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occasion, that in doing this we do what is not only unnecessary, but dangerous. It will excite the jealousy of the people, raise fresh alarms, and create new rumors. We shall lose the confidence of our constituents, without which no Government can be well administered. I said before that gentlemen did not consider the extent of their doctrine, when they contended so strongly for energy in government. Energy in government may become a despotism. The people of America, I will be bold to say, do not wish a government energetic to this degree. They wish the Government to be as the Constitution has fixed it, and its powers to be exercised in the manner it has pointed out; and not to be accumulated upon the Chief Magistrate, in order to make him like a sovereign whose yoke they disdained to bear.

Let me remind gentlemen once more of the situation of this country. There are thousands of our fellow-citizens dissatisfied with this feature of the Constitution. There are two whole States which have not adopted our Constitution. Can this be the time to make your Government more odious to show a disposition towards monarchy ? It cannot be ? The patriots of America will never do aught to drive their country into that anarchy from which it is but just arising; they will not force the people to be loudly clamorous for amendments; yet such is the evident tendency of the present policy.

I earnestly hope that the words which we have all along contended against may be struck out; for, desirable as this bill is, I would rather lose it altogether than pass it in its present form.

Mr. MADISON.—I am in favor of the motion for striking out, but not upon the principles of my worthy colleague. I will briefly state my reasons for voting in the manner I intend. First, altering the mode of expression tends to give satisfaction to those gentlemen who think it not an object of legislative discretion; and second, because the amendment already agreed to fully contains the sense of this House upon the doctrine of the Constitution; and therefore the words are unnecessary as they stand here. I will not trouble the House with repeating the reasons why the change of expression is best, as they are well understood. But gentlemen cannot fairly urge against us a change of ground, because the point we contended for is fully obtained by the amendment. It was truly said by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. BENSON,) that these words carry with them an implication that the Legislature has the power of granting the power of removal.

[June, 1789.

Executive. The Legislature creates the office defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the Legisla tive power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an Executive nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I would not extend or strain that qualification be yond the limits precisely fixed for it. We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it was founded. In this point of view, we shall readily conclude that if the Legislature determines the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be insecure if they were to designate the officer also. The nature of things restrains and confines the Legislative and Executive authorities in this respect; and hence it is that the Constitution stipulates for the independence of each branch of the Government.

Let it be understood that the Legislature is to have some influence both in appointing and removing officers, and I venture to say the people of America will justly fear a system of sinecures. What security have they that offices will not be created to accommodate favorites or pensioners subservient to their designs? I never did conceive, that so far as the Constitution gave one branch of the Legislature an agency in this business, it was, by any means, one of its most meritorious parts; but so far as it has gone, I confess I would be as unwilling to abridge the power of that body as to enlarge it. But considering, as I do, that the Constitution fairly vests the President with the power, and that the amendment declares this to be the sense of the House, I shall concur with the gentlemen in opposition so far as to strike out these words, which I now look upon to be useless.

I have a great respect for the abilities and judg ment of my worthy colleague, (Mr. PAGE,) and am convinced he is inspired by the purest motives in his opposition to what he conceives to be an improper measure; but I hope he will not think so strange of our difference, if he considers the small proportion of the House which concurs with him with respect to impeachment being the only way of removing officers. I believe the opinion is held but by one gentleman besides himself. If this sentiment were to obtain, it would give rise to more objections to the Constitution than gentlemen are aware of; more than any other construction whatever. Yet while he professes to be greatly alarmed on one account, he possesses a stoic apathy with respect to the other.

Mr. SEDGWICK did not mean to trouble the House with the reasons upon which his opinion was founded. He supposed every gentleman had made up his mind upon full deliberation. He had made up an opinion for himself, and intended to be guided by this opinion in giving his vote.

JUNE, 1789.]

peachment; but he thought it was the discretion of the Legislature to authorize the exercise of it, because they had complete power over the duration of the offices they created. Hence he deemed it necessary to make an express grant of the power of removal: but strike out these words, and there is no express grant in the bill. Now, if he was right in his construction, it became necessary to retain the words; they could do no harm for the reasons before mentioned, and they stand very well with the amendment already agreed to. If he erred in judgment, no injury could arise from the error. But if other gentlemen err in their construction, we have a weak, decrepit explanation, which the President may not easily understand. For if he supposes the Constitution totally silent, he can hardly draw authority from your law; and he will be reduced to the dilemma of acting in the manner related of the late Governor of Virginia by an honorable gentleman from that State, (Mr. WHITE,) which is by no means to be wished.

