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Executive Departments.

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misbehaviour would be, to suspend the officer until could the Legislature safely trust the President after trial and conviction, when he would be re- with this power? The question of right he conmoved. A gentleman has asked, what must be ceived to be indisputable; it was merely a ques done if an incumbent is found unfit for his office? tion of expediency. Gentlemen admit that we He would answer, the person must remain there. have a right to limit the duration of the office. What must be done if a member of this House is What is authorizing the removal by the Presi found unfit to perform the business of his con- dent but limiting it? and if we conceive this the stituents? Certainly he must and will continue best method of limiting it, why shall it be objected on this floor. You cannot remove him unless to as unconstitutional? If it increases the responguilty of some crime. He did not hold the opin-sibility of the President, and certainly it does this, ion mentioned by some gentlemen, that the power why should the Legislature hesitate in obtaining who appoints can remove, because there were the highest security for the public interest and several cases where those who appoint have not safety? the power of removal. In some of the State Governments, the chief Executive Magistrate appoints to office, but cannot remove. So, under this Constitution, neither the people nor the Legislature can remove the members of the Senate or House of Representatives; nor can the Electors remove the President or Vice President, both of whom they appoint to those offices. He apprehended the power which the Constitution gave to Congress of establishing certain offices by law, would enable them to limit the tenure of the office; but if Congress declined the exercise of this power, the officers appointed would continue in their station during good behaviour.

Mr. LAWRENCE apprehended the words of the resolution limited the tenure of the office in the manner which the honorable gentleman last up seemed to admit to be proper. To be sure, it did not denominate the period by years or days, but it nevertheless fixed a precise period for its existence, viz. during the pleasure of the President. The Constitution had certainly intended that Congress should define the tenure of office, or it would never have declared the Judges should continue during good behaviour. This Constitutional provision in their favor, was to render them independent of the Legislature, which it was not supposed would be the case if nothing on this head had been declared. It is the only thing which prevents us from making them dependent upon the will of the President for their continuance in office, or from ordaining that their commission shall expire at the end of a certain term of years. He conceived, as the Constitution was silent with respect to the time the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should remain in office, that it therefore depended upon the will of the Legislature to say how the department should be constituted and established by law, and the conditions upon which he shall enjoy the office. We can say he shall hold it for three years from his appointment, or during good behaviour; and we may declare unfitness and incapacity causes of removal, and make the President alone judge of this case. We may authorize the President to remove him for any cause he thinks proper. It is in our power to make such declaration; but at the same time the Constitution provides, that the President shall not have it in his power to hold a person in office who has been guilty of crimes or misdemeanors against the Government; the power of removal in such cases is in the Legislature, by impeachment. The only question which remained, he considered to be,

Mr. SYLVESTER thought the Constitution ought to have a liberal construction, and therefore was of opinion that the clause relative to the removal by impeachment was intended as a check upon the President, as already mentioned by some gentlemen, and to secure to the people, by means of their representatives, a Constitutional mode of obtaining justice against peculators and defaulters in office, who might be protected by the persons appointing them. He apprehended the doctrine held out by the gentleman from South Carolina would involve the Government in great difficulties, if not in ruin, and he did not see it was a necessary construction of the Constitution. Why, then, should the House search for a meaning, to make the Constitution inconsistent with itself, when a more rational one is at hand? He, however, inclined at present to the sentiments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BLAND,) who thought the Senate ought to be joined with the President in the removal, as they were joined by the Constitution in the appointment to office.

Mr. GOODHUE was decidedly against combining the Senate in this business. He wished to make the President as responsible as possible for the conduct of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch of the Government. If the removal and appointment were placed in the hands of a numerous body, the responsibility would be lessened. He admitted there was a propriety in allowing the Senate to advise the President in the choice of officers; this the Constitution had ordained for wise purposes; but there could be no real advantage arising from the concurrence of the Senate to the removal, but great disadvantages. It might beget faction and party, which would prevent the Senate from paying proper attention to the public business. Upon the whole. he concluded the community would be served by the best men when the Senate concurred with the President in the appointment; but if any oversight was committed, it could best be corrected by the superintending agent. It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over the executive officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had a power to correct the abuses he might discover.

