been mistaken as to the land that he was acquiring from the Government, for he must have lived on it five years in order to have perfected his homestead. He could not have been ignorant of the large tract lying east of what was described in the plat of 1845 as "lot 1." The official plat at the time of the patent was the plat of the survey of 1875. He was chargeable as matter of law with notice of that plat. More than that, as the survey was at his instance, it is a reasonable assumption that in fact he knew what the lines of that survey and plat were. Under those circumstances full justice is done if a patent title to lands outside his lines as shown by the plat of 1845, is sustained, for he still is protected in the tract bounded by those lines and amounting to 164.84 acres. To give him twice that amount of land would be enabling him to profit by a mistake of the Government—a mistake of which he was cognizant. Under those circumstances we are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida must be and it is Affirmed. HYDE v. SHINE. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 406. Argued February 21, 23, 1905.-Decided May 29, 1905. Section 1014, Rev. Stat., authorizes a removal from a judicial district in a State to the District of Columbia. Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1. Where the indictment charges that a conspiracy was entered into in a District, the trial court of that District has jurisdiction of the offense although the overt acts carrying out the conspiracy were committed in another jurisdiction. While this court does not approve the practice of indicting citizens in courts far distant from their residence if they can be tried in courts of their own jurisdiction, § 1014, Rev. Stat., contains no discrimination based upon distance and requires the commitment to be made for trial before the court having cognizance of the offense, and in the absence of an exception in the statute the court cannot create one. Section 23, ch. 35, Comp. Stat. District of Columbia, giving the Criminal Court of the District jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors committed in the District, not lawfully triable in any other court, has reference only to other courts within the District, and was not intended to change the law with respect to the general jurisdiction of courts having jurisdiction of the same offense. On the facts in this case the indictment which charges a completed conspiracy to defraud the United States by means of obtaining state lands through sales to fictitious persons and then exchanging them for lands of the United States under the forest reserve acts, held sufficient notwithstanding that the State received full compensation for the lands. The States and the United States have power to punish violations of a statute enacted as a part of the public policy even though they may not have suffered any pecuniary damage from such violations. A patent to a fictitious person is in legal effect no more than a declaration that the Government thereby conveys the property to no one, and in sugh a case the doctrine that a subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected does not apply. Whether the act charged is or is not a crime is one which the trial court is competent to decide, and, under the circumstances of this case, this court will not review the validity of the indictment upon habeas corpus. While a Federal court on habeas corpus may order the petitioner's discharge if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, where a prima facie case is made by the indictment, and the commissioner receives evidence on petitioner's behalf, it is for him to determine whether probable cause existed and the court will not weigh the evidence on habeas corpus. The requirement in § 1014, Rev. Stat., that proceedings for removal shall be agreeable to the usual state procedure, applies to the proceedings for arrest and examination of the accused before the commissioner, but not to subsequent independent proceedings before the Circuit Court on habeas corpus. While the Circuit Court has power to issue a writ of certiorari auxiliary to the writ of habeas corpus it is wholly discretionary with it, and its refusal to do so cannot be assigned as error. THIS is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court denying the appellant's application for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and dismissing his petition therefor. The proceedings which culminated in the arrest and remanding of the appellant originated in an indictment found in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the appellant Argument for Appellant. 199 U. S. and John A. Benson, Henry P. Dimond, and Joost H. Schneider, charging them with a conspiracy, under Rev. Stat. sec. 5440, "to defraud the United States out of the possession and use of and the title to, divers large tracts of the public lands of the United States." All of the defendants except Schneider are residents of San Francisco, California. Upon a complaint made, based upon such indictment, before a United States Commissioner for the Northern District of California, Hyde was arrested under Rev. Stat. sec. 1014, taken before a Commissioner and held to bail to answer the indictment in the sum of $50,000, and in default thereof was committed to the custody of the defendant Shine to await the order of the District Judge for his removal to the District of Columbia, or until he should be discharged by due course of law. Upon such order of removal being issued, United States v. Hyde, 132 Fed. Rep. 545, appellant presented his petition to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, praying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and for his discharge from imprisonment, which were denied, and this appeal taken. Mr. William B. Hornblower and Mr. Charles C. Cole for appellant in this case. Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. J. C. Campbell, with whom Mr. Charles Page and Mr. Samuel Knight were on the brief, for appellant in No. 410, argued simultaneously herewith.1 Section 1014, Rev. Stat., does not authorize a removal to the District of Columbia. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655; Goode v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, 98; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154: In re Dana, 7 Ben. 1; In re Buell, 3 Dillon, 116; In re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 889; United States v. Haskins, 3 Sawyer, 262. It is locally inapplicable to the District of Columbia. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, Fed. Cas. No. 302a; Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; Cissel v. McDonald, 16 Blatchf. 150; United States v. Ames, 95 Fed. Rep. 453. As to the word "district" and how it is used see 9 Am. 1 Dimond v. Shine, see p. 88, post. 199 U.S. Argument for Appellant. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 661; Kelley v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441; Un. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 524; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 180. No general act is applicable to the District of Columbia where there is a specific act in force upon the same subject. In re Kirk, 3 Mackey, 116. As to effect of the act of June 22, 1874, see Re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 901; Cong. Rec., 43d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 81, and p. 1303; and Sen. Rep. 658. A person who commits a crime in the District of Columbia may be tried in the District where he is found or is first brought. 730, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Carr, 3 Sawyer, 302; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157, 182. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction of the offense charged. § 5440, Rev. Stat. The conspiracy became complete in California or Oregon and not in the District of Columbia. Under § 730, Rev. Stat., appellant should be tried in California where he was apprehended. United States v. Bird, 1 Spr. 299; Dist. Col. Code, § 1, 31 Stat. 1189. And if appellant could be tried anywhere else & 1014 does not authorize his removal to the District of Columbia. The same rule applies to cases of extradition. In re Baldwin, 29 N. W. Rep. 482; Carter v. Barlow, 74 N. W. Rep. 745; Ex parte Johnson, 167 U. S. 120; Re Tivnan, 5 Best & Sm. 645; 1 Kent Com., 10th ed., 186; Wharton, 7th ed., 2960; Moore on Extradition, § 367. Under this statute the conspiracy is the offense and the overt acts are no part thereof. United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 192, 204; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539, 546; Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464; McKenna v. United States, 127 Fed. Rep. 88; Gantt v. United States, 108 Fed. Rep. 61; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145; United States v. Lancaster, 4 Fed. Rep. 896; United States v. Gardiner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829; United States v. Green, 115 Fed. Rep. 343, 351; United States v. Donan, 11 Blatchf. 168. VOL. CXCIX-5 Argument for Appellant. 199 U. S. If an overt act was necessary to complete the crime the courts in the District of Columbia would not have jurisdiction as the statute of limitation runs from the commission of the first overt act which was over three years before the indictment. United States v. Owen, 32 Fed. Rep. 134; United States v. McCord, 72 Fed. Rep. 159; § 1044, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33. See also Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464; United States v. Newton, 52 Fed. Rep. 275; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145; United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed. Rep. 754. United States v. Green, 115 Fed. Rep. 343, distinguished. The venue of the alleged conspiracy is improperly laid in the District of Columbia. United States v. Rindskopf, 6 Biss. 259; act of March 2, 1874, 14 Stat. 471; § 731, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 202; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Fed. Rep. 452; see also Commonwealth v. Mactoon, 101. Massachusetts, 1; Shaftsbury v. Graham, Skinner, 32; Smith v. Cranshaw, 2 Rolle, 258; Regina v. Best, 1 Salk. 174; King v. Brisac, 4 East Rep. 164. The courts of the District of Columbia have no jurisdiction of a bare conspiracy committed in California, not to commit a crime, but where the conspiracy itself is the only crime charged. The venue must be not where the conspiracy was but where the result was put in execution. As the indictment was found in a court not having jurisdiction of the offense it cannot constitute the basis for removal proceedings. The alleged act of conspiracy was committed, if at all, prior to the going into effect of the District Code. See cases, supra, and as to a law not having a retrospective operation see Dodge v. Bank, 109 Fed. Rep. 726; Dewart v. Purdy, 29 Pa. St. 113; 31 Stat. 5, 1189, 1199, 1436. The indictment is void for not concluding "against the peace and Government of the United States" as required by statute. 2 Stat. 115. It is the duty of the court to look into the indictment, and if it charges no offense against the United States, or is so es |