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doctrine, that the meaning of the Constitution cessarily follow; because there was no express may as well be ascertained by the legislative as by authority given to the Legislature in the Constithe judicial authority. When the question tution to enable the President, the courts of law, emerges as it does in this bill, and much seems to or heads of the departments, to remove an inferior depend upon it, I should conceive it highly proper officer; all that was said on that head was conto make a legislative construction. In another fined solely to the power of appointing them. If point of view it is proper that this interpretation the gentleman admits that the Legislature may should now take place, rather than at a time when vest the power of removal, with respect to inthe exigency of the case may require the exer- ferior officers, he must also admit that the Consticise of the power of removal. At present, the tution vests the President with the power of redisposition of every gentleman is to seek the truth, moval in the case of superior officers; because and abide by its guidance when it is discovered. both powers are implied in the same words. The I have reason to believe the same disposition pre- President may appoint the one class, and the vails in the Senate. But will this be the case Legislature may authorize the courts of law or when some individual officer of high rank draws heads of departments to appoint in the other case. into question the capacity of the President, with If then it is admitted that the power of removal the Senate, to effect his removal? If we leave vests in the President, or President and Senate, the Constitution to take this course, it can never the arguments which I urged yesterday, and those be expounded until the President shall think it ex- which have been urged by honorable gentlemen pedient to exercise the right of removal, if he on this side of the question for these three days supposes he has it; then the Senate may be in- past, will fully evince the truth of the construcduced to set up their pretensions. And will they tion which we give, that the power is in the Predecide so calmly as at this time, when no impor-sident alone. I will not repeat them, because tant officer in any of the great departments is appointed to influence their judgments? The imagination of no member here, or of the Senate, or of the President himself, is heated or disturbed by faction. If ever a proper moment for decision should offer, it must be one like the present.

I do not conceive that this question has been truly stated by some gentlemen. In my opinion it is not whether we shall take the power from one branch of the Government and give it to another; but the question is, to which branch has the Constitution given it? Some gentlemen have said, that it resides in the people at large; and that if it is necessary to the Government, we must apply to the people for it, and obtain it by way of amendment to the Constitution. Some gentlemen contend, that although it is given in the Constitution, as a necessary power to carry into execution the other powers vested by the Constitution, yet it is vested in the Legislature. I cannot admit this doctrine either; because it is setting the Legislature at the head of the Executive branch of the Government. If we take the other construction of the gentleman from South Carolina, that all officers hold their places by the firm tenure of good behaviour, we shall find it still more improper. I think gentlemen will see, upon reflection, that this doctrine is incompatible with the principles of free Government. If there is no removability but by way of impeachment, then all the Executive officers of Government hold their offices by the firm tenure of good behaviour, from the Chief Justice down to the tide waiter.

[Mr. SMITH interrupted Mr. M., and said that he had admitted that inferior officers might be removed, because the Constitution had left it in the power of the Legislature to establish them on what terms they pleased; consequently, to direct their appointment and removal.]]

Mr. MADISON had understood the gentleman as he now explained himself. But still he contended, that the consequences he had drawn would ne

they must have full possession of every gentleman's mind. I am willing, therefore, to rest the decision here; and hope that it will be made in such a manner as to perpetuate the blessings which this Constitution was intended to embrace.

Mr. PAGE. The more I hear on this all-important question, the more I am alarmed. Gentlemen fear much from a blending of the Legislative and Executive authorities; and I do not blame their fears, for they are but too well grounded; but then they ought not to press for the interference of the Legislature in a matter which they acknowledge wholly to be within the Executive department. I think, upon their own principles, they ought to join us in striking out the clause, and leave this question where it ought to be. There is no fear but a proper interpretation will be made, if the Chief Magistrate is a friend to his country. He will exercise his authority when it is required; and if he judges himself to be possessed of the power of removal, he will use it, and submit it to his country to judge whether he was vested with it or not.

