if its limitation was determined, it would always be in the power of the Government to make it commensurate with what the public debts and contingencies required.

The Constitution, as had already been observed, places the power in the House of originating money bills. The principal reason why the Constitution had made this distinction was, because they were chosen by the people, and supposed to be best acquainted with their interests and ability. In order to make them more particularly acquainted with these objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater number, and were chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to the mass of the people. Now, if a revenue law was made perpetual, however unequal its operation might be, it would be out of the power of this House to effect an alteration; for if the President chose to object to the measure, it would require two-thirds of both Houses to carry it. Even if the House of Representatives were unanimous in their opinion that the law ought to be repealed, they would not be able to carry it, unless a great majority appeared in the Senate also.

[H. or R.

doubt intended for a wise purpose. The Constitution had given them, and it was a fair inference to suppose that the Senate ought to be trusted in this particular as well as the House. He did not apprehend any danger from the money being in the treasury; because it could not be touched without the special appropriation of Congress, and the receipts and expenditures of the public revenue must be published, which was an additional security. He apprehended that the limitation would not be equal to the demands of Government, because he thought they would continue unsatisfied for a longer term than gentlemen seemed willing to allow the law to exist. The time mentioned by the former Congress, and to which they requested the concurrence of the several States, was, that the impost duties might be continued for twenty-five years. This request was made on full consideration, and they did not think it was more than sufficient to discharge the principal and interest of the national debt. He concluded, therefore, that it was better to let the law remain without limitation; because when they found the purposes for which it was intended were accomplished, it would be in the power of Congress to repeal the law.

He observed, that an honorable gentleman had thought that no appropriation of the public money Mr. LAWRENCE thought the present was a subcould be made for a longer term than two years.ject of great importance, and he lamented it was This was true, as it related to the support of armies; but the question here did not appear to be respecting an appropriation. It was the revenue itself, which, without any appropriation, might continue flowing into the public treasury independent of the will of the people, and might thereby become a convenience in the hands of some other department of the Government, for the purpose of oppression. Experience might also forcibly suggest the necessity and importance of alterations in the law, yet, without this clause, it might never be in the power of the House to make them.

Mr. BOUDINOT said, he was in favor of the motion at the first view; but it was without proper consideration. He had attended to the arguments with a great desire of obtaining information, the consequence had been, that such difficulty arose in his mind on the subject, that he was unprepared to give his assent to it. He considered the want of public credit as one of the greatest evils the Legislature had to encounter; that such had been our situation for a long time under the late Government, that we were unable to perform any of the functions necessary to promote the public welfare. From this melancholy consideration, he was induced to join in every Constitutional measure to promote so laudable an end. He did conceive that if the present bill was limited in its operation or duration, it would prevent the growth of public credit. He thought, unless some very valuable advantage was to result from the limitation which gentlemen had in view, it ought not to be adopted; for his part, he could discover none. He considered a law always to be in the power of the Legislature. It was true there were checks to prevent a hasty repeal or adoption of any measure whatsoever. These checks were no

not brought forward at an earlier period, because he feared the time would not allow that full discussion or deliberation which ought to take place. He wished also that the House was acquainted with the necessities of the United States, that so they might make provision accordingly; but these two points were mere matter of speculation as to their precise amount; yet he believed it was agreed on all hands, that the ways and means provided in this bill for the support of Government, the payment of interest and instalments of the foreign and domestic debt, were, so far as agreed to, inadequate to the object. If this be the case, the public debt must accumulate; and as we do not know when the time may come for its extinguishment, the provision cannot be limited; for every gentleman will agree, that if the demand for revenue be increasing, the fund ought to be commensurate to the object. Is there any time when the civil list will cease its demand? If there is not, there will be a perpetual call for revenue. He thought it absolutely impossible to provide for the payment of the debts, if the bill was limited to two, three, or four years; such a precarious provision would never tend to the reestablishment of public credit. If the bill was not limited, it would always be in the power of the Legislature to lower the duties or make such other alteration as might, upon experience, be thought beneficial to the community; whereas if the bill were limited, it would be thought improper to make any amendments during the term for which it is enacted, although those amendments appeared indispensably necessary. But why is this degree of caution necessary? Will not the administration of public affairs be conducted in future by representatives as good as ourselves? Will they have less wisdom or virtue to discover

and pursue the good of their fellow-citizens than we have?

