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ken up, the amendments were severally agreed may also open a door for cabal, if at any time the to, and the bill, as amended, was ordered to be friends of the Senators are employed on such a engrossed for a third reading.
mission. If the Constitution is silent on this CENSUS OF THE UNION.
head, and I presume it is, the principle of expeThe House then went into a Committee of the But do gentlemen suppose that they will acquire
diency will never lead us to this amendment. Whole on the bill providing for the enumeration a greater degree of security? I apprehend this of the inhabitants of the United States. After will not be the case; the President is as nearly making several amendments to said bill, the com- related to the people as the Senate are; he will mittee rose, and reported the bill with amend- be equally careful of their interests
, and he is not ments to the House. Whereupon, the bill with the proposed amend-intriguing cabal as they are. Hence, I presume.
from his situation, so exposed to the effects of an ments was committed to a select committee, con- the point of security is equally against the motion. sisting of Messrs. FosTER, GOODHUE, SHERMAN, Mr. STONE.-If we adopt the ideas of the comLAWRENCE, SCHUREMAN, CLYMER, WHITE, SE- mittee, and give to any body a discretionary por NEY, Smith, of South Carolina, Baldwin, ander of disposing of the public moncy, it should be MADISON.
given to the President, by and with the consent REMISSION OF FINES.
of the Senate; because the Constitution has Mr. Ames, from the committee to whom was vested them with equal authority in every transreferred the report of the Secretary of the Trea- action relative to this business. If you give an sury on the petition of C. Sadler, reported that influence to the President superior to the Senate, provision ought to be made for the remission or in any thing relating to the intercourse between mitigation of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, in the United States and foreign nations, you deviate certain cases.
from the principles of the Constitution. If be is The report being agreed to, it was referred to to form treaties, by and with the advice and conthe same committee to bring in a bill accordingly. sent of the Senate, they ought to have an equal
Mr. Ames then presented the draught of a bill influence over the persons who are to conduct the copformably to the order of the House.
negotiations. If you give equal power to A and FOREIGN INTERCOURSE.
B to transact' your business, and they employ
agents, and you give the means of payment excluThe order of the day being called for the House sively to A, I leave it to any person of candor to resolved itself into a Committee of the whole on say which of the two will have the most influence the bill to provide for the means of intercourse in conducting it. If A is also to have the power between the United States and foreign nations. of giving a large or small salary, he will have fre
The bill authorizes the President to draw for a times the influence that the other will. From sum not exceeding forty thousand dollars, to com- hence I infer, that if you give a discretional por pensate the services of such officers as shall be er at all, you should give it equally to the persons sent abroad.
who are to constitute your agents. Mr. LIVERMORE moved to make this an annual Mr. HUNTINGTON observed, that this subject appropriation, which he supposed was the inten- had been discussed in the committee, and it was tion of the committee who brought in the bill. determined to vest the discretionary power in the
Mr. Livermore's amendment was adopted. President alone, of drawing for the money as cirMr. Lee said, that, as the Constitution had vest- cumstances might require; because it might hap ed in the President, with the advice and consent pen, that the
money mighi be wanting during the of the Senate, the power of appointing ambassa- recess
of the Senate, and it would hardly be exe dors and other public ministers, he thought they pedient to call that body together for the purpose ought to be equally interested in proportioning of making a draft upon the Treasury for a small their salaries; and further, the President ought sum of money; it was also judged prudeni not to be empowered to draw money for those leave it at the discretion of the Executive officer purposes without their advice and consent. He to apportion the salaries ; because officers of equal thought it would be well to determine whether rank might be well compensated with a less sam the Constitution did not bind them to adopt this at some Courts than at others. He apprehended idea ; and, in order to obtain the sense of the no danger could arise, because the highest stand House on it, he would move to amend the clause that could be given was proposed to be fixed by inserting the words " by and with the consent by the law. of the Senate," after the word " President." Mr. SedgwicK.-As far as I am concerned in Mr. Smith, of South Carolina.—It appears very bringing forward this bill
, two considerations ir connected
with the President in the appointment | tleman from Virginia, and they were these : que of the officers noticed in this bill; but yet I do not arising from the consequences naturally attending presume it follows, as a matter of course, that such a combination of the departments of Goreme they should be connected in apportioning the ment; and the other, the responsibility which w salaries, or drawing for the money. If it is not ought'never
to lose sight of when we are provid enjoined by the Constitution, it will be wrong to ing for the distribution of the public money, ish the responsibility of the Executive
officer; it has told
us that we give an unbounded influence
[H. of R.
