Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, followed in Hyde v. Shine, 62.
Brooklyn City Railroad Co. v. New York, 199 U. S. 48, followed in Twenty-
third Street Ry. Co. v. New York, 53.
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, followed in Dimond v. Shine, 88.
Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, followed in Kies v. Lowrey,
Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. New York, 199 U. S. 1, followed in Twenty-
third Street Ry. Co., v. New York, 53.
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, followed in
Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
Russian-American Packing Co. v. United States, 199 U. S. 570, followed
in Royal Packing Co. v. United States, 579.
CERTIORARI.
See COURTS, 3;
TAXATION, 5;
CHARTER PARTY.
See MARITIME LAW.
CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICITON, C 1;
NATIONAL Banks, 2;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
CLOUD ON TITLE.
See PARTITION, 3.
COMBINATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
COMMERCE.
See STATES, 10.
COMMISSIONS.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
COMMON LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 1.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See MARITIME LAW;
PUBLIC LANDS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9;
PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Commerce clause. See STATES, 10.
1. Contract; limitation of freedom of contract.
Freedom of contract may be limited by a state statute where there are
visible reasons of public policy for the limitation. Minnesota Iron Co.
v. Kline, 593.
2. Contracts and due process of law-Validity of Iowa law relative to combina-
tions of insurance companies.
Section 1754 of the Iowa Code of 1897, prohibiting combinations of insur-
ance companies as to rates, commissions, and manner of transacting
business, is not unconstitutional as depriving the companies of their
property or of their liberty of contract within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the auditor of the State will not be en-
joined from enforcing the provisions of the statute. A company law-
fully doing business in a State is no more bound by a general uncon-
stitutional enactment than a citizen of that State. Carroll v. Greenwich
Insurance Co., 401.
See LOCAL LAW (FLORIDA);
STATES, 4;
TAXATION, 2, 3, 9.
3. Due process of law; deprivation of liberty; interference by state authorities
in proceedings in Federal courts.
Statutes should be given a reasonable construction with a view to make
effectual the legislative intent; and the granting by the Governor of a
State of a reprieve to a person sentenced to death in order that an appeal
may be heard in this court, from an order of the District Court dismiss-
ing a petition in habeas corpus proceedings, is not such an interference
by state authorities in a proceeding in the Federal courts in violation
of 766, Rev. Stat., as will make the subsequent confinement and
execution of the prisoner a deprivation of liberty or life without due
process of law. Rogers v. Peck, 425.
4. Due process of law as respects procedure in criminal cases in state courts.
Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
require the State to adopt a particular form of procedure, so long as the
accused has had sufficient notice and adequate opportunity to defend
himself in the prosecution, and the State may determine, free from
Federal interference or control, in what courts crime may be prosecuted
and by what courts the prosecutions may be reviewed. Ib.
5. Due process and equal protection of laws-Validity of New York law
regulating sale of milk.
Section 66 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York, regulating the
sale of milk in that city, as the same has been construed by the highest
court of that State, held not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
as depriving those engaged in that business of their property without
due process of law or denying them the equal protection of the laws.
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 552.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17;
JURISDICTION, C 6;
STATES, 2, 8;
TAXATION, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11.
6. Equal protection of laws-Effect of law of one county as to jury trial differ-
ing from that of other counties.
The fact that a law relating to jury trials applicable to a particular county
in a State is different from the general law on that subject applicable to
all other counties is not necessarily a discrimination against the people
of the county affected and a denial of the equal protection of the law,
and so held, in this case, it appearing that every person within the
county affected was accorded equal protection of the law prevailing
there. Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
7. Equal protection of laws-Validity of legislation confined to a familiar and
well-defined class of perils.
The statute of Minnesota, G. S., 1894, § 2701, providing that the liability
of railroad companies for damages to employés shall not be diminished
by reason of the accident occurring through the negligence of fellow
servants, and excepting from its provisions damages sustained by em-
ployés engaged in construction of new and unopened railroads, does
not, as interpreted by the highest court of that State, discriminate
against any class of railroads or deny to such class the equal protection
of the laws; the exception merely marks the time when the statute
takes effect. There is no objection under the Fourteenth Amendment
co legislation confined to a peculiar and well-defined class of perils,
and it is not necessary that they are shared by the public if they con-
cern the body of citizens engaged in a particular work. Minnesota
Iron Co. v. Kline, 593.