As to the appropriation of this revenue, he was sorry the information before the House did not warrant them to proceed to that part of the business: he hoped it might be well done at some future period, but till it was done, not a farthing of the revenue could be paid out of the treasury. Where must the bill for the appropriation originate? It must be here. Then what ground have the House to fear the check of the Senate, or the President, in a case where they still retain all the power in their own hands? For it is as much in their power to limit this bill, by limiting the appropriation, as it is by the clause now proposed.

[MAY, 1789.

inviolate; it was one of the greatest securities the people had for their liberties under this Government. Moreover, the importance of the House itself depended upon their holding the purse strings; if they once part with this power, they would become insignificant, and the other branch of the Legislature might become altogether independent of them. For these reasons he was in favor of the motion of his honorable colleague, and hoped it would obtain.

Mr. GERRY.-There seems to be a great variety of opinions entertained by gentlemen on this question. But he thought they would all agree on these two points: first, that there were very great demands upon the Federal treasury; and secondly, that they had no kind of documents to If he supposed the liberties of the people would show what they were, or what the revenue bill be endangered unless the motion obtained, he would produce. Under these circumstances, genmost surely would be in support of it; but he tlemen must agree that there is danger of passing thought the liberties of the people would ever be a law that would operate oppressively, and withsure, while they chose men of wisdom and integ-out reason. There was also danger of erring in rity to represent them. He had no reason to believe the people would be inattentive to this great privilege; and if it were exercised with discretion, there was no reason to apprehend that Congress would continue to collect an oppressive revenue, after the object for which it was imposed had ceased to exist. He was well persuaded, if the bill were limited, it would have the effect the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SINNICKSON) mentioned, namely, that of injuring the public credit.

Mr. BLAND. Our public credit consists of two branches; first, as it respects the evidences of our debt, in the hands of those from whom we have had money or services; and secondly, as it respects our ability to borrow in future. Now, the first branch of public credit depends upon the punctuality with which the interest is paid; but this, in foreign nations, does not depend upon the limitation of the act. Do gentlemen suppose our laws, like those of the Medes and Persians, unchangeable? Can any person, who has read our Constitution, believe that it is in our power to pass a law without limitation? No, it is impossible. Every person knows that a future Congress may repeal this, and every other law we pass, whenever they think proper. Taking the subject in this point of view, gentlemen would see that the arguments in favor of a perpetual revenue were more specious than solid; while those for a limitation contemplated the best and safest means of avoiding difficulty, in the repeal or alterations which hereafter might be thought necessary. Nothing but experience could demonstrate the propriety or impropriety of the present measures; therefore they ought to be adopted merely by way of trial. The Government ought to be cautious in its first setting out, lest it alarm the people; and he thought his constituents would be much alarmed, if they conceived the power of the purse to be given into the hands of the other branches of the Government. The Constitution had particularly entrusted the House of Representatives with the power of raising money; great care was necessary to preserve this privilege

the mode of collecting, for want of experience to guide them. From these considerations, there was no doubt but the act would require the reconsideration of the Legislature in a short time; there may be applications from the people of all quarters to repeal a part of it. But what are their immediate representatives to do, in case the bill be made perpetual? They may be convinced that a repeal would be just and necessary; but it may not be in their power to remedy the griev ances of their constituents, however desirous they may be of doing so; for, although this House may originate and carry a bill unanimously through for the repeal, yet it will be in the power of the President, and the minority of the other branch of Congress, to prevent a repeal.

The arguments of gentlemen, relative to the support of public credit, appeared to him illfounded. The revenue intended by this bill was not specially appropriated. If it were appropriated to the payment of the public creditors, they would expect they had a security herein, which ought not to be withdrawn; but would not Congress, from the peculiarity of our situation, if from no other cause, have a right to change the security for an easier and more agreeable one to their constituents? To be sure they would. Then what advantage can result from declaring a system perpetual, which, constitutionally, may, can, and will be changed whenever the public good requires it?

Viewing the business in every point of view, it appeared to him the best policy, and most likely to give satisfaction, to limit the duration of the bill to one or two years; and therefore he hoped the motion would be agreed to.

