might be obliged to accept such terms of peace as they should think would do for us."

matter contained in my memorial. The memorial of M. Van Berckel; the proposition of the burgomasters of Amsterdam; their attack upon the Duke of Brunswick, and the battle of Doggerbank; the appointment of Señor del Campo to treat with Mr. Jay; the success of Colonel Laurens, in obtaining orders for the French fleet to go upon the coast of America; their victory over Graves, and the capture of Cornwallis; the Emperor's journey to his maritime towns, to Holland, and to Paris; his new regulations for encouraging the trade of his maritime towns; his demolition of the barrier fortifications; and his most liberal and sublime ecclesiastical reformation; and the King of Sweden's reproach to the King of England for continuing the war, in the very words of my memorial;-these traits are all subsequent to that memorial, and they are too sublime and decisive proofs of the prosperity and glory of the American cause to admit the belief that the memorial has done it any material harm.

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By comparing facts, and events, and dates, it is impossible not to believe that the memorial had some influence in producing some of them. When courts, princes, and nations have been long contemplating a great system of affairs, and their judgments begin to ripen, and they begin to see how things ought to go, and are going, a small publication, holding up these objects in a clear point of view, sometimes sets a vast machine in motion at once, like the springing of a mine. 'What a dust we raise!' said the fly upon the chariot wheel. It is impossible to prove that this whole letter is not a similar delusion to that of the fly. The councils of princes are enveloped in impenetrable secrecy. The true motives and causes which govern their actions, little or great, are carefully concealed. But I desire only that these events may be all combined together, and then, that an impartial judge may say, if he can, that that homely harmless memorial had no share in producing any part of this great complication of good.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE policy which dictated the recent resolution as to Dana, is seen to govern in Europe.

Franklin, being apprised by him of his commission to Russia, advised him to communicate it to Vergennes, and to take his opinion, whether it would be proper to disclose his powers to the court at St. Petersburg, and obtain their approval before he proceeded thither.

Vergennes informed Dana, "that he would run the risk of exposing his person and the dignity of the United States, if he assumed any character whatever in Russia, while the empress had not acknowledged the independence of the United States, and expected to act the part of mediatrix, which demanded the most perfect impartiality."*

Dana, convinced that it was the policy of France not to render the United States "independent" by new allies, proceeded to Russia as a common traveller.

His instructions indicated it "as a leading and capital point, that the United States should be formally admitted as a party to the convention of maritime powers," and

* S. J. iii. 31.

directed him to communicate the general object of his mission to the resident envoy of France.

On arriving at St. Petersburg, he consulted that envoy, who evinced a decided repugnance to the disclosure of his objects or powers. As the fortunes of the United States rose, repeated applications were made to him for an introduction to the court. They were discouraged, until at last-tied down by his instructions, and convinced that, alone and unsustained, his reception would be refused-he apprised congress of his position, and of the necessity of douceurs to the Russian cabinet before a negotiation could be opened. Thus, by the complicated policy of France, America stood dumb before the nations of Europe.

This letter of Dana was referred to a committee, of which Madison was chairman. Hamilton saw the advantages, though remote, of opening a commerce with RUSSIA, provided a treaty could be formed on equal terms without bestowing presents. With this view, he moved that Dana "be informed that the treaties lately entered into for restoring peace, have caused such an alteration in the affairs of these states, as to have removed the primary object of his mission to the court of Russiathe acquisition of new supports to our independence. That with respect to a commercial treaty with Russia, they consider the benefits of it to this country in an extensive degree as rather remote, and have therefore little present inducement to enter into it besides a desire of cultivating the friendship of that court, and preserving a consistency with the disposition already manifested towards forming a connection therewith; and also of laying the foundation of a future intercourse, when the circumstances of the two countries may be more favourable to the same. That as experience will enable both nations to form a better judgment hereafter of the principles upon which that inter

course may be most advantageously couducted, congress would wish any treaty now formed to be of temporary duration and limited to a fixed period. That in this view, unless he shall have already formed engagements or made proposals from which he cannot easily recede, of a more indefinite and extensive nature before this reaches him, he be instructed to confine the duration of the proposed treaty of commerce to fifteen years, agreeable to the term limited in a similar treaty with Sweden, and to stipulate expressly that it should be subject to the revisal of congress, and that in all matters he insist upon exact reciprocity." As to the proposed douceur, "that he be informed, as by the confederation no persons holding offices under the United States are permitted to receive presents from foreign powers, so it is not consistent with the situation or policy of these states to adopt that practice in their transactions with other nations." After two divisions, one of which was on a modification of the prohibition of douceurs at the instance of Madison, so as to permit the payment of any that might have been stipulated, this motion failed.

On the following day, Madison proposed an instruction to decline making any propositions for a treaty with Russia unless Dana was pre-committed; and if so, to limit it to fifteen years, omitting the prohibition of presents. This was defeated, and a substitute offered by Elsworth, to limit the duration of any treaty then in progress to fifteen years, subject to revisal, passed unanimously.

The question of acceding to the armed neutrality had been raised in the course of this debate by Hamilton. He offered as an amendment this important declaratory resolution:

"That though congress approve the principles of the armed neutrality founded on the liberal basis of a maintenance of the rights of neutral nations and of the pri

vileges of commerce, yet they are unwilling, at this juncture, to become a party to a confederacy which may hereafter too far complicate the interests of the United States with the politics of Europe; and, therefore, if such a progress is not yet made in this business as may make it dishonourable to recede, it is their desire that no further measures may be taken at present towards the admission of the United States into that confederacy." This amendment was referred, and a report subsequently passed, which stated, "that as the primary object of the proposed accession to the neutral confederacy no longer can operate, and as the true interest of these states requires they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations," it was inexpedient to renew the powers of Dana.

It approved the liberal principles of that confederacy, but directed the American commissioners," in case they should comprise in the definitive treaty (with Great Britain) any stipulations amounting to a recognition of the rights of neutral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipulations by arms." Thus it is seen that at Hamilton's instance the great principle which should be especially the governing maxim of a republic, the principle of an absolute neutrality, was inscribed on the front of our national councils.* It is an evidence of the wisdom of this resolution, that each of the parties to the armed neutrality entered into engagements within thirteen years after its origin, in direct contravention of it.

France was still pursuing her system studiously. Various communications were made from time to time by La

* Madison, vol. 1, p. 454, 460, does not give these important proceedings. He merely refers to the secret journal, and adds that the passage relating to the armed neutrality was generally concurred in, and assigns certain reasons for the disagreements as to the treaty of commerce with Russia.