1842. PARR บ. THE ATTORNEY then, when these are answered, for other general purfor the benefit of the town. Then this being poses, trust property, there is nothing in the Act of Parliament to take away the jurisdiction which the Court GENERAL. of Chancery would otherwise have over it, or to take away the right which the subject would otherwise have to relief in a Court of Equity, in case of any misapplication of the trust property. Now looking at this information, the allegations in it state a case of fraud. There may be no foundation for it; but surely, if the allegations are true, there is a case of gross fraud. I give no opinion as to Mr. Parr's right to compensation for the office of town-clerk. It may turn out, when the matter is properly investigated, that the office was abolished; and then, notwithstanding his resignation, he may be entitled to compensation. Upon that point it is unnecessary to give an opinion, although there seems to me to be great difficulty in saying that he could be entitled to compensation when he had voluntarily resigned the office. But apart from the compensation awarded to him for his office of town-clerk, it is positively alleged that compensation has been granted to him for several offices, which are wholly unconnected with the office of town-clerk, and some of which he still holds. If that be so, the bond is illegal; and it would be a gross misapplication of the borough fund to apply it for the purpose of paying off such a bond. I therefore see no ground at all for saying that the case, as set out in this information, is not one which calls for the interference of a Court of Equity. Lord Cottenham:-The case having been disposed of by the two noble and learned Lords who have now given their opinions, I will only say that, after attend 1842. PARR v. THE GENERAL. ing to all that has been urged at the bar, I have heard nothing that could alter the opinion which I formed in the Court of Chancery, after a very mature consideration of all the allegations in the information, ATTORNEYupon which the question must necessarily depend. It having been established in the case of the AttorneyGeneral v. Aspinall-which I believe has not been brought here by appeal, and which has been followed by other cases in the Court of Chancery-that a borough fund is constituted a trust fund by this Act of Parliament, the question then is, whether the information states a case of breach of trust, of improper dealing with that which is held by the corporation for public purposes, and therefore in that sense to be considered a trust fund, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, for the purpose of preventing breaches of trust and abuses of that sort of confidence, whether reposed in individuals or corporations. Looking at the information, we find that it states that, which, beyond all doubt, would constitute a great abuse of this property, and therefore a breach of trust. Nothing more is required to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and therefore it becomes impossible that a general demurrer for want of jurisdiction can be supported. The only other part of the case now under consideration is one which applies only to the first decision; for it does not apply to the decision by the Master of the Rolls, of which your Lordships have heard nothing at the bar. That has been entirely passed over; yet that is one of the orders against which the appeal is presented. The objection for multifariousness applies only to the order upon the information before it was amended. Now nothing can be more difficult than to lay down rules as to multifariousness. As cases 1842. PARR THE GENERAL. necessarily come before the Court in various shapes, many matters are to be considered before a rule can be laid down applicable to all cases; because, however ATTORNEY- important it is to prevent one defendant from being exposed to the expense of litigation, where it appears that he is only interested in part of it, yet if that rule were to be strictly adhered to, it would frequently become impossible to agitate the whole case when some one defendant was interested only in part of it. That was brought under the consideration of Sir John Leach, who laid down no general rule; but with the ability which belonged to him--probably more than to any other Judge-of stating with great precision the grounds upon which he conceived a particular rule ought to be adopted, in the case referred to (a) he puts it upon this, that if the case be an entire case as against one defendant, no other defendant then has a right to complain, although he is connected only with some portion of the whole case. The consequence of adopting a different rule would obviously be, that, in order to prevent an objection for multifariousness, you must split an entire case. Now if the facts of this case be considered, it is obvious that there is but one entire case against the corporation. It is said that that is out of Court, because, by amending the information, the Attorney-general has withdrawn part of his case. Now the plaintiff is bound to ask all the relief that he may be entitled to, and the amendment is certainly advancing part of his case. But the question upon the information, before it was amended, was, is the case stated an entire case as affects the corporation? The case stated originally was this: here is a bond given for an im (a) Turner v. Robinson, 1 Sim. & S. 313. 1842. PARR V. THE proper purpose, throwing a charge upon the borough fund to which it ought not to be liable. In order to get a fund to meet the demand upon the bond, a rate is imposed, and money levied from the ratepayers, ATTORNEYto pay that illegal demand; and the information seeks GENERAL. protection against the bond, and seeks protection against the illegal rate. The illegality affecting the bond also creates an illegality affecting the rate, because the rate is imposed for the illegal purpose of laying a burthen upon the borough fund, to which that fund ought not to be subject. If, therefore, this matter were split into two cases, which according to the argument of Mr. Parr's counsel would be necessary, it would be one information complaining of the bond, and another information complaining of the rate the case as against the corporation, as to both, being identically the same, the same facts, the same circumstances, all the allegations would be the same; but the relief prayed in the one case would be applied to the bond, and in the other case applied to the rate. That is precisely the case contemplated by Sir John Leach, where there is one entire case as against one defendant; in which case the other defendant cannot object because he happens to be connected only with a portion of the entire case. Upon these grounds I thought, and I still think, that the objection for multifariousness does not apply to this case. The Lord Chancellor :-It must be understood that we decide nothing as to the point of the case, about the construction of that part of the Act which relates to the reappointment of the town-clerk. It is not necessary for this purpose: what I rely upon is, that the party is in possession of some of those offices for which he claims to receive compensation. 1842. PARR V. THE ATTORNEY Lord Cottenham :-When the case was before me in the Court of Chancery, I took care to guard myself against being supposed to have decided that point. It was not necessary to decide it, because there were GENERAL. other matters upon the face of the information, which, supposing even that point had been in favour of Mr. Parr, would have made it necessary to overrule the demurrer. Appeal dismissed, and the orders complained of affirmed, with costs. |