Mr. HUNTINGDON thought it easy to see the danger of making this bill perpetual: besides parting with the power which the Constitution gave to the House of Representatives, in authorizing them solely to originate money bills, there would be another inconvenience, which was, extending the revenue beyond what the nature of the public debt required. The foreign debt was payable by instalments; it was saying nothing to

allege that the debt would accumulate, because the United States must make provision for the annual extinguishment of a part. If the revenue arising from the impost be insufficient for this purpose, recourse must be had to some other fund which will enable us to perform the engagements of the late Congress. It is true, the debt is large, and will take time to pay it off, but he had no doubt but it would be done according to contract, and with honor to the Union. How, then, can gentlemen suppose the revenue ought to be perpetual, in order to be commensurate with the object? If they contemplated the contraction of more debts in future, the supposition might be true; but he saw no reason why gentlemen should extend their views so far. He thought if a future war, or some other untoward circumstance, should increase the national debt, it ought to be provided for by the Government who were acquainted with the necessity. He thought the House ought to consider seriously before they parted with their powers; it was easy for them to pass a bill to give power, but it was difficult to recall it. He had seen many instances of this kind; one in particular, in the State from which he came, where the Legislature had given the appointment of sheriffs, and some other little matters out of their hands, and had been a long time endeavoring to get it back; but they had not been able to obtain it. He had no suspicions of any character in the Senate, but the Constitution had made that body in some degree perpetual, to obtain a permanency in the laws; if, therefore, this revenue bill had once their approbation, they might be inclined to continue it, even against the sentiments of the people and of the House. Though he was not against trusting gentlemen who now composed the Senate, he was against trusting their

successors.

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debts, foreigners would find the means to make them. Taking it therefore for granted, that Congress would always provide for these objects, he would proceed to consider what effect might arise from a permanent or temporary provision. If the latter were made, the creditors would honor us for our exertions, and confide in our continuing to provide for them in the manner we should find upon experience most convenient to the community. If the system was declared to be a perpetual provision for the payment of their interest, it would give no hope, in the first place, for the redemption of the capital; and in the second, if Congress were to alter it, and which, in all probability, they shortly must, the security would be impaired, and an essential injury done to the public credit, which we are so desirous to revive.

How can gentlemen contend that the bill is not commensurate to the object? Do they know what the object is? He supposed it would be appropriated as mentioned, to the support of Government and the payment of the interest and principal of the national debt; but such appropriation had not taken place, and it was uncertain whether it ever would. He thought it would be better to bring in a bill specially appropriating this fund to the payment of the foreign debt, and then it might be declared that it should continue, and be applied to this use, until the foreign debt was cleared. He conceived it would be unconstitutional to make the law perpetual, and therefore he was in favor of the clause."

Mr. AMES considered this as a very important question; and in order that his own mind might be fully enlightened, he had listened with the most unwearied attention to the arguments urged on both sides; but he was far from being satisfied that the motion was necessary or proper for the House to adopt. The principal reason offered in He thought the faith of the United States its support was, that the revenue is not specially sufficiently pledged to the public creditors, not appropriated; but he could not perceive that this only by the late Congress, but by the Constitution, furnished a reason why the clause should be which showed a particular attention to their introduced; either gentlemen are afraid that the interest. It then only remained, by efficient mea- Senate will not agree to the appropriation, or they sures, to perform its stipulations; and this ever will agree. If they will agree, there is no reason would be a duty on the representatives of the for distrust; if they will not agree with the people, until it was fully complied with. In House, then we ought not to trust them with this confidence that it might be done within a reason- bill, until we bring forward a clause for the purable time, he was for a period neither so short nor pose of appropriating the fund it is intended to so long as had been mentioned. About seven or raise. Gentlemen tell us the act is imperfect, ten years, he thought, would effect the object the and therefore ought to be limited; if this be the gentlemen had in view and he would join them case, it may be a good reason for recommitting in voting for that time. the bill, but can be none for adopting the clause. If we have not taken up time enough in adjusting and considering the several parts of this law, let it be readjusted and reconsidered in a Committee of the Whole, until gentlemen are satisfied as to its perfection."

Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, was also in favor of the clause; he conceived the only reason of weight urged against it, related to the restoration of public credit; but he thought every person possessed of the stock or debt of the United States would have the same feelings and reasoning as the House; they would know that their demands depended upon a higher source than Congress, and might be sure that we would do our duty in making particular provision. If Congress neglected this, one part of the creditors would compel them. If it was found that the United States were not disposed to pay their

Gentlemen tell us they are willing to make the revenue commensurate with the debt. If they do this, all the inconveniences resulting from the imperfection of the system will be entailed upon us for a number of years. Other gentlemen mention a year or two for its limitation. Can the House listen seriously to such a proposition? If we were to tell our creditors that we are making

provision for them for one year, would it tend to inspire them with confidence in our wisdom or justice? Would our foreign creditors believe we were scrupulously fulfilling our engagements with them? No: nothing less than a fixed, permanent system, can beget confidence or give security. An illusory system of one or two years duration would engender distrust; its very visage would make the public suspect deception. If we do not mean to deceive, why not make the provision commensurate to the occasion? His idea of a temporary act was pro hac vice, by way of experiment; but he thought the House could not make the experiment with this bill, because the public credit would not admit of it. If this act be made for one year, will it not be a considerable expense to the public by going over all the ground again, which had taken the House such a length of time to discuss?

