involving a national bank is not ousted by mere possibility that Federal questions may arise during proceedings. The rule is also approved, obiter, in the dissenting opinion, Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 285, 25 L. 658.

Constitutional law. Special legislation is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, p. 128.

Cited and applied in Williamson v. Williamson, 3 Smedes & M. 745, 41 Am. Dec. 638, affirming sale of intestate's lands made under special act of legislature; Langdon v. Strong, 2 Vt. 257, holding valid, a statute authorizing an administrator in a particular case, to convey lands to creditors in payment of debts of estate.

Distinguished in Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 78, 30 Am. Dec. 440, holding special act authorizing guardian to sell lands of ward, judicial in its nature and void under clause in State Constitution prohibiting legislature from exercising judicial power.

Miscellaneous. Cited also in Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 357, 19 L. 419, as to bill of exceptions; dissenting opinion, Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 202, 8 L. 97, on point that Federal courts derive jurisdiction solely from Constitution and acts of congress.

12 Wheat. 129-134, 6 L. 575, MONTGOMERY V. HERNANDEZ.

Appeal and error.- Under the judiciary act it is not every misconstruction of an act of congress that can be re-examined; the decision must have been against the right claimed under such an act, p. 132.

This rule has been applied in the following citing cases: Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 743, 12 L. 896, denying jurisdiction, where on trial no right was set up under act of congress, State court having dismissed bill upon construction of one of its own statutes; Doe v. Eslava, 9 How. 444, 13 L. 209, refusing to review final decree in favor of person claiming under Spanish grant confirmed by congress; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 666, 38 L. 308, 14 S. Ct. 455, ruling similarly where judgment of State court was upon a matter of fact only; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160, U. S. 238, 40 L. 411, 16 S. Ct. 300, denying jurisdiction to issue writ of error until final judgment against right claimed. The following cases apply the rule in denying jurisdiction where the right was not claimed for the party against whom decision was rendered, but for a third person under whom he did not claim; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 323, 13 L. 439; Hale v. Gaines, 22 How. 160, 16 L. 269; Long v. Converse, 91 U. S. 113, 23 L. 235; Miller v. Bank, 106 U. S. 544, 27 L. 290, 1 S. Ct. 538; Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 650, 33 L. 1064, 10 S. Ct. 625. Cited approvingly, but without particular application of the rule, in Lee v. Kaufman, 3 Hughes, 133, F. C. 8,191.

Limitation of actions - Bond.- Cause of action for breach of a condition in a marshal's bond, consisting in failure to pay over cer

tain moneys collected in admiralty cause, does not acrue until final judgment in such cause, when the statute commences to run, p. 134.

The principle involved in this ruling has been applied in the following citing cases: Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 542, 18 L. 943, holding that time during which courts in rebellious States were closed to loyal citizens was to be deducted from time fixed by statute of limitations; Devereaux v. Brownsville, 29 Fed. 751, holding that repeal of municipal charter, whereby there is no organization to be sued and creditor is disabled from proceeding, will arrest the statute of limitations; In re Waties, 39 Fed. 265, holding that in computing time under statute giving priority to wages for "labor performed within six months next preceding first publication of notice of proceedings in bankruptcy," period intervening between institution of proceedings and final decree is to be disregarded; Mercantile Trust Co. v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 69 Fed. 196, holding that stay of execution in record entry of judgment, stays running of statute limiting duration of judgment lien; Brown v. Merrick, 16 Ark. 615, but holding where statute began to run in lifetime of creditor it did not stop at his death until administration was granted on his estate; Sanderson v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 848, holding statute to be suspended during period within which creditor is unable to sue debtor's estate; Morrison v. St. Gemme, 23 Mo. 346, holding that statute will not run in favor of administrator until claim against estate is established as provided by statute; Taylor v. Thorn, 29 Ohio St. 574, holding that allowance by administrator of claim against estate, arrests statute. See also extended note in 13 Am. Dec. 371. Cited approvingly, but without application of the rule, in State v. Pratte, 8 Mo. 287, 40 Am. Dec. 142.

Distinguished in Ten Eyck v. Wing, 1 Mich. 53, where disability of creditor to sue was caused by creditor himself; Treasurer v. Martin, 50 Ohio St. 204, 33 N. E. 1114, holding that where creditor has fraudulently allowed debtor to obtain injunction restraining suit, he will not be allowed upon dissolution of injunction to set up such disability against plea of statute of limitations.