But I am astonished at the arguments of gentlemen, who contend, that granting this authority to the President is the best security to public liberty. Has any State in the Union ever thought it necessary to put such a power into the hands of their Chief Magistrate, in order to secure the liberties of the citizen? If it is that great security which some gentlemen seem to think, it is strange that it should never, as yet, have been thought of under the State Governments. If no State has yet given such a power, I think we are setting a bad example to begin it; if any have done it, we do ill not to set them a better.

When I seconded my colleague's motion for striking out these objectionable words, I contented myself with saying nothing more than that I seconded his motion. This I did, sir, to save time, and avoid a repetition of what I had said when the subject was before discussed. I lay it down as a rule, sir, not to use more words here

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than are absolutely necessary to explain the motives which induced me to vote in a certain manner; or which I humbly conceive may serve to elucidate the subject, and induce some members to vote with me. But, sir, on the present occasion, as much has been said and repeated against the motion which I seconded, and as it is a question of great importance, I must again break through the rule which I had imposed on myself, and give a loose to my imagination, as others have done; if my laconic method of arguing does not strike the House, the members who dislike long speeches must excuse me for being troublesome to them.

[JUNE, 1789.

crouch before the President, as the heads of such departments at Constantinople now do before the Grand Seignior. I see here no prerogatives. Strike out the clause, sir, and you leave your officers responsible to the President, but not abject tools to him. You leave him responsible to Congress, and to our fellow-citizens, his constituents. If he see cause, it will be his duty to lodge information to ground an impeachment; and, in the mean time, he will take such measures as the public good may require. If treason be committed, a commitment on impeachment, and trial, may follow.

The mischief which is past the President may I cannot agree to let these words stand as part retract. He may cause it to be punished by Conof the bill, because I think them incompatible stitutional means, and by the controlling power with the spirit, if not with the letter of the Con-given in the bill itself. In my opinion, he may stitution; as better calculated to excite the prevent a repetition of the mischiefs. Sir, it is to jealousy of Republics, than to secure the due ad- our infant republic-on which, too, the eyes of the ministration of the affairs of our new Republics; whole world are fixed; on which the future prosand as directly tending to confirm the suspicion pect of the happiness of mankind depends-of of those who have asserted that the new Govern- great consequence to avoid every step which may ment would run instantly headlong into a mon- even appear to be leading it into the fatal paths of archy. Having this idea of the matter, and being tyrannical Government. Every sentence of our persuaded at the same time that the heaped-up laws, sir, should be carefully guarded against expowers on the Chief Magistrate especially as the pressions which may tend to increase the insolent bill proposes, does not render him more responsi- hopes of the enemies of our Government, and the ble; but, on the contrary, by increasing his im- anxious fears of its friends. Every word ought portance, and multiplying his dependants, directly to be expunged from our laws which can have tends to diminish his responsibility, and secure that tendency, if not absolutely and evidently him, if not against suspicion, at least against necessary for the public good. charges of delinquency. To the argument which has been urged against the amendment, which is drawn from the necessity of having energy in Government, despatch, secresy, and decision, I think all these advantages may be had, without putting the respectable heads of departments in a situation so humiliating, that I can scarcely suppose a man of true independent spirit, and fit to be in such an office, could submit to. This doctrine, if pushed as far as it will go, will lead to great lengths-to imprisonment-nay, to execution. Why may it not be said that the President may remove a judge from his bench, or a colonel from his regiment? Does it not appear that much mischief may be done by a corrupt judge, or by a treacherous or cowardly colonel? Yet the former must be impeached, and the latter tried by a court-martial. In the latter case, indeed, as Commander-in-Chief, he may arrest, secure, and decide. And here, I confess, I should see no impropriety in those who wished to guard against the evils they talk of, if they were to move to amend the clause, by proposing that the President should have the power to arrest and imprison, as well as remove; nor do I see any thing amiss in declaring in what manner an officer who is to be appointed under a law shall be removed. The law may with propriety say, what shall be the qualification and what the disqualification of the officer. But, sir, I wish, in the first place, to get rid of an expression which I think will furnish arms to our enemies to attack our Government with fresh vigor, and will discourage our friends, and which must serve to break down the spirit of our officers of State, and make them