Mr. MADISON. I look upon every Constitutional question, whatever its nature may be, as of great importance. I look upon the present to be doubly so, because its nature is of the highest moment to the well-being of the Government. I have listened with attention to the objections which have

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Executive Departments.

been stated, and to the replies that have been made, and I think the investigation of the meaning of the Constitution has supported the doctrine I brought forward. If you consult the expediency, it will be greatly against the doctrine advanced by gentlemen on the other side of the question. See to what inconsistency gentlemen drive themselves by their construction of the Constitution. The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. SMITH,) in order to bring to conviction and punishment an offender in any of the principal offices, must have recourse to a breach of the common law, and yet he may there be found guilty, and maintain his office, because he is fixed by the Constitution. It has been said, we may guard against the inconveniency of that construction, by limiting the duration of the office to a term of years; but, during that term, there is no way of getting rid of a bad officer but by impeachment. During the time this is depending, the person may continue to commit those crimes for which he is impeached, because if his construction of the Constitution is right, the President can have no more power to suspend than he has to remove.

What fell from one of my colleagues (Mr. BLAND) appears to have more weight than any thing hitherto suggested. The Constitution, at the first view, may seem to favor his opinion; but that must be the case only at the first view; for, if we examine it, we shall find his construction incompatible with the spirit and principles contained in that instrument.

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sibility without obtaining even the shadow; for no gentleman will pretend to say the responsibility of the Senate can be of such a nature as to afford substantial security. But why, it may be asked, was the Senate joined with the President in appointing to office, if they have no responsibility? I answer, merely for the sake of advising, being supposed, from their nature, better acquainted with the character of the candidates than an individual; yet even here the President is held to the responsibility-he nominates, and, with their consent, appoints. No person can be forced upon him as an assistant by any other branch of the Government.

There is another objection to this construction, which I consider of some weight, and shall therefore. mention to the committee. Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now deliberating, than that founded on the mingling of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government in one body. It has been objected, that the Senate have too much of the Executive power even, by having a control over the President in the appointment to office. Now, shall we extend this connexion between the Legislative and Executive departments, which will strengthen the objection, and diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the Executive? I cannot but believe, if gentlemen weigh well these considerations, they will think it safe and expedient to adopt the clause.

It is said, that it comports with the nature of Mr. GERRY.-The Constitution provides for the things, that those who appoint should have the appointment of the public officers in this manner: power of removal; but I cannot conceive that this The President shall nominate, and, by and with sentiment is warranted by the Constitution; I be- the advice and consent of the Senate, shall aplieve it would be found very inconvenient in prac- point ambassadors, other public ministers, and contice. It is one of the most prominent features of the suls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Constitution, a principle that pervades the whole officers of the United States, whose appointments system, that there should be the highest possible are not herein otherwise provided for, and which degree of responsibility in all the Executive offi- shall be established by law. Now, if there be no cers thereof; any thing, therefore, which tends to other clause respecting the appointment, I shall lessen this responsibility, is contrary to its spirit be glad to see how the heads of departments are and intention, and, unless it is saddled upon us to be removed by the President alone. What expressly by the letter of that work, I shall oppose clause is it that the President gives his power in the admission of it into any act of the Legisla- express terms? I believe there is none such. If ture. Now, if the heads of the Executive depart- there is a power of removal, besides that by imments are subjected to removal by the President peachment, it must vest somewhere. It must alone, we have in him security for the good be- vest in the President, or in the President and haviour of the officer. If he does not conform to Senate, or in the President, Senate, and House of the judgment of the President in doing the execu- Representatives. Now there is no clause which tive duties of his office, he can be displaced. This expressly vests it in the President. I believe no makes him responsible to the great Executive gentleman contends it is in this House, because power, and makes the President responsible to that would be that mingling of the Executive the public for the conduct of the person he has and Legislative powers gentlemen deprecate. I nominated and appointed to aid him in the ad- presume, then, gentlemen will grant, that if there ministration of his department. But if the is such a power, it vests with the President, by President shall join in a collusion with this and with the advice and consent of the Senate, officer, and continue a bad man in office, the case who are the body that appoints. I think we ought of impeachment will reach the culprit, and drag to be cautious how we step in between the Presihim forth to punishment. But if you take the dent and the Senate, to abridge the power of the other construction, and say he shall not be dis-one, or increase the other. If the power of replaced but by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the President is no longer answerable for the conduct of the officer; all will depend upon the Senate. You here destroy a real respon

moval vests where I suppose, we, by this declaration, undertake to tranfer it to the President alone.