Miscellaneous citations.- Cited in Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald. 403, 406, F. C. 764, on point that jurisdiction of Federal courts is confined to enumerated cases. See also dissenting opinion, Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 204, 206, 8 L. 98; Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 68 Fed. 649, on point that statute of limitations can be suspended only for causes provided in the act itself.

12 Wheat. 135-136, 6 L. 577, WINN'S HEIRS v. JACKSON.

Jurisdiction.- Supreme Court has not jurisdiction under the Judiciary act to review State court judgment remanding cause to trial court for further proceedings, such judgment not being final within the meaning of the act, pp. 135, 136.

Cited and rule applied in Hart v. Burnett, 20 Cal. 172, denying

application for citation, upon issuance of writ of error by clerk of Federal court, where judgment in Supreme Court in action of ejectment remanded cause for further proceedings. See also valuable note in 60 Am. Dec. 431, on subject of final and interlocutory decrees. The dissenting opinion in Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 206, 8 L. 98, approves the rule in general discussion.

12 Wheat. 136–152, 6 L. 577, POSTMASTER-GENERAL v. EARLY. Statutes Construction of, is exclusively a function of the judiciary, and a mistaken opinion of the legislature as to the law cannot bind the courts, p. 148.

Cited and principle applied in the following: United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 549, 24 L. 1084, construing an act amending an act "to prevent smuggling; " District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U. S. 27, 36 L. 62, 12 S. Ct. 372, holding act prescribing qualifications of police officers in district to have been repealed by later act providing permanent form of government for district, notwithstanding subsequent recognition, by congress, of the first act as still subsisting; Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 361, refusing to recognize in criminal proceeding, legislative construction of term " jeopardy," as employed in State Constitution.

Statutes. The legislature may pass a declaratory statute which, although inoperative in the past, may act in future, p. 148.

This principle applied in the following citing cases: Home Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stockdale, 12 Fed. Cas. 456, denying retroactive effect of statute construing a statute taxing dividends of corporations; United States v. The Ohio, 27 Fed. Cas. 229, denying retroactive effect of act of congress providing for licensing and enrollment of coasting vessels; Wood v. Wood, 54 Ark. 178, 15 S. W. 460, giving effect to statute limiting jurisdiction in matters of divorce and alimony (see also S. C. on rehearing, 59 Ark. 451, 43 Am. St. Rep. 48, 27 S. W. 643, 18 L. R. A. 160); Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 311, 16 N. W. 662, construing statute relating to property rights of married women; State v. Slover, 126 Mo. 664, 29 S. W. 721, construing statute regulating proceedings in contested election cases; Farmers' Bank v. Hale, 59 N. Y. 62, construing act declaring intention of legislature with regard to previous act regulating rate of interest.

Bonds. Including in an official bond other things which are separable from the subjects for which it may lawfully be taken, does not necessarily vitiate it, p. 150.

Cited and principle applied in United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 363, 9 L. 456, holding act prescribing form of paymaster's bond directory merely, and bond not void if in purport it conforms to act; Greathouse v. Dunlap, 3 McLean, 311, F. C. 5,742, holding voluntary bond valid although surety binds himself to greater extent than

required by law; Bates v. Bank, 2 Ala. 487, holding contract executed by bank not entirely void because embracing matters ultra vires; Cleaves v. Dockray, 67 Me. 123, where executor's bond held valid as common-law bond, although containing conditions not required by statute; State v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 57, holding bond of county treasurer valid for so much as was prescribed by statute, although void as to residue. Cited approvingly, but without particular application of the rule, in State v. Bowman, 10 Ohio, 449.

Distinguished in State v. Heisey, 56 Iowa, 406, 9 N. W. 327, holding that where bond is not required of public officer, voluntary bond is void for want of consideration; Fain v. Headerick, 4 Cold. 338, setting aside award where no part of contract in dispute was founded upon legal consideration.

Post-office department.— The postmaster-general may take bonds to secure the payment of money due, or which may become due, to the general post-office, pp. 150, 151.