Sir, the arguments in favor of the clause which I wish to expunge, are such as have laid the foundation of tyranny in other countries. The doctrine of energy in Government, as I said before, is the true doctrine of tyrants. I know, sir, nevertheless, that here it is the true doctrine of freemen, patriots, of men who wish to see it only applied to support that Government which they think is wisely calculated to preserve the liberties of their country. But, sir, I warn those patriots against the use of arguments, which, above all others, may, to their grief and mortification, be cruelly turned against them. For my part, I shall ever prefer the security of my fellow-citizens, whether in or out of office, to a rigid observance of the rules of office; and an independent spirit in our officers, to a prompt servility. Energy of Government may be the destruction of liberty; it should not, therefore, be too much cherished in a free country. A spirit of independence should be cultivated; a sense of honor and virtue nourished with care; and though some irregularities might take place, they would be such as could not endanger public liberty.

I wish to strike out the clause too, sir, because we shall leave the Constitution to the proper expositors of it, and because it ill becomes the representatives of a free people, in their first act, to show an eagerness to extend the powers of the Executive.

The friends of the clause support it, because it tends to make the President responsible, and prevents the Senate from exercising a power not vested in them by the Constitution, which they think has already invested them with too much

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durante bene placito, et ne dure se bene gesserint —a monstrous doctrine. As to inferior officers, who, we are told, must also be impeached, Congress have a Constitutional right to empower the President to appoint, and I suppose to remove also; not that the power necessarily follows appointments.

power; they require singleness in the Executive in their Constitutions from confederated America. power to extend the energy of Government. It is said the officers ought to be commissioned Need I repeat that this energy is oftener employed against the liberty of a people, than in favor of it? The liberty and security of our fellow-citizens is our great object, and not the prompt execution of the laws. Indecision, delay, blunders, nay, villanous actions in the administration of Government, are trifles compared to legalizing the full exertion of a tyrannical despotism. Good God! what, authorize in a free republic, by law, too, by your first act, the exertion of a dangerous royal prerogative in your Chief Magistrale! What! where honor and virtue ought to be the support of your Government, will you infuse and cherish meanness and servility in your citizens, and insolence and arbitrary power in your Chief Magistrate, when you know that thousands of virtuous citizens are dissatisfied with your Government, because they think they see the seeds of monarchy in it? And two whole States have refused to unite with you, because they think your Government dangerous to their liberties; will you openly, before their faces, in a solemn act of Congress, insert words which fully justify their opinions and fears?

Let me ask again, does increasing the power and multiplying the dependants of the President diminish his responsibility? How is the President responsible for the conduct of officers whom he appoints, with the advice of the Senate? Why not, if the Constitution be silent, as some say, make the Senate responsible for their advice in this case, and say, that the President, with their advice and consent, may suspend and deprive persons of office? Why should they, of whose persons gentlemen are so much afraid, be screened from censure, for the malpractices of the heads of departments, more than the President? If the clause remain in the bill, the case may stand thus: the Senate may concur in appointing an able, faithful officer; the President may remove him for not being subservient to his views. So that here is a good method to procure a good officer, and a summary process to get rid of him at the same time-the sure means of producing resentment and animosity between the President and Senate, and taking away all responsibility from the latter, and diminishing that of the former. Thus, then, we see the doctrine of responsibility fails to support the clause.

