Mr. JACKSON wished to say a few words on the bill. The ayes and noes being called for, he conceived it his duty to state his reasons for his vote. He declared himself to be in favor of the limitation, for the reasons offered by honorable gentlemen yesterday. He said he had as ardent a desire to re-establish public credit, and place it on a good footing, as any member on that floor, yet he did not think making this law perpetual would have that tendency. He had no doubt but every subsequent Legislature would be equally desirous of doing justice to the creditors of the Union, and he therefore felt no uneasiness in leaving such provision to be made by them. If the next Legislature were disposed to violate the public honor, would the law now under consideration stand in their way? For his part, he could not conceive it an insuperable bar. The establishment of public credit depends upon the practice of an honest and upright policy; it will not depend upon paper promises; it must be true and substantial payments that will restore to us our lost honor. If Government do this, our credit will be re-established, let the funds be obtained in what manner they may. He thought the foundation of public credit ought to be laid at home before the superstructure was raised. To do this, the confidence of the people was to be gained; they must be satisfied of the justice of our measures; and this cannot be, unless it impartially affects every part of the Union. Now, some parts of the present bill are very exceptionable to the Southern States; even the Northern gentlemen are far from unanimously approving them. He believed there was not a member who liked every part of the bill. Under these circumstances, what was to be expected but complaints from the people, and a consequent repeal of the bill. He did not wish to insinuate that the Senate would be so depraved as to oppose the public voice, but they might misunderstand it; they were a permanent body, and might be more inclined to support what they considered the honor of the Government, than the convenience of the people. The House of Representatives appeared to him to be the body best calculated to know and feel the interests of their immediate constituents; they ought, therefore, to preserve the power of redressing grievances, and not give too much into the hands of the Senate. He acknowledged the claims which those that fought and bled for their country had upon the justice of Congress; but he did not believe that class of citizens would complain or murmur at this House for keeping the purse-strings in their hands when it was considered necessary to the security and happiness of the people. Mr. WHITE did not see the necessity of calling the yeas and nays; he thought the measure was intended to have one of these two objects, either to show that one part of the House had mistaken the interest of their country, and ought to be held up to posterity, in order that their memories may be charged with their want of knowledge; or that there is a part of this House who think them [MAY, 1789. selves more wise and patriotic than the majority. He never called the yeas and nays in his life, nor believed he ever should; but he was willing to have his vote appear, in all cases, when gentlemen thought proper to perpetuate the decision of the House in that way. On this occasion he would vote in favor of the amendment, and would endeavor to answer the objections, which, if well founded, would be a subject of great uneasiness in his mind, considering how he intended to give his vote. It was said, that a temporary law would have a tendency to injure the credit of the United States; he believed the credit of the United States was established on as solid principles as the most solemn act could recognise; he meant that part of the public credit which respected the debt contracted, and the engagements entered into before the adoption of the Constitution. If gentlemen would reflect, they would find it mak ing part of our social compact. He believed no other country had made an act of this nature, to secure the just claims of their creditors. From this view of the subject, what more is necessary to be done than to carry the Constitution into effect? He would ask gentlemen if they believed that foreigners would scrutinize into our revenue system? Would they examine our ways and means, in order to determine the degree of confidence they ought to have in us as a nation? Would the public creditors scrutinize in this manner the modes by which Government meant to accomplish their ends? He thought it hardly probable the people would take the pains of examining the minute details of a revenue system; they would rather inspect our actions, and if they see our conduct directed by wisdom and prudence, they would be confirmed in the belief of that justice in Government which the Constitution has assured them of. If our payments are in future punctually made, and the full amount of the interest regularly discharged, the national credit will be re-established. He would now proceed to examine, whether rendering this law perpetual would be a wise and prudent measure. It had been well observed by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) that every part of the law would bear harder on some States than on others; perhaps there was no State in the Union which would not be in some degree dissatisfied. He could perceive, by the sentiments of gentlemen in this House, that the burdens would be peculiarly felt; under these impressions, gentlemen have expressed themselves more warmly than perhaps they ought. There had been predictions of the most dangerous consequences of high duties, which he would not repeat; if these dangers were not imaginary, would it be prudent in the House to risk these consequences, and make these dangers unavoidable by rendering the law perpetual. Much pains had been taken to impose the burdens as equally as possible. If the duty on molasses bears hard upon one State, the tonnage duty would bear