to the Executive officer, because we enable him or the President and Senate. If they could apto apportion the money among them. That gen- portion themselves, they might authorize another tleman, perhaps, did not attend to the bill, which body to do it; for he presumed, that neither the provides expressly for the several grades of officers President, nor the President and Senate could conwhich the Constitution supposed, in the ordinary tend for this power as a matter of right; the quesevents, would be employed in superintending the tion then seemed to him to turn altogether upon interests of the United States at foreign Courts. the expediency, which was conceded to be in favor If he had observed this, he would not suppose that of the manner prescribed in the bill. the discretion of the President gave him an im- He remarked that the discretion of the Presiproper in fluence. These officers cannot be ap-dent was confined within precise limits; he could pointed to any situation, nor to any rank, but with not grant a larger salary to the officers than that the advice and consent of the Senate; no particu- prescribed in the bill; all that he could do was, iar character can be selected by the President; therefore, to give less where he thought less would therefore, I presume, the Senate have all the be sufficient, of which he conceived the President agency he wishes them to possess.
to be the proper judge. Mr. Stone understood that the President was Mr. Stone said, that gentleman had not replied at liberty to give any thing under nine thousand to his observation, drawn from the Constitution; dollars to a minister plenipotentiary, or under he had contended that a discretionary power in five thousand to a resident, or three thousand to the hands of the President, to give a greater or a chargé des affaires; if so, he was at liberty to less salary, would give him a greater influence pay them well or ill, as he should conceive they than the Constitution had contemplated. The merited.
Constitution had given to the President the power Mr. SEDGWICK.—When it is said that he shall of making treaties; but it must be done by and not give a larger sum to a minister of the first with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the grade, I presume that the payment of that par- Senate. Do we then not depart from this princiticular sum will generally take place; but there ple, when we increase the agency of the Presiare other circumstances attending this business dent? If it is not contrary to the letter of the which show the propriety of vesting the discre- Constitution, I presume it is contrary to the printionary power in ihe President alone. Suppose a ciple of it, and we are bound to administer this minister actually appointed, and some incidental system of Government upon its real principles. business should arise, to occasion an actual expen- He believed that the President knew very well diture of part of this money; for example, a what would be a proper sum to give to every officer minister at the Court of Prussia might find it of the diplomatic corps, at all the Courts of Eunecessary to remove some obstructions to his rope ; but it did not follow that the Senate was negotiations which had arisen at the Court of without an equal knowledge; he would always Russia; he would be obliged to apply to the Pre- attribute as much knowledge and integrity to that sident to authorize him to take measures for its body as to the Chief Magistrate, and this he did prevention; but as money would be essentially on the principle of the Constitution, which supponecessary to effect the object, the President, tbough sed that there was equal safety and equal proprihe approved of the idea of the minister, could do ety in authorizing them to attend to such part of nothing without calling the Senate together, if it the public interest as was connected with the happened to be a recess; the business would not appointment of their servants employed in the progress without an expense of more than, per- intercourse between the United States and foreign haps, double the sum that was necessary. To Courts. provide for cases of this kind was one of the However, if this amendment was ever made, objects the committee had in view; another was, he should be against the bill, for two reasons; that the person who touched the public money one, because it vested a discretionary power in should be responsible for the expenditure. If the the disposal of public money; and the other, money is to be drawn by the President and because it incurred a perpetual expense, which hé Senate, so diffuse is the responsibility, as to be hoped at some day would be found to be unneconsiderably weakened, if not altogether destroyed. cessary, These were the considerations that operated con- Mr. LAWRENCE did not apprehend the President
ENCE clusively with me, and determined my judgment would derive any influence from the power of in favor of the bill as it stands.
drawing for the money necessary to pay the offiMr. LAWRENCE said, that there was a Constitu- cers their salaries. He supposed, however, that it tional necessity that the President, by and with would be proper to limit the bill; because the the consent of the Senate, should appoint all the circumstances of the Union might require a less officers employed in foreign negotiations; the sum perhaps than was contemplated at the present same necessity existed with respect to making time. treaties; but he did not conceive there was any Mr. Stone supposed, on a variety of occasions, Constitutional necessity for connecting the Sen- that the President may wish for one person and ate with the President in apportioning the sala- the Senate for another. If the person approved ries; it was altogether in the power of the Legis- by the President be rejected by the Senate, and lature; they might apportion the salaries and fix their favorite employed, the President can make them by law, if they thought it convenient, with his situation so įrksome, on account of his salary out encroaching upon the right of the President, and the manner of payment, as to induce him to