It has been repeatedly said, strike out the clause, and you give the Senate the power they ought not to have. How does this give a power? It may leave the Constitution at large, and that may give the power; and, indeed, those gentlemen seem to be aware that it does, or they would not say that the Senate will have the power, if we do not take it away. The truth is, the Constitution does give that power, and wisely gives it to the Senate, to secure the inhabitants of the respective States. It is to no purpose to say that nations do not blend or separate the power in the manner we have done by our Constitution, and to draw inferences from them that it is improper, because England, and the other nations of Europe, are totally different

The call for the question was now pretty general through the House, and several gentlemen were up to speak, when Mr. SUMTER rose, and begged the patience of the committee until tomorrow. He appealed to their candor on the occasion; and hoped other gentlemen, who were disposed to speak, would be indulged with the privilege. He therefore moved that the committee rise and report progress.

Mr. LEE hoped the committee would not rise, and that the subject would be decided. He did not think it possible it could receive any further elucidation. Gentlemen should remember it had been, on a former occasion, one whole day under consideration, and now, again, it had been debated for three days; this was surely allowing time enough for its discussion; besides, if it was not, gentlemen would have a further opportunity of delivering their sentiments, for the decision now will not be final.

Mr. STONE said, he had some further observations to make on this subject, but he would not press the committee to hear him; if they were inclined to indulge him on this point to-morrow he should be sensible of the favor.

Mr. MADISON said, that he did not wish to prescribe the privileges of the members of a hearing; if the gentlemen were disposed to deliver any further sentiments to the committee, he should not insist upon a decision at this time.

The committee now rose, and the House adjourned.

FRIDAY, June 19.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from several of their amendments to the bill "for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises imported into the United States," disagreed to by this House; and insist on their other amendments to the same bill, also disagreed to by the House. The Senate have also agreed to the report of the joint committee, appointed to view and report on the appropriation of the rooms in the City Hall, to which they desire the concurrence of this House.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. TRUMbull in the Chair. The question on striking out the words " to be removable by the President" being still under consideration,

Mr. JACKSON, from Georgia.-I am well aware how disagreeable and irksome it must be to have another member rise on this question; but when

Department of Foreign Affairs.

I consider that the liberties of my country may | who would rather sink into annihilation than be suspended on the decision of this question, I sacrifice it at the altar of despotism or anarchy. feel myself compelled to trespass once more on Look into the production of her chosen sonsthe patience of the committee. And I cannot look at your own Constitution. Do gentlemen but think the time well spent that has been em- find that it is modelled upon their principles? ployed in the consideration of this business; it Are the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powis of great magnitude in every point of view, ers kept separate and distinct? No, Mr. Chairman, whether it be considered as a Constitutional ques- they are blended; not, to be sure, in so high or dantion, or a question of expediency. And gentle- gerous a degree, but in all the possible forms they men will excuse me, if my language should not are capable of receiving; the Executive has a qualíbe adapted to that delicacy to which so respect-fied check upon the Legislature; the Legislature able a body is entitled. I have accustomed my-exercises the powers of the Judiciary and Execuself to a blunt integrity of speech, which I hope tive. Thus, then, I take it, neither our Governthe goodness of my intentions will excuse. For 1 do most verily believe that this power will become inimical to liberty, and blast all those delightful buds of happiness which the establishment of the new Constitution flattered us would expand and ripen into fruition.

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Carthage lost her liberty? How have all the an-Executive and Legislative powers. If these are cient republics been swallowed up in the gulf of the principles of the Constitution, why will gentyranny and despotism, but by an accumulation tlemen contend for the independency of each of power in one particular branch of their Gov- branch of the Government? The celebrated Mr. ernments? How careful, then, ought we to be in Wilson agrees with me in this sentiment; for he the preservation of those limits which the Con- declares that the Senate was constituted a check stitution has prescribed. If, then, the Constitu- upon the President. Let gentlemen turn over his tion has vested the power of removal in the Presi- speeches delivered in the convention of Pennsyldentand Senate, we ought, on no pretence whatever, vania, and they will find he asserts it as an into change the body authorized to exercise it. The controvertible fact. This sentiment is confirmed words of the Constitution forcibly imply our con- by other writers of reputation. It is our business struction; and it has never yet been proved, nay, to preserve the Constitution inviolate; and if it has hardly been controverted, that the power these are its principles, we are to see that they which appoints is not the power to remove. are not injured or deviated from.

