relative supply in particular years. It seems impossible to account for a continuing depression of prices, otherwise than by a rise in the exchangeable value of gold and silver, from a scantiness in the supply. The comparative aggregate of our exports in every succeeding year shows continuing depression, which appears to increase in a greater proportion of late years, than attended the depression when it first began in 1811; but the commencement, unquestionably, was occasioned by a defalcation in the supply of the precious metals; and the progressive depression since is perfectly consistent with a progressive increase in the supply of other commodities, conducing with the scantiness of the supply of the precious metals to depress prices.

Since 1814, the official and declared value has been given, in our finance accounts, of every separate article exported. A list of them is subjoined to the prefixed table, comprising every branch of home produce and manufacture. With the exception of a few articles, the official and declared value of which is always the same (umbrellas and parasols for example), the declared value of every article becomes less and less every year. Depression has fallen much more heavily upon some articles than upon others. The differences of depression can be accounted for, from circumstances applicable to each branch of manufac

ture; but it can no more be explained how depression should increase upon every article every year, than it can be explained how a great and sudden depression should have begun in the year 1811, otherwise than by a defalcation in the supply of gold and silver from the mines; which, in point of fact, we know happened in that year, and still continues, to the extent of three fourths of the previous annual supply. Other causes may account for the differences, but no other cause can account for the commencement or the continuance of the depression, without the intermission even of a single year. How much of the amount of the depression may arise from this cause, and how much from other causes, it is impossible to ascertain; but there is one among our articles of export which may afford reasonable evidence in this respect, namely, tin unwrought. The Cornwall mines are worked now exactly as they were in 1814. Tin is got nowhere else in Europe; and at present, from no other than the Cornwall and Banca mines. We have, therefore, in some measure a monopoly of the article, and are enabled to suit the supply to the demand, the increase of which, as it should seem, should be to increase the price. Yet the quantity exported has increased yearly since 1814, until the three last years that it has fallen off. The finance accounts do not enable me to

state how much depression fell upon tin in common with other articles of export in 1811; but since 1814 the depression amounts to upwards of 50l. per cent., which, as it appears to me, can be ascribed only to the defalcation in the supplies of gold and silver from the mines, increased by the consequences attending the return to cash payments in 1819, and the putting down of the small notes in 1826. Its depression, as stated in the finance accounts, accordingly appears to have been greatest in the years 1819, 1820, and 1821; again in the year 1826; and again in 1830; when the small notes were completely withdrawn from circulation.

The general depression of the aggregate exports appears to have been also greatest in these years. Still the general depression in these years is much less than the depression experienced in 1811. The depression occasioned by the alteration of our currency, therefore, while it confirms the conclusion, that the commencement of the depression can alone be ascribed to a defalcation in the supply of gold and silver from the mines, also shows that that defalcation must have had a much more powerful influence upon general prices than the alteration in the currency, to which all the distress we have suffered has been generally attributed. As the return to a metallic standard, for which preparation was

made in 1819, could not have an effect beyond the difference between the mint and the marketprice of gold, so the withdrawing of small notes from circulation could not exceed the amount of the exchangeable value of the gold required to take the place of the small notes. Either effect could only be temporary, and limited, in its operation in depressing industry. But restraints upon our money system, which I shall proceed now to notice, have a more extensive and a more lasting operation.

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PART II.

MONEY RESTRAINTS.

CHAP. I.

THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND ITS EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE, WITH ITS IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE.

THE Bank of England was established in the year 1694, by an act* passed for granting several rates and duties on tonnage of ships and beer, &c., for securing certain recompenses, &c. to persons who should advance 1,500,000l. to the state, by which their majesties were authorised to grant a commission to take particular subscriptions for 1,200,000%., part of the said sum of 1,500,000l., to be paid to the receipt of the Exchequer; in consideration of which, the subscribers were to receive an annuity of 100,000l. per annum, being interest at the rate of 81. per cent., or 96,000l., and 4000l. for management: and their majesties were authorised, by letters

* 5 W. & M. c. 20.