equally so upon others. But still it is probable that there are unequal pressures laid by the bill, which experience alone could enable MAY, 1789.] Duties on Imports: [H. of R. possible, in the nature of things, that two Senators can be as well acquainted with the feelings and interests of the people of Virginia, as ten men selected from among them, and taken from the several parts of the State? Will the people These circumstances, in the constitution of the Senate, afforded a powerful objection to the new system of government, and the people would never have adopted it had they supposed that the powers of this body were unlimited in continuing a system of taxation, which had at any time met the approbation of their particular representatives. the Legislature to alter to the satisfaction of all parties. The system was great, complex, and comprehensive; it embraces commerce, manufactures, agriculture, finance, and, in short, every thing in which a nation can be concerned. Will it be prudent, then, under our present disadvan-be satisfied to have that body able to continue a tages, and without information, to enact a law revenue system which their immediate representaffecting the highest interests of the people, which atives think oppressive, or perhaps unnecessary? can never be repealed but by the consent of three Certainly they would not; whatever the wisdom independent bodies? Gentlemen have told us, and virtue of the Senate may be, he was conthat no valuable purpose can be answered by vinced they were not competent for those pecumaking the law temporary; now, he thought a liar objects for which a just representation was valuable purpose could be answered by it. The absolutely necessary. The Senate, it is true, is two Houses of Congress, with the qualified nega- not a House of Lords; they do not possess any tive of the President, formed the legislative power properties materially distinguishing them from of the United States; they are distinct powers the members of the House of Representatives; to be exercised by both branches of the Legisla- but, though the distinction is not so striking in ture. The House had been told, on a former the one case as in the other, yet it was neveroccasion, that the Senate possessed greater pow-theless real. The House of Lords is created ers than the Representatives. He admitted that, by the King, and is a permanent body; the in some instances, they had greater powers; but Senate is chosen by the State Legislatures, and with respect to revenue matters, they certainly though the individuals have not a permanency had less, and very properly so. Shall we then in office, yet the body never ceases to exist. give up to a body, who has already a superiority over us, those superior powers which we possess relative to revenue? A perpetual system would give the Senate greater advantages than Constitutionally they ought to enjoy. He thought it of little consequence for the House to possess the right of originating money bills, if those money bills were made perpetual. The exercise of this right would be lost, and he thought it necessary He supposed, if an excise was laid, or direct that every part of Government should feel itself taxes were found necessary, the people would be dependent upon the people. We have been told, oppressed by them, because the same principle with truth, that the Senate are a virtuous body; that made an impost law perpetual would apply in they are so, and he hoped would remain so for all other cases. What, then would become of the ages yet to come, nay, for ever; and, in his legis- boasted privilege of the people, the right of taxlative capacity, he would act upon no other sup-ing themselves? He expressed a willingness to position. But still it ought to be remembered, pass a revenue law commensurate with the occathat they would always be men, and liable to all sion, to operate until the public debts are paid. the errors, frailties, and infirmities, with the rest This was all the creditors could demand or exof their fellow mortals; besides, they were con-pect, and all the House could with safety do. He stituted in some measure for purposes to which the other branch was incompetent; while this House was constituted for purposes for which the Senate is unequal. It is a well grounded republican maxim, that taxation and representation should depend each on the other. The people should be taxed only by representatives chosen for that purpose. This principle was written in the hearts of our British ancestors; it had been maintained by the best blood of our citizens, and he hoped it would descend with the fullest energy to our posterity. What, said he, are we about to do? A great branch of revenue, indeed the only branch, to which an application is now proper, or expected by the people, is about to be put out of our hands forever; for it would not be in the power of this House, or any future House, to annihilate those funds without the consent of the Senate and the concurrence of the President. Now, the Senate are not an equal representation of the people; in that body the States have equal numbers, white, in this House, the representation is proportioned to their population. Delaware sends one, Georgia three, and Virginia ten. Is it might be told that the Senate would be as ready to repeal the law as the House of Representatives; but, perhaps, the Senate could not be as well informed of the situation of the people, although they might be wise men; because it is not in the nature of things that two men should possess as much information of the circumstances and wishes of the people as ten men could; besides, there is something in the nature of man which would not suffer him easily to part with power. He could cite some striking instances of this spirit. He could refer to a remarkable one which took place in the State from which he came. About the year 1670 an insurrection was raised in Virginia. After its suppression, the Assembly, to manifest their loyalty, passed an act giving the