to be more regarded than his profit, for it was not the king's intent to make a void grant. (r)

A bad grant is void not against the Crown merely, but in a suit between the patentee and a third person. A patent for two or more inventions, when one is not new, is void altogether. The statute invalidates a patent for want of novelty, and consequently, by force of the statute, the patent is void so far as relates to that which is old. But further, the consideration for the grant is the novelty of all, and the consideration failing, or, in other words, the Crown being deceived in its grant, the patent is void, and no action is maintainable upon it.(s) If any part, being a material part of the alleged invention, fail, the discovery in its entirety forming one entire consideration, the patent is altogether void.(t)

It

14. Grants of letters patent are intended for the public weal; and if it appears that the Crown has been deceived by the party obtaining the grant, the grant will be void. (u) The consideration, or motive, expressed on the face of a grant will often be sufficient to determine its validity or invalidity. is laid down, that if the king grant a greater estate than he can lawfully do, as if the king seised in tail or for life grant in fee, it will be void for the whole, for the king was deceived.(x)

15. A false recital in a thing not material will not vitiate the grant, if the king's intention is manifest and apparent.

If the king is not deceived in his grant by the false suggestion of the party, but from his own mistake upon the surmise and information of the party, it shall not vitiate the grant.

Thus, where an invention was new, and useful on the

(r) Case of The Churchwardens of St. Saviour's in Southwark, 10 Rep. 67; Bewley's case, 9 Rep. 131 a.

(s) Morgan v. Seaward, 2 M. & W. 544; ib. 562, Parke, B. citing Travell v. Carteret; 3 Lev. 135; 1 Rep. 53, case of Alton Woods; 2 Rep. 54, Cholmeley's case; 5 Rep. 94 a, Barwick's case; Alcock v. Cooke, 5 Bing. 346; Hill v. Thompson, 8 Taunt. 375; Brunton v. Hawkes, 4 B. & Ald. 542.

(t) Hill v. Thompson, 8 Taunt. 375.

(u) Case of monopolies, Darcy v. Allin, 11 Rep. 86; Noy, 178, S. C.; Webst. P. C. 1, 5.

(x) Com. Dig. Grant, G. 8, citing 1 Rep. 44 a, the case of Alton Woods.

whole, but not useful in some cases, a patent for it was held good. The Court, in Morgan v. Seaward, said that they did not mean to intimate any doubt as to the validity of a patent for an entire machine or subject, which, if taken altogether, is useful, though some parts of it might be useless, where there is no false suggestion.(y)

16. In future no warrant will be granted for the sealing of any letters patent which contain two or more distinct substantive inventions.(z) This rule seems not to apply to the case where one invention is applicable to the improvement of several manufactures, or where several inventions conduce to the same common purpose or object, and are applicable to the improvement of the same manufacture.

(y) Rex v. Mussary, Bull N. P. 76 a; Haworth v. Hardcastle, 1 B. N. C. 189; Morgan v. Seaward, 2 M. & W. 544.

(z) Second set of Rules, 1852.

CHAPTER II.

The Subject-Matter.

A MANUFACTURE.

1. THE Crown has no power to grant letters patent for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, except for the sole making or working of any new manufacture within this realm.

Writers upon patent law have felt considerable difficulty in classifying the inventions in respect of which letters patent may be obtained, not so much on account of the difficulty of defining the principles which determine what is and what is not a patentable subject, as because most inventions are capable of being ranged under several of such classes.

Any positive definable change in a manufacture, producing a new and definable result, and being an improvement, seems to be patentable. (See Webster's Subject-matter, pp. 24, 29.)

2. According to the best authorities, the manufacture spoken of in the statute may be either a mode of manufacturing, or a vendible substance produced, as distinguished from a mere principle or the use or disposition of anything, without reference to any product resulting from such use. (a)

3. Under the head of new vendible substances may be classed all new compositions of things produced, such as new manufactures in the ordinary sense of the term; secondly, all mechanical inventions made to produce old effects. A new piece of mechanism is a thing made. (b) A patent for a method of doing a thing is generally a patent for the thing

(a) Per Eyre, C.J. 2 H. Black. 492; L. J. C. Hope, The Househill Company v. Neilson, Webst. Pat. Ca. 683.