See STATES, 9;
TAXATION, 1, 2, 6.
Fourteenth Amendment. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 17;
STATES, 9;
TAXATION, 2, 10.
8. Implied inhibition as to interference of Federal and state government.
That which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which
is expressed, and amongst the implied matters is that the Nation may
not prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of govern-
ment, and no State can interfere with the National Government in
the free exercise of the powers conferred upon it. South Carolina
v. United States, 437.
9. Limitation of powers delegated to Congress.
The National Government is one of enumerated powers, and a power enu-
merated and delegated by the Constitution to Congress is compre-
hensive and complete, without other limitations than those found in
the Constitution itself. Ib.
10. New conditions embraced within scope of powers conferred.
The Constitution is a written instrument, and, as such, its meaning does
not alter. Its language, as a grant of power to the National Gov-
ernment, is general and, as changes come in social and political life,
it embraces all new conditions within the scope of the powers con-
ferred. Ib.
11. Power of National Government over license taxes.
The framers of the Constitution in granting to the National Government
full power over license taxes intended that the power should be com-
plete and not to be destroyed by the States extending their functions
in a manner not then contemplated. Ib.
12. Preservation of even balance between National and state governments.
To preserve the even balance between the National and state governments
and hold each in its separate sphere is the duty of all courts, and pre-
eminently of this court. Ib.
13. Recourse to common law and position of framers of Constitution in its
interpretation.
In interpreting the Constitution recourse must be had to the common law,
and also to the position of the framers of the instrument, and what they
must have understood to be the meaning and scope of the grants of
power contained therein must be considered. Ib.
14. Second jeopardy-Action of appellate court in finding appellants guilty
of higher crime than that of which convicted below.
Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the
Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and con-
victed of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' impris-
onment and a fine. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philip-
pine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty of
homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen
years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review
the judgment on the ground that the action of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands amounted to putting the accused in second
jeopardy, held, that: There is a vital difference between an attempt of
VOL. CXCIX--40
the Government to review a verdict of acquittal in the court of first
instance, and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a
judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from
the higher one charged in the indictment. Kepner v. United States,
195 U. S. 100, distinguished. Where upon the indictment of a greater
offense the one accused is found not guilty thereof but guilty of a lower
offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new
trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new
trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment, and such new
trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the
same offense within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the
provisions in that regard in the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat.
691. The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver to
the plea of second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the
offense for which he has once been convicted and if that request be
granted he must take the burden with the benefit and go back for the
new trial upon the whole case. Quare, whether the constitutional
provision against second jeopardy was intended to apply to a judg-
ment under these circumstances. Trono v. United States, 521.
15. States; effect of first ten amendments on powers of States as to their own
people.
The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution operate on the Na-
tional Government only and were not intended to, and did not, limit
the powers of the States in respect to their own people. Jack v.
Kansas, 372.
16. States; power to grant to witness immunity for violation of Federal statute.
A State cannot by statute grant immunity to a witness from prosecution
by the United States for violation of a Federal statute, or prevent the
testimony given by him under compulsion of the statute from being
used against him in a prosecution by the United States, and the ab-
sence of such immunity from prosecution by the United States, does
not necessarily invalidate the statute under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. lb.
17. States; validity, under Federal Constitution, of Kansas anti-trust law in
respect of immunity from prosecution of witness.
The provisions in the Kansas anti-trust law, as construed by the highest
court of that State, compelling witnesses to testify as to violations of the
act, and granting immunity from prosecution for violations testified
to, or the use of the testimony against the witness, are not void under
the Fourteenth Amendment, because immunity from Federal prosecu-
tion is not granted; and one committed, in accord with the provisions
of the statute, for contempt for refusing to testify to acts within his
knowledge is not deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Ib.
18. Taking of property within meaning of constitutional provision as to com-
pensation.
|