H. OF R.]
[JANUARY, 1798. a voluntary resignation; or if he continues in they ought to be concerned in affixing the salaries office, he must change his disposition and be sub- of them. It would apply, on the same principle
. servient to the Magistrate who can render him to the Secretary of the Treasury, and every other more easy in his employment. And can gentlemen of the Heads of Departments, except the Judges ; say that this is not an influence ? Now, if it is it would not extend to them, only because it readmitted to be but the smallest degree of influ- quires that their salaries shall be permanent, ence, it is contrary to the principles of the Con Another inconvenience would result: A Senastitution, which interests the Senate equally with tor might be sent on an embassy, and being, from the President, in the whole business of negotia- his situation in that body, in habits of intimay tion. It is not to be apprehended that any danger with all the members of it, there would be danger will arise, during the present administration, from of an improper allowance being granted to him. a trust of this nature; but he was not willing to These objections, besides the probability of the establish a precedent which might operate hereaf- President's being obliged to take some steps in ter to warrant the Executive in the exercise of an the business during the recess of the Senate, show unconstitutional power.
the necessity of vesting this discretionary power Mr. Sherman.-The establishment of every in the President alone, where gentlemen admit treaty requires the voice of the Senate, as does the there is the greatest degree of responsibility
. But appointment of every officer for conducting the the Constitution does not appear to trust that business. These two objects are expressly provi- equal confidence in the Senate ; for it gives the ded for in the Constitution, and they lead me to President the first and greatest influence. It is believe that the two bodies ought to act jointly in he who is to nominate the person, and the concur every transaction which respects the business of rence of the Senate may generally be expected to negotiation with foreign powers. But the bill pro- follow, as a matter of course
. After giving us vides for the President to do it alone, which is him this influence, little danger can be supposed evidently a deviation from the apparent principle to arise from vesting in him a discretionary of the Constitution. And what do gentlemen power which is absolutely necessary, and for the urge as an argument to induce the committee to proper exercise of which he is highly respeto adopt their idea? Why, that the singleness of the sible. officer who appropriates and disburses the public Mr. Scott thought this measure appeared like money, will insure a higher degree of responsibili- an expedient, into the use of which they were ty than the mode recommended, at least by infer- falling for want of information. The very pre ence, by the Constitution. This argument would amble which the committee had affixed to the bill serve to prove that a single person ought to exer- warranted the idea. But he not only doubted the cise the powers of this House--consequently, it propriety of the expedient, but also whether the goes too far. There is something more required committee had a right to adopt it. He thought, than responsibility in conducting treaties. The however, it was a question well worthy of disce Constitution contemplates the united wisdom of sion, whether this House was well warranted to the President and Senate, in order to make trea- commit the appropriation of the money of the ties for the benefit of the United States. The people of the United States to any particular more wisdom there is employed, the greater secu- body, whether it was the President alone
, or the rity there is that the public business
will be well President and Senate combined. He thought done. As to the circumstance of drawing money from the first view of the subject
, that the voice out of the Treasury, it is of little consequence of this House ought to be given to the disposition but if a discretionary power is to be exercised in of every sum that goes out of the Treasury
, and apportioning the salaries of the Ministers,
there consequently he objected to the principle of the will be more security in connecting the Senate bill, and should vote against it, with or withont
the amendment. But if the bill must pass in its Mr. Smith, of South Carolina.—Gentlemen present form; if the apportionment of the severa seem to confine their views to ministers employed Salaries was
so great a secret as to elude the search in making treaties; but this is not all that the bill of the House,
and their information
must continue refers to. Many officers may be established in the in its present incomplete state, he should vote fer diplomatic line without being concerned in making that mode which appeared to give the greatest France without being employed in the formation was adequate to forming a complete
provision ca of any treaty whatever. A treaty may be nego- this head: he did not see what was to prevent tiated without the intervention of any person in them from running the routine of every Court to such a character ; or a person may be employed Europe, and apportioning, as they proceeded
, the distinct from him, as was the case in the late salaries of every grade of officers in the diplomatie commercial treaty between France and Great corps, provided a different sum was necessary * Britain. If the Constitution is involved in the present France
, Britain, and Genoa. He just mentioned question, it is because the
Senate are connected his objection to the committee, to prepare them with the President in appointing the officer. But for a motion he intended to make when the are joined in the appointment of all superior offi- commit the bill to the Select Committee, in order cers; it would then follow as a consequence, that to make special provision therein.
[H. OF R.
