between him and the Respondent or his agents; and that Mr. Carter, therefore, was not aware of, and did not interfere with, any such treaty. It was nowhere proved that Mr. Carter used the knowledge he had acquired of the Respondent's property and of his embarrassments to prejudice him, or intercept any benefit coming to him. It was open to all the world, and consequently to Mr. Carter, to treat with Mackmurdo for an assignment of those securities; they were in the market; there was no negotiation for them pending with the Respondent, and the relation between him and Mr. Carter had ceased long before. Admitting that the rule in equity is applicable to counsel, as it is to trustees, bankrupts' assignees, executors, and agents, the Appellant submits that this case is not within the rule. Is a counsel who once held a brief in a cause for a party, to be prevented from purchasing any of that party's property, at a public sale, after the confidential relation between them has ceased? To that extent the decree now appealed from would carry the rule. There must be a breach of confidence, to make the rule applicable. How can there be any breach of confidence after the confidential relation has been determined? There is no case reported, in its circumstances or in principle, like this. There is no authority for extending the principle of equity to circumstances like these. The principle" that agents cannot buy the property of their employers without leave," is, because they are in the position of trustees to their cestui que trust, as his assignees are to a bankrupt, and attorneys to their clients. The principle is laid down in Coles v. Trecothick (d). Mr. Carter was not at any time an agent (d) 9 Ves. 247. for the Respondent, employed to deal with Mackmurdo for these securities. Two years before his purchase of them he had been discharged by the Respondent, or at all events had ceased to be his counsel and legal adviser; and there is no evidence that he used the knowledge he had acquired as counsel in prejudice of the Respondent, or intercepted any benefit from him. At the time when Mr. Carter first opened his treaty in 1832, and from that time until the completion of it by the execution of the assignment of the securities to him in August 1833, there was no treaty pending between the Respondent and Mackmurdo for a compromise of Mackmurdo's claims; and therefore Mr. Carter did not act unjustly or unprofessionally in the purchase of these securities. The decree is wrong also in respect to the interest. Even supposing that the Appellant is to be considered a trustee for the Respondent for the residue of the money due on foot of the securities, after deducting the sum of 2,400 l. and interest; yet, by the decree, interest is directed to be calculated on the 2,400 l. at the rate of 5 per cent. only, although interest has been calculated on the sum due on foot of the securities at the rate of 6 per cent., and so decreed; and although the Respondent, by his notice of the 24th December 1834, as well as by the bill in the cross cause, offered to pay interest to the Appellant at 6 per cent. This was a debt due on Irish securities which are to bear legal interest, which is 6 per cent. in Ireland. was also a debt contracted in Ireland. A party purchasing a future or reversionary interest is to have the highest interest the law allows, and not the Court interest. The Master computed the interest at 6 per cent., and the Court confirmed that report. It 1841. CARTER v. PALMER. 1841. CARTER บ. PALMER. As to costs, supposing the decree right on the main point, the Appellant is decreed to pay the costs of the Respondent in the first cause, from the time of the service of the notice of the 24th December 1834, and to pay all the costs of the Respondent in the cross cause; although, 1st, the Respondent, by his notice, offered to pay the Appellant's costs up to the time of payment to him of the sum of 2,400 l. and the interest thereof, out of the funds to the credit of the first cause; although, 2dly, by the course of Courts of Equity the Appellant should be considered as equitable mortgagee, and as such entitled to his costs, before he should be required to reconvey the securities to the Respondent; and although, 3dly, the Respondent, by setting up several inconsistent defences to the original bill, made it necessary for the Appellant to go into lengthened evidence upon such matters of defence, whereby a vexatious and unnecessary expense has been entailed upon him. It is true, no appeal lies for costs; still when a case is brought up by appeal on any appealable point, the House inquires into the matter of costs, and sets them right. Mr. Tinney and Sir Wm. Follett, for the Respondent: It is in vain for the Appellant to expect a Court of Equity will lend its aid to enforce specific performance of these securities to their full amount, regard being had to the means by which they were obtained from the Respondent, and to the circumstances under which, as well as the consideration for which, the Appellant procured them. It is not necessary to contend that the Respondent's connexion with Oswald & Co. was not a partnership, making him liable to the debts of the firm. Supposing him to be liable as such partner, surely he still had a right to see that the amount of the debt claimed was duly ascertained before he executed any security for its payment. The pressure and threats of being made a bankrupt by Sheppard & Mackmurdo, as shown by the evidence of O'Reilly and also of Carpenter, compelled him to yield, and postpone the examination of the accounts to the execution of the securities. Independently of the evidence in the cause, there is a proviso in the deed of covenant itself, by which it is declared that in case it should appear afterwards that any mistake was made in the amount of the debt, and that the balance due to Sheppard & Mackmurdo should be found less than was stated by them in their accounts, the deed and bond should be security for so much less as the real balance should be found to be. That proviso showed that the party taking the securities knew and admitted that the true amount of the debt had not been ascertained. Mr. Howell, the acting partner, who knew the state of the accounts, and who had no interest in the matter, having been made a bankrupt, remonstrated with the Respondent for signing for so much more than the real debt, and frequently told him and O'Reilly that the accounts had not been correctly taken, and that the balance could not be near the sum secured. That must have been the opinion of Mackmurdo himself, who in 1821, after these securities became vested in him, gave an undertaking in writing that if, upon further examination of the accounts between the two firms, it should be found that the amount stated in the bond was incorrect, the sum to be raised on it should be what might be established as the correct balance, and not what the bond specified, should that not be all due. The Respondent does not now seek to impeach the securities; but in the face of these admissions and proofs, it can 1841. CARTER v. PALMER. 1841. CARTER V. PALMER. not be said that they were absolute and unimpeach- |