render the owner liable for the death of a five-year-old child by falling into it and drowning, on the ground that the duty to guard a child against unconcealed dangers devolves upon the parents, and not upon the landowners.

In Bottum v. Hawks (1911) 84 Vt. 370, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 440, 79 Atl. 858, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1025, 3 N. C. C. A. 186, one who maintained an opening into an underground mill race, located near a public highway and school building, between which and the opening there were no barriers, and about which children were accustomed to play because of its attractive character, was held not to be under any duty to protect it to prevent accidents to children, and therefore not to be liable for the drowning of a five-year-old child therein.

196. Mine.

As attractive nuisance, see Faylor V. Great Eastern Quicksilver Min. Co. (1919) 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101, under heading, "Standing cars."

197. Mine hoist..

See "Hoisting apparatus."

198. Molten lead.

Injury to child by upsetting of ladle. containing, see Crane v. South Suburban Gas Co. [1916] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 33, 32 Times L. R. 74, 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. 172, 114 L. T. N. S. 71, 80 J. P. 51, 60 Sol. Jo. 222, 14 L. G. R. 382–Div. Ct., under heading, "Fire."

199. Mortar bed.

In Gnau v. Ackerman (1915) 166 Ky. 258, 179 S. W. 217, where a pile of sand placed in the street in the course of constructing a building to which children were attracted to play had been converted into a mortar bed by making a depression in the center and filling it with unslaked lime, and left unguarded, it was held that the city, the owner of the premises, and the contractor were liable for injuries to a boy between two and three years of age, who went there to play, and was burned by the slaking lime.

But in Zartner v. George (1914) 156 Wis. 131, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 129, 145 N. W. 971, a sand pile and mortar box

containing slaking lime, covered with a layer of sand, were held not to be such attractive nuisances as to render the one using them liable for injuries to a six-year-old boy who jumped into the mortar box and sustained serious burns on his feet from the hot lime, where the evidence showed that it was necessary to leave the box uncovered in order not to get the lime so hot that it would burn, and that it was likewise necessary to spread a thin coating of sand over the top, so the lime would not get too soggy.

200. Motor trucks.

See Gamble v. Uncle Sam Oil Co. (1917) 100 Kan. 74, L.R.A.1917D, 875, 163 Pac. 627, under heading, "Vehicles in motion."

201. Moving cable.

See "Cable."

202. Moving cars.

As proximate cause of injury, see Seymour v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. (1909) 224 Ill. 579, 79 N. E. 950, and Swartwood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1908) 129. Ky. 247, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1112, 130 Am. St. Rep. 464, 111 S. W. 305, in IV. j, supra.

In Wilson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1903) 66 Kan. 183, 71 Pac. 282, it was held that the fact that a slowly moving train might be a temptation to boys to mount and ride thereon could not be regarded as an invitation by the railway company to do so, and that a boy who went upon such a train without invitation or right was a trespasser, the extent of the company's duty toward whom was not to injure him wantonly or recklessly.

The doctrine does not apply to moving cars, so as to require a railroad company to maintain a lookout for children who are in the habit of jumping on or off the cars while in motion. Swartwood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) supra.

In Barney v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 372, 26 L.R.A. 847, 28 S. W. 1069, it is said that even if the doctrine were applicable to railroad cars when at a standstill, it could not apply to cars in motion, fully equipped with the requisite number of

hands, so as to render the company liable for injury received by a boy while catching a ride.

Moving railroad cars are not dangerous machines in the sense that the term is used in the Turntable Cases. Steele v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (1895) 4 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 350. In St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Davis (1908) - Tex. Civ. App. · 110 S. W. 939, it is said that railroad trains are not such attractive articles as to be classed with turntables, requiring special care to prevent injury resulting from childish indiscretions, and railroad companies are not required to guard them against the unobserved intrusion of even very young children.

Railroad cars used in the ordinary course of business do not come within the class of instrumentalities that may be designated as attractive nuisances. Bogdon v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. (1922) 59 Utah, 505, 205 Pac. 571.

The operation of trains over railroad premises does not make them dangerous machines within the meaning of the Turntable Cases. Clark v. Northern P. R. Co. (1902) 29 Wash. 139, 59 L.R.A. 608, 69 Pac. 636.

