SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
There having been an Associate Justice of this court appointed since the commencement of this term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said court among the Circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz.:
For the First Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, RUFUS W. PECKHAM, Associate Justice.
For the Third Circuit, GEORGE SHIRAS, JR., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, MELVILLE W. FULLER, Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, EDWARD D. WHITE, Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, HENRY B. BROWN, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, STEPHEN J. FIELD, Associate Justice.
Announced February 3, 1896.
ALIEN.
See JURISDICTION, E, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
AMENDMENT.
See PRACTICE, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
JURISDICTION, E, 2.
APPEARANCE.
See JURISDICTION, B, 3.
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
An assignment of error which indicates the subject-matter in the charge to
which the exceptions relate with sufficient clearness to enable the court,
from a mere inspection of the charge, to ascertain the particular mat-
ter referred to, is sufficient. Hickory v. United States, 408.
At the request of the parties, this court, after deciding where is the true
and proper southern boundary line of the State of Iowa, appoints a
commission to find and remark the same with proper and durable
monuments. Missouri v. Iowa, 688.
1. Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 57, 61, affirmed and applied to a ques-
tion raised in this case. Goldsby v. United States, 70.
2. Affirmed upon the authority of Washington & Idaho Railroad Company
v. Cœur d'Alene Railway & Navigation Company, 160 U. S. 77. Wash-
ington & Idaho Railroad Co. v. Cœur d'Alene Railway & Navigation Co.,
101.
3. Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, affirmed to the point that when, pending
an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault
of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the
appellate court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to
grant him any effectual relief, the court will not proceed to a formal
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. New Orleans Flour Inspectors
v. Glover, 170.
4. Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18, affirmed and applied to this case. Dough-
erty v. Nevada Bank, 171.
INDICTMENT, 4;
JURISDICTION, E, 1;
PRACTICE, 1.
CASES DISTINGUISHED.
See JURISDICTION, A, 6.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The claimant originally enlisted at Washington in August, 1878, and was
discharged at Mare Island, California, November 6, 1886, receiving,
(under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 1290, as amended by the act of
February 27, 1877,) travel pay and commutation of subsistence from
Mare Island to Washington. He did not return to Washington, but,
November 10, 1886, reënlisted at Mare Island as a private, and in the
course of his service was returned to Washington, where, at the ex-
piration of two years and four months, he was discharged at his own
request. Held, that, as the service was practically a continuous one,
and his second discharge occurred at the place of his original enlist-
ment, he was not entitled to his commutation for travel and sub-
sistence to the place of his second enlistment. United States v.
Thornton, 654.
CONFESSION.
See EVIDENCE, 8.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in no way under-
takes to control the power of a State to determine by what process
legal rights may be asserted, or legal obligations be enforced, pro-
vided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives rea-
sonable notice, and affords fair opportunity to be heard, before the
issues are decided. Iowa Central Railway Co. v. Iowa, 389.
2. Whether the court of last resort of a State has properly construed its
own constitution and laws in determining that a summary process
under those laws was applicable to the matter which it adjudged, is
purely the decision of a question of state law, binding upon this
court. Ib.
3. It is no denial of a right protected by the Constitution of the United
States to refuse a jury trial in a civil cause pending in a state court,
even though it be clearly erroneous to construe the laws of the State
as justifying the refusal. Ib.
4. In Louisiana the constitution and laws of the State, as interpreted by
its highest court, permit the taking, without compensation, of land for
the construction of a public levee on the Mississippi River, on the
ground that the State has, under French laws existing before its
transfer to the United States, a servitude on such lands for such a
purpose; and they subject a citizen of another State owning such
land therein, the title to which was derived from the United States,
to the operation of the state law as so interpreted. Held, that there
was no error in this so long as the citizen of another State receives
the same measure of right as that awarded to citizens of Louisiana in
regard to their property similarly situated. Eldridge v. Trezevant,
5. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution do
not override public rights, existing in the form of servitudes or ease-
ments, which are held by the courts of a State to be valid under its
constitution and laws. Ib.
6. The act of August 1, 1888, c. 728, authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury, whenever in his opinion it will be necessary or advanta-
geous to the United States, to acquire lands for a light-house by
condemnation under judicial proceedings in a court of the United
States for the district in which the land is situated, is constitutional.
Chappell v. United States, 499.
7. In 1883 R. had his legal residence in New Jersey, but actually lived in
New York. His wife resided in New Jersey, and filed a bill in the
Court of Chancery of that State against him for divorce on the ground
of adultery. The defendant appeared and answered, denying the alle-
gations in the bill. In 1886 the plaintiff filed a supplemental bill
charging other acts of adultery subsequent to the filing of the bill.
The court made an order, reciting the appearance and answer of the
defendant to the original bill, directing him to appear on a day named
and plead to the supplemental bill, and ordering a copy of this order,
with a certified copy of the supplemental bill, to be served on him per-
sonally, which was done in the city of New York. The defendant did
not so appear and answer, and the further proceedings in the case
resulted in a decree finding the defendant guilty of the acts of adul-
tery charged "in the said bill of complaint and the supplemental bill
thereto," granting the divorce prayed for, and awarding the plaintiff
alimony. The plaintiff commenced an action in a court of the State
of New York to recover alimony on this decree, whereupon the defend-
ant, by the solicitor who had appeared for him and filed his answer to
the original bill, applied for and obtained from the chancellor in New
Jersey an amendment to the decree so as to make it read that the de-
fendant had been guilty of the crime of adultery charged against him
in said supplemental bill. The complaint in the New York case set
forth the proceedings and decree in the New Jersey case, and alleged
that the defendant had accepted the proceedings as valid, and had,
after the decree of divorce, married another wife. The defendant
answered, denying that the Court of Chancery in New Jersey had any
jurisdiction to enter the decree on the supplemental bill, and admitting
his second marriage. On the trial of the New York case, the evidence
of an attorney and counsellor of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as
an expert, was offered and received to the effect that in his opinion the
chancellor erred in taking jurisdiction and proceeding to judgment on
the supplemental bill, without service of a new subpoena in the State,
or the voluntary appearance of defendant after the filing of the sup-
plemental bill, and that the law of New Jersey did not warrant him in
so doing. The trial resulted in a judgment for defendant, which was
sustained by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the law of
New Jersey and the practice of its Court of Chancery had been shown
by undisputed evidence to be as stated by the expert. Held, (1) That,
in the absence of statutory direction or reported decision to the con-
trary, this court must find the law of New Jersey applicable to this
case in the decree of the chancellor, and that the remedy of the defend-
ant, if he felt himself aggrieved, was by appeal; (2) That the opinion
of the expert could not control the judgment of the court in this re-
spect; (3) That the New York courts, in dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint, did not give due effect to the provisions of Article IV of the
Constitution of the United States, which require that full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every
other State. Laing v. Rigney, 531.
1. Impossibility of performing a contract, arising after the making of it,
although without any fault on the part of the covenantor, does not
discharge him from his liability under it. Jacksonville, Mayport &c.
Railway v. Hooper, 514.
2. A lessee of a building who contracts in his lease to keep the leased build-
ing insured for the benefit of the lessor during the term at an agreed
|