v. Walker (d); Wright v. Williams (e); Jones v. Price (f); Richards v. Fry (g); and Lawson v. Langley (h) and added, that the House had now an opportunity of reviewing those cases, and putting a plain and reasonable construction on the Act. The reversal of this judgment would have a most beneficial result, by removing the doubts which are entertained on the meaning of the Act; but should the judgment receive their Lordships' sanction, it would be necessary to pass another Act to correct the existing Act. Lord Brougham:-There are no conflicting decisions; they are all one way. Sir William Follett :-There is no decision precisely applicable to this case. Mr. Serjeant Manning followed on the same side. Mr. Erle was heard for the Defendant in Error. His and Mr. Serjeant Manning's arguments on this occasion were not so materially different from their arguments in the Court below, which are already reported (i), as to render it necessary to report them here. The Lord Chancellor :-The facts of this case, as stated in the bill of exceptions, are, that a window having been made and enjoyed by the Defendant in Error for nearly 20 years, in the course of the last of those 20 years, and before the expiration of it, the Defendants below, the Plaintiffs in Error, built a wall which, the Plaintiff complains, obstructed the light (d) 1 Cr. M. & R. 211; S. C. 4 Tyrr. 502. (e) 1 Mees. & W. 77; S. C. Tyrr. & G. 375. (f) 3 Bing. N. S. 52. (g) 7 Ad. & E. 698. (h) 4 Ad. & El. 890. & E. 688. 1841. FLIGHT บ. THOMAS June 14. 1841. FLIGHT v. THOMAS. and air of that window. Upon these facts being proved, error is assigned on the direction of the learned Judge who presided at the trial; as the bill of exceptions expresses it, "that the learned Baron did then and there declare and deliver his opinion to the jury, that the several matters so shown and proved to the said jury were sufficient, and ought to be allowed as decisive evidence that the light and air ought to have entered through the said part of the same window, and to entitle Thomas to a verdict upon the issues joined in his replications to the second and fifth pleas; and with that direction left the same to the jury:" and the jury found a verdict accordingly. The question in this case turns on two sections of the Act 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71.-[His Lordship having read the third and fourth sections, as before set out, proceeded :]-These being the words of the Act of Parliament, and the facts in the case being that the 20 years' enjoyment of the use of the window expired before one year expired after the erection of the wall which occasioned the interruption,-so that, in point of fact, when the suit had commenced 20 years had elapsed from the time when the window was first opened, and one year had not elapsed since the time when the obstruction was created, the question is, whether the learned Baron was correct in stating to the jury that, under the provisions of this Act, the Plaintiffs had a right of action to remove the obstruction. The argument at the bar rested principally on this, that there had not been 20 years' enjoyment. That there had not been one year's interruption acquiesced in, is clear from the facts stated in the bill of exceptions; but the ground of the objection to the direction of the learned Judge was, that there had not been 20 years' enjoyment of the window. Now, in point of fact, there is no doubt that there had not been 20 years' enjoyment, according to the ordinary meaning and usage of that term; but the question is not whether there had been 20 years' enjoyment in the ordinary sense, but whether there had or had not been 20 years' enjoyment within the meaning of the Act; because, whatever term the Act uses, if it explains the meaning of that term, it is quite immaterial whether the word may or may not be used in any other sense where it is not explained what the meaning of the term is. Now, as I read these two sections, the meaning is that there must be 20 years from the commencement of the right of enjoyment to the commencement of the suit; and no interruption shall be considered as an interruption within the meaning of the Act, that is to say, for the purpose of interfering with the 20 years, unless that interruption shall have lasted one year. The Act, therefore, explains what it means by enjoyment without an interruption of one year's duration. Twenty years must elapse, but no interruption shall be considered as preventing the 20 years from running, unless that interruption has a duration of one year. Now I think it was hardly disputed-although, when it was put to the learned counsel, an attempt was made to show a distinction-that within the terms of this Act, if an interruption of any duration had taken place, and had ceased during the running of the 20 years, so that at the expiration of the 20 years there was no obstruction, that would prevent the action being brought at the expiration of the 20 years: it must be so within the terms of the Act; because the objection is, not that there is not 20 years' enjoyment, 1841. FLIGHT V. THOMAS. 1841. FLIGHT v. THOMAS. but that there is not 20 years' enjoyment without interruption; and whether that interruption be in the middle or be at the end of the term, cannot, within the meaning of this clause, create any difference in the result. Now That would be the construction which I should think the obvious construction of these two clauses, if there had been no decision on the subject. It does, however, so happen that in all the Courts at Westminster this question has arisen more or less directly. In the case of Jones v. Price (k), the real point decided was that the 20 years must be pleaded as being next before the commencement of the suit. The right was there laid, not as next before the obstruction created, but next before the commencement of the suit. if the right mode of pleading be "next before the commencement of the suit," that of course implies that the plea would have been bad if it had been "next before the injury complained of." In Richards v. Fry (1), it was held that the laying the term of enjoyment before the act complained of was bad, and that it ought to have been next before the commencement of the suit. There are also the case of Wright v. Williams (m), and the case of Lawson v. Langley (n); which cases prove this, not only that it is good to lay the right 20 years before the commencement of the suit, but that it is bad if it is not so laid: it is bad if it is laid next before the injury complained of. Those cases decide that, according to the true construction of the Act, the 20 years are to be reckoned from the date of the commencement of the right claimed until the commencement of the suit. Then we have only to put a construction on the (k) 3 Bing. N. C. 52. (m) 1 Mees. & W. 72. (n) 4 Ad. & El. 890. words of the Act relating to the interruption. The words of the fourth section of the Act are positive that no interruption for less than one year shall be deemed an interruption within the meaning of this Act -the meaning and purpose of the Act being to give 20 years' enjoyment the effect of absolute right-that no interruption of the enjoyment of that right for less than one year shall have effect for the purposes of the Act. Under these circumstances, I think there cannot be a doubt that the construction put upon this Act by the Court below was a correct construction; and I shall move your Lordships to affirm the judgment with costs. Lord Brougham:-I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend that the learned Baron to whose direction the exception was taken, which was afterwards brought by writ of error to the Exchequer Chamber, and subsequently brought from the Exchequer Chamber before this House, was right. I cannot get over the words of the Act, in the fourth section, with respect to the completion of the 20 years being next before the action brought, and the proviso with respect to an interruption for one year's duration. The arguments which were used to show not merely the inconvenient but the apparently absurd consequences that might result, I do not think sufficient to countervail the plain and obvious meaning of the words. I cannot get rid of those words; and the absurdity imputed in the argument to that construction, does not appear to me sufficient to warrant a departure from that plain construction. Then, as my noble and learned friend has remarked, though the 1841. FLIGHT v. THOMAS. |