The People v. Pease. ponding change in their jurisdiction in reference to a court of the same name in England. The county court there is held by the sheriff, is limited in its jurisdiction to pleas of debt or damages under the value of forty shillings, and is not a court of record. (1 Bl. Com. 178; 3 id. 35.) The county court of the constitution of 1846 is a court of record, and is not limited to the trial of small causes. The name was chosen with reference to its local and territorial jurisdiction, and not to indicate the character of its jurisdiction within its territorial limits. The constitution of 1846 declares that the county court shall have such jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' courts, and in special cases, as the legislature may prescribe; but shall have no original civil jurisdiction except in such special cases. (Const. art. 5, § 14.) The constitution only limits the power of the legislature in conferring original civil jurisdiction on the court, and does not prescribe the character or extent of jurisdiction other than original, which it may, under the legislative sanction, exercise. What constitutes a "special case" within this clause of the constitution is in great doubt; eminent jurists differing as to its true interpretation, and the court of appeals being as yet unable to fix upon a classification or definition by which the "special cases" may be distinguished from ordinary actions, cognizance of which the court cannot take. It was for a time supposed that the legislature could authorize it to take jurisdiction over ordinary common law actions, under circumstances prescribed by it. (Beecher v. Allen, 5 Barb. 169.) It was finally decided that an action for assault and battery was not a "special case," although the parties resided in the county and the damage claimed did not exceed 500 dollars; and the reporter says, in his head note to Kundolf v. Thalheimer, (2 Kernan, 593,) "It seems that the county court has not jurisdiction in any of the ordinary common law actions." It has now been decided that those courts have jurisdiction in cases of partition, and in actions to foreclose mortgages. (Arnold v. Rees, 18 N. Y. Rep. 57. Doubleday v. Heath, 16 id. 80.) Judge Com The People v. Pease. stock, in Arnold v. Rees, says, "It would seem impossible, therefore, to hold that the constitution, in providing for jurisdiction in special cases to be prescribed by the legislature, has excluded all the remedies which were pursued by actions at common law," which is adverse to the reporter's semble in Kundolf v. Thalheimer. The uncertainty and doubt which has rested upon the power of the legislature to give the county court jurisdiction has greatly obstructed the usefulness of the court, and they can only be removed by adjudication of the court of appeals, as cases arise from time to time. But it is concerning original jurisdiction only that there is any doubt. There is no restriction upon the legislature as to any other jurisdiction. By the constitution, article 14, § 5, suits pending in the common pleas, and regularly commenced in justices' courts, were required to be transferred to the county courts provided for in that constitution. And by the judiciary act of 1847, all proceedings in such suits were transferred to, and vested in, the proper county court. (Laws of 1847, p. 329, § 35.) Then, as now, in any action commenced before a justice of the peace, the defendant might interpose the plea that the title to lands would come in question, and upon doing so, and giving the bond prescribed by statute, an action for the same cause might be commenced in the court of common pleas. (2 R. S. 236, §§ 59 et seq.) A justice of the peace had no jurisdiction other than of common law actions. It was exclusively "a common law jurisdiction." The same actions when continued in the court of common pleas were common law actions, and the court taking cognizance of them exercised "common law jurisdiction." Such actions were among those originally commenced in a justice's court, and by the very terms of the constitution were transferred to, and the jurisdiction therein vested in, the county court, which of itself, and without further legislation, brought the court within the requirements of the act of congress as a court "having common law jurisdiction." (Brown v. Brown, 2 Seld. 106.) No legislation can deprive the court of this characteristic The People v. Pease. until this provision of the constitution is abrogated. It is not necessary to show that a single cause is pending, which was thus transferred. The jurisdiction is there, whether it has occasion to exercise it or not. By the code, as amended in 1851, suits commenced in a justice's court were authorized to be continued in the county court, whenever it appeared by the answer of the defendant that the title to lands would come in question. (Code of 1851, § 55, &c.) This act was constitutional, and conferred jurisdiction upon the county court over common law actions thereafter to be brought. (Cook v. Nellis, 18 N. Y. Rep. 126.) This act continued in force until 1858; so that under this law the court actually exercised common law jurisdiction from 1851 to 1858 in this class of cases. So partition, and some of the other remedies which are confessedly within the jurisdiction of the county court, are known to the common law in which courts of law and equity had