elevation of its fentiment, or its immediate agreeableness to its poffeffor. In ordinary characters, we approve of a bias towards modefty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to others: The vicious excefs of the former virtue, namely, infolence or haughtiness, is immediately disagreeable to others: The excefs of the latter is fo to the poffeffor. Thus are the boundaries of these duties adjusted. A defire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far from being blameable, that it seems infeparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble difpofition. An attention even to trivial matters, in order to please is also expected and demanded by fociety; and no one is furprised, if he find a man in company, to obferve a greater elegance of drefs and more pleasant flow of conversation, than when he paffes his time at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then, confifts VANITY, which is so justly regarded as a fault or imperfection? It feems to confift chiefly in fuch an intemperate display of our advantages, honours, and accomplishments; in fuch an importunate and open demand of praise and admiration, as is offenfive to others, and encroaches too far on their fecret vanity and ambition. It is befides a fure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is so great an ornament in any character. For why that impatient defire of applause; as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not reasonably expect, that it would for ever. attend you? Why fo anxious to inform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things which were faid to you; the honours, the distinctions which you met with; as if these were not things of courfe, and what we could readily, of ourselves, have imagined, without being told of them? DECENCY, DECENCY, or a proper regard to age, fex, character, and station in the world, may be ranked among the qualities, which are immediately agreeable to others, and which, by that means, acquire praise and approbation. An effeminate behaviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman; these are ugly because unfuitable to each character, and different from the qualities which we expect in the fexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The difproportions hurt the eye, and convey a disagreeable fentiment to the spectators, the fource of blame and disappro-, bation. This is that indecorum, which is explained fo much at large by CICERO in his offices. Among the other virtues, we may also give CLEANLINESS a place; fince it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconfiderable fource of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy fenfation, which it excites in others; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the learned have involved themselves in fuch mazes of perplexity and error. But befides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of whose beauty, we can, in fome degree explain and account for, there ftill remains fomething mysterious and inexplicable, which conveys an immediate fatisfaction to the spectator, but how, or why, or for what reafon, he cannot pretend to determine. There is a MANNER, a grace, an eafe, a genteelnefs, an I-know-not-what, which fome men poffefs above others, which is very different from external beauty and comelinefs, and which, however, catches our affection almoft as fuddenly and power. powerfully. And though this manner be chiefly talked of in the paffion between the fexes, where the concealed magic is eafily explained, yet surely much of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no inconfiderable part of personal merit. This clafs of accom plishments, therefore, must be trufted entirely to the blind, but fure teftimony of taste and fentiment; and must be confidered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philofophy, and make her fenfible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquifitions. We approve of another, becaufe of his wit, politeness, modefty, decency, or any agreeable quality which he poffeffes; although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments, which we form concerning manners and characters. SECTION IX. CONCLUSION. PART I. IT may juftly appear furprising, that any man, in fo late an age, should find it requifite to prove, by ela borate reafoning, that PERSONAL MERIT confifts altogether in the poffeffion of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the perfon himself, or to others. It might be expected, that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised inquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, without any argument or difputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, fo naturally claffes itself under the divifion of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that it is not eafy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther, or confider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable muft pofsess these qualities with regard either to the perfon bimfelf, or to others, the compleat delineation or defcription of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a fhadow is caft by the fun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is caft, be not broken and uneven; nor the furface, from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confufed; a juft figure is immediately prefented, without any art or attention. And it feems seems a reasonable prefumption, that fyftems and hypothefes have perverted our natural understanding; when a theory, fo fimple and obvious, could so long have efcaped the most elaborate examination. But however the cafe may have fared with philofophy; in common life, these principles are still implicitly maintained, nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or fatire, any applaufe or censure of human action and behaviour. If we obferve men, in every intercourfe of bufinefs or pleafure, in every difcourfe and conversation; we shall find them no where, except in the fchools, at any lofs upon this fubject. What fo natural, for inftance, as the following dialogue? You are very happy, we shall suppose one to say, addreffing himself to another, that you have given your daughter to CLEANTHES. He is a man of honour and humanity. Every one, who has any intercourse with him, is fure of fair and kind treatment*. I congratulate you too, fays another on the promifing expectations of this fon-in-law; whofe affiduous application to the study of the laws, whose quick penetration and early knowledge both of men and business, prognofticate the greatest honours and advancementt. You furprize me, replies a third, when you talk of CLEANTHES as a man of business and application. I met him lately in a circle of the gayeft company, and he was the very life and foul of our converfation: So much wit with good manners; fo much gallantry without affectation; fo much ingenious knowledge fo genteelly delivered, I have never before observed in any one ‡. You would admire him ftill more, fays a fourth, if you knew him * Qualities useful to others. + Qualities useful to the perfon himself. more |