Mr. GERRY was glad to find the majority had relinquished the right of the Legislature to grant this power. If they would go further, and leave the operation of the Constitution uninfluenced, they would do right; but certainly it is improper for the House to throw its weight into the scale with the President, to counteract what gentlemen think a constitutional imbecility.

Mr. MOORE expressed his approbation of the motion, after what had been carried, because he would not have it thought that the Legislature possess a right to confer powers not vested in them by the Constitution.

Mr. LAWRENCE was against striking out the words, because he thought the Legislature had power to establish offices on what terms they pleased. The Constitution secured the independence of the judges, by making their appointment during good behaviour; but would any gentleman contend that Congress could not make this the tenure of other offices, if they thought such tenure likely to be most productive of public good? If this was admitted, the Legislature might abridge the constitutional power of the President respecting the removal of such officers. To avoid this clashing of opinions, he wished the words to remain in the bill.

Mr. BOUDINOT was against the motion, because the Constitution vested all executive power in the President. The power of designating and appointing officers to execute the laws was in its nature executive. Consequently, the President would appoint ex officio if he had not been limited by the express words of the Constitution. Hence he inferred, ex officio, he would remove, without limitation; but as debate had arisen, and the question been seriously agitated, he was clear for making a legislative declaration, in order to prevent future inconvenience.

He had another reason. The arguments on a similar motion had taken up four days; they were such as convinced a large majority of the House that the words ought to remain in the bill. Now, to strike out after such mature deliberation, argued,

[H. OF R.

a fickleness which he hoped never to see affect this honorable body. No new arguments have now been urged. The former ones were conclusive, or they were not conclusive; if they were conclusive, we did right in keeping in the words; if they were not conclusive, we ought to have given them up. They appeared then to be conclusive, and appear still to be so; therefore he would vote against the motion.

Mr. TUCKER.-I am embarrassed on this question, as the yeas and nays are called; because the vote is taken in such a manner as not to express the principles upon which I vote.

In the Committee of the Whole, I voted for striking out the words that are now proposed to be struck out; and my reason was, I was doubtful whether it was proper to vest on this occasion the power in the President alone. It appears to me, that the power is not necessarily vested in the President by the Constitution, neither in the President and Senate. I find no words that fix this power precisely in any branch of the Government. It must, however, by implication, be in the Legislature, or it is no where, until the Constitution is amended. I presume the implication is at least equally favorable to the Legislature as to any other branch, if it necessarily belongs to the Government. I apprehend a law is necessary in every instance to determine the exercise of the power. In some cases, it may be proper that the President alone should have it. I am not clear in my own mind, what general rule, if any, can be established on this subject. Perhaps in other cases it may be lodged with the President and Senate ; or it may be given to the heads of departments. But whosoever is invested with it, it must be in consequence of a law; and the Legislature have a right to vest it where they please. For my part, I am not under those serious apprehensions which gentlemen have expressed. I do not apprehend that vesting it in the President, or President and Senate, will effect a change of Government; but at the same time, I am anxious to preserve a consistency, and that the business should be settled upon proper ground.

I said I was against the words in the committee, because I doubted if the President was the proper person to exercise this authority. The amendment adopted this morning I likewise voted against, because I do not wish that the law should imply that the power of removing officers at pleasure is a Constitutional right vested in him. Now, I would rather a law should pass vesting the power in improper hands, than that the Constitution should be wrongly construed. If we say the President may remove from office, it is a grant of power; and we can repeal the law, and prevent the abuse of it. But if we, by law, imply that it is a Constitutional right vested in the President, there will be a privilege gained, which the Legislature cannot affect; at least, the reversion of such a solemn opinion will occasion much inconvenience, not to say confusion.

For these reasons, I shall now be against striking out the words, though I wish to have some modification of them; but the last question

being carried, has left me in doubt what to propose, to be consistent with my opinions. I am precluded from adding, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and perhaps it would be out of order to change the word remove into suspend.