[MAY, 1789.

He considered these advantages as having made that nation rich and powerful. He believed a like conduct on our part would produce the same consequences, because our Government is of such a nature as to give the public creditors the greatest security they could wish. If the revenue is appropriated, and the law for collecting it is without any limitation, the funds cannot be taken away without a positive act of injustice, to which both Houses of the Legislature must assent by a majority of two-thirds, or three independent parties must unite. It was therefore three to one in favor of the public creditor, that the funds appropriated to his use would not be annihilated. Under these circumstances, Government might more safely be trusted. This, he observed, was not the case under despotic princes; their will alone could tear away the security of the subject. Under a pure democracy, the case was almost as bad; no confidence could be placed, because the caprice and whim of one body could dictate a change. Now an act that expires at a limited period reterests, which involves expense; besides, it affords less confidence, because a variety of circumstances occur to prevent a continuation of the necessary provision to establish the foundation of credit. It may be prevented by the mere disagreement of the two Houses. This uncertain situation of the public credit will prevent the Government from re-loaning their foreign and domestic debt, which might otherwise be done to very great advantage at a reduced interest. Viewing the subject in all these points of light, he could not help being opposed to the motion.

Gentlemen have insisted upon the necessity of keeping the purse-strings in their hands. What do they mean by this? What power have the House over the money that comes into the trea-vives the topics of partial politics and opposing insury? Are they at liberty to apply it to their own use? Do not Congress declare the revenue to be the property of the public creditors, when they appropriate it to their use? Shall we say the people, then, keep the purse-strings in their hands? For what honest purpose shall they keep them? Why shall we, the House of Representatives, detain the money of foreigners? Does it not seem to carry fraud on the face of it? One gentleman says that he is unwilling to trust a future Senate; but if it shall be of equal integrity with the present, why should he hesitate? The State will be equally careful of obtaining a good Mr. PAGE expressed his surprise to find gentle representation, for their own sakes. But suppose men opposed to the limitation of the bill, who the reverse should happen, do we not act wisely had complained so much of its imperfections. in making a provision for the security of our He thought a measure of the kind now proposed honor and the public welfare, which cannot be de- absolutely necessary to reconcile these gentlemen stroyed by one misguided branch of the Legisla- to particular parts of the bill. For his own part, ture? Now, suppose this law to expire, and the he had objections to some articles, and for that Senate should be unwilling to provide for the ob- reason, if there was no other, he would be in fajects we have in contemplation, will this not pre-vor of the limitation. It had been frequently asvent the representatives of the people from carry-serted that half the revenue would be lost by ing their wishes into execution? But if the smuggling. Can this, then, he would ask, be a Senate be willing to co-operate with the House, bill proper to perpetuate, or fit for the restoration for what honest reason do we endeavor to retain of the credit of the United States? He asked this power? Besides, if the act is imperfect, will gentlemen whether they would lend a hand to it not be easier to correct the imperfect part than rivet round the necks of their fellow-citizens a regto frame a new system? Surely gentlemen are ulation which experience has convinced them under a great mistake when they suspect danger was unjust, unequal, and oppressive? Yet the gento arise from the revenue continuing to flow into tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. AMES) had dethe public treasury. Have not the House a com-clared that experience had convinced him that at plete command over it? No money can be drawn least one particular article was subjected to a duty out but by appropriations by law. The President of this kind. cannot touch it. Does it increase the power of the Senate? The Senate have no command over it, unless authorized by law. Can the House of Representatives make any use of it? They cannot get a farthing, because the consent of the Senate is required to enable them to draw for it. What has been the conduct of Great Britain, in relation to her funds? What has carried the credit of that kingdom to a superior eminence, but the attention she has paid to public credit?

He did not believe public credit could be restored otherwise than by a strict and positive adherence to our engagements, and a faithful performance of the duties they undertook. While this continued to be a leading feature of the Government, he would be bold to say that we should daily grow in reputation, prosperity, and happiness. He hoped, therefore, that a particular attention would be paid to their future conduct, and that each member would emulate the other in pro

viding for the revival of public credit, by acts of justice to the holders of public securities.

