is so, he thought there was no doubt of the power of Congress to make it. But generally speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though of course they affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance and elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations. A reasonable construction must be given to the constitution; and such construction is as necessary to the just power of the states as to the authority of Congress. Quarantine laws, for example, may be considered as affecting commerce; yet they are, in their nature, health laws. In England, we speak of the power of regulating commerce, as in parliament, or the King, as arbiter of commerce; yet the city of London enacts health laws. Would anyone infer from that circumstance, that the city of London had concurrent power with parliament or the Crown to regulate commerce? or that it might grant a monopoly of the navigation of the Thames? While a health law is reasonable, it is a health law; but if, under color of it, enactments should be made for other purposes, such enactments might be void.

In the discussion in the New York courts, no small reliance was placed on the law of that state prohibiting the importation of slaves, as an example of a commercial regulation, enacted by state authority. That law may or may not be constitutional and valid. It has been referred to generally, but its particular provisions 21*] have not been stated. When they are more clearly seen, its character may be better determined.

It might further be argued that the power of Congress over these high branches of commerce was exclusive, from the consideration that Congress possessed an exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. That it did possess such exclusive jurisdiction, would hardly be contested. No state pretended to exercise any jurisdiction of that kind. The states had abolished their courts of admiralty, when the constitution went into operation. Over these waters, therefore, or at least some of them, which are the subject of this monopoly, New York has no jurisdiction whatever. They are a part of the high sea, and not within the body of any county. The authorities of that state could not punish for a murder committed on board one of these boats, in some places within the range of this exclusive grant. This restraining of the states from all jurisdiction, out of the bodies of their own counties, shows plainly enough that navigation on the high seas was understood to be a matter to be regulated only by Congress. It is not un reasonable to say that what are called the waters of New York are, to purposes of navigation and commercial regulation, the waters of the United States. There is no cession, indeed. of the waters themselves, but their use, for those purposes, seemed to be entrusted to the exclusive power of Congress. Several states have enacted laws which would appear to imply their conviction of the power of Congress, over navigable waters, to a greater extent. 22*] *If there be a concurrent power of reg ulating commerce on the high seas, there must be a concurrent admiralty jurisdiction, and a concurrent control of the waters. It is a com mon principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as navigation is concerned. Their use is navi

gation. The United States possess the general power over navigation, and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters. If it be admitted, that for purposes of trade and navigation, the North River, and its bay, are the river and bay of New York, and the Chesapeake the bay of Virginia, very great inconveniences and much confusion might be the result.

It might now be well to take a nearer view of these laws, to see more exactly what their provisions were, what consequences have followed from them, and what would and might follow from other similar laws.

The first grant to John Fitch, gave him the sole and exclusive right of making, employing, and navigating all boats impelled by fire or steam, "all creeks, rivers, bays and waters within the territory and jurisdiction of the state." Any other person, navigating such boat, was to forfeit it, and to pay a penalty of a hundred pounds. The subsequent acts repeal this, and grant similar privileges to Livingston and Fulton; and the act of 1811 provides the extraordinary and summary remedy which has been already stated. The river, the bay, and the marine league along the shore, are all within the scope of this grant. *Any vessel, [*23 therefore, of this description, coming into any of those waters, without a license, whether from another state, or from abroad, whether it be a public or a private vessel, is instantly forfeited to the grantees of the monopoly.

Of

Now, it must remembered that this grant is made as an exercise of sovereign political power. It is not an inspection law, nor a health law, nor passed by any derivative authority; it is professedly an act of sovereign power. course, there is no limit to the power to be derived from the purpose for which it is exercised. If exercised for one purpose, it may be also for another. No one can inquire into the motives which influence sovereign authority. It is enough that such power manifests its will. The motive alleged in this case is, to remunerate the grantees for a benefit conferred by them on the public. But there is no necessary connection between that benefit and this mode of rewarding it; and if the state could grant this monopoly for that purpose, it could also grant it for any other purpose. It could make the grant for money; and so make the monopoly of navigation over those waters a direct sourceof revenue. When this monopoly shall expire, in 1838, the state may continue it for any pecuniary consideration which the holders may see fit to offer and the state to receive.

