Almen v. Louisville (1918) 180 Ky. 441, 202 S. W. 880.

In Charlebois v. Gogebic & M. River R. Co. (1892) 91 Mich. 59, 51 N. W. 812, where the obstruction of the natural drainage by a railroad embankment caused the formation of a pool of water in which an eight-year-old boy, living upon the other side of the embankment, which was about 18 feet in height, was drowned on the day following its formation, it was held that the railroad company was not liable for failure to provide means of drainage or guards around the pool, since it could not have been foreseen when the embankment was made that immediately after a rainstorm and the formation of a pool, the boy would climb over the embankment and fall into it.

In Thompson v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1913) 105 Miss. 636, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1101, 63 So. 185, it was held that no cause of action was stated by a declaration alleging that defendant had constructed a dam which formed a pond in the woods, half a mile from the residence portion of a city; that in such pond there were deep and dangerous holes; that it was uninclosed and without warning or trespass

signs; that it was the custom of children to wade in the pond; and that this was permitted by defendant's agents; that plaintiff's nine-year-old son was attracted to and impliedly invited to such pond, and, with other children, waded therein and into one of said dangerous holes, and was drowned, on the ground that the injury was not to be reasonably anticipated as probable, and could not have been prevented by reasonable precautions. The court said: "Here we have a generally shallow body of water covering a large area in the woods, a half mile from the inhabited parts of the town, wherein boys waded, and wherein appellant's boy was drowned. We think it must be conceded that this deplorable tragedy could not have been anticipated as probable by the exercise of reasonable forethought, nor could it have been prevented by any reasonable precautions. Of course, one could have anticipated the possibility of this sad event; but we think the danger was comparatively remote. Scattered over the length and breadth of the land are innumerable ponds and lakes, artificial and natural; and occasionally a boy or man loses his life while wading or bathing in such body of water. If, as a matter of law, the owners of fishponds, mill ponds, gin ponds, and other artificial bodies, wherein it is possible that boys may be drowned, can be held guilty of actionable negligence unless they inclose or guard same, few will be able to maintain these utilities, and to our minds an intolerable condition will be created."

In Arnold v. St. Louis (1899) 152 Mo. 173, 48 L.R.A. 291, 75 Am. St. Rep. 447, 53 S. W. 900, it was held that a city was not liable for the drowning of children in a pond which was situated partly upon a street and partly upon private property, on the ground that the pond was a nuisance which the city had failed to abate. where it appeared that the accident did not happen in the portion of the pond located upon the street.

In Smith v. Jacob Dold Packing Co. (1899) 82 Mo. App. 9, it was said that a pond is not to be treated as an