Mr. Madison remarked, that the amendment
FOREIGN INTERCOURSE. offered by his colleague (Mr. LEE) would not decide the question for which it was intended; be
The House then again resolved itself into a cause the part of the bill into which he moved to Committee of the whole, Mr. Baldwin in the have it inserted, only related to the power of the Chair
, on the bill providing compensation for perPresident to draw for the money, which was a
sons employed in the intercourse between the thing totally distinct from apportionment, and United States and foreign nations. which could be better performed by the President
Mr. Jackson.—The question before us, I prealone than connected with a large body.
sume, turns upon the propriety or impropriety of Mr. Lee hereupon withdrew his motion, and trusting the President alone, or the President and having modified the whole clause of the bill, so as Senate, with a discretion in the disposition of the to embrace this question, " Whether the advice public money. It will be a matter of indifference and consent of the Senate ought not to be had in to me which of these it is given to; but I am the exercise of the discretionary power of appor- clear we have the power to give it to whom we tioning the salaries ?" proposed it in order to take please; we may even give it to a committee of the sense of the committee.
this House, if we deem it expedient. But I am Mr. Benson said, it would be wrong to blend inclined to give it to neither. The appropriation the Senate with the President, in the exercise of of public money belongs in a peculiar manner, an authority not jointly vested in them by the to this House, and I am for retaining the power Constitution; and in any business whatever of an in our own hands. It was objected to this, that Executive nature, they had no right to do it any it would take up time; but I ask, for what were more than they had a right to associate a com- we sent here, but to watch over the public treamittee of this House with him. Now, he had not sure ? Gentlemen have said, that the President yet heard any gentleman say the Constitution ex- and Senate ought to have discretionary power in pressly commanded the association moved for, and allowing salaries to our ministers abroad, because unless it was a command, he presumed they were they are best informed what will be a proper not disposed to conform to it.
compensation for the service which they have an Mr. LEE informed the committee, that his mo- exclusive right to order to be performed. I beg tion was likewise intended to strike out the pro- these gentlemen to look at the law passed last vision for contingent expenses; not tbat' he session, providing for commissioners, which comthought them disallowable, but because he wished missioners, by the by, were, to all
' intents and for a general bill providing for all the contingents purposes, officers of the diplomatic corps. Did of the Government.
ihis House view themselves as inadequate to say Mr. Sedgwick was as much opposed to the what would be a proper com pensation for any amendment in this form as any other. He would gentleman the President might employ? No, ever be in favor of singleness in the Executive, sir; this House annexed a daily pay to the office, but especially when it was proposed to join with sufficient to procure good men. Why cannot it a body that existed forever-for this was his the same be done at this time? Did the late idea of the Senate ;-a body in which every mem-Congress ever think of vesting such a discretionber, from their long adherence thereto, learned to ary power in their President ? Certainly they understand each other, and might, on any occa- did not. On what principle, then, is it contended sion, impede the progress of the other branch of that we should vest a discretionary power in an the Government to the injury of the whole. individual? Is it because it will take up our
Mr. Lee said, these ministers were the joint time? That is a poor excuse. It is out of our servants of the President and Senate, and there- power to learn what is sufficient to maintain a fore oughi to be equally under their care; they minister at Paris, Madrid, Amsterdam, or London, had a joint agency throughout, and therefore or to discriminate between them and Genoa. If they ought to have the same in apportioning the we are not possessed of full information on this compensation for their services.
head, cannot we acquire it of the proper officer ? Mr. Livermore deemed the question of some Will not the records of the late Congress eluciimportance, and therefore wished for time to con- date the subject? Is it not fair to suppose, that sider it more fully. In order to obtain this, he what was sufficient three or four years ago, will moved the committee to rise and report progress. be sufficient now; or if a difference is necessary, This motion obtained, and the House adjourned. we can judge thereof as well as another ? But
any how, sir, I am clear for keeping the power of
disbursing the public money in our own hands. WEDNESDAY, January 27.
If we adopt this bill now, on some future occa
sion we shall have to go further; and the princiThe engrossed bill for giving effect to the laws ple that one is more responsible than many, will of the United States therein mentioned, in re- lead us to establish an arbitrary Government. spect to the State of North Carolina, was read
Mr. Boudinot conceived that this difference of the third time and passed.
opinion rose from not attending fully to the subThe bill for the remission and mitigation of ject-matter of the bill on the table.' Gentlemen fines, penalties, and forfeitures, was read a second seemed to argue, that a discretionary power, with time, and committed to a Committee of the respect to the disbursement of the money granted Whole.