It has been mentioned, that it is proper to give this power to the President, in order to make him

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more fully responsible for this officer. I am for supporting the President to the utmost of my power, and making him as responsible as possible. I would therefore vest every gift of office, in the power of the Legislature, in the President alone; but I cannot think we ought to attempt to give him authority to remove from office, in cases where the Constitution has placed it in other

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ate have a check over the appointment, because he can remove, and tire out the good disposition of the Senate.

His colleague had objected to the removal in this way, because the Senate would be kept constantly sitting. He did not think this objection of any weight, because the Constitution made some other things their duty, which would require them to be pretty constantly sitting. He alluded to the part they were called upon to peform in making treaties; this, therefore, would be a trifling objection.

Mr. LIVERMORE considered this as a Constitutional question, and was of opinion, that the same power which appointed an officer, had the right of removal also, unless it was restrained by an Mr. BENSON thought it was not absolutely neexpress declaration to the contrary. As the Pre-cessary to make any provision on this head, besident, by and with the advice and consent of the cause the power was given to the President by Senate, is empowered to appoint ambassadors, cer- the Constitution; but as the argument had been tainly they have a right to remove them and ap- pretty well gone into, he would add no more at point others. In the case of the judges, they present, than just to remark an error the gentlemust be appointed for life, or during good beha-man last up had fallen into. He had supposed viour. He had no idea, that it could ever enter into the President to have the powers of a monarch, the heart of any man living, that all officers ap- that he could introduce and keep a favorite in pointed under the Constitution were to have a office in despite of every other branch of the Govperpetuity in office. The judges themselves would ernment: the Senate was an effectual check to a not have had this right, if had not been expressly system of favoritism, and it lay in the power of given by the Constitution, but would be remova- the House to correct any abuse arising from such ble in like manner with ambassadors, other public a system,.if it unhappily was fallen into. ministers, and consuls. He took it, therefore, in Mr. BLAND insisted that the check of the Sethe present case, that the President and the Sen-nate was not sufficient, if the power of removal ate would have the power of removing the Sec- was taken from them. Indeed, he was satisfied, retary of Foreign Affairs. The only question, from the privilege the President had of nominattherefore, which appears to be before the commit-ing and filling up vacancies pro tempore, he would tee is, whether we shall give this power to the become absolute, if he alone had the power of rePresident alone? And with that he thought they moval. He was therefore against this part of the had nothing to do. He supposed, if the clause motion, both on principle and policy. He therewas left out, the President and the Senate would fore moved to add to the words of the motion, proceed, as directed by the Constitution, to ap-"by and with the advice and consent of the Sepoint the officer; and hereafter, if they judged it nate," so that the power of removal might be denecessary, would remove him; but if they neg-clared to be in the same body as the Constitution lected to do so, when it was necessary, by reason of his misdemeanors, this House would impeach him, and so get rid of him on conviction.

placed the appointment.

Mr. CLYMER said, the power of removal was an Executive power, and as such belonged to the President alone, by the express words of the Constitution: "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Senate were not an Executive body; they were a Legislative one. It was true, in some instances, they held a qualified check over the Executive power, but that was in consequence of an express declaration in the Constitution; without such declaration, they would not have been called upon for advice and consent in the case of appointment. Why, then, shall we extend their power to control the removal which is naturally in the Executive, unless it is likewise expressly declared in the Constitution?

Mr. BLAND. It seems to be agreed on all hands, that there does exist a power of removal; the contrary doctrine would be a solecism in Government. If an officer embezzles the public money, or neglects or refuses to do the duties of his appointment, can it be supposed there is no way of getting rid of such a person? He was certain it was essentially necessary such a power should be lodged somewhere, or it would be impossible to carry the Government into execution. Their inquiries were therefore reduced to this point: Does it reside, agreeably to the Constitution, in the President, or in the President and the Senate? The Constitution declares, that the President and the Senate shall appoint, and it naturally follows, that the power which appoints shall remove also. What would be the consequence of the removal by the President alone, he had already mentioned, and need not repeat. A new President might, by turning out the great officers, bring about a change of the ministry, and throw the affairs of the Union into disorder: would not this, in fact, make the President a monarch, and give him absolute power over all the great departments of Every question respecting treaties or public Government? It signifies nothing that the Sen-officers must go through their hands. Why shall

The question on adding the words "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," as moved by Mr. BLAND, was put and lost.

Mr. WHITE. It has been said, that the Senate are not an Executive body. I grant that they are not an Executive body when they are sitting for Legislative purposes; but they are an Executive body when performing their Executive functions as required in the Constitution.