A slowly moving freight train is not within the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, so as to render it incumbent upon the railway company to keep a lookout to prevent boys from swinging on the ladders. Catlett v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (1893) 57 Ark. 465, 38 Am. St. Rep. 254, 21 S. W. 1062. But in Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co. (1924) Cal. App. - 226 Pac. 28, it is said that it is not material whether the attractive instrumentality is stationary or moving, unless the moving thereof be such as to exclude it from the terms of the doctrine.

In Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co. (Cal.) supra, where a quarry company operated on tracks running from its quarry to a railroad line a train consisting of a locomotive crane and two flat cars, which ran at a speed not exceeding 1 mile an hour, and it appeared that children going to and from school were accustomed to walk along a private wagon road par

allel to such tracks, or on a footpath adjoining, or on the tracks themselves, and would get on the cars, though they were warned off when seen, and while such train was returning to the quarry with the flat cars in front, a boy of eight, while playing upon or about the cars, was run over, it was held that the quarry company might be held liable under the attractive-nuisance doctrine. The court said: "It cannot be held that the jury's implied findings that defendant's train was an attractive instrumentality is unwarranted. Certainly a little boy, accustomed to seeing the train move back and forth daily, would be tempted to steal a ride on the slowly moving cars, with those in charge out of sight, and there being little danger, therefore, of discovery, and, even if discovered, 'everybody knew Jim Beach, and Jim is a man who is very easy-going.' Without any additional expense, the defendant could have stationed his brakeman in a position where the cars and the track ahead would have been under his observation, instead of permitting him to sit idly upon the dago [the locomotive crane] while the train was being backed blindly up the grade. Plainly, the engineer and brakeman did not exercise ordinary care in their operation of the train. Appellant contends that 'the doctrine of the attractive-nuisance cases does not extend to railroad cars; certainly not when in motion.' As applied to ordinary cases this contention may be conceded." The court then proceeded to distinguish the case of Allred v. Pioneer Trust Co. (1918) 179 Cal. 315, 176 Pac. 455, in which it was held that the defendant was not negligent in failing to place its men in a position where they could at all times inspect all parts of the vehicle it was operating, and said: "The facts of the instant case are unlike those in the case cited. The train was not moving forward in the ordinary way, so that the engineer would naturally see any person on or about the track, but was being backed very slowly, the end of the car farthest away being nearly a hundred feet from the positions of the engineer and

fireman, neither of whom could see the cars or the track in the direction in which they were going, and the duties of the brakeman, at least, not being such as in any manner to prevent his keeping the cars and track under his observation. These facts are similar, in principle, to those of the case of Skinner v. Knickrehm (1909) 10 Cal. App. 596, 102 Pac. 947, in which a judgment for damages was affirmed. In that case the defendants caused a wagon to be attached to the rear of a very slowly moving house on a public street. The wagon was left unguarded and unattended, and thereby became and was attractive to young children. A child climbed upon the wagon and was thrown therefrom by the jolting thereof and injured. It does not appear to be material whether the attractive instrumentality is stationary or moving, unless the movement thereof be such as to exclude it from the terms of the doctrine."

In Underwood v. Western & A. R. Co. (1898) 105 Ga. 48, 31 S. E. 123, it was held that the doctrine of the Turntable Cases would not be extended so as to cover a moving car on the track of a railway company, and to render the company liable for an injury to a ten-year-old boy, who, while attempting to get his foot upon the ladder of a freight car, was injured. The court said: "Nothing is more alluring to a child than a passing vehicle, whether it be a buggy, carriage, dump cart, wagon, or a railway train; and if railroads are to be liable because boys, without the knowledge of the employees in charge, attempt to swing upon their passing trains, then the owners of the other vehicles named would be equally liable if a boy, without the knowledge of the person in charge, was injured while attempting to swing upon the rear axle or other part of such vehicles."

In Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Redding (1895) 140 Ind. 101, 34 LR.A. 767, 39 N. E. 921, it was held that trainmen were not guilty of wilful and wanton negligence in failing to stop a freight train running on a sharp upgrade at a speed of 8 miles. an hour, to remove a boy of eight, who

had caught hold of and was hanging to one of the cars.

