Minturn v. Maynard et al. been taken by the process of the other. The marshal or the sheriff, as the case may be, acquires by a levy a special property in the goods, and may maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may be taken in execution at the same time, by the marshal and the sheriff, does this special property vest in the one or the other, or both of them? No such case can exist; property once levied on remains in the custody of the law, and it is not liable to be taken by another execution in the hands of a different officer, and especially an officer acting under a different jurisdiction." The instruction of the district court is erroneous, and its judgment is therefore reversed and cause remanded. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. CHARLES MINTURN, APPELLANT, v. LAFAYETTE MAYNARD, GILBERT A. GRANT, THOMAS G. WELLS, LUCIEN SKINNER, FREDERICK BILLINGS, CHARLES J. BRENHAM, ISAAC T. MOTT, J. DE LA MONTAGNE, E. M. NEAL, AND THOMAS L. CHAPMAN. Where a libel was filed in personam, against the owners of a steamboat in California, by their general agent or broker, for the balance of an account for money paid, laid out, and expended, in paying for supplies, repairs, and advertising of the steamboat, together with commissions on the disbursements, the libel was properly dismissed, for want of jurisdiction. There was nothing in the case to bring it within the class of maritime contracts; nor does the local law of California, which authorizes an attachment of vessels for supplies or repairs, extend to the balance of accounts between agent and principal, who have never dealt on the credit, pledge, or security of the vessel.1 THIS was an appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of California. 1 DISTINGUISHED. The Kalorama, 10 Wall., 217. Minturn v. Maynard et al. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Brent and Mr. May, for the appellant, and by Mr. Cutting, for the appellees. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The respondents were sued in admiralty, by process in personam. The libel charges that they are owners of the steamboat Gold Hunter; that they had appointed the libellant their general agent or broker; and exhibits a bill, showing a balance of accounts due libellant for money paid, laid out, and expended for the use of respondents, in paying for supplies, repairs, and advertising of the steamboat, and numerous other charges, together with commissions on the disbursements, &c. The court below very properly dismissed the libel, for want of jurisdiction. There is nothing in the nature of a maritime contract in the case. The libel shows nothing but a demand for a balance of accounts between agent and principal, for which an action of assumpsit, in a common law court, is the proper remedy. That the money advanced and paid for respondents was, in whole or in part, to pay bills due by a steamboat for repairs or supplies, will not make the transaction maritime, or give the libellant a remedy in admiralty. Nor does the local law of California, which authorizes an attachment of vessels for supplies or repairs, extend to the balance of accounts between agent and principal, who have never dealt on the credit, pledge, or security of the vessel. The case is too plain for argument. The judgment of the court of admiralty, dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction, is affirmed with costs. Order. *This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of [*478 the record from the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said district court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs. 501 Florida v. Georgia. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, COMPLAINANT, v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA. In cases in which this court has original jurisdiction, the form of proceeding is not regulated by act of congress, but by the rules and orders of the court. These rules and orders are framed in analogy to the practice in the English court of chancery. But the court does not follow this practice, where it would embarrass the case by unnecessary technicality or defeat the purposes of justice. There is no mode of proceeding by which the United States can bring into review the decision of this court upon a question of boundary between two states. Justice therefore requires that the United States, which represent the rights and interests of the other twenty-nine states, should have an opportunity of being heard before the boundary is established. The attorney-general having filed an information, stating that the interests of the United States are involved in the establishment of the boundary line between Florida and Georgia, he has a right to appear on behalf of the United States and adduce proofs in support of the boundary claimed by them to be the true one, and to be heard at the argument. The United States will not, by this proceeding, become a party in the technical sense of the word, and no judgment will be entered for or against them. But the evidence and arguments offered, in their behalf, will be considered by the court in deciding the matter in controversy.1 Each party is at liberty to cause surveys and maps to be made. But the court does not deem it advisable to appoint persons for this purpose. IN 11 How., 293, it is reported that the state of Florida filed a bill in this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, against the state of Georgia to establish a boundary between them. The state of Georgia answered, and other proceedings were had; but the case was not yet at issue, nor was all the testimony taken upon which the parties proposed to rely. At the present term, the attorney-general appeared in court and filed the following information, moving at the same time for leave to intervene on behalf of the United