into his hands. In an action brought
against the administrator and guar-
dian, by the widow, to recover a
compensation for her dower inter-
est; Held, that under these circum-
stances the law would not imply a
promise on the part of the widow to
repay to the guardian the money
thus furnished or expended by him,
in support of the family; but that
on the contrary, the legal inference
was, the money was furnished and
advanced by him as guardian, and
not as creditor of the widow. Ac-
cordingly held, that the moneys thus
advanced by the guardian could not
be set off or allowed as a counter-
claim, in such action, against the
widow's claim for dower. Elliott v.
Gibbons,
498

5. A deed of separation between hus-
band and wife, by which the former
relinquishes to the latter personal
property and a business carried on
by her in her own name, for her
sole and separate use, and covenants
that the property and business, and
the profits of the business, shall
thereafter belong to, and be carried
on by her for her sole and separate
use as if she were a feme sole, being
executed without consideration, and
without any covenant on the part
of the trustee to indemnify the hus-
band against the debts of the wife,
is void even in equity, as to subse-
quent creditors.
ib

6. The assent of the husband to his

wife carrying on a business in her
own name, carries with it an im-
plied authority to contract debts, in
conducting the business in her name.

canceled; and that upon such sur-
render the assured should be enti-
tled to receive his deposit note, upon
the payment of his proportion of all
losses and expenses that had oc-
curred previously. The by-laws
contained a provision that whenever
a party insured should mortgage the
property, his policy should be void,
unless he should give notice thereof
to the company. At an annual
meeting of the members of the com-
pany, it was resolved that when an
insured had alienated his property
before loss sustained, his premium
note should not be assessed, al-
though he had not surrendered his
policy. Held that, independent of
the resolution, passed by the com-
pany, a person insured who had
alienated the insured property by
mortgage and deed, without giving
notice to the company of such alien-
ation, or surrendering his policy,
remained liable, upon his premium
note, for losses occurring subsequent
to the alienation. But that by the
resolution the company waived a
compliance by its members with the
provisions of the charter relating to
a surrrender of the policy, &c. and
in effect declared that it would dis-
pense with the formality of a sur-
render, when there were no losses
to be paid, and the assured had
aliened the insured property; and
that it would itself take notice of
the alienation, and would make no
assessment upon the premium note,
to pay future losses. Huntley v.
Beecher,
580

2. Accordingly held, that the receiver

of the company could not maintain
an action to recover an assessment
upon a premium note thus situated,
made for the purpose of paying
losses occurring since the alienation
of the property.
ib

3. Held also, that the resolution was
not void, as being in conflict with
the provision contained in the char-
ter of the company.
ib

4. The fact that the charter of an in-
surance company expires, by its own
limitation, within the period during
which a policy is by its terms to
continue, will not avoid the policy,
and discharge the insured from his
liability upon his premium note.
The policy is valid for the unexpired
term of the charter.

ib

ing for a postponement on the
ground that the plaintiff's evidence
was a surprise upon him, examined
a witness on the subject testified to
by the plaintiff's witnesses, and
sought to show by him that the facts
to which they had sworn were not
true; and at the close of the testi-
mony, agreed that the written points
of both parties should be submitted
for the consideration of the court,
without any suggestion of surprise,
or any request that the decision
should not be made on the case as it
stood; and in consequence of his
omission to furnish his points, near-
ly seven months elapsed before the
decision of the judge was made;
several motion terms in the mean
time having been held, at which an
application could have been made
by him to open the case; instead of
doing which, he permitted the court
to examine and decide upon the
evidence adduced, without any in-
terference or complaint on his part;
and gave no intimation of having
been surprised by the plaintiff's evi-
dence, until three months after the
decision of the court was made; it
was held that the defendant, by his
conduct, must be presumed to have
been willing to abide by the decis-
ion of the court on the questions of
fact presented for its determination;
and that he could not repudiate and
reject that decision after it was
found to be adverse to him.

ib

2. Where leases for years and for lives
contained a provision that if the
yearly rents reserved should be in
arrear or unpaid, in whole or in part,
for twenty days after the days of
payment, the leases, and the estates
granted, should cease and deter-
mine, and be and become absolutely
void and of no effect; and that the
lessor might re-enter, and have and
enjoy the premises as of his former
estate; Held that the enforcement
of a forfeiture arising from a non-
payment of rent by a recovery of
the possession of the premises in an
action against the tenant, rendered
the leases void only from the time
the forfeiture occurred; and did not
bar an action by the lessor, for the
recovery of the rents due at the time
of the default, viz. the same rents,
for the non-payment of which the
forfeiture was incurred. Mattice v.
Lord,
382

3. The leases are void from the day of
forfeiture, but are valid for the pre-
vious time.
ib

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRA-
TORS, 7.
PLEDGE.

M

MANDAMUS.

See OFFICE AND Officer, 5.