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Where there is a practical destruction, or material impairment of value, of
lands by overflowing them as the result of construction of dams, there
is a taking within the meaning of the Federal Constitution which de-
mands compensation, but otherwise when the owner is merely put,
as in this case, to additional expense in warding off the consequences
of the overflow. Manigault v. Springs, 473.

19. Taking private property, etc.-Sharing in common benefit as compensation.
Property rights of individuals must be subordinated to the general good

and if the owner of garbage suffers any loss by its destruction he is
compensated therefor in the common benefit secured by the regulation
requiring all garbage to be destroyed. Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
20. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of ordinance for cremation of
garbage.

An ordinance of the competent municipal authorities based upon reason-
able grounds for the cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated
place as a means for the protection of the public health is not a taking
of private property for public use without compensation within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution even though such garbage and
refuse may have some elements of value for certain purposes. Reduc-
tion Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306; Gardner v. Michigan, 325.

21. Taking private property, etc.; right to make claim based on.
Where the basis of the claim that an ordinance is unconstitutional as taking
private property for public use without compensation the claim must
be made by one whose property is taken, and it cannot be raised on
his behalf by others whose property is not taken. Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 306.

22. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of exclusive privilege to dispose
of garbage.

The exclusive privilege granted to one company by the Board of Super-
visors of San Francisco to dispose of the garbage in the city and county
of San Francisco held not to be void as taking the property of house-
holders for public use without compensation. Ib.

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1. Construction as to place of delivery of goods.

In construing a contract with the Commissary General for supplies to posts
in Cuba described at one place as "remote from the seacoast" and at

another as "in the interior of the island;" held, that the two phrases
meant the same thing and interpreted the word "interior," and that
the contemporaneous construction of the Commissary General in re-
fusing to take supplies for a post about eight miles from Havana and
the camping ground for that city, that the contract applied only to
posts remote from the seacoast, was correct. Also held that the written

contract could not be extended to places not specified therein, by an
indefinite oral agreement. Simpson v. United States, 397.

2. Mail; right of contractor to extra compensation.
In construing a contract for mail service in New York City, held that:
The new and additional mail messenger or transfer service which the
contractor could be required to perform under authority of the Post-
master General without additional compensation did not include a
vast amount of additional work necessitated by the opening of a new
post office not contemplated by either of the parties when the contract
was made. The same principles of right and justice which prevail
between individuals should control the construction and carrying out
of contracts between the Government and individuals. The contractor
had a right to presume the Government knew how many stations were
to be served; and, where the proposals positively specified that only
two elevated railroad stations were to be served, the contractor was
entitled to extra compensation for serving four stations notwithstand-
ing the proposal required the bidders to inform themselves as to facts
and stated that additional compensation would not be allowed for
mistakes. The contractor was not entitled to extra compensation
for "foot service," carrying mails up and down steps at elevated rail-
road stations, as delivery at the foot of the steps would have been
insufficient. United States v. Stage Company, 414.

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Inspection of books by shareholders a matter of right.

The shareholder has a common law right, for proper purposes and under
reasonable regulations as to time and place, to inspect the books of the
corporation of which he is a member. The possibility of the abuse of
a legal right affords no ground for its denial, and while an examination
of the books of a corporation should not be granted for speculative or
improper purposes, it should not be denied when asked for legitimate
Guthrie v. Harkness, 148.

purposes.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;

LOCAL LAW (Florida);

NATIONAL BANKS, 2, 3.

COSTS.

See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1d.

COURTS.

1. Conclusiveness of decision of Land Department on questions of fact.
The decision of the proper officers of the Land Department on questions of
fact in a contest is conclusive on the courts and, in the absence of fraud
in preventing a party from presenting his case, the decision is not sub-
jected to review by the courts by a charge of perjury against the wit-
nesses. Estes v. Timmons, 391.

2. Correction of ambiguous language of decree.

Where the language of the decree of the Circuit Court is open to miscon-
struction it should be corrected by the Circuit Court itself. Union
Pacific Co. v. Mason City Co., 160.

3. Discretion of Circuit Court to issue writ of certiorari auxiliary to writ of
habeas corpus.

While the Circuit Court has power to issue a writ of certiorari auxiliary to

the writ of habeas corpus it is wholly discretionary with it, and its
refusal to do so cannot be assigned as error. Hyde v. Shine, 62.

