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will imply from that fact, a contract between the State and the relator, that no tax in addition to that specified in the legislation shall ever be imposed upon the corporation. In other words, that beyond the tax imposed by the act of incorporation, the State has impliedly remitted all further obligation to pay taxes,

The right to impose the various forms of taxation now imposed on New York corporations, cumulatively, has been recognized in numerous cases, including Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 686, on which the relator relies.

That there was no intention to exempt special franchises from taxation and that the payments required to be made by the State were merely by way of compensation for the right conferred, becomes apparent when the history of chapter 252 of the Laws of 1884 is considered. See Davis v. The Mayor, 14 N. Y. 506; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; New York state constitution, as amended by Article III, section 18; Public Papers of Governor Cleveland, 1883, 1884, pp. 95-103, 108-117; Public Papers of Governor Hill, 1886, pp. 95-101, in which the terms of the various statutes and ordinances on which the plaintiff in error relied, were analyzed and discussed.

The objection that the act under consideration violates the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, is without merit.

This court is not concerned with the correctness of the valuation of the relator's special franchises, or of the soundness of the rules of evidence, or of the opinions adopted by the tax commissioners, the referee, or the several state courts which sat in review of the assessment. When the parties to a controversy and especially those whose property has been assessed for purposes of taxation-have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court cannot be said to deprive the unsuccessful litigant of his property without due process of law. Sauvinet v. Walker, 92 U. S. 90; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Cơ., 113 U. S. 9;

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Arrowsmith v. Harmoniny, 118 U. S. 356, 369; Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162; Bergemann v. Packer, 157 U. S. 655; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103; McMillan v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Hagan. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660; Pittsburgh Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Fallbrook District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; Merchants' & Mfrs'. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 590; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404; Bellingham Bay v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310; Corry v. Mayor of Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466.

The relator, instead of presenting facts which would guide the state board of tax commissioners in fixing a valuation on the special franchises to be assessed, stood mute on that subject, gave no testimony and presented no facts, but contented themselves with an effort to point out some flaw, if possible, in the ratiocination by means of which the state board of tax commissioners had reached a tentative valuation of the relators' property. If such a procedure should receive judicial sanction, insuperable difficulties would be placed in the way of taxing officers and the collection of state revenues would become well-nigh impossible. That a judicial or quasi-judicial officer may not be subjected to such an extraordinary inquisition has been conclusively shown in Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 307, quoting from Packet Company v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580.

In Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 610, the procedure of putting the members of the state board of valuation and assessment upon the witness stand "to testify to the operations of their minds in doing the wrong entrusted to them" was under the authority of Fayerweather v. Ritch, supra, denounced as an "anomalous course."

Equally unfounded is the claim that this legislation deprives the relator of the equal protection of the laws.

In matters of taxation, however, it has been long since deVOL. OXCIX-3

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cided that such classification is not in contravention of the Constitution. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 354; Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 228; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 293; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261: Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 196 U. S. 608.

The plaintiff in error has attacked this legislation under two principal heads.

That the legislature has arbitrarily exempted from taxation, under section 35 of the Rapid Transit Law, competitors of the plaintiff in error, who it is said are conducting exactly the same business, by means of the subway.

This exemption provision referred to has no relevancy to a special franchise, and even if it did, the railroad referred to in the Rapid Transit Act is sui generis. It clearly differs from every other railroad in the State. The company operating the subway does not own any special franchise in the sense that the relator and other corporations own them. In fact, the underground railroad is the property of the city of New York. Chapter 4, Laws of 1891, as amended by chapter 752 of the Laws of 1894; chapter 519 of the Laws of 1895; chapter 729 of the Laws of 1896; and chapter 616 of the Laws of 1900; Sun Printing & Publishing Association v. Mayor &c. of New York, 152 N. Y. 257.

It is claimed that the statute is unequal because the deductions permitted by section 46 of the act of 1899 discriminate in favor of corporations who make annual payments either of a fixed sum, or of a fixed percentage of gross receipts, or both, and against the owners of franchises who, because they make no payments "in the nature of a tax" are allowed no deductions.

As to this we urge that the relators are not aggrieved by this alleged discrimination. They are the beneficiaries of section 46. It does not therefore lie with them to attack for inequality a statute under which they derive a benefit.

Irrespective of this answer, the statute creates no inequality, since it places the owners of special franchises on an equal footing. There is an equitable classification of the persons or corporations who are subjected to the special franchise tax similar to that which was recognized as valid in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, and Orr v. Gillman, 183 U. S. 278.

Exact equality is a practical impossibility under any system of taxation and is not required. Under this statute a single rule is applied, which operates with entire equality upon all in like circumstances.

In Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, the right to allow deductions for indebtedness was declared to be within the range of the State's power to regulate taxation.

If there were even a doubt as to the constitutionality of the legislation now attacked, it should be determined in favor of the validity of such legislation, since it affects the revenues of a sovereign State and is designed to promote a just distribution of the burdens of taxation among its citizens. King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 436.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals settles that there is nothing in the law or the proceedings in this case in conflict with the constitution of that State. It is not contended by the plaintiff in error that there is any constitutional objection to the taxation of franchises. The right to subject them to a share in the burden of supporting the government is conceded.

The main contention is that this tax legislation impairs the obligation of contracts. It must be borne in mind that presumptively all property within the territorial limits of a State is subject to its taxing power. Whoever insists that any particular property is not so subject has the burden of proof and must make it entirely clear that, by contract or otherwise, the

property is beyond its reach. In Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, said (p. 561):

"That the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is essential to the existence of government; are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed. We will not say that a State may not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial release of it may not exist; but as the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished, that community has a right to insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate. purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear."

In Vicksburg &c. R. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, Mr. Justice Gray cited many authorities, quoting the different phraseology in which by the several writers of the opinions the same rule was announced. In Wells v. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531, the law was thus stated by Mr. Justice Peckham (p. 539):

"The payment of taxes on account of property otherwise liable to taxation can only be avoided by clear proof of a valid contract of exemption from such payment and the validity of such contract presupposes a good consideration therefor. If the property be in its nature taxable the contract exempting it from taxation must, as we have said, be clearly proved. It will not be inferred from facts which do not lead irresistibly and necessarily to the existence of the contract. The facts proved must show either a contract expressed in terms, or else it must be implied from facts which leave no room for doubt that such was the intention of the parties and that a valid consideration existed for the contract. If there be any doubt on these matters, the contract has not been proven and the exemption does not exist."

In Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662, the same Justice declared (p. 672):

"The rule is that, in claims for exemption from taxation