It is admitted, that in cases of ambassadors and Mr. BALDWIN.-I have felt an unusual anxiety public ministers, it would be improper to recall during the debate upon this question. I have atthem without the concurrence of the Senate ; be- tentively listened to the arguments which have cause the Senate are combined with the Presi- been bronght forward, and have weighed them in dent, and strongly too, in the objects of their ne- my mind with great deliberation; and as I congotiations. How then can gentlemen discrimi-sider a proper decision upon it of almost infinite nate? The Constitution vests the power of ap- importance to the Government, I must beg the pointing in the one case, the same as in the other; indulgence of the House while I submit a few and these officers are also public ministers; the observations. Constitution views them in that light; they are styled the heads of departments, and are appointed to advise the President.

The main ground on which the question is made to rest is, that, if we adopt this clause, we violate the Constitution. Many of the gentleBut setting aside the Constitutionality of the men who advocate the present motion for strikquestion, where it must be admitted we have the ing out, would, if they could do it with consisadvantage, let us examine the question of expe- tency to the Constitution, be in favor of the diency, and meet gentlemen on their own ground. clause. We have been reminded of our oaths, In this circle we must expect to meet spectres in- and warned not to violate the solemn obligation. deed. Has not your President got the sword in This injunction has come from so many parts of his own hands? for I look forward to the time the House, that it arrested my whole attention when America will have both an army and a for a few minutes; and then they produced us navy. I do not confine myself to the present pe- the clause in the Constitution, which directed riod. You may then have a President different that officers should be appointed by and with the from the magistrate that at present fills the Chair. advice and consent of the Senate. They then If then he has the power of removing and controll- tell us, that they should be removable in the ing the Treasury Department, he has the purse- same manner. We see the clause by which it is strings in his hand; and you only fill the strong directed that they should be appointed in that box, and collect the money of the empire, for his manner, but we do not see the clause respecting use. The purse and the sword will enable him their removal in the same way. Gentlemen to lay prostrate the liberties of America. Is this have only drawn it as an inference from the fora mere spectre? No. Experience confirms the mer; they construe that to be the meaning of the observation, a wise people will never let their Constitution, which we construe the reverse. freedom lie at the will and pleasure of any man. hope, therefore, gentlemen will change their exAnother observation has been made to prove pression, and say, we shall violate their constructhe expediency of this measure. It was said by tion of the Constitution, and not the Constitution the gentleman from Virginia, that the President itself. This will be a very different charge; unwas chosen by and from the mass of the people, less the gentlemen pretend to support the doctrine and therefore might be safely trusted. But the of infallibility, as it respects their decisions; and President may be chosen by electors appointed by that would perhaps be more than the House the State Legislatures; and therefore he is an would be willing to admit, and more than the improper person to be entrusted with this author- people in this country are accustomed to believe. ity. He is not accountable to the people; for I have said, the gentlemen rest their principal they have no immediate hand in appointing or opposition on this point, that the Constitution rejecting him. While some gentlemen assert, plainly means that the officers must be removed and others deny, the responsibility of the Presi- in the way they are appointed. Now, when gendent, there is danger in deciding. These oppo-tlemen tell me that I am going to construe the sing opinions cannot be reconciled: and therefore will give no proper data to decide in favor of the President.

I call once more on gentlemen to answer me this question, and I shall rest satisfied in giving up my opinion; let them prove to me that it was not the intention of this Constitution to blend the

Constitution, and may interpret it in a manner which was never intended, I am very cautious how I proceed. I do not like to construe overmuch. It is a very delicate and critical branch of our duty; and there is not, perhaps, any part of the Constitution on which we should be more cautious and circumspect than on the present.

I