same privilege to the Governor and Council, with respect to scandalous words spoken of them, as the statute De Scandalis Magnatum gives to the Peers of Great Britain. The Assembly were soon after impressed with an opinion that these privileges were incautiously transferred, and endeavored to recover them. It was a uniform prac tice of the House of Representatives to send up a bill for that purpose every session; but although the Council always proved themselves the friends of liberty, and joined the Assembly, both in their legislative and individual capacities, in a warm and spirited opposition to British tyranny, yet they would never consent to repeal that act to the very last moment of their existence. [May, 1789. but he contended the House had no right to transfer any part of their power to be exercised by any body whatsoever. Mr. SYLVESTER was in favor of the limitation clause. A good deal had been said in the House respecting the jarring interests of the several States. It had been confessed on all hands that this was an experimental law; he viewed it as such, and expected, in the course of a few years, the Legislature would be able to discover the errors of this day. But what advantage can result from their knowledge, if they have not power to make the necessary alterations, or to build up a new system more perfect than the old? He had examined the annals of history, but was unable to discover that any nation had ever established a perpetual revenue law. He imagined gentlemen would admit these reasons to be sufficient to warrant the vote they were about to give. Mr. TUCKER did not think it necessary to give his opinion otherwise than by his vote, because gentlemen, who had yesterday delivered their sentiments in favor of the clause, had anticipated what he had to say. But as he found himself influenced by the call for the ayes and noes on this question, he should be induced to state some of his reasons in favor of the amendment. He said he was glad the ayes and noes had been called, and if it had not been done by any other gentleman, he should have conceived himself bound to have done it; because he did not think himself at Mr. CLYMER was of opinion that, if the bill liberty, but on very particular occasions, to make were suffered to stand as it was, without the addia law perpetual. He wished to see a doctrine tion of the limiting clause, it would not be perestablished never to pass a law without limita-petual, as gentlemen seemed to imagine. He did tion, unless justified by some extraordinary cir- not think it could be considered as a law in percumstances. Nothing, he thought, could ever petuity, unless there was an express declaration justify such an act but the immutability of the to that effect. He had no doubt but a few years object, and the absolute necessity and simplicity of experience would enable Congress to correct this every thing relating to it. If the House passed a bill. But if it was limited to ten or twelve years, perpetual revenue law, which had not an immu- it could not be done within that period without a table object, they would abridge their own power, violation of the public faith. He thought this and destroy one of the great privileges of the peo- act, like the acts of Parliament, should be comple. Every bill of this nature, more or less, nar-mensurate with its object. The public credit rows the powers of this House, and throws it into could be supported only by providing funds to the hands of the Executive and a minority of the answer the demand. Senate; for it is to be considered, that whenever we pass a bill on any subject, every matter in that bill contained is given up to the Executive and one-third of the Senators-so much so that it is out of the power of this House, even with a unanimous vote, to recover any part of it. At this rate we may go on, from time to time, in passing laws transferring our powers, and at length become mere cyphers in the Government. The Senate would be able, with these advantages, to retain every privilege that was transferred, and it is natural to suppose they would have the inclination or if they surrender this power, they might do it in commutation for other privileges. A change of circumstances might render a change of the law necessary; a revolution in commerce and manufactures might make some alterations proper, even if this bill be now perfect; for what is equal and just to-day might be otherwise two years hence. The design of this clause, he supposed, was to prevent a misapplication of the revenue; but this could be secured by attending to the appropriation. The House would have, in this case, an effectual check over the Executive power, as well as over the other branch of the Legislature. He thought this was as much as they ought to have, consistent with the distribution of the powers made by the Constitution. Mr. SINNICKSON did not expect this was to be a perpetual law, incapable of alteration; but he wished to see it a permanent system. The idea of a temporary system was long ago said to be out of the contemplation of the House. He should only observe, in addition to this, that our credit depended essentially upon what should be done at this time. He thought if the revenue existed merely upon the breath of the Legislature, for one or two years at a time, we should never attain that object. He thought that the public good required something substantial to be done in favor of those who had lent the public money in the Now, supposing these circumstances to occur in two years, and a new House of Representatives to have met, desirous of making those alte-hour of distress. rations which experience had demonstrated to be necessary, what would they say when they found we had parted with the power which the Constitution intended for the immediate representatives of the people? Would they not justly charge us with betraying the privileges we are sworn to maintain, by transferring the power of raising revenue to the Executive and Senate? He did not suppose