priation of any part of the school funds for the payment of special assessments to recover the cost of street improvements would be an appropriation thereof to a purpose other than that of the school system, and therefore forbidden by the constitutional provisions that school funds shall be held inviolate and shall be used for educational purposes only. Louisville v. Leatherman (Ky.) and, Butte v. School Dist. (Mont.) supra.

Lands donated by Congress to a state for the benefit of schools cannot be assessed for the expense of local improvements. Poock v. Ely (1889) 2 Ohio C. D. 408.

But property owned by a school district which is not used actually and exclusively for public purposes is subject to assessment for local improvements. School Dist. v. Board of Improvement (1898) 65 Ark. 343, 46 S. W. 418; Witter v. Mission School Dist. (1898) 121 Cal. 350, 66 Am. St. Rep. 33, 53 Pac. 905; City Street Improv. Co. v. University of California (1908) 153 Cal. 776, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 451, 96 Pac. 801; Auditor Gen. v. MacKiunon Boiler & Mach. Co. (1917) 199 Mich. 489, 165 N. W. 771.

"As a private owner, however, of land not used exclusively for school purposes, but held as an investment or from which to derive rentals, as property of an individual is held and owned, we see no reason why the lands of a school district should not be assessed for improvements, the same as those of any other private owner." Witter v. Mission School Dist. (1898) 121 Cal. 350, 66 Am. St. Rep. 33, 53 Pac. 905.

It has been held that a statute requiring boards of education to pay assessments against school property for street improvements out of their own funds is unconstitutional. Re School Property (1896) 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 577, 7 Ohio N. P. 568. View that property is liable.

Other courts take the view that the usual constitutional exemption of school property from taxation refers only to taxes for general purposes of revenue, and has no reference to

Illinois. Chicago use of Schools v. Chicago (1903) 207 Ill. 37, 69 N. E. 580; Chicago v. University of Chicago (1922) 302 Ill. 455, 23 A.L.R. 244, 134 N. E. 723. Indiana. Windfall City v. Somerville (1914) 181 Ind. 463, 104 N. E. 859, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 661. Compare Edgerton v. Huntington School Twp. (1890) 126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156; Sutton v. Montpelier (1902) 28 Ind. App. 315, 62 N. E. 710.

Iowa. Sioux City v. Independent School Dist. (1880) 55 Iowa, 150, 7 N. W. 488, approved in Edwards & W. Constr. Co. v. Jasper County (1902) 117 Iowa, 365, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301, 90 N. W. 1006.

Kansas. Wichita v. Board of Education (1914) 92 Kan. 967, 142 Pac. 946.

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New York. Re Dinn (1923) 121 Misc. 633, 202 N. Y. Supp. 62. Washington. Re Howard Ave. North (1906) 44 Wash. 62, 120 Am. St. Rep. 973, 86 Pac. 1117, 12 Ann. Cas. 417; Spokane v. Fonnell (1913) 75 Wash. 417, 135 Pac. 211.

In Spokane v. Fonnell (Wash.) supra, the court held that school property, situated with reference to a local improvement the same as other property within the district, was subject to an assessment for its share of the expense thereof.

And in Whitmore v. Hartford (Conn.) supra, it was held that the exemption from taxation of school property did not apply, in the case of a special assessment for local improvements which were directly beneficial to the school property in question as well as to the premises of the other adjoining property owners.

Under express statutory provision in Kansas, it has been held that property held by a school board for school purposes was nevertheless subject to special assessment for its share of the cost of constructing sewers, drains, and pavements in front of the premises. Wichita v. Board of Education (Kan.) supra.

In Re Howard Ave. North (Wash.) supra, it was held that in the absence of special statute it was the duty of the city authorities to assess school property within the assessment district in proportion to the benefits received in condemning land for an entrance to a public park. The court said: "While authority to levy such assessments is traceable to the taxing power, they are nevertheless assessed on the theory that the property against which they are levied is benefited thereby to the extent of the levy, and the municipality acts as an agent, merely, in collecting the tax. The district improved is never coextensive with the county or city, and it is not true that in paying the assessment the county must raise money to pay over to itself, and that no one would be benefited but the officers employed in the collection of the tax. There is no reason why the county, the city, or the school district should not pay for the benefits received by it the same as any other property owner. Of course, their property may not be sold, but there is no reason why the amount of the tax should not be paid out of the treasuries of these institutions; and, if the governing bodies fail to make payment, mandamus will lie to compel them to do so."

In New York (Re Dinn (N. Y.) supra) it was held that "all colleges, churches, courthouses, jails, schoolhouses, and even lands of the state, are liable to be assessed for local improvements . . . unless expressly exempted therefrom."

But where an assessment for street improvements is made on the theory that the intrinsic value of the property will be increased thereby, the property of a school district is not assessable for the reason that the

property is not rendered more valuable for the purpose for which it is used, and for which it must continue to be used. Hartford & West Middle Dist. (1877) 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. 687.

In Washington there is a statute empowering a city to assess the cost of any local improvement against school property in the same manner as if the school property was private property. However, the interest of the state in such property cannot be sold to satisfy the lien of any such assessment, but only such interest or other right therein which is in private ownership can be made the subject of such a sale Trimble v. Seattle (1911) 64 Wash. 102, 116 Pac. 647.

In Illinois it is held that exemption from taxation does not exempt from special assessments for local improvements; that school property is subject to such assessments, whether it is occupied for school purposes, or is vacant, or is occupied by buildings from which the school receives rent; and that the payment of an assessment against school property for improvements of benefit to the property is a proper method of applying the funds of a school district for the benefit of its schools. Chicago use of Schools v. Chicago, 207 Ill. 37, 69 N. E. 580; Board of Education v. People (1905) 219 Ill. 83, 76 N. E. 75.

However, it has been held that the rule announced in the Illinois decisions does not apply to land granted by Congress to the state for the use of schools under the 6th section of the act of Congress enabling the people of Illinois to form a state Constitution, and providing that "the section numbered 16, in every township, . . . shall be granted to the state for the use of the inhabitants of such township, for the use of schools." The land thus granted is held to be exempt from special assessments. People ex rel. Little v. Trustees of Schools (1886) 118 Ill. 52, 7 N. E. 262.

In Indiana (Windfall City v. Somerville (1914) 181 Ind. 463, 104 N. E.

859, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 661), where a statute authorized the assessment of school property and payment out of the special school revenue for local improvements, it was held that the statute was valid and subjected the property to an assessment for street paving.

But where the school lands were granted by Congress in trust for the use and support of public schools it

has been held that they could not be subjected to assessment in aid of the construction of public ditches or drains, although fronting on and beneficial to the premises. Edgerton v. Huntington School Twp. (1890) 126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156.

An earlier decision in Sutton v. Montpelier (1902) 28 Ind. App. 315, 62 N. E. 710, was handed down prior to the statute. R. E. La, G.