4. Disqualification of judge for interest as ground for reversal.

While courts will guard against any attempt of an interested judge to force
himself upon litigants, if the record does not clearly establish the dis-
qualification relied upon this court will not disturb the judgment on
that ground. McGuire v. Blount, 142.

5. Judicial notice.

Courts may take judicial notice of the effect of garbage on the public health.
Gardner v. Michigan, 325.

6. Power to direct verdict.

Where the court would be bound to set a verdict aside for want of testimony
to support it, it may direct a finding in the first instance and not await
the enforcement of its view by granting a new trial. McGuire v.
Blount, 142.

7. Procedure in courts of Philippine Islands in criminal cases-Power of
appellate court to convict of higher offense than that of judgment appealed
from.

Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the
Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and con-
victed of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' im-
prisonment and a fine. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty
of homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen
years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review

the judgment on the ground that the action of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands amounted to putting the accused in second
jeopardy, held that: In reversing the lower court and itself convicting
the accused on such appeal, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
acted within its powers, and in ordinary procedure in the courts of that
country under the act of July 1, 1902. Trono v. United States, 521. ·
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
NATIONAL BANKS, 3;

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 12;
CRIMINAL LAW;

INJUNCTION;

JURISDICTION;

LOCAL LAW (FLORIDA);

PLEADING;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 2;
STATES, 5, 7.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Conspiracy; place of trial where conspiracy entered into although completed
elsewhere.
Where the indictment charges that a conspiracy was entered into in a Dis-
trict, the trial court of that District has jurisdiction of the offense
although the overt acts carrying out the conspiracy were committed
in another jurisdiction. While this court does not approve the practice
of indicting citizens in courts far distant from their residence if they
can be tried in courts of their own jurisdiction, § 1014, Rev. Stat.
contains no discrimination based upon distance and requires the com-
mitment to be made for trial before the court having cognizance of the
offense, and in the absence of an exception in the statute the court
cannot create one. Hyde v. Shine, 62.

2. Conspiracy; sufficiency of indictment.

On the facts in this case the indictment which charges a completed con-
spiracy to defraud the United States by means of obtaining state lands
through sales to fictitious persons and then exchanging them for lands
of the United States under the forest reserve acts, held sufficient not-
withstanding that the State received full compensation for the land.

Ib.

3. Review, upon habeas corpus, of validity of indictment.

Whether the act charged is or is not a crime is one which the trial court is
competent to decide, and, under the circumstances of this case, this
court will not review the validity of the indictment upon habeas corpus.
Ib.

4. Jurisdiction of criminal court of District of Columbia.
Section 23, ch. 35, Comp. Stat. District of Columbia, giving the Criminal
Court of the District jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors com-
mitted in the District, not lawfully triable in any other court, has
reference only to other courts within the District, and was not intended
to change the law with respect to the general jurisdiction of courts
having jurisdiction of the same offense. Ib.

5. Weighing of evidence as to probable cause, by Federal court on habeas corpus.
While a Federal court on habeas corpus may order the petitioner's discharge

if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, where
a prima facie case is made by the indictment, and the commissioner re-
ceives evidence on petitioner's behalf, it is for him to determine whether
probable cause existed and the court will not weigh the evidence on
habeas corpus. Ib.

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In an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff relied upon a line of con-
veyances not going back to the original source of title coupled with
possession on the part of a grantor, held, on a discussion of the evidence
that the deeds sufficiently identified the land and that the plaintiff was
entitled to go to the jury on the question of possession. Chesapeake
Beach Ry. v. Washington R. R., 247.

2. Title passed by trustee's deed under decree of foreclosure.

A deed by the trustee of a mortgage reciting a foreclosure decree is not
limited in its operation to the authority conferred by the decree but
passes the title of the trustee to the land which it purports to convey. Ib.

3. Validity of conveyance by disseisee.

A conveyance of land in the District of Columbia made by a disseisee is
valid. Ib.

DISPENSARY LAW.

See INTERNAL REVENUE, 2.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See DEEDS (Chesapeake Beach Ry. v. Washington R. R., 247).
EJECTMENT. Id.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3 (Hyde v. Shine, 62).

TITLE (Chesapeake Beach Ry. v. Washington R. R., 247).

DIVERSE CITIZENSHIP.

See JURISDICITON.

DOCUMENTS.

See EVIDENCE.

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