v. BLAKE. had nothing to do with the suit. He would be en- 1841. titled to the rents of the real estate, and his per- LAWRENCE sonalty would be interested to that extent; he must have all the rights which represent N. A. Burke's interest during his life; and for the purposes of the suit, the devisees of N. A. Burke were not alone sufficient, his administrator was necessarily introduced; the record would have been objectionable for want of parties by reason of his absence. The bill of 1834 is perfectly correct, or, if objectionable at all, is solely objectionable because it omitted the legatees; but then they had been plaintiffs in the previous bills, when answers were put in by the Lawrences. The bill of 1836, except as a mere bill of revivor, may be put out of the case. The introduction of some of the legatees was objected to, because it was said that they had been paid; but it does not appear that they had been wholly paid; and supposing that they had been paid, the admission to that effect, was one made for the benefit of the Lawrences, and the introduction of such parties does not, therefore, form a good ground of objection by them. The statement that they had been paid, could not affect the legatees, for they were not parties to the bill. The Lawrences were not called on to answer this bill of 1836, and so their answer to the bill of 1834 must be confined to that bill. Treating the bill of 1836 as a mere bill of revivor, the decretal order may be considered as made with reference to the bill of 1836; and so considered it is in every respect a good decree, and must be sustained. Mr. Loftus Wigram, in the absence of Mr. Knight Bruce, in reply:-The first answer to the objection of delay is, that no one of these decrees was enrolled till 1841. ບ. BLAKE. In 1839, and by the orders of this House the time for LAWRENCE appealing runs only from the time of enrolment. That part of the first decree which directed an account of the personal estate and nothing more, may not be open to objection; but the decree goes on to direct an account of the descended estate, of which there is none; it is incorrect in that respect. As to the other point, the right of the junior Appellant, it is submitted that the whole interest under the will was never vested in the father to the exclusion of the son; the son had a legally recognised interest under it, and in respect of that interest he is now entitled to appeal, and therefore Jesson v. Wright does not affect this case. As to the marshalling of the assets, it is said that the order here is only in the common form, and two decrees from Seton have been cited. But these are only extracts, and even they do not appear to be in accordance with the form in the present case. another part of the book (z) is the whole of a decree made in the matter of a suit by a bond creditor, where the assets are legal. That decree is in the following terms:-" And in case the intestate's personal estate shall not be sufficient for that purpose, then the Master is to take an account of the rents and profits of the real estate received, and thereout the specialty creditors are to be paid what is remaining due to them as aforesaid. And in case the rents and profits shall not be sufficient, then it is ordered that the intestate's real estate, or a sufficient part thereof, be sold; and out of the money arising by such sale, the plaintiff and the other specialty creditors of the said intestate are to be paid what shall be remaining due to them. And in case the intestate's specialty creditors shall exhaust any part of his personal estate in payment of (z) Seton, p. 84. 1841. บ. their demands, then the intestate's simple contract creditors are to come in and receive a satisfaction pro LAWRENCE tanto out of his real assets." There is nothing here to show that Mahon, who is a co-plaintiff, had any interest in the suit. [The Lord Chancellor :-The surplus of the 10,000 7. was to go to the estate, so that he was absolutely entitled to the surplus, and the result of the suit may be to produce a large surplus.] There is not any surplus now. The Master has found what is due from W. Lawrence's estate, and what is due in respect of the legacies, and that what is due from Walter Lawrence's estate is not sufficient to satisfy the legacies. It is clear, therefore, that this co-plaintiff has improperly joined in the suit; and that being so, he cannot be entitled to the benefit of any order made in it. The order in his favour is, therefore, bad. In the case of Bill v. Cureton (a), there was a similar misjoinder, and the present Lord Chancellor, then Master of the Rolls, said, "The purchaser in this suit not having the protection of the statute of 27 Eliz., cannot have a better title than the settlor, from whom he purchased; and if he had a good title in himself, he could have no relief in this suit, having associated himself as a co-plaintiff with the settlor: it having been in several late cases decided that, under such circumstances, no decree can be made, although the plaintiff might, in a suit in which he was sole plaintiff, have been entitled to relief." That case must be applied to decide the present. The bill of 1836 was filed in order to give the benefit of the former decrees to the two Blakes only. They had been co-plaintiffs in the bill of 1834; they had not any title at that time. The decree of 1838 ought to be reversed, on (a) 2 Myl. & Keen, 503. BLAKE. the ground of delay; and on the ground that the real estate has been unduly charged with the whole debt, and the personal estate relieved from it; and lastly, because the plaintiffs, in the bill of 1836, have made out no case for the interference of a Court of Equity in their favour. The Lord Chancellor :-If the House should be of opinion that the decree of 1838 was irregular, then all the other parts of the case fail, and the House has not anything to do with the prior proceedings. Judgment postponed. Lord Cottenham:-My Lords, this is an appeal against eight decrees or orders of the Court of Chancery in Ireland; the first of which is of the date of the 24th of February 1813, and the last of the 24th of November 1838; during the whole of which time. the litigation has proceeded upon the footing of the decree of 1813. If, therefore, that decree should now be altered in any material point, the 29 years which have elapsed since that time, and the large expenditure which this protracted litigation must have occasioned, would be thrown away, and rights which might have been asserted with effect in 1813 may now be lost. This consideration would of itself be sufficient to make this House most reluctant to disturb what all parties must have supposed to have been so long settled on behalf of the Appellant, Walter Lawrence the elder, who was a party to the decree of 1813, and who states that he attained the age of 21 in December of that year. How far the mere lapse of so much time ought to operate if it had appeared that any injustice had been done by the decree of 1813, it is not necessary to determine, for such can 1842. v. BLAKE. not be said to be the present case. At the date of that decree, the Appellant Walter Lawrence the LAWRENCE elder, then above 20 years old, was a defendant, as heir of Walter Lawrence, against whose estate the bill prayed the payment of a large sum of money alleged to have been received by him as trustee under an Act of Parliament for the sale of certain real estates, in the proceeds of which the plaintiffs were interested; and for this purpose it prayed that the assets of the late Walter Lawrence might be marshalled; and the decree, after directing accounts of the personal estate, directed the Master to take an account of the real estates of Walter Lawrence, and of the debts which affected the same. There was, therefore, no adjudication of rights, and no decision binding upon the Court in the future progress of the cause; there was nothing but mere inquiry, with the result of which the Court was at liberty to deal as it might see proper. Under such circumstances, this House will not, after so great a length of time, listen to technical objections, which do not substantially affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. The next decree appealed from is one of the 9th of March 1819, which was made in a supplemental suit, which, so far as it affected the Appellant, was for the purpose of stating the will of the alleged debtor, Walter Lawrence, and his marriage settlement; and by this decree it was declared that the plaintiff was entitled to stand as a creditor against the real estates of Walter Lawrence, deceased, for so much of the personal estate of the said Walter Lawrence as had been applied in the discharge of debts which affected his real estates, but without prejudice to any question which might arise in taking the account of the personal estate, and of the application thereof under the |