concurrent jurisdiction. (4 Bouv. Inst. 232.) A writ of partition lay at common law. (2 Black. Com. 189.) So the proceeding to admeasure dower was a common law proceeding, &c. Again, the county court has common law jurisdiction in the revision of all judgments given in justices' courts. The court of appeals is a court of general common law jurisdiction, and yet it has no original jurisdiction. The county court, as an appellate court, is in like manner a court "having common law jurisdiction." The police court of Lowell which was authorized to hear and determine all complaints and prosecutions in like manner as justices of the peace, and had jurisdiction of all civil suits and actions cognizable by a justice of the peace, and had a seal and a clerk, was held to have authority under the act of congress to naturalize aliens. (Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Metc. 168.) We are also cited to a decision of Judge McLean in re M. Smith, said to have been made in 1859 and to be published in 3d volume Law Gazette, p. 237, to the effect that the probate courts for the several counties in Ohio had jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings. For more than ten years the county courts of this state have as The People v. Pease. sumed jurisdiction to admit aliens to naturalization, and thousands have been naturalized by them; and to hold at this day that they had no jurisdiction would be fruitful of mischief, creating doubts and uncertainty as to civil and personal rights, endangering titles to property, and in many instances, perhaps, destroying inheritances and changing the course of descent. If there is a doubt as to the jurisdiction we ought not to yield to it, except upon the clearest evidence that it is well founded. But I entertain no doubt, and am of the opinion that the county court is a court of common law jurisdiction and has jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings, under the act of congress. The judge at the trial also suffered the party to attack the certificate of naturalization by evidence aliunde, and to show that it was procured by fraud; that its recitals were false, and that the party was not entitled to be naturalized. The certificate was the legal evidence of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction collaterally in question in the action. It was final and conclusive. It imported absolute verity, and could not, if valid on its face, be thus impeached in this action. When alienage is in issue, the judgment of the court admitting the alien to become a citizen is conclusive evidence upon that point. (Ritchie v. Putnam, 13 Wend. 524.) A record of naturalization cannot be contradicted by extrinsic proof that no declaration of intention had in truth been made. (Banks v. Walker, 3 Barb. Ch. Rep. 438.) Like any other judgment, it is complete evidence of its own validity. (Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters, 393.) This erroneous ruling does not appear to have affected the result, but as an exception was taken to the admission of the evidence, it is proper to pass upon it with a view to govern any future trial of the action. There must be a new trial granted; costs to abide the event. BACON, J. concurred. PRATT, P. J. was of the opinion that the qualifications of those who had voted at an election could not be inquired into Looney v. Hughes. upon the trial of a right to an office, in an action in the nature of a quo warranto; that the action of inspectors, in receiving the ballot, was conclusive; and concurred in the remaining propositions put forth in the opinion. MULLIN, J. dissented. New trial granted. [ONONDAGA GENERAL TERM, January 3, 1860. and Mullin, Justices.] Pratt, Bacon, W. F. Allen LOONEY, Supervisor of the town of Lancaster, vs. HUGHES and BRIGGS. The duty of a town collector to pay to the several officers named in his warrant the sums required to be paid to them respectively, within one week after the first day of February, is the duty which the collector and his sureties, by their bond, undertake shall be performed; and on the failure of the collector to execute that duty, the condition of the bond is broken, and the liability of the obligors at once attaches. For the purpose of enforcing that liability as speedily as practicable, the legislature has provided, for the public benefit, a summary mode of proceeding against a collector in default, by the issuing of a warrant within twenty days by the county treasurer, against the property of such collector, directed to the sheriff. But the issuing of such a warrant, and the return thereof unsatisfied, are not conditions precedent to the right of the supervisor of the town to maintain an action against the sureties, upon the official bond of the collector. Nor will the omission of the county treasurer to issue his warrant within the time specified in the statute, discharge the sureties from their liability upon the bond. GREENE, J. dissented. The provisions of the statute, relative to the issuing of such warrant, by the county treasurer, being for the public benefit, and not for the benefit of the sureties, are merely directory, in respect to the time within which the warrant is to be issued. MOTIO OTION on the part of the plaintiff for judgment upon a verdict taken subject to the opinion of the court. The action was tried at the Erie circuit, before Justice GRAY and a |