Cited and principle applied in United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 360, 9 L.455, asserting power of congress to require paymasters to file bond to secure funds in their hands; Postmaster-General v. Rice, Gilp. 561, F. C. 11,312, in charge to jury under facts similar to those in principal case; Postmaster-General v. Reeder, 4 Wash. C. C. 679, F. C. 11,311, holding that omission of postmaster-general to sue principal does not release surety; State ex rel. v. Augert, 127 Mo. 464, 30 S. W. 120, citing principal casé as instance where court recognized power as existing by implication.

Jurisdiction.- Under the act of March 3, 1815, the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of suits by the postmaster-general upon official bonds of postmasters, pp. 148, 152.

Cited and principle applied in Dax v. Postmaster-General, 1 Pet. 823, 7 L. 162, a similar case; Wetmore v. Rice, 1 Biss. 239, F. C. 17,468, citing principal case as instance where Supreme Court asserted original jurisdiction of Circuit Courts in suits upon official bonds; Postmaster-General v. Furber, 4 Mason, 334, F. C. 11,308, asserting jurisdiction over matters of account generally between postmaster-general and deputy postmasters; Henry v. Sowles, 28 Fed. 482, asserting jurisdiction over suit to protect money in hands of United States marshal. Cited approvingly in Dundas v. Bowler, 8 McLean, 206, F. C. 4,140, discussing general subject of jurisdiction. Statutes. In construing a statute, the apparent intent of the legislature is to govern, and in ascertaining this intent, one part of the statute may be interpreted by any other which may indicate the meaning given by the legislature itself to ambiguous phrases, p. 152. Cited and principle applied in Baring v. Erdman, 2 Fed. Cas. 787, interpreting term "material" in statute authorizing taking of materials from neighboring lands for construction and repair of rail·

road; State v. Corbett, 61 Ark. 241, 32 S. W. 690, construing act providing punishment for prize fighting; Blanchard v. Railroad Co., 31 Mich. 49, 18 Am. Rep. 146, applying principle in construing clause in deed.

Miscellaneous citations. Cited in Bank of United States v. McKenzie, 2 Brock. 401, F. C. 927, and United States v. Kendal, 5 Cr. C. C. 251, F. C. 15,517, as instance where original jurisdiction of Circuit Court was sustained as being given by statute; United States v. Green, 4 Mason, 434, F. C. 15,258, as authority for holding that Circuit Court has jurisdiction over all suits brought in name of a Federal officer under authority of act of congress, regardless of amount; In re Metzger, 17 Fed. Cas. 234, but not in point; United States v. Mooney, 11 Fed. 47%, on point that recognition of concurrent jurisdiction is a grant of it, though it may not have before existed; Bishop v. State ex rel., 149 Ind. 228, 63 Am. St. Rep. 283, 48 N. E. 1040, 39 L. R. A. 279, construing "deputy postmaster;" dissenting opinion, Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 516, 38 L. 255, 14 S. Ct. 408, but application not apparent.

12 Wheat. 153-169, 6 L. 583, JACKSON v. CHEW.

Statutes

Construction.- The Supreme Court will adopt the decisions of the highest court of a State settling a rule of construction regarding titles to land, p. 167.

This rule has been applied in the following citing cases: Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 155, 8 L. 80, affirming decision of State court in its application of statute of uses to a devise; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 297, 8 L. 405, overruling a previous case upon showing that State construction of statute of limitations had been changed; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 318, 13 L. 712, following State court in holding that statute abolishing entails included estates tail in remainder and vested in remainderman an estate in fee simple; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 502, 15 L. 472, applying principle in holding that Supreme Court will follow decisions of State court settling jurisdiction of its probate courts; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 433, 16 L. 745, under facts similar to those in principal case; Barrett v. Holmes, 102 U. S. 655, 26 L. 292, construing State statute limiting time for entering upon State lands; Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 289, 26 L. 450, enforcing decision of State court that mortgage is inoperative as to third person, unless property recorded; Mitchell v. Lippincott, 2 Woods, 471, F. C. 9,665, reviewing authorities, and following State court in holding invalid, under "married woman's law," a mortgage executed by wife to secure husband's debts; Myers v. Reed, 9 Sawy. 137, 17 Fed. 404, following State court in holding that conveyance to husband and wife made them tenants by entirety; Barney v. Keokuk, 4 Dill. 598, F. C. 1,032, affirming right of railway under State law to lay tracks upon streets of city with consent of city authorities, regardless of ques