To the seven provided for by succeeding sections authority is granted "upon the same terms, in the same manner, under the same restrictions, and with the same privileges as is provided for in this act in relation to the bridge at Quincy, Illinois." The remaining one of the nine bridges (that over the Mississippi River at St. Louis) was to be constructed by the St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company, "subject to all the conditions contained in said act of incorporation and amendments thereto, and not inconsistent with the following terms and provisions contained in this act."

It is insisted that the act of 1871 makes applicable to the Omaha bridge only the two or three provisions in the act of 1866 common to all the bridges named therein, and as the section authorizing the bridge at St. Louis contained no direction for its use by terminating railroads, that requirement, although imposed on all the other bridges, was not brought into the act of 1871, and is inapplicable to the Omaha bridge. Counsel for the Union Pacific Company have also called our attention to a few statutes authorizing the construction of bridges which contain no provision in respect to use by other railroad companies. As against this, counsel for the Mason City Company have cited over 350 acts, to be found in the several statutes of Congress, from the fifteenth to the thirty-second volume, in each of which there is a direction for use by other companies. Obviously, that was the general policy of Congress, and the few exceptions there to were dictated by the peculiar circumstances of the cases.

Bearing in mind this general policy of the Government, we think it a fair construction of the act of 1871. that incorporating, as it did, the provisions of the act of 1866, it must have intended to incorporate not merely those in terms applied to all the bridges, but also one in harmony with that general policy and applied to substantially all, and this, although in reference to a single bridge, other and special directions were made. Aside, therefore, from any reliance upon the doctrine of stare decisis, the act of 1871 must be considered as requiring the

Union Pacific Company to permit the trains of all roads terminating at the Missouri River at Omaha to use its bridge up to the fair limits of capacity, and on payment of reasonable compensation.

It may be remarked in passing that it is expressly conceded in this case by the Union Pacific Company that there is no question of the reasonableness of the compensation tendered, or the capacity of the bridge and approaches for the service asked by the Mason City Company.

The final question is this: Is the status of the present Union Pacific Railroad Company, the appellant, so different from that of the company to which it is a successor as to render inapplicable the decision in the Rock Island case and to nullify the requirements of the act of 1871?

What are the facts? The acts of Congress, July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489; July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, creating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, authorized it to mortgage its road for $16,000 a mile, (increased to $48,000 a mile in the mountainous districts), and loaned the credit of the United States for an equal amount, secured by a second lien on the property. The initial point of the main line of the Pacific Railroad was fixed on the Iowa bank of the Missouri River opposite the city of Omaha. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Hall et al., 91 U. £. 343. On March 1, 1865, the Union Pacific Railroad Company executed its first mortgage, conveying its entire line from the western boundary of the State of Iowa to its western terminus. This mortgage in terms included the road "heretofore constructed or hereafter to be constructed." The act of 1871 authorized a mortgage of not exceeding two and a half million of dollars to raise money for the construction of the bridge. This mortgage was executed, the money raised and the bridge built. The act of 1862, section 18, provided that "the better to accomplish the object of this act, namely, to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, Congress may,

at any time, having due regard for the rights of said companies

named herein, add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act." The act of 1864, which was an amendment of the act of 1862, in section 22 preserved the right of Congress to at any time "alter, amend, or 'repeal this act." It also, in section 9, gave express authority to the company to maintain ferries or construct bridges over the Missouri River. The mortgage of 1865 was foreclosed, and the present appellant, the Union Pacific Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Utah, became the purchaser. The contention now is that as this mortgage antedated the act of 1871, the purchaser at the foreclosure thereof took the property freed from any burdens or obligations imposed by that act. It held the bridge as a part of its line, under no obligations to permit its use by any other company.

We shall not stop to inquire whether this foreclosure and sale was anything more than a reorganization under the form of a judicial proceeding, nor whether if it were in all respects a bona fide sale to an independent third party such sale took the property out of the jurisdiction of Congress, and prevented that body from further legislation in aid of the purpose of the act, "namely, to promote the public interest and welfare." The question before us is whether an amendment to the act purely administrative in the character of the burdens imposed, aimed to promote the public interest and welfare. enacted while the title to the property remained in the original cc pany a corporation chartered by Congress, which preserves. intact all the pecuniary rights of the company, and whose privileges are accepted and acted upon by the company, is denuded of vitality by a sale to a new company under foreclosure of a mortgage executed prior to such legislation. That question must be answered in the negative.

The first transcontinental railroad, to wit, the Union Pacific Railroad, was a great public undertaking. Private capital was believed to be and was, in fact, unwilling to attempt it. Congress felt that the public interest required its construction. It sought to interest private capital in the enterprise, and be

lieved that the work could be better done through the instrumentality of a corporation. At the same time it became practically the sponsor for the enterprise by large donations of Government credit and public lands. In so doing it was not seeking to aid a purely private enterprise. What it did was in furtherance of the public interests, and it reserved to itself the right to alter, amend, or repeal the act in so far as was necessary to promote those interests, limiting its action by the single proviso that due regard must be had to the rights of the company. Every one who purchased the bonds of the company or gave it credit did so with full knowledge that this was a quasi-national enterprise, and that if deemed necessary by Congress the interests of the public might be promoted by additional legislation in so far as the pecuniary rights of the company and its creditors were not sacrificed. The construction of the bridge, doing away as it did with the delay and annoyance of transportation across the river by a ferry, added largely not merely to the value of the entire property, but also to the great convenience of the traveling and shipping public. The act giving authority for a lafge issue of bonds, thereby insuring the immediate construction of the bridge, was accompanied by a proviso that upon reasonable compensation the use of the bridge should be accorded to other companies. Availing itself of the privileges conferred the company accepted the amendment in its entirety and is bound by its terms as fully as though it had embodied them in a contract. So long as the full facilities of the Union Pacific Company were not interfered with thereby, and a reasonable compensation was paid therefor, it cannot in any just sense be held that its rights were not duly regarded. And it cannot be tolerated that a private individual or a state corporation can, by the purchase at a judicial sale of the property, strike down all the legislation of Congress passed subsequently to the mortgage for the promotion of the public interests. We cannot assent to the contention that the present owner of the property holds it free from obedience to all such legislation. Now, as before

the foreclosure and sale, the public interests are to be regarded, and not simply private purposes, wishes or prejudices.

One thing more requires notice. It is contended that the terms of the decree are too broad; that they give to the Mason City Company not merely the use of the bridge and its approaches, including therein connections with western roads terminating at Omaha, but also the use of all side or spur tracks connecting the Union Pacific Railroad with private industries, and the track extending northward from the main line of the Union Pacific to the old ferry crossing. On the argument counsel for the appellee stated that his company made no claim to a right to use these tracks. If the language of the decree is open to this misconstruction it should be corrected, and the Circuit Court may make such correction on proper application.

Decree affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA took no part in the decision of this

case.

NEDERLAND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, v. MEINERT.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 11. Argued October 18, 1905.-Decided November 6, 1905.

Promptness of payment of life insurance premiums is essential and although forfeitures are not generally regarded with favor they are necessary and should be fairly enforced in regard to such payments. A statute requiring notice of time of payment of premium and effect of non-payment thereof should not be construed so as to make it a trap for either the company or the assured.