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we make the President responsible for what goes through other hands? He is not solely responsible, agreeably to the Constitution, for the conduct of the officers he nominates, and the Senate appoints; why then talk of obtaining a greater degree of responsibility than is known to the Constitution ?

We are told, that we ought to keep the Legislative and Executive departments distinct; if we were forming a constitution, the observation would be worthy of due consideration, and he would agree to the principles; but the Constitution is formed, and the powers blended; the wished-for separation is therefore impracticable.

Mr. VINING remarked, that the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLYMER) was too well founded to be overturned by the critical distinction made by the gentleman last up, and was sufficient to convince gentlemen, if they would consider it well, that the Constitution vested the power of removal in the President alone. He begged the committee to consider the monstrous effect it would produce if the Legislature went on to mingle the Legislative and Executive powers. He would place it in one other point of view, and then have done with the subject. It is well known, that the Senate are to decide upon an impeachment made by this House. Now, can they be impartial judges when they have already given judgment in the case? Suppose the President communicates his suspicions to the Senate respecting the malfeasance of a public officer, and they, from factious or party views, or, indeed, for want of full information, refuse their consent to the removal; can they be the equal and unbiased judicature which the Constitution contemplates them to be? He thought they could not.

Mr. PAGE requested the committee to delay the decision of this question, because he did not wish gentlemen to commit themselves, without having fully reflected upon the subject. It had presented itself to his mind, as one of the most momentous questions that could arise, in which the rights of the People, the energy of Government, and the liberty of posterity were staked. He begged them not to cast the die, on which the fate of millions was hazarded, until they had maturely considered the subject. He felt a degree of security in the check the Senate had over the President, in appointing to office; but he should not think himself safe, if the power of removal was in the President alone.

The question was now taken, and carried by a considerable majority, in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in the President.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

The committee then proceeded to the consideration of the Treasury Department.

Mr. GERRY knew nothing of the system which gentlemen propose to adopt, in arranging the Treasury Department. He thought they were hurrying on business too rapidly. Gentlemen had already committed themselves on one very important point; he hoped the honorable mover of this proposition would explain his intentions,

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before the committee decided the question. He could not see where it might lead.

The late Congress had, on long experience, thought proper to organize the Treasury Department, in a mode different from that proposed by the resolution. He would be glad to know what the reasons were that should induce the committee to adopt a different system from that which had been found most beneficial to the United States. He hoped gentlemen would give time for considering the subject maturely; wherefore, he would move to postpone it, for the present, and proceed to the War Department.

Mr. BOUDINOT rose, to express his surprise that gentlemen should say that they were not prepared, when the subject had been often mentioned to the House, and its necessity was self-evident. He had a week ago proposed to refer it to a select committee, but had been overruled. He was told then, that the proper mode of doing the business was, to go into a Committee of the Whole. He had taken that mode, in consequence, and hoped the business would not be unnecessarily delayed.

Mr. GOODHUE admitted the necessity of having a Treasury Department, as said by the gentleman last up, was self-evident; but it was not obvious whether the Department should be placed under one man, or a Board of Commissioners. In order to have time for considering the question, he would second the motion for postponing.

Mr. BENSON said, the motion of postponement was contrary to the rules of the House. The gentleman might move the committee to rise, and the effect would be the same. While he was up, he would declare his sentiment to be in favor of a single head of this Department, rather than three; but he would have the principal officer well checked in the execution of his trust. The motion being changed for the rising of the committee, it was agreed to. Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, May 20.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, Mr. TRUMBULL in the Chair. The resolution for establishing the Treasury Department being under consideration:

Mr. GERRY.-We are now called upon, Mr. Speaker, to deliberate, whether we shall place this all-important Department in the hands of a single individual, or in a Board of Commissioners. I presume the gentleman, who has brought forward this string of propositions, means, that this officer shall have power to examine into the state of the public debt and expenses, to receive and disburse the revenue, to devise plans for its improvement and expansion, and, in short, to superintend and direct the receipts and expenditure, and govern the finances of the United States; having under him officers to do the subordinate business of registering and recording his transactions, and a Comptroller to control his opera tions with respect to the accounts and vouchers