Mr. HARTLEY was against striking out, and so would every gentleman be, he trusted, who was not fully convinced that the power of removal vested by the Constitution is in the President. He owned he had some doubts on that head himself; perhaps some others might be in the same predicament; but he had none with respect to the propriety of the President's exercising that prerogative, and therefore should readily consent to grant it. This might be done by retaining the words, and without going beyond the avowed limits of the legislative authority.

Mr. VINING acquiesced in striking out, because he was satisfied that the Constitution vested the power in the President; and he thought it more likely to obtain the acquiescence of the Senate on a point of legislative construction on the Constitution, than to a positive relinquishment of a power which they might otherwise think themselves in some degree entitled to.

A desultory conversation followed; and the question was put and decided by the yeas and nays, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Ames, Baldwin, Benson, Brown, Burke, Clymer, Coles, Gerry, Goodhue, Griffin, Grout, Hathorn, Huntington, Leonard, Livermore, Madison, Matthews, Moore, P. Muhlenberg, Page, Parker, Partridge, Van Rensselaer, Scott, Sherman, Sinnickson, Smith, (of South Carolina,) Sturgis, Sumter, Vining, and White-31.

NAYS-Messrs. Boudinot, Cadwalader, Carroll, Contee, Fitzsimons, Gilman, Hartley, Heister, Lawrence, Lee, Schureman, Sedgwick, Seney, Smith, (of Maryland,) Sylvester, Thatcher, Trumbull, Tucker, and Wadsworth-19.

The words being struck out, the bill was ordered to be engrossed, and read the third time to morrow. Adjourned.

TUESDAY, June 23.

Mr. HUNTINGTON, from the committee appointed for the purpose, reported a bill to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries, which passed its first reading.

DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

The House took up for consideration the Senate's amendments to the impost bill, which the House on the 16th instant had refused to concur in, and which a message from the Senate now informed them they would not recede from.

Mr. THATCHER moved to agree to the amendment of the Senate in the enacting style, with an amendment. The House originally sent the bill up in this form, "Be it enacted by the Congress of the United States;" the Senate proposed as an amendment, "Be it enacted by the Senate

[JUNE, 1789.

and Representatives;" and Mr. Thatcher wished to add the words "House of" before "Representatives"-observing that the word Senate spoke of the collective body of the Senators, and the word Representatives alluded to the individual members of this House only, and did not comprehend their Legislative function. There ought to be an equality in the enacting style; therefore the words "House of" were necessary. This motion was agreed to.

The clause discriminating between the distilled spirits of nations in treaty, or otherwise, was now taken into consideration.

Mr. LEE was disposed to agree with the Senate on this article, because it would have but little effect, and therefore was not worth the delay; but he should be immovable with respect to the discrimination in the article of tonnage. He was far from abandoning his principle by this conces sion; it was merely the effect of deference and respect for the Senate, and a desire to set the Government in motion.

Mr. PAGE.-Gentlemen on a former occasion called this discrimination an empty compliment to our allies; yet it is that very compliment for which nations have stickled. It is the practice of nations to reciprocate advantages to each other's commerce; and hereby we manifest that spirit of attention and generosity which will do honor to the councils of America.

Mr. GERRY said, there were various opinions respecting the treaties which the United States had entered into. But admitting them to be beneficial, what are the principles upon which they are formed? Upon principles of reciprocity. What obligation are we laid under by them? Merely to fulfil the part we have stipulated to perform. Are there other obligations? If there are obligations of honor and generosity, will a difference of two cents on a gallon of distilled spirits discharge them? Will this be considered by our allies as paying a debt of gratitude? I apprehend not. Will it draw on a war, as it has been called, of commercial regulations, with a kingdom which has much in her power? If it does, will the benefit equal this disadvantage? If it does not compensate it, we shall be bad politicians to adopt measures injurious to our common good. Coercive measures ought not to be pursued in preference to lenient ones, unless there is a moral certainty of success by the former, and but a doubtful chance by the latter. If we should fail in our object, our impotence will become the scoff of the world, and our commerce be destroyed. Gentlemen ought to be well assured that they will not be compelled to recede with disgrace from a system of this kind, before they venture to adopt it. I have no conviction of this nature; and therefore I am willing to strike out the clause.

Mr. PAGE declared treaties to be beneficial, and gratitude a principle by which nations ought to be actuated. He feared nothing from retaliation; he was too confident of success to dread a commercial war with the nation alluded to. It had been demonstrated by his worthy colleague, (Mr.