States for the reasons stated in the information. Now, on this 15th day of December, 1854, Caleb Cushing, attorney-general of the United States, in his proper person comes here into the court, and for the said United States gives the court to understand and be informed, that a certain *479] bill of complaint *is pending in said court, by or in behalf of the state of Florida, complainant, against the state of Georgia, defendant, wherein is in controversy a certain portion of the boundary line between said states, and of the lands contiguous thereto. That by Mariano D. Papy, attorney-general of the state of 1 REFERRED TO. State of Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall., 73; Alexander v. Horner, 1 McCrary, 645. Florida v. Georgia. Florida, formal notice in the name and behalf of said state has been given to the United States that the matter of said bill is of interest and concern to the said United States. That, by inspection of said bill of complaint, it appears that the state of Florida alleges that the portion of boundary line in question should run, commencing at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers, and thence in a straight line to a point at or near a monument commonly called Ellicott's Mound, at the assumed head of the River St. Mary's, which line has been surveyed by the surveyors of the United States, and is known as McNeil's line, or howsoever otherwise the same may be described or designated. That in said bill of complaint the state of Florida further alleges, that the state of Georgia pretends that, commencing at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers, as aforesaid, the said line should run to a point called Lake Spalding, or a point called Lake Randolph. It further appears that the said points of Lake Spalding and Lake Randolph are situated about thirty miles to the south of said Ellicott's Mound, and the effect will be, if the pretence of the state of Georgia be sustained, to transfer to said state of Georgia a tract of land in the shape of a triangle, having a base of some thirty miles, and equal sides each of the length of about one hundred and fifty miles, comprehending upwards of one million two hundred thousand acres of land, which have been considered and treated heretofore as public domain of the United States, and surveyed as such, and much of which has accordingly been sold and patented by the government as of the territory of east Florida acquired from Spain. And for the information of the court herein, the attorneygeneral files, annexed to this motion: 1. A certified copy of the (cautionary) traverse line so surveyed in 1825, by said McNeil. 2. A certified copy of the field-notes of said traverse line so surveyed. 3. A certified copy of the map of the (cautionary) true line, plotted from traverse line, by said McNeil. 4. An official copy of diagram of surveyor-general of the United States for Florida, of surveys of public lands of United States in said state, to September 30, 1853. Whereupon, and in consideration of the interest and concern of the United States manifestly apparent in said bill of complaint, the said attorney-general of the United [*480 States prays the consideration of the court here, and moves the court that he be permitted to appear in said case, and be Florida v. Georgia. heard in behalf of the United States, in such time and form as the court shall order. This motion was opposed by the states, and was argued by the Attorney-General, in behalf of the United States; by Mr. Badger and Mr. Berrien, on behalf of the state of Georgia, and by Mr. Wescott and Mr. Johnson, on behalf of the state of Florida. Upon a question of this character, where "the file affords no precedent," the reporter would be pleased if he could report the arguments of counsel in extenso; but want of room compels him to submit to the reader only the following condensed and imperfect sketch of the respective arguments. Mr. Cushing began with a general view of the subject of intervention, how it was considered in other countries, Spain, France, and England, and particularly the latter; and how far the English doctrines had been recognized in the United States. He then passed from the subject of intervention between private persons to cases where the attorney-general interfered, both in England and this country. He then considered the effect of the act of congress, (1 Stats. at L., 93,) establishing the office of attorney-general, and making it his duty "to prosecute and conduct all suits in the supreme court in which the United States shall be concerned;" and contended that, if the government cannot be heard in this case by intervention, it cannot be heard at all. His argument under the 15th and 16th heads is given entire. 15. If there were no precedents to justify the right claimed for the attorney-general, then the court should make one, in deference to the great principle of equity laid down by Lord Cottenham, in Taylor v. Salmon, that it is the duty of the court of chancery "to adapt its practice and course of proceeding, as far as possible, to the existing state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new cases which, from the progress daily making in the affairs of men, must continually arise; and not, from too strict an adherence to forms and rules established under very different circumstances, decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy." Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & C., 141. course, This court has repeatedly decided that it has ample power to regulate chancery practice for the new and purely American question, of suits in equity between States; subject, of to the control of congress in this respect. Grayson v. State of *Virginia, 3 Dall., 320; Huger v. State of South Carolina, 3 Id., 371; State of New York v. State of Conneo *481] |