forth with the storming party, and was wounded: still he was determined to persevere; and as soon as his wound was dressed he returned again to the attack, and received a second wound which killed him. On the 27th of June a practicable breach was effected in the principal fort; and about the same time the buildings in another of the forts, by the fire from which the approach to the first was defended, were discovered to be in flames. Preparations were immediately made to take advantage of these circumstances; but before the attack had commenced, the commander of the fort which was in flames offered to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours. Lord Wellington refused to listen to this proposal, which was evidently made in order to gain time to extinguish the flames; and returned for answer, that the forts must be immediately surrendered. The commander replied, that he was entirely dependent upon the governor of fort St. Vincent. On this, therefore, lord Wellington gave instant orders to storm. The British army had now become accustomed to this kind of enterprise, and advanced to the execution of it with the utmost promptitude, coolness, and steadiness: the enemy appeared to have been rendered incapable of any determined or regular resistance, and fled before the storming party, leaving them masters of the fort at the expense of very few lives. As soon as this fort fell, the governor of the others offered to capitulate on lord Wellington's own terms: the garrison was to march out with the honours of war; to be considered and treated as prisoners of war: the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks.

When lord Wellington surveyed these forts after their surrender, he was surprised they had been taken so speedily, and with such a trifling loss: the enemy had been employed for nearly three years in constructing the works by which they were defended, and for the last eight or nine months they had bestowed une common labour and expense upon them: they were garrisoned by nearly 800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery; and so impregnable had the enemy deemed them, that they had formed and left in them large depôts of clothing and military stores of every description. Notwithstanding their great strength, however, lord Wellington would have reduced them in a much shorter time than he did, had he not been obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of am munition, which occasioned a delay of six days.

As soon as these forts were reduced, lord Wellington pushed forward, Marmont not appearing dis posed to stop his progress, or even to wait for his approach. In the beginning of July the enemy crossed the Douro with all his forces, retiring upon Tordesillas, and leaving his rear guard at Rueda: this sir Stapleton Cotton attacked with great impetuosity, and compelled them to fall back on their main body. Lord Wellington, however, was not able to oppose any obstacles to the enemy's passage of the Douro; and having effected this, they took up a strong position on that river.

As lord Wellington was convinced that it was impracticable to attack Marmont in this position, he changed his plan; and, instead of advancing in the direction of Valladolid, broke up and withdrew, apparently threatening Madrid. Marmont about the same time endeavoured to carry

ammunition. On the morning of the 21st of July the whole British army was concentred on the Tormes; and on that day also the enemy moved towards the same river, near Huerta: so far the enemy had completely failed in the grand object of all his movements, as lord Wellington still preserved a communication both with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo.

into execution a scheme he had formed for cutting off the communication between the British army and Ciudad Rodrigo; and for this purpose, having been reinforced by the division under Bonnet, he extended his right as far as Toro, employed himself in repairing the bridge over the Douro, and moved part of his army in such a direction as to threaten the left of the British. On the 17th of July Marmont had assembled his forces at La Nava del Rey in such a position, that lord Wellington judged it prudent to provide for the retreat and junction of his troops; and this measure became absolutely necessary on the 18th, when the enemy had turned the left flank of the British position at Castrejon. Marmont being thus foiled in his attempt to turn the left in such a manner as to throw the British army into confusion, or compel it to fight on disadvantageous terms, attempted to turn its right of this lord Wellington was immediately aware, and took such measures as might enable him either to defeat, or, if the enemy should commit any blunder in his movements and manœuvres, to take advantage of them. Several days were thus spent; each general being afraid to hazard a battle, unless he could gain an advantageous position, or perceive an opportu. nity of fighting on very favourable terms; lord Wellington constantly watching the movements of the French, and making correspondent movements of his own army. Had the British army been more nearly on an equality with that of the enemy, lord Wellington would not thus have declined an engagement, and retired before it: but the inferiority was very considerable, and the British army was, moreover, ill supplied with stores, provisions, and

On the afternoon of the 21st the enemy crossed the Tormes, and moved towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and during the two succeeding days he executed a variety of evolutions and movements, apparently with a view to distract lord Wellington's attention, and to conceal his real object: the left of the British army seemed to be his object for a considerable time; and towards the protection and defence of that lord Wellington directed his movements and efforts, but not so exclusively as to weaken the right, against which he still suspected that Marmont had designs. At last Marmont, in his anxiety to outmanœuvre the British army, neglected the proper defence of his own: he extended his line to the left so far, as to weaken the main body considerably: this fault was no sooner committed than it was observed by lord Wellington, who, having been long anxious for an opportunity of attacking him, determined to profit by this blunder, notwithstanding the enemy's troops still occupied very strong ground, and their position was well defended by cannon. The plan of the battle, and the arrangement and movements of the different divisions of the British army, were soon fixed: the enemy's left was attacked by major-general Packenham with the 3d division, who, having formed it across their flanks, overthrew every thing opposed to him: they were