In Wilson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1903) 66 Kan. 183, 71 Pac. 282, the court refused to extend the turntable doctrine to a case where a twelve-year-old boy, who understood and appreciated the danger, was injured while catching a ride on a slowly moving freight train. The court said that while the doctrine of the Turntable Cases is recognized in Kansas, it had no disposition so to extend it as to include railway trains. "The peril of jumping upon and from moving trains is so well understood, and the task of keeping boys from stealing rides and hopping upon cars of trains slowly moving through towns or railroad yards is so impracticable and burdensome, as to make the rule invoked inapplicable. So to guard trains as to keep boys entirely away from them would require a host of employees, and fix a standard of responsibility which has never received countenance in this state. Such a standard of duty and responsibility cannot be invented and applied by the court without legislation."

A railroad company whose conductor has for a long time encouraged boys to catch rides on a train of which he is in charge is bound to anticipate that they will do so, and must exercise ordinary care to look out for and protect them from injury. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele (1918) 179 Ky. 605, L.R.A.1918D, 317, 201 S. W. 43.

In Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Smith (1881) 46 Mich. 504, 41 Am. Rep. 177, 9 N. W. 830, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 24, where an eight-year-old boy, trespassing upon the premises of a railroad company, got on the step of a locomotive, and, being ordered off by the fireman, jumped off, fell, and was run over, it was said that, the boy being a trespasser, the railroad company would be held liable only in case there was gross and wanton negligence on its part.

In Nixon v. Montana, W. & S. W. R. Co. (1914) 50 Mont. 95, 145 Pac. 8, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 299, a slowly moving freight train, the only unusual feature of which was that two cars were be

hind the caboose, was held not to be an attractive nuisance so as to render the railroad liable for the death of a child in attempting to catch a ride. The court said: "The mere fact that trains, as such, are attractive, does not suffice; for they are familiar objects, and, whether moving rapidly or slowly, they are necessary instrumentalities through which a railroad must conduct its business. So, too, the placing of cars behind the caboose may have been quite reasonable and proper. In any event, there is no intimation in the complaint that, from previous practice or otherwise, the company or its agents knew, or should have known, that a train so made up was especially alluring to children. No reason is suggested why this should be so, and the other allegations strongly indicate that such was not the fact. In no jurisdiction, so far as we are informed, in which the turntable doctrine is accepted, has it been applied to moving trains."

In Greer v. Damascus Lumber Co. (1912) 161 N. C. 144, 76 S. E. 725, the court said that if a turntable is a dangerous instrumentality if unlocked or unguarded, surely the tailboard of a backing engine must be.

In Counizzarri v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (1915) 248 Pa. 474, 94 Atl. 134, it was held that where a strip of land in close proximity to defendant's tracks had been used for many years as a street or passageway for pedestrians or vehicles, and by children as a playground, it was the duty of employees, before moving cars standing on the tracks, to ascertain whether there were any persons so near the cars as to be liable to injury thereby.

In Smalley v. Rio Grande Western R. Co. (1908) 34 tah, 423, 98 Pac. 311, a railroad company was held not to be liable to a five-year-old trespasser, hurt by a moving car in the company's switch yards, on the theory that the yard and the switching of cars are dangerous and attractive agencies or instruments which allure and attract young children.

In Ellington v. Great Northern R. Co. (1905) 96 Minn. 176, 104 N. W. 827, it was held that the fact that

young children were known to be in the habit of frequenting a railroad right of way did not impose upon the railroad company the duty, before moving its cars about its yards, to take some steps to ascertain whether children were there, and, if so, to guard against injuring them.

In Berg v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. (1910) 111 Minn. 305, 126 N. W. 1093, it was held that, according to the law of the state of Michigan, the turntable doctrine has no application to the case of a child who enters a railway yard for the purpose of catching rides on trains. The court said that it would be unreasonable to require the company to employ a greater number of brakemen than necessary for its purposes just to see that boys did not steal rides.

In Devereaux v. Thornton (1879) 4 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 449, it is held that a railroad company does not discharge its whole duty to children at play at a place where cars are being weighed by simply directing them to get out of the way of danger, when it knows that they are in danger; and that they are incapable of caring for themselves.