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Before this committee proceed one step farther great dissatisfaction. I would be glad to know of in this business, they ought seriously to consider the gentlemen, who are for vesting these powers the situation of this country, and what will be in a single person, where they will find the man the consequence of appointing such an officer; who is capable of performing the duties of a consider how it will affect the public in general, financier? For it is not the mere calling him a the revenue, and even the Government itself. He financier, and giving him a large salary, that will is declared, in the list of duties assigned him in enable him to perform his functions in such a the paper read yesterday by the gentleman from manner as to give satisfaction. We had once a New York, (Mr. BENSON,) to have the power to gentleman who filled such a department, and I form and digest the accounts, and to control all believe the only one in the United States who had the officers of the Department. It is evident, knowledge and abilities by any means competent that we put his integrity to the trial, by such an to the business; but that gentleman is now emarrangement. If he is disposed to embezzle the ployed in another branch of the Government, and public money, it will be out of the power of the cannot be called to this trust. During the late Executive itself to check or control him in his war, Congress thinking it necessary to employ a nefarious practices. The extension of his busi- financier, were led to inquire for a proper characness to the collectors of at least fifty seaports, ter to fill such an office; but not being able to dis(over whom the naval officer can have no control, cover such a one in this country, in whose abiliwith respect to the money received,) will furnish ties they had sufficient confidence, they wrote to abundant opportunities for peculation. In addi- Doctor Price a letter, to induce him to come to tion to the moneys arising from the impost, he America, and accept of an appointment under may have to do with large sums derived from them, for the superintendence of their finances. other quarters, for the sale of the vacant lands, He wrote, in answer, that he felt with gratitude the money of defaulters now due to the United the honor which they had done him by their apStates, and the revenue arising from taxes and ex-plication, and signified, that he was desirous of cises. Admit these innumerable opportunities rendering every service in his power to aid the for defrauding the revenue, without check or con- glorious cause in which America was embarked; trol, and it is next to impossible he should remain but, from his advanced situation in life, and inunsullied in his reputation, or innoxious with re- firmities of body, he was under the necessity of spect to misapplying his trust. declining. This circumstance serves to show how difficult it is to get a proper person for so arduous an undertaking. But it appears to me, that if we could fix upon a person equal to the office, involving him in forming accounts, and such trifling business, would divert his attention from the more important duties he is called upon to perform. The proper business of finance, I take it, ought to be to consider of the means to improve the revenue, and introducing economy into the expenditures; to recommend general systems of finance, without having any thing to do with the actual administration of them, because, if he engages in the Executive business, we shall be deprived of his talents in more important concerns. If it should be granted that there is a person of abilities to be found, adequate to the duties of the office, I want to know where the advantage arises of appointing him alone in preference to a Board? If you have commissioners, you have an opportunity of taking one from each grand division of the United States, namely, the Eastern, the Middle, and Southern Districts. If this person is a memwill have ber of the Board, is it not evident you every advantage from his abilities in such a situation, as you would if he were placed in office without control? If he was possessed of such genius, he could employ it more usefully as a Commissioner of the Board of Treasury, than when left to perform all the drudgery of the Executive part; because while his fine imagination was busied in reducing a chaos to a beautiful system, his colleagues might perform those parts which required less elevation of thought; by dividing the burden, the business would be done with more regularity and facility. Surely no advantage to the public would arise from giving him the sole man

Other great opportunities may arise in case of an anticipation of the public revenue; or, if it is necessary to prevent the injury which a rapid depreciation of the securities occasion to public credit, he may be employed in purchasing them, in order to advance the credit of the Union. But what is to prevent the greatest imposition in this business? Charging them to the public at their nominal value, it is not in the power of the Government to check this species of speculation; what then is the situation of your officer? He must subject himself to suspicion: indeed, it is as much as his reputation is worth to come into a place of this kind; he can hardly preserve his integrity. His honor, credit, and character, must inevitably be injured. He cannot prove himself innocent of the suspicion, because it is the negative side of the question. He can offer nothing more in his defence than a mere denial of the crime.

There is another point which ought to be well considered: This officer is to digest and form the accounts. He can consequently give the business such complexity, as to render it impossible to detect his impositions; and as the inferior officers, who might discover the fraud, are to be appointed by the principal, will they not consequently be men after his own heart?

Taking these circumstances together, it must be very disagreeable to the person appointed, provided he is an honest, upright man; it will be disagreeable also to the people of the Union, who will always have reason to suspect, that a partiality is shown to the collectors, and other officers of the State to which he belonged. This has absolutely been the case, and was productive of very

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