[MAY, 1789.

tinguish the national debt in twenty-five years; but, in addition to this fund, they expected to make annual requisitions on the States for one and a half million of dollars at least ; so that gentlemen could not expect the whole to be paid by this single fund in a short time. He wished a limitation to the law in general terms, such as until the debt, foreign and domestic, is discharged. He thought a short term would make an unfavorable impression upon the minds of the public creditors, and tend in a great measure to cloud the happy prospects that began to brighten the political hemisphere of this country.

Mr. GERRY asked his colleague if he advocated carrying the taxes to such an extent as to accumulate sums in the treasury for which the United States had no particular use? Yet if this revenue law were made perpetual, it would collect money into the public coffers after the national debt was paid. This would be such a emptation to the Executive to possess itself by force of the treasures of the nation, as he hoped would never be put in its way. If our commerce and population increased, this revenue would increase in the same proportion. He could not, Mr. GERRY expressed an intention of calling therefore, bear the idea of all this money being the yeas and nays if he was supported, because he collected into one spot, unless there was an abso-thought it a question in which the essential interlute demand for it. He thought it incompatible ests of the people were deeply involved. with the liberty and security of the people, and therefore hoped the House would agree to a short limitation.

Mr. LAWRENCE said, he held his present opinion upon the purest principles of patriotism, and an ardent love for his country's happiness. He had no objection to the yeas and nays being taken, as he was not inclined to disguise his sentiments.

Several members rose to speak on this question, when Mr. AMES moved the adjournment, fearing gentlemen would grow warm upon the question. Whereupon, the House adjourned.

SATURDAY, May 16.

offering to the acceptance of Congress ten miles square of territory, in any part of the said State, for the seat of the Federal Government, which was read and ordered to lie on the table.

A petition of Duncan Campbell, of the city of New York, was presented to the House and read, praying that compensation might be made him for sundry advances which he made during the late war, for the service of the United States.

Mr. MADISON, for the sake of accommodation, would make another proposition. He was extremely sorry to differ with gentlemen about Mr. PAGE was glad the yeas and nays were modes, when their object appeared to be the same. called, as it would give gentlemen an opportunity He thought the spirit of the Constitution and the of showing to their constituents their approbation structure of the Government rendered it impro- of a measure calculated to secure the blessings of per to pass a perpetual revenue law. The argu-liberty to themselves and posterity. ments had been clear on this point; but as there was an evident propriety in making the means commensurate to the occasion, he was inclined to give the bill such a perpetuity as would answer the purpose of providing for the public debt and restoring the national credit. He thought this might be done by modifying his motion so as to refer to the collection bill; for he hoped, before Mr. SENEY, from Maryland, presented to the that passed, the House would be able to ascer-House an act of the Legislature of that State, tain the appropriation, and could limit it accordingly. The words he would propose were, that this act should not continue and be in force longer than the day of, unless otherwise limited by the act providing for the appropriation. As he had heard it intimated that the yeas and nays would be called on this question, he was desirous of rendering the clause as satisfactory as possible. Mr. AMES could not bear to lie under the imputation of inconsistency, with which he was charged, inasmuch as he contended against the limitation of a bill he had opposed as oppressive in some of its parts. He believed the amendment now offered was new to almost every gentleman. For his part, he had always supposed it was intended as a permanent system. He remembered many gentlemen had made use of this expression, through the various debates which had taken place in the several stages of the bill. He had underderstood it in this light, and had therefore combated, with some degree of energy, such parts as appeared to him impolitic or unjust. He imagined the gentlemen on both sides had labored to make the bill as perfect as possible, with a view of making an equitable provision for the public exigencies, which should affect all parts of the Union with the greatest degree of impartiality. Mr. SHERMAN, observed, that when Congress applied to the several States for the five per cent. impost, they judged it would enable them to ex

Ordered, That the said petition lie on the table. A petition of John Fenno was presented to the House and read, praying to be employed in the printing service of the United States.

Ordered, That the said petition be referred to the committee appointed yesterday, for receiving proposals for printing the acts and other proceedings of Congress.

DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

The House resumed the consideration of the amendment proposed yesterday to the bill for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises imported into the United States, and the said amendment was read as follows: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that this act shall be in force until the day of -, and from

thence until the end of the next session of Congress which shall happen thereafter."

The question was called for, and Mr. LawRENCE required the ayes and noes.