In Ott v. Johnson (1905) 38 Tex. Civ. App. 491, 86 S. W. 649, where tramway cars used in a logging train, known to defendant's employees to be attractive to children, were released and sent without brakes down grade, and a seven-year-old boy was injured in trying to get on them while in motion, it was held to be a question for the jury whether defendant's servants had exercised due care in releasing the bars after the boy, who had purposely gone upon the premises, had been ordered away, without ascertaining how near he was to the track, or whether the enticing cars would again draw him into danger.

In Emerson v. Peteler (1886) 35 Minn. 481, 59 Am. Rep. 337, 29 N. W. 311, it was held that a contractor who is grading a street, and, in the course of the work, uses small dump cars for transporting dirt, is under no duty to provide a watchman to prevent children from boarding the moving cars under the temptation to ride.

In Hestonville Pass. R. Co. v. Connell (1879) 88 Pa. 520, 32 Am. Rep. 472, a street railway company was held to be under no duty to take precautions against the act of a child six years and nine months of age, in attempting to jump or climb upon the forward platform of a horse car while it was in motion.

In Jefferson v. Birmingham R. & Electric Co. (1897) 116 Ala. 300, 38 L.R.A. 458, 67 Am. St. Rep. 116, 22 So. 546, it was held that a company operating small cars by a dummy engine in a street, at a low rate of speed, with frequent stops, which cars were attractive to children, was under no duty to have someone thereon to keep children from boarding them.

In Bishop v. Union R. Co. (1884) 14 R. L. 314, 51 Am. Rep. 386, 6 Am. Neg. Cas. 394, it is held that a street railway company which provided a driver for two horse cars, coupled together, was not required to furnish a second man to prevent children from getting on the platforms while the cars were passing along the street.

In Rasimas v. Chicago R. Co. (1921) 223 Ill. App. 288, a street car with the vestibule doors closed was held not to be an attractive nuisance, so as to render the company liable to a boy who was injured while riding on the step while the car was being shifted from one track to another at the barns.

203. Moving house.

Injury to a child catching ride on wagon attached to moving house, see Skinner v. Knickrehm (1909) 10 Cal. App. 596, 102 Pac. 947, under heading, "Vehicles in motion."

204. Moving stairway. See "Escalator."

205. Moving van.

See Czarniski v. Security Storage & Transfer Co. (1918) 204 Mich. 276, 170 N. W. 52, under heading, "Vehicles not in motion."

206. Moving vehicles. See "Vehicles in motion."

207. Mowing machine.

One engaged in cutting grass with a mowing machine is under no duty to

keep a lookout for trespassing children. Preston v. Austin (1919) 206 Mich. 194, 172 N. W. 377.

208. Naphtha.

In Dahl v. Valley Dredging Co. (1914) 125 Minn. 90, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1173, 145 N. W. 796, it was held that the rule of the Turntable Cases did not apply where boys, ranging from thirteen to seven years of age, took from the engine room of a dredge on which they frequently played, during the temporary absence of the crew, a can containing naphtha, and poured it upon some waste which they had set on fire, in consequence of which they were burned, on the ground that there was no reason to anticipate that the children would meddle with the can; that naphtha is not naturally attractive to children; and that due care had been exercised in keeping it in a proper receptacle in a proper place.

209. Nitroglycerin caps. See "Dynamite caps."

210. Oil.

In Peirce v. Lyden (1907) 85 C. C. A. 312, 157 Fed. 552 (2d C.), where boys were in the habit of taking oil in tomato cans from open barrels stored in a dilapidated shed in a railroad yard, and throwing the oil upon fires which they had lighted, to the knowledge of the night watchman, who locked the shed at night to keep them from stealing oil, it was held that the owner was liable for injury to a boy of tender years, who was burned by oil taken from the shed and thrown upon a fire. The court said that nothing was more attractive to boys than fire, and as they had been in the habit of throwing defendant's oil upon fires made by them, and this fact was actually known to the night watchman, it was proper to submit the question of defendant's negligence to the jury.

211. Oil can.

In Anderson v. Karstens (1920) 218 Ill. App. 285, reversed on a point of practice in (1921) 297 Ill. 76, 130 N. E. 338, it was held as a matter of law that an emptied 5-gallon can which had formerly contained lubri