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The religious theocracy of New England during the pre-Revolutionary period whatever else it may have done, certainly made for intellectuality. It was insisted upon from the first that the clergy must be men of distinctive intellect and scholarly training. In an atmosphere vibrant with controversy, they became skilful dialecticians and their sermons generally were argumentative, with Q. E. D. endings. The people in the congregation often took notes as if they were a class in divinity, and usually they left the church discussing the soundness of the doctrines which had been advanced and often divided sharply among themselves concerning some hair-drawn point of predestination, free will, infant damnation, or baptism. The culminating product of a century of such intellection was Jonathan Edwards, unquestionably the profoundest thinker and acutest dialectician America has ever produced.

The son of a Connecticut minister, graduated at Yale at seventeen, a tutor almost immediately in the college, minister for nearly twenty-four years at Northampton, Massachusetts, a self-appointed missionary to the Stockbridge Indians, and finally President of Princeton College, dying of small pox just at the beginning of his administration, these are the main points in his biography. The rest of the record concerns his thinking and the results of his thought. As a preacher he was appallingly effective. His "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," has come down to us as the best-known sermon of a sermonic age. The effect of it upon the Northampton audience to whom it was preached almost exceeds belief. At the end of it the entire congregation was in terror, some even shrieking, and many writhing in hysterics. Yet his manner is described as not sensational: it was the force of personality and the inevitableness of his logic that carried conviction. His most important work is his great metaphysical argument which is generally known by the abbreviated title, "Treatise on the Freedom of the Will," a piece of reasoning the final conclusions of which have not been widely accepted, yet the logic of which has never been successfully refuted. Though little that Edwards wrote can be classed as literature, in the strict definition of the word, one should carefully study him as a typical figure if one is to understand the intellectual and spiritual environment from which came in later years that notable school of writers which Dr. Holmes once denominated "the Brahmins of New England." The following selections have been modernized in spelling.

A YOUNG PURITAN'S CODE

with, how many soever, and how great

soever.

To be continually endeavoring to find out some new contrivance, and inven5 tion, to promote the forementioned things.

Never to do any manner of thing, whether in soul or body, less or more, but what tends to the glory of God, nor

[From the Seventy Resolutions Formed in His Twentieth Year.] Being sensible that I am unable to do anything without God's help, I do humbly entreat him by his grace, to enable me to keep these resolutions, so o be, nor suffer it, if I can possibly avoid far as they are agreeable to his will, for Christ's sake.

Resolved, That I will do whatsoever I think to be most to the glory of God and my own good, profit and pleasure, in the 15 whole of my duration; without any consideration of the time, whether now, nor never so many myriads of ages hence. Resolved to do whatever I think to be my duty, and most for the good and advan- 20 tage of mankind in general. Resolved, so to do, whatever difficulties I meet

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it.

To live with all my might, while I do live.

Never to do anything, which I should be afraid to do, if it were the last hour of my life.

To think much, on all occasions, of my own dying, and of the common circumstances which attend death.

When I feel pain, to think of the pains of martrydom, and of hell.

When I think of any theorem in di

vinity, to be solved, immediately to do what I can towards solving it, if circumstances do not hinder.

That I will live just so as I can think I shall wish I had done, supposing I live to old age.

To endeavor, to my utmost, so to act,

If I take delight in it as a gratification of pride, or vanity, or on any such 5 as I can think I should do, if I had account, immediately to throw it by.

Never to do anything out of revenge. Never to suffer the least motions of anger toward irrational beings.

Never to speak evil of any one, so that 10 it shall tend to his dishonor, more or less, upon no account except for some real good.

To live so, at all times, as I think is best in my most devout frames, and 15 when I have the clearest notions of the things of the Gospel, and another world.

Never to do anything, which, if I should see in another, I should count a just occasion to despise him for,.or to 20 think any way the more meanly of him.

Whenever I do any conspicuously evil action, to trace it back, till I come to the original cause; and then, both carefully endeavor to do so no more, and to 25 fight and pray with all my might against the original of it.

Never to count that a prayer, nor let that pass as a prayer, nor that as a petition of a prayer, which is so made, 30 that I cannot hope that God will answer it; nor that as a confession, which I cannot hope God will accept.

In narrations, never to speak anything but the pure and simple verity.

Never, henceforward, till I die, to act as if I were any way my own, but entirely and altogether God's.

already seen the happiness of heaven, and hell torments.

On the supposition, that there never was to be but one individual in the world, at any one time, who was properly a complete Christian, in all respects. of a right stamp, having Christianity always shining in its true lustre, and appearing excellent and lovely, from whatever part and under whatever character viewed: Resolved, To act just as I would do, if I strove with all my might to be that one, who should live in my time.

Always to do that which I shall wish
I had done when I see others do it.
Let there be something of benevolence
in all that I speak.

WHETHER

[1722-23]

ANY EVENT, OR VOLITION, CAN COME TO PASS WITHOUT A CAUSE

[From Treatise on The Freedom of the Will.]

