Thereafter it took out a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the tax board. Surely by this due process of law was secured. It will not do to say that the valuation of a piece of property is mere guesswork. True, it is often largely a matter of opinion, and mathematical exactness is not always possible. Various elements enter into and affect an opinion respecting the value of a given piece of property, and all that can be required is that the assessing board exercise an honest judgment based upon the information it possesses or is able to acquire. That valuation is of the property as a totality, and it is unnecessary in making an assessment to disintegrate the various elements which enter into it and ascribe to each its separate fraction of value. Oftentimes the combination itself is no inconsiderable factor in creating the value. We are of the opinion that the relator was not denied due process of law in the valuation and assessment of its franchise.

We see nothing else in the record calling for notice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York is

Affirmed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. TWENTY-THIRD STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. CENTRAL CROSSTOWN RAILROAD COMPANY v. SAME.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. CONSOLIDATED GAS COMPANY v. SAME.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. NEW AMSTERDAM GAS COMPANY v. SAME.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. CONEY ISLAND AND BROOKLYN RAILROAD COMPANY v. SAME.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

Nos. 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80. Argued April 17, 18, 19, 1905.—Decided May 29, 1905. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. v. New York ante, p. 1, and Brooklyn City Railroad Co. v. New York, ante, p. 48, followed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Elihu Root and Mr. William D. Guthrie for plaintiffs in error in Nos. 75 and 76. Mr. Elihu Root, with whom Mr. Frank H. Platt was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error in Nos. 77 and 78.

Mr. Julius M. Mayer, Attorney General of the State of New York, and Mr. Louis Marshall for defendant in error.1

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

While these cases differ in some details from the two pre

1 Argued simultaneously with Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. New York. For abstracts of arguments see ante, p. 9.

ceding, in which opinions have just been announced, there are no such differences as put them outside the scope of the reasoning of those opinions. Therefore, the judgments in them

are

Affirmed.

GLEASON v. WHITE.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

No. 188. Argued and Submitted March 16, 17, 1905.-Decided May 29, 1905.

Two official surveys of a tract of land bordering on navigable waters were, with an interval of thirty years, duly made, approved and filed in the Land Department at Washington. By the earlier survey a fractional section was divided into two lots, by the later into seven. These divisions conflicted. After the later survey two patents were issued, one using the description in the first and conveying the entire fractional section, the other following the second survey and conveying only part of the section. As to a portion of the ground these patents conflicted. In an action at law in the state court the second patent prevailed as to the tract in conflict.

Held that, in the absence of findings of fact (there being evidence tending to show that the first patentee took with full knowledge of the two surveys, the later one having been made partly at least at his request, and it also appearing that by the decision he received the full number of acres to which he was by the earlier survey entitled and for which he paid), the judgment in favor of the second patentee for the part in conflict ought not to be disturbed.

IN 1845 fractional township 53 south, range 42 west, in Dade County, Florida, was surveyed and a plat thereof was approved and filed in the office of the surveyor general in Florida, and also in the office of the Land Department of Washington. By this survey fractional section 19 was divided into two lots, numbered 1 and 2, containing 164.84 acres. In 1875 a resurvey was made of the township, plats of which were also duly approved and filed in the office of the

surveyor general in Florida and with the Land Department at Washington. By this new survey said section 19 was divided into 7 lots, containing in the aggregate 337.76 acres. The difference between the two surveys of section 19 is shown in the following plats:

On June 24, 1878, a patent was issued to William H. Gleason, on a homestead application, for a tract described as lots 1 and 2 of section 19, containing 164.84 acres, according to the official plat of the survey of 1845. Plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, claims by deed from the patentee. On May 4, 1885, lot 5 of section 19, according to the survey in 1875, was patented by the United States to Florida as swamp land, and thereafter deeded by the State to the defendant. In 1898 this

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

199 U. S.

action to recover a part of lot 5 was commenced in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County. The case was tried by the court without a jury; a judgment rendered for the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and thereafter brought to this court on writ of error. Included in the action was lot 1 of section 19, as shown by the plat of 1875, but as judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in respect to that tract, it is unnecessary to further refer to it. There was a stipulation as to certain facts, with a provision that testimony of further facts might be received, and that the court might view the premises. The findings of the court recite that it viewed the premises, and upon the stipulated facts, and further testimony incorporated in a bill of exceptions, found generally for the defendant as to lot 5.

Mr. George M. Robbins for plaintiff in error:

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked because plaintiff in error asserted, in the state courts, his right to land in lot 5, under a patent issued by the United States and the statutes governing the survey and contents of divisions of the public lands, and this right was denied; and because the rights of the parties also involved a consideration of the swamp land grant of September 28, 1850. St. Paul & Pa. R. R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 7 Wall. 272; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47; Kean v. Calumet Canal & Imp. Co., 190 U. S. 452.

The United States having once granted this land under a patent it did not pass by the swamp land patent to the State. Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. 525; Hooper v. Scheimer, 23 How. 235; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92.

The plat by which Gleason made his entry and received his patent showed that he had a water boundary to the entire fractional section on the east. The state court gives him a boundary on land (lot 5) for the south half of the north half of his entry. The rule is that where a section is made frac