at

at the same time attacked in front by brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 4th and 5th divisions, and the cavalry under sir Stapleton Cotton: this attack also completely succeeded; the enemy being driven from the heights which they occupied in great disorder, and with considerable loss. In consequence of the failure of an attack made by brigadier-general Pack, the enemy were enabled to throw some troops on the left of the 4th division; but the front of the 5th division being changed, they were enabled to fire on the flanks of the enemy, and thus compelled them to retreat. About this time general Beresford and general Leith were wounded. The centre and the left of the enemy were now most completely beaten; but the right, reinforced by the troops that had fled from the left, still continued to resist, till lord Wellington directed them to be attacked in front, and on one of their flanks, when they fled with the greatest precipitation. It was now completely dark; and this circumstance favoured the enemy in their flight, and proved most unfortunate to sir Stapleton Cotton, who was wounded by one of the British soldiers. The next morning the pursuit was renewed: the enemy's rear guard were overtaken at La Serna, attacked and thrown into disorder; the cavalry flying in all directions, leaving the infantry to their fate. Such was the defeat and dismay of the enemy, that they fled with the utmost precipitation, abandoning every thing that could impede their progress; and in less than two days after the battle the remains of Marmont's army had nearly reached Valladolid. When Marmont found that lord Wellington was retreating before him, he had sent for all the reinforcements

that could be spared: Joseph Bonaparte accordingly had marched from Madrid with the army of the north, but he was too late; he had the mortification to meet that army defeated, disgraced, and ruined, which he expected to have joined and assisted in the defeat of the British.

In the battle of Salamanca, 11 pieces of cannon, 2 eagles, and 6 colours, were taken: one general, 3 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and upwards of 7000 soldiers, were made prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was immense. Marmont himself was wounded early in the battle: four general officers were taken in the pursuit, besides the one that was made prisoner in the battle: and three, among whom was Bonnet, were wounded.

Our loss was severe, amounting to 694 killed, 4,270 wounded, and 236 missing. Major-general Le Marchant was killed; and lieutenant-generals Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and major-general Alten, were wounded.

Such was the battle of Salamanca; which, whether we consider it in reference to the uncomnion sagacity displayed by lord Wellington in taking advantage of the injudicious movement of his adversary; the promptitude and skill with which the plan and arrangements were formed, at this critical moment; the intrepidity and success with which all these arrangements were executed; or the final issue of the whole; must be deemed the most decisive proof of the superiority of British military talent and bravery; and a battle to which the sons of Britain may always appeal with the proudest feelings, as challenging a comparison with any that history records.

CHAP.

and beaten in such a manner, and to such a degree, that it not only suffered a loss of nearly one-third of its numbers on the field of battle, but fled, thus weakened, in the ut most disorder and confusion. The battle of Salamanca, therefore, on the part of the English, promised not a barren victory; and even those who, while they gloried in the former battles which their countrymen had gained in the peninsula, lamented that they seemed not to forward the grand objects, either of rousing the Spaniards or of ex pelling the French, acknowledged that now their hopes were sanguine on these points, and that they confidently expected that lord Wellington would be the saviour of the peninsula. On the other hand, those who had continually talked of the zeal of the Spanish nation, but who, when they were called upon to prove that zeal by its effects, had excused the Spaniards by appealing to the state of their country, occupied and oppressed by the enemy, now acknowledged that, as lord Wellington had, as it were, annihilated one of the main armies of that enemy, if the Spaniards did not step forward and exert themselves effectually in their own cause, their opinion of them would undergo a change, and their hopes of the deliverance of the peninsula would become languid. To military men the battle of Salamanca was particularly interesting and instructive: the manœuvres of both the armies for several days before the battle discovered great skill, under the direction and guidance of great caution and mutual apprehension on the part of the generals: but the superior merit, both in the manœuvres previous to the battle, in the manœuvre with which the British commander commenced the

engagement, and in the evolutions during it, was undoubtedly on the side of lord Wellington. His object and interest were to retreat; his skill and attention, therefore, were directed to conduct his retreat in such a manner, as not only to prevent Marmont from attacking him to advantage, but also profit by any mistake which his adversary might commit. He had therefore to watch the army of the enemy, at the same time that he was directing the movements and operations and providing for the safe and effectual retreat of his own. The object and interest of Marmont were to press on lord Wellington, but not so closely as to bring on a battle where situation and circumstances were unfavourable: he was sensible of the skill and caution of lord Wellington, and of the bravery of the British troops: this skill and caution he hoped to confound and perplex by the variety of his manœuvres; and if he could succeed in this object, he trusted that his great numerical superiority would be a match for the superior bravery of the British army. The line of retreat offered Marmont frequent opportunities of manoeuvring in such a manner as to conceal from lord Wellington what his real object was; whether he intended seriously to commence a general attack on the British army; and, if such were his serious intention, on what point the attack would take place. But Marmont was not equal to the execution of the plan he had laid down: this plan required not only to be successful, but that it should not prove detrimental to the party who had formed and were execu ting it; that while the attention of the British commander was diverted and distracted, the French army

should