they would neglect the public good; Mr. BOUDINOT thought himself obliged to say a few words more, in order to justify the part he should take in the division of the House on this question. He conceived the manner in which the motion was brought before the House, after the bill was supposed to be gone through, did not give such opportunity for the members to consider the subject as its importance seemed to require, and which might have been had if it 1 had been brought forward at an earlier period. If, said he, we are to have the measures of the Parliament of Great Britain hung about our necks in all our public proceedings, and observations from their practice perpetually sounding in our ears, that practice ought to be defined and established, He believed that in the whole volumes of the statute law there was not one single revenue act to be found with a limitation. He believed that the revenue laws passed fifty, sixty, eighty, and near a hundred years ago, in that kingdom, existed at the present moment. We have long seen and been convinced of the infirmities of the former Confederation, and shall we now rivet those infirmities upon the present Constitution? Are we never to stand upon a certain and solid foundation? Is not our public credit totally gone? Has not experience convinced us that the loss of it would have been our total destruction, if the generous exertions we have lately made had not revived some degree of confidence in our future measures? Are we not so deeply in debt as to give us reason to believe that it will require many years to emancipate ourselves? If this is the case, will a revenue law for one or two years bring that relief which is expected? Will this prevent an increase of the public debt? Will it restore value to the evidences of that debt held by our creditors? He would ask any man, whether, if the United States were in the situation in which they were the last war, he would be induced to lend money upon a temporary and inadequate fund provided for two years? He believed the answer would be in the negative. [H. OF R. mean that the judicial department shall not be permanent? Will they pass a bill to establish this branch of government for one or two years? Certainly they do not mean to be guilty of such absurdity. It was contended that the House were relinquishing their right to the purse-strings; what was their right? They can originate a money bill, but the Senate can alter and amend it; they can negative it altogether; the system of finance is under the mutual inspection and direction of both Houses. Then why should this branch attempt, unconstitutionally, to check the co-operating powers of the Senate? It had been well observed by gentlemen, in the early part of this debate, that the House had prejudged the question of perpetuity. He had himself brought forward a motion for a temporary revenue, which had been decided against by the House in committee; so that, unless they meant to give this system a permanency, much time and money had been wasted to little effect. He believed no person would be induced to lend money on a fund which depended on the will of one House, because, if either branch of the Legislature objected to the repassing of the law, the fund will be annihilated, and they will have but one branch to trust to. Mr. MADISON withdrew his motion in order to introduce another, which he hoped would reconcile both sides of the House. He joined those gentlemen who opposed the clause in thinking that one or two years would be a period insufficient to answer the purposes in contemplation. If the House agree to the clause he would substitute for the one just withdrawn, he would move to fill the blank with a more distant day. His motion was, that this act shall not continue in force after theday of unless otherwise provided in the act for the appropriation of the revenue. Mr. FITZSIMONS Seconded the motion. A gentleman has said that foreigners will not examine our acts in detail, to see whether sufficient security is afforded for their debt. He was of a different opinion. Would gentlemen say that they never examine a security? Would they lend money for ten years, to be repaid by annual instalments, when the funds extended no further than five years? He thought they had seen enough of public faith, and public bodies, to in- Mr. SHERMAN liked this motion better than the duce them to use greater caution. Look at the other. Although he was in favor of leaving the situation of the public creditors; see their disap- law at large, he would vote for this clause, if the pointments and distresses, and say whether any blanks were filled up with a sufficient time to acthing short of an actual provision for the princi-complish those objects which the Government pal and interest of their debt can give them satis-had in view in providing revenue. faction? But can this be done by a temporary revenue law of one or two years? He did not mean that the law should be perpetual, because it was not in the power of the Legislature to pass such; he meant it should be adequate to the object. He contended it was an impropriety in language to call a law perpetual which it was always in the power of Congress to repeal or alter; and said, a law limited to ten or twelve years was more out of their power than one in which nothing was declared with respect to its perpetui- Mr. FITZSIMONS was of opinion, that this rety; the latter was always subject to the will of venue ought to be appropriated to the payment of the Legislature, the former could not be altered the public debts, what were the views of other during that period without a violation of the pub-gentlemen he could not say. He was neverthelic faith. Some gentlemen say they never will consent to a perpetual law; if this is the case, there will be an end to the Government. Do gentlemen Mr. AMES thought the question would recur when the appropriation or collecting bill came before them; he would rather, for his own part, decide the question at this moment, than consume