in the bill, ought not to be vested in the President
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[JANUARY, 1790. alone, because the Senate were connected with but I differ from this opinion, and think that the him in appointing the ministers among whom it power of reducing a certain sum enables him to was to be distributed. Now this objection, he fix the sum as much as if it had been in his dis thought, had been fully answered; therefore, he cretion to raise it. It is, in either case, doing 2 should make no further observations upon it. complete Legislative act, which the Constitution But the gentleman last up opposed this discre- has in part assigned to this House, and which we tionary power altogether, whether vested in the cannot dispose of to any man or body of men, President alone, or the President in conjunction If the committee join with me in this sentiwith the Senate, because he supposes the House ment, they will concur in the rising of the comis competent to decide. Now, I conceive we are mittee, in order to have the bill recommitted to a so circumstanced as not to be able to ascertain select committee, to bring it in upon differen the proper sum required by every diplomatic offi- principles. cer who may be sent to the various Courts of Mr. SEDGWICK would have no objection to go Europe, and other quarters of the globe. Now, through and fix the salaries in the manner some what power do we propose to vest in the Presi- gentlemen wished; but he feared the House bad dent ? Not that of giving away the public money not sufficient information for that purpose; but in such a manner as he may please; but that for then, in the opinion of the gentleman las up. certain services he shall give a sum not exceed- they were obliged to do it in this way. Now, he ing a fixed amount; if he can get the business did not believe such a necessity existed; because done for less than we suppose it deserves, it is a he was satisfied, from the Constitution, and the proper caution that we use to enable some one to construction put upon it by the House at the las reduce it. And who is so proper as the Presi- session, that it was in the power of the Legisladent? The gentleman says, we should fix the ture to vest a discretionary authority in my salaries of ministers at the different Courts. I proper body to dispose of specified sums for spe much question the propriety of making such dis-cific articles. How else could the business of the crimination in a public act. I had rather refer it quartermasters' or commissaries department * to the Executive Magistrate, under such restric- performed, when such business was required tions and limitations as are provided in the bill. But, though he did not approve of the gentleman
Mr. Scott.—The subject in dispute I view but reasoning, he would vote for the rising of the as a secondary consideration, Mr. Chairman. I committee, because he did not think they has think we ought first to determine upon the prin- sufficient information before them to warrant a ciple, whether a discretion can be given at all. decision. This was the idea I suggested yesterday, and Mr. Smith.-If the doctrine of the gentleman which has been again brought forward by the is true, it is flagrantly violated at the last session gentleman from Georgia. Now, to decide this and that by the very act referred to by the ged question, we ought to inquire whether this power tleman from Georgia. He observed that we stad is of an Executive or Legislative nature? I the pay of the commissioners who were seat think disposing of, or giving away sums of public treat with the Creek Indians, at eight dollars per money, is a Legislative, not an Executive act, and day. True, sir ; but we did not limit the whole sun cannot be performed in any other way than with which should' be given them; they were em all the formalities of Legislative authority. This ployed for a term in the discretion of the Pres: being my conception of the business, I shall take dent; but besides, we appropriated forty thousand no notice of the propriety of giving it to the Pre- dollars to be expended in the business of Indian sident, or to the President and Senate, because treaties, and that at discretion. The Senate, to the same objection lies against both; it would be be sure, reduced this sum to twenty thousand. improper to give it to either, because we have not which the House ultimately agreed to ; but in the authority so to do; it being a Legislative tran- first instance we agreed to appropriate for saction, we cannot put the part which depends thousand. We certainly did not think we acte upon us off our own shoulders, or on the shoulders unconstitutionally at that time; and yet, all that of any other.
we directed the expenditure of was but a serent It has been said, we cannot fix the necessary or eighth part of the amount. sum for each, without making invidious distinc From some papers before this House, but whet tions between foreign nations. If that argument it may be improper to notice very particuları amounts to anything, it amounts to this, that all we find that instructions have been signed by th
: officers who are sent 'abroad must have an equal President alone, and he it was who drew the compensation ; for if a discrimination is made in money for certain uses out of the Treasury; the any manner, it amounts to a distinction, and must is a precedent in favor of the bill as it now stand be invidious
. But I cannot see a distinction in The case referred 10, respecting the practice i this light; we may have occasion
for officers who the late Congress, is 'not at all in point; the la have
little to do ; and it cannot be thought invidi- Congress were invested with both Legislative and ous that
we do not pay them as much for doing Executive powers, it was therefore they, a. less business, as we do others for doing more, or they only, who could accomplish the whet who are put to greater expenses in performing business. their duties. It is said, that the proposition does not amount had not power to vest the President with a disera
Mr. Jackson denied having said that Congres to an absolute appropriation by the President ;| tionary authority in the case now before the