I assert that nothing ever comes to 35 pass without a Cause. What is selfexistent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable; but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves; that whatsoever begins to be which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or

That no other end but religion shall have any influence at all on any of my 40 actions; and that no action shall be, in the least circumstance, any otherwise than the religious end will carry it.

Never to allow any pleasure or grief, joy or sorrow, nor any affection at all, nor any degree of affection, nor any circumstance relating to it, but what helps religion.

45

That I will act so, in every respect, as judge would have been best, and most 50 prudent, when I come into the future world.

That I will act so in every respect, as I think I shall wish I had done, if I should at last be damned.

I frequently hear persons in old age, say how they would live, if they were to live their lives over again: Resolved,

to come.

And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or things and the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto been at rest, 55 start out of a state of rest, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of

a

the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly change the direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one; or change its color; the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the mind of mankind necessarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason 10 to causes; from the ideas now immeof them.

Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be 5 without evidence of the existence of anything whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects

If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from effects to Causes ceaseth, and So all knowledge of any existence, besides 15 what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of the being of God ceases: we argue his being from our own being and

diately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view: from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of these sensations; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or anything else, by memory;

the being of other things, which we are 20 only as we argue that the ideas, which

sensible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their 25 own nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.

are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive o know other things only by means of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without Causes, all this 30 necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity nor difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity nor difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty, nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.

But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause; and we begin to maintain, that things may come into existence, and 35 begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themselves without any Cause; all Our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the 40 Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, 45 beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect.

For

And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the case in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence contingently, without any cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and hour.

succession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has occasion.

Our minds do alike naturally suppose 50 through all ages. So it is in a constant and determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it has a Cause proportionable and agreeable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine 55 that there cannot be anything coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the Cause.

If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz., acts of the Will, seemed to come to pass of themselves; but those

5

of this sort in general came into being thus; and it were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were capable subjects of such events; this very thing would demonstrate that there was some cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and 10 choose for a particular sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This No Cause, which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distin- 15 guished from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, 20 shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of the water out of the heavens; and that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the

matter.

25

35

of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot; if they make this objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it ever so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing's coming into existence without a Cause; because to suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to the existence; and so a thing that makes way for existence, with such a circumstance, namely, without a cause or reason for existence. But that which respect makes way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence; for then the thing has made sure of existence already, without its help.

If we should suppose nonentity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends; 30 or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensation in animals, or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the Will; or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles; then certainly it would not be expected, although many 40 millions of millions of things are coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, 45 and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that constantly whenever there is occasion for them.

have

in

any

So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too? It is not the particular kind of effect that makes the ab50 surdity of supposing it has been without a Cause, but something that is common to all things that ever began to be, viz., that they are not self-existent, or necessary in the nature of things.

If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that renders it possible for it to come into existence without a Cause, and should say, that the free acts of the Will are existences 55

[1754]

It is easy to gain the impression that the Puritan age in Massachusetts was one of unrelieved sombreness; that the ministers, at least of the early churches, thought only of Jcnathan-Edwards-like themes. One does not read long in the literature of the period, however, to realize that there were also lighter elements. The life of Mather Byles (1706-1788), for forty-three years pastor of the Hollis Street Church in Boston, would in itself relieve one of this impression. So inveterate a wag was he that a contemporary described him thus: There's punning Byles provokes our smiles,

A man of stately parts.

He visits folks to crack his jokes,

Which never mend their hearts.

With strutting gait and wig so great,
He walks along the streets;

And throws out wit, or what's like it,
To every one he meets.

5

He

He was a poet of more than local reputation, his work being mentioned even by Pope. was generally accepted by his own generation as the leading American writer of his century, New England even placing him in the realm of the great classic writers of the world. One contemporary rhymer declared that

Harvard's honor and New England's hope
Bids fair to rise and sing and rival Pope.

His stately, Pope-like verses, however, have perished, but a few of his lighter efforts still are remembered, notably those called forth by his constant jovial clash with his Harvard classmate and rival wit Joseph Green, (1706-1780).

Green undoubtedly was the most brilliant humorist of pre-revolutionary America. A busi ness man, a distiller, a man of wealth and manifold activities, yet he always found time for poetry. His pen was ever ready, at a moment's notice, to make an epigram, a satirical epitaph, an inscription for a picture, or any other jeu d'esprit that might be timely. At one time Byles, whom he followed constantly in wit combats, was inveagled by his friends on ship-board, and sorely against his will taken on a voyage to Maine. Making the best of it, he insisted on regular worship, and finding no hymn books, composed a hymn for the occasion. This gave Green a chance for a lampoon to which effort Byles instantly responded. Green was a satirist with a bitter pen, and most of the abuses of his time, especially those coming from abuse of power, he rebuked in scathing stanzas. On occasion he could be as serious as could Byles, but such occasions were not frequent. In 1743 one of his friends composed this quatrain to be used as his epitaph:

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