the time of the House with another debate. Besides the House was not in possession of an act for appropriating the revenue; such a measure might never be agreed to; therefore he hoped the decision would take place at this time rather than be evaded. less in favor of limiting the law, and that upon Constitutional principles, though he wished it commensurate to its object. Gentlemen had said a great deal respecting the imperfection of the sys tem, that it was the effect of compromise; but nevertheless, he thought it as free from defects as it was possible a revenue system could be formed with such materials as the House possessed; but if it was imperfect, he did not see the difficulties some gentlemen mentioned, in altering and amending it when experience shall have pointed out its defects. He was sorry the appropriations could not be made at this time, for want of a knowledge of the public debt and current expenses; but he hoped it might be done before the members left their seats, and then gentlemen might have an opportunity of making this law commensurate with the object they have in view. He would observe further, that all which had been said by gentlemen respecting public credit, tended to injure it and promote a spirit of speculation. He hoped it would not be understood, that this House were against providing an ample fund for the payment of the debts eventually, and for the punctual discharge of the interest in the interim. If we mean to borrow money, it is certain those who lend will judge of the security ; and it is to be hoped, they will not think, from any thing that has been said here, that the Legislature hesitates to provide good and sufficient funds for their security. Mr. BOUDINOT acquiesced in the motion now brought forward for the sake of accommodation, although he thought the bill would stand better without any limitation clause whatever. Mr. PAGE was against the latter part of this clause. It had been justly said, that the bill would be oppressive; but, from the necessity of the times, the people will submit to it. Shall we not let them see the end of their burden in the law itself? Are they to look into another bill for that purpose? Perhaps after the Senate have agreed to this act, they may oppose the limitation in the subsequent one; they may insist upon having this in perpetuity, and then the object which the House have in view will be defeated. Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, moved a division of the question. Mr. LEE wished to strike out that part of the motion which related to the exception. Mr. LIVERMORE seconded Mr. LEE. The question was put, and that part of the clause lost. The question now stood as originally introduced to the House. The previous question was then demanded by five members: Shall the main question be now put? And on the question, shall the main question be now put? it was resolved in the affirma tive. [MAY, 1789. Coles, Benjamin Contee, Thomas Fitzsimons, William Floyd, George Gale, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, Samuel Griffin, Jonathan Grout, John Hathorn, Daniel Heister, Benjamin Huntington, James Jackson, Richard Bland Lee, George Leonard, Samuel Livermore, James Madison, junior, Andrew Moore, Peter Muhlenburg, John Page, Josiah Parker, George Partridge, Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, Smith of South Carolina, Jonathan Sturgis, Peter SylJoshua Seney, Thomas Scott, William Smith, William vester, Jonathan Trumbull, Thomas Tudor Tucker, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Alexander White, and Henry Wynkoop. Those who voted in the negative, are, Messrs. Fisher Ames, Elias Boudinot, Lambert Cadwalader, George Clymer, John Lawrence, Roger Sherman, Thomas Sinnickson, and George Thatcher. The clause being added, it was agreed to fill the blank so as to read the first day of June, 1796. Ordered, That the said bill, with the amend ments, be engrossed, and read the third time today. A message from the Senate informed the House that they had instructed their committee appointed to confer with a committee of this House, and report what newspapers the members of Congress shall be furnished with, at the public expense, to receive proposals for printing the acts and other proceedings of Congress. An engrossed bill, for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises, imported into the United States, was read a third time, and the blanks therein filled up. Resolved, That the said bill do pass, and that the title be, "An act for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises, imported into the United States." Ordered, That the Clerk of this House do carry the said bill to the Senate, and desire their concurrence. MONDAY, May 18. A petition of John Bryce, of the city of New York, was presented to the House and read, praying to be employed as a stationer and book-binder to Congress. Also the several petitions of Edward Evelith Powers, and Thomas Greenleaf, printers, praying to be employed in the printing service of Congress. Ordered, That the said petitions be referred to the committee appointed to receive proposals for printing the acts and other proceedings of Con gress. And then the main question being put, that the Resolved, That leave be given to bring in a bill conHouse do agree to the amendment proposed to cerning the importation of certain persons into the the said bill, it was resolved in the affirmative-United States, prior to the year 1808, and that Mr. ayes 41, noes 8. PARKER, Mr. SINNICKSON, and Mr. MUHLENBURG, do The ayes and noes being called for by one-fifth prepare and bring in the same. of the members present: Those who voted in the affirmative, are, Messrs. Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, Theodorick Bland, Ædanus Burke, Daniel Carroll, Isaac On motion, ordered, that a committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill, providing for the actual enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States, in conformity to the Constitu |