mary tenement, there is generally no admission at all, her estate being a continuation of the seisin of the husband; when she takes only a part, the heir is admitted to the whole tenement, paying his fine; and if she is admitted to a portion of the tenement then assigned to her, the payment to the lord is merely nominal. The representation respecting the fines could not be understood to mean more than that such fines as are sometimes certain and sometimes arbitrary, viz. fines on alienation and descent, are in this manor arbitrary. But how does the Respondent shape his demand for compensation? He wholly discards the representation, on which he purchased, that the annual profits amounted to 1507.; and he seeks a compensation equal to the difference between the value of the manor, supposing the heir to be admitted on payment of one years' quit-rent, and the widow to make a nominal payment for her freebench, and what the value would be if every customary heir, and every widow, were on admission to pay to the lord two years' improved value of the tenement. It was on a refusal of this compensation that he filed his bill. This is the case of compensation which he makes in his bill, and this is the amount of compensation for which he has obtained a decree. The decree makes no reference to the annual value stated in the Particulars, and makes no distinction between the fines on the admission of the heir and the widow; therefore, if the vendors had been acting in their own right and selling their own property, I am of opinion that the decree could not be supported. But the consideration that they sold as trustees, is enough to show that specific performance, making compensation, ought not to have been decreed. It is an implied condition that trustees to 1842. WHITE V. CUDDON. 1842. WHITE บ. CUDDON. sell will use all reasonable diligence to obtain the best price. If they fail in reasonable diligence, if they contract under circumstances of haste and improvidence, a Court of Equity will not enforce the specific performance of the contract, however fair the conduct of the purchaser may have been. The remedy of an action at law is open to such a purchaser, but he has no claim to the assistance of a Court of Equity. In this case the trustees were guilty of gross negligence in stating that the fines were arbitrary, and still more in stating that the annual profits for the last eight years amounted to 150l. a year, whereas during that period they amounted to 2021. a year; and they exceeded 150l. a year, upon an average of 30 years; so that the property of the cestui-que trust was sold greatly under its value. But after a sale upon such a mistaken representation of the annual value, the Respondent, according to the claim he has made in the Master's office under the decree, would be entitled to an abatement of 993l., or one-third of the purchase money. In selling the trust property in such a manner and with such a result, the trustees would certainly be guilty of a gross breach of trust. The contract, therefore, cannot be specifically enforced against them, and the purchaser ought to be left to an action at law, to recover damages from them adequate to the loss he can show that he has sustained by their breach of contract. The suggestion, that there might be a decree for a specific performance against the trustee, leaving it to the cestui-que trust afterwards to seek to set aside the sale, is very properly disclaimed on the part of the Respondent. Under these circumstances, I think that the bill ought to have been dismissed with costs, and that in strictness we should have been bound to give judg ment to this effect; but I am glad to think that, by consent, the decree will stand for a specific performance, according to the terms of the agreement, without any abatement, the Respondent paying the costs of the suit in the Court of Chancery. Lord Brougham:-The reason why I made a reference to the consent of the Appellant, was for the purpose of what my noble and learned friends have both adverted to; that your Lordships may not appear to have given any kind of opinion as to what would have been the consequence if the specific performance had been contested. I apprehend the decree should be for a specific performance, it being stated the defendant not objecting. Lord Cottenham:-I proposed that there should be a decree for a specific performance, the defendant not objecting. Mr. Bethell:-Just so, my Lords; the Respondent asking, and the defendant not objecting thereto. Then it will be the usual decree, the Respondent to pay the costs of the suit below. [It was ordered and adjudged that the decree complained of be, and the same is hereby reversed. And (at the request of the Respondent, and the Appellant not objecting thereto) that the Respondent shall have a specific performance of the contract contained in the memorandum dated the 10th of August 1838, referred to in the decree complained of; and that the Appellant and all proper parties do convey the estate mentioned in the said memorandum to the Respondent, on payment by the Respondent of the residue 1842. WHITE บ. CUDDON. 1842. WHITE v. CUDDON, of the purchase money, with interest, according to the conditions of sale; such conveyance to be settled by the Master, if the parties differ; and that the Respondent do pay the costs of the suit and proceedings in the Court below, to this time.] 1. By A.'s will in 1783, his widow, whom he appointed exe- |