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The question is not whether Mackmurdo was overreached in this matter, but whether the Appellant can have the aid of a Court of Equity to enforce payment of 6,7567. in respect of a debt for which he paid only 2,400l., knowing that the creditor could not recover the whole amount, and his knowledge of the debt and of the debtor's means to pay it being derived from the confidential relation between them as legal adviser and client; and knowing at the same time that the client was himself in treaty for the purchase of it. It is quite clear that the Appellant, in this transaction, availed himself of the knowledge and opportunities offered by his being the confidential counsel and adviser of the Respondent, to gain a benefit to himself to the prejudice of the client. It may be assumed as certain that Mackmurdo was not as well acquainted as the Appellant with the state of the Respondent's property: suppose then that the Appellant, instead of purchasing the debt, contracted to sell to Mackmurdo, for a certain sum, the knowledge he had professionally acquired of the Respondent's affairs, would a Court of Equity enforce that contract against Mackmurdo? Lord Plunket, in his judgment declares the principle thus (e):-That counsel is not to "communicate to any third person the knowledge acquired by him in that character, or use it in his own behalf to the prejudice of the person who so confided in him. This rests on clear principles of public convenience and of moral duty, as well as on positive authority. There would otherwise be an end to that unreserved intercourse between the client and the person to whom he entrusts the defence of his property, or of his life or character. If the counsel could not enable a third person to work this prejudice (e) 1 Drury & Walsh, 743, 4. 3 A

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to his former client, by communicating to him the facts which he had confidentially learned, neither can he make such use of them for himself."

It is asked whether a counsel is prevented from bidding at a public sale for the property of any person for whom he once held a brief: the object of putting that question is, to shut out the proper inference from the facts of this case. The Appellant knew that there was a negotiation between the Respondent and Mackmurdo, in respect of this debt; and it was his duty not to interfere until he knew from the Respondent himself or his agents that the negotiation was at an end, and that the field was open to him and he might treat for himself. Instead of doing so, he went clandestinely to Mackmurdo and made his contract, which, being objected to as fraudulent on his part, he did not attempt to enforce, but concealing that transaction from the Respondent's agents, he afterwards meets Mackmurdo and closes with him. Had the Respondent's agents discovered that the Appellant was negotiating with Mackmurdo, and filed a bill for an injunction, a Court of Equity would restrain him from interfering. The cases illustrating the rule that prohibits a party, acquiring professionally a general knowledge of a client's affairs, from ever using that knowledge for his own or any other person's benefit, to the prejudice or danger of the client, are as applicable to counsel as to solicitors, whose mistakes or misconduct occasioned them, unless it is to be held that less confidence is placed in counsel. Some of these having recently arisen in Ireland, are referred to by Lord Plunket, as collected in the report of Biggs v. Head (f); and his Lordship refers also to the cases in this country;

(f) 1 Sausse & Scully, 335.

Exparte James (g), Bulkley v. Wilford (h), Evatt v. Price (i). The principle is clearly recognised in Fox v. Mackreth (k), as explained by Lord Eldon in Coles v. Trecothick (1); and also in another class of cases which go to restrain an attorney from shaking off the confidential relation to his client, or acting for his opponent; as Cholmondeley v. Clinton (m), Beere v. Ward (n).

The Appellant was not merely counsel for the Respondent, but his general legal adviser and agent. His going to Ostend to arrange with the Respondent for the resettlement of his estates, shows that he acted in that general character: his sending his pupil, Mr. Abbott, at the Respondent's expense, to investigate the titles and the value of the property in Ireland, shows it. The Appellant therefore having been not only the confidential counsel of the Respondent, but particularly consulted by the Respondent in all his efforts to adjust, by compromise, the claims of the party under whom the Appellant derives title to the securities, and never having intimated any intent to intermeddle with such claims for his own benefit, he ought to be considered as having purchased them for the benefit of the Respondent, his client, and it was not competent to him to derive any benefit to himself from any dealing in respect of such claims, without full and explicit notice to the Respondent, which he never gave. Even if, as contended for the Appellant, the relationship of counsel and client had, in fact, ceased, yet on grounds of public policy the Appellant should not be per

(g) 8 Vesey, 337.

(h) Ante, Vol. II. p. 102.

(i) 1 Sim. 483.

(k) 2 Bro. C. C. 400.

(1) 9 Ves. 247.
m) G. Cooper, 80.
(n) Jacob, 77.

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mitted to derive benefit from a dealing which would necessarily expose him to the imputation of making use of confidential communications to his own advantage and to the prejudice of the Respondent's interest, without the Respondent having any adequate means of detecting such breach of trust, if it in fact existed.

There is no ground for impeaching the decree on the question of interest. The bond and deed of covenant were executed abroad to secure English debts, to an English merchant, described as of Blackwell Hall, London, charging estates in England and Ireland with the payment of the principal with lawful interest. The Appellant, an English barrister, purchases these securities in London. If he filed his bill in England, of course he could not ask for more than lawful interest in England; but he sues in Ireland, and the Respondent having then offered to pay him back his 2,4007. with 6 per cent., and the Court having declared by its former decree that the Appellant ought to accept that offer, he now claims it as a right. But this House set aside that decree on the Appellant's former appeal, and he cannot now have any benefit from it; and as there is no rule of interest agreed on by the parties, and the securities mention lawful interest or interest only, the Appellant cannot, at any event, have more than 5 per cent., which is the Court rate of interest in Ireland; Leslie v. Leslie (0).

It has been also said that the decree did great injustice on the point of costs. The Appellant ought not in justice to have any costs of his suit from the time from which he was declared to be a trustee for the Respondent. An offer was made as soon as the

(0) Lloyd & G. 5. (Cas. temp. Sugd.)

bill was filed, if he would admit his character of trustee, to pay the money with interest, and all costs incurred up to that time. The suit afterwards proceeded in consequence of his unrighteous conduct, and in strictness no costs ought to have been given him. Trustees persisting in unnecessary litigation ought to pay the costs personally; Henley v. Phillips (p), Campbell v. Campbell (q); at all events an appeal does not lie for costs.

Mr. Pemberton, in reply:-We do not say that the Appellant would be justified in interfering against the interests of the Respondent, who had been his former client; but surely it is not to be held that because counsel once held a brief or otherwise acted for a party, he is for ever precluded from dealing in any way with that party's property. The principle of equity so often referred to did not affect the purchase of these securities, as the Appellant had ceased to be the Respondent's legal adviser, and did not use any knowledge he had acquired in professional confidence to the prejudice of the Respondent. It is now or must be admitted on all hands that the securities were unimpeachable, and that the debt was a bona fide debt. The letter put in evidence as written in 1821 by Mackmurdo (to whom addressed no one knows) speaks of some other bond; it is proved by O'Reilly and Carpenter that the bond in this cause was executed in 1816, and delivered by O'Reilly to Carpenter in 1817. The only objection to the Appellant's purchase now remaining, is that the Respondent was in treaty for a compromise, to which Mackmurdo, having doubts of being able to enforce the securities, was willing to listen. The best evidence (q) 2 Myl. & C. 25.

(p) 2 Atk. 48.

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