If the state may grant this monopoly, it may also grant another for other descriptions of vessels; for instance, for all sloops.

If it can grant these exclusive privileges to a few, it may grant them to many; that is, it may grant them to all its own citizens, to the [*24 exclusion of everybody else.

But the waters of New York are no more the subject of exclusive grants by that state, than the waters of other states are subjects of such grants by those other states. Virginia may well exercise, over the entrance of the Chesapeake, all the power that New York can exercise over the bay of New York, and the waters on the shore. The Chesapeake, therefore, upon the principle of these laws, may be the

extent.

If, then, the power of commercial regulation, possessed by Congress, be, in regard to the great branches of it, exclusive; and if this grant of New York be a commercial regulation, affecting commerce, in respect to these great branches, then the grant is void, whether [*27 any case of actual collision had happened or not.

But further; under this concurrent power the state does that which Congress cannot do; that is, it gives preferences to the citizens of sume states over those of others. I do not mean here the advantages conferred by the grant on the grantees, but the disadvantages to which it subjects all the other citizens of New York. To impose an extraordinary tax on steam navigation visiting the ports of New York, and leaving it free everywhere else, is giving a preference to the citizens of other states over those of New York. This Congress could not do, and yet the State does it; so that this power, at first subordinate, then concurrent, now becomes paramount.

The people of New York have a right to be protected against this monopoly. It is one of the objects for which they agreed to this constitution, that they should stand on an equality in commercial regulations; and if the government should not insure them that, the promises made to them, in its behalf, would not be performed.

He contended, therefore, in conclusion on this point, that the power of Congress over these high branches of commercial regulation, was shown to be exclusive, by considering That was wished and intended to be done, when the convention for forming the constitution was called; by what was understood, in the state conventions, to have been accomplished by the instrument; by the prohibitions on the states, and the express exception relative to inspection laws, by the nature of the 26*] *power itself; by the terms used, as connected with the nature of the power; by the subsequent understanding and practice, both of Congress and the states; by the grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government; by the manifest danger of the opposite doctrine, and the ruinous consequences to which it directly leads.

It required little now to be said, to prove that this exclusive grant is a law regulating Commerce; although, in some of the discussions elsewhere, it had been called a law of police.

when the rights claimed under it came in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured under the laws of the United States; and such collision, he maintained, clearly existed in this case. It would not be denied that the law of Congress was paramount. The constitution has expressly provided for that. So that the only question in this part of the case is, whether the two rights be inconsistent with each other. The appellant had a right to go from New Jersey to New York in a vessel owned by himself, of the proper legal description, and enrolled and licensed according to law. This right belonged to him as a citizen of the United States. It was derived under the laws of the United States, and no act of the legislature of New York can deprive him of it, any more than such act could deprive him of the right of holding lands in that State, or of suing in its courts. It appears from the record, that the boat in question was regularly enrolled at Perth Amboy, and properly licensed for carrying on the coasting trade. Under this enrollment, and with this license, she was proceeding to New York, when she was stopped by the injunction of the chancellor, on the ap plication of the New York grantees. There can be no doubt that here is a collision, in fact; that which the appellant claimed as a right, the respondent resisted; and there remains nothing *now but to determine whether [*28 the appellant had, as he contends, a right to navigate these waters; because, if he had such right, it must prevail. Now, this right was expressly conferred by the laws of the United States. The first section of the act of February, 1793, c. 8, regulating the coasting trade and fisheries, declares that all ships and vessels, enrolled and licensed as that act provides, "and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries." The fourth section of the same declares "that in order to the licensing of any ship or vessel, for carrying on the coasting trade or fisheries," bond shall be given, etc., according 1.-1 Bl. Com. 273; 4 Bl. Com. 160.