(b) 2 H. Black. 492, Boulton v. Bull.

produced. Thus, a method of lessening the consumption of steam and fuel in fire-engines, by means set forth in the specification, is an invention of fire-engines of a newly-invented construction. Patents for chemical processes may be patents for the vendible substance produced.(c)

4. Under modes of manufacturing may be classed any process or practical manner of doing a thing, any new method of working, any artificial manner of operating with the hand or known machinery, or by new processes, in any art, producing effects already known, but at less expense, or otherwise with advantage.(d)

Passing lace between a surface of gas and a narrow chimney, which draws the flame through the lace, so as to burn and destroy the minute fibres in the interstices of the fabric, is a good subject of a patent, though the flame of charcoal and other substances had previously been used to singe the fibres from silk, cotton, or lace goods placed on a board, the flame being driven against them by bellows. (e)

In Daniell's patent for improvements in dressing cloth, after the surface of a piece of cloth had been properly dressed, and the nap on the surface laid even and smooth, the piece was rolled up very smoothly and evenly in a close and compact roll, which being immersed in hot water, the fibres of the wool became softened, and acquired a tendency to retain the same direction, and thus the effect of the dressing was rendered permanent. (f)

5. It generally happens that the result of the new mode of manufacturing is a better, or at any rate a different article from that before produced. As in Crane's patent, a better iron was the result of the new combination. So that the invention was the subject-matter of a patent, as being either of a better article or of a new combination.

6. A patent cannot be obtained for an abstract philosophical principle. The statement of what a principle is proves it not to be the subject-matter of a patent. It is the first ground and rule of arts and sciences. A patent must be for some

(c) Per Heath, J. 2 H. Black. 482, Boulton v. Bull.

(d) Crane v. Price, Webst. P. C. 409, Tindal; Rex v. Wheeler, 2 B. & Ald. 349, Abbott, C.J. Per Eyre, C.J. 2 H. Black. 492, 494. (e) Hall v. Jarvis and Boot, Webst. P. C. 97.

Daniell's patent, Godson on Patents, 274.

new production from such elements, and not for the elements themselves.(g) Without the application of the principle to a practical object and end, without the application of it to human industry or to the purposes of human enjoyment, a person cannot appropriate a principle to himself. Something of a corporeal or substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art, or, at the least, some new mode of employing practically his art and skill, is requisite to satisfy the word manufacture. (h)

It is impossible to support a patent for a mere method, without having carried it into effect, or produced some substance.(i) In Neilson's case, Alderson, B. said that the difficulty which pressed upon his mind was, that Neilson had taken out a patent in substance like Watt's, for a principle,the application of hot air to furnaces; but he thought he had not practically described any mode of carrying it into effect. The principle must be embodied in some practical mode, and the patent is taken out not for the principle, but for the mode of carrying the principle into effect.(k) In an American case, the plaintiff claimed "to cut ice of a uniform size by means of an apparatus worked by any other power than human. The invention of the art, as well as the particular method of the application of the principle, are claimed by the subscriber." The Judge said the patentee claimed a title to the art of cutting ice by means of any power other than human power. Such a claim is not maintainable in point of law. It is a claim for an art or principle in the abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery by which ice is to be cut. No man can have a sole right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of apparatus, though he is not inventor of any or of all of such means, methods, or apparatus.(1)

7. The mere use or effect of the employment of a known

(g) The Househill Company v. Neilson, L. J. C. Hope, Webst. P. C. 683; 2 H. Black. 487, Boulton and Watt v. Bull, per Buller, J.

(h) Rex v. Wheeler, 2 B. & Ald. 350, Abbott, C.J.

(i) Per Heath and Buller, JJ. Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Black. 468, 486.

(k) Neilson v. Harford, Webst. P. C. 342; Jupe v. Pratt, Webst. P. C. 144.

(1) Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story's Rep. 273, 285, cited Curtis on Patents, 64.