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Messiah, the Anointed One, the King and Lord of the Universe, exalted over all creatures and all worlds. Whether the evidence of what I have now stated is found in the Scriptures, is the inquiry on which, of course, the whole question turns. And to the investigation of

this, we may now proceed.

1. Christ is called the Son of God, because, in respect to his HUMAN NATURE, he is derived from God.

You and I are agreed in respect to the twofold nature of the Messiah, a nature truly divine and truly human, united in the person of Christ. In respect to his human nature, we are agreed that it is derived from God. And this derivation is one reason, as I now propose to show, why Christ is called the Son of God. If this be expressly taught in the Scriptures, and it be not taught that he is as to his divine nature derived, then I cannot help feeling that I am bound to acquiescence in the ground of the appellation as stated by the sacred writers; without alleging a reason for the appellation, which I cannot find in the Scriptures.

Luke 1:35. The angel said to her, divine influence shall come upon thee, and the power of the most High shall overshadow thee; WHEREFORE (do) that holy [child] which shall be born, shall be called the SON OF GOD."

Here then the angel of God himself has stated the ground of the appellation Son of God, as given to the Saviour, to be the production of his human nature by divine supernatural influence. "WHEREFORE the holy child shall be called the SON OF GOD." Whatever other reasons then we admit, this must not be excluded. It stands here with a prominence and a clearness, which render it impossible to obscure it.

The resemblance between the appellation here, and


that given by Luke to Adam, in his chapter of geneal-
ogy, is sufficiently obvious. Adam is called the son of
God, because divine and supernatural power was imme-
diately exerted, in his creation. "The holy child" is
called the Son of God, because the "
High" is supernaturally exercised to
ception. A common principle led to
both cases; viz, the principle that God was, by his
power or influence, in an immediate and supernatural
sense, the author or father of both Adam and the
Holy Child."


power of the most produce his conthe appellation, in

Now if the divine Logos was derived from the Father, was begotten from eternity, and was therefore Son, in the highest sense, before the birth of Jesus, I am not able to understand how this birth could be the reason, why Christ should be called the Son of God. The angel does not say, that the child should be called Son of God, because the Logos who was eternally Son should be united with him or dwell in him; but he should be called Son, because of supernatural divine power exercised to produce his conception.

The manner in which Turretine disposes of the testimony just adduced, is remarkable. "Particula dio," says he, "est nota consequentiae, non consequentis, signi cur sit vocandus Filius, non causae, quia antequam conciperetur, jam fuisse dicitur, Jo. 1: 1. Phil. 2: 6. Unde non dicit simpliciter, erit, sed xaŋoŋoerai, id est, manifestabitur." Tom. 1. p. 331.

In respect to the passages cited; John 1: 1, asserts that the Logos was in the beginning, and was God; but John says not a word concerning Son, it should be noted, until he has mentioned the incarnation of the Logos. It is then that he speaks of the glory of the only begotten.

The passage in Philippians speaks of Christ as having, previously to his incarnation, been in the form of God (εv μoggn Oεov,) and equal with him, but as having assumed our nature, suffered in it, and in consequence of this, as having a name given to him above every name, and being highly exalted. As God or divine Logos, surely he was not capable of exaltation; but as Messiah, triumphant over death and hell, as the incarnate Saviour, he could be exalted from his state of humiliation and suffering to one of supreme dignity and glory.

All then that the passages prove, which Turretine has cited, is merely that the Logos, or the μορφη Θεου existed, antecedently to the incarnation. But who, except Socinians, denies this? Beyond all reasonable question the pre-existence of the Logos is established by these passages; but not his eternal Sonship. Of this, neither text says any thing.

The criticism of this learned divine on the particle deo is very extraordinary. He represents it as a partiδιο cle transitive, but not illative here. To express his views, we must translate the verse in question thus; "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the highest shall overshadow thee, in consequence of which, [or, so that] the holy [child,] which shall be born of thee, shall be revealed as the Son of God." A translation without usage to support it; against the laws of the language; and without any parallel, with which I am acquainted. Ao is simply an abridged form of writing dua o, and means, as Schleusner expresses it, quare, quaproter, ideo, propterea. In Hebrew-Greek, it is twice a transitive particle; viz. in Rom. 2: 1, and James 1: 21. But the meaning of it here, and the sit

uation in which it stands, are both entirely diverse from the meaning which Turretine assigns it, and the situation of it in Luke 1: 35. In Rom 2: 1, and James 1: 21, it is by necessity of the context, and by this only, rendered transitively. That necessity springs from the fact, that what succeeds the word do, in both cases, is matter entirely diverse from what precedes; so that to render the particle dia by moreover, or further, besides, &c, is forced upon us ab exigentia loci.

In Luke 1: 35, a similar translation of do would make a mere frigid sense, or rather little short of nonsense. And what is most conclusive against any attempt to change the usual sense of do here, is, that this particle instead of standing at the commencement of a new subject, (as it does in the cases noted above,) stands between the protasis and epitasis of a sentence; in which position it is always and necessarily illative. Accordingly, neither Scapula nor Schneider assign to it other sense than the illative one. o, says Scapula, quamobrem, quocirca, proinde: and Schneider says, propter quod, propterea, deswegen, weswegen, daher. fact, to assign it any other sense than this, is out of question; unless in a case of absolute compulsion, where a new subject is commenced. And of this, two instances only are produced, in all the Lexicons; both of which differ widely in respect to circumstances and meaning, from the case under consideration.



I take it for granted, that a priori reasoning cannot determine the laws of philology, nor prove the usus loquendi of language as to do. That Turretine felt the

necessity of doing violence to the laws of usage, in the case under consideration, can not appear strange, to any one who considers how incompatible the usual sense.

of the word would be with his theory, and how difficult it is to submit a favourite dogma to the simple language of the Scriptures. But that we are obliged to philologize as Turretine does, is a position which we are at liberty to doubt, without peril of the greater excom


The violence done to do, however, is not more remarkable, than that which is done to xàndnoɛtai. "Non dicit (says he) simpliciter erit, sed xàŋŋoerai, i. e. MANIFESTABITUR."

First, then, that nadeva in Hebrew-Greek often signifies the same as esse to be, is a thing too well known and obvious to require any proof here. See Schleus. Lex. in voc. Kaλɛw, No. 10. It is an idiom, which extends even to the native Greek; as Schleusner has shewn, on the word just cited; and Schneider, on the same word. It is therefore a version perfectly justifiable by the usus loquendi, if we translate, "Therefore shall the holy [child] BE the Son of God."

But secondly, the common sense of xadeo is to name or surname, to give any person or thing a title or designation; and agreeably to this, have our English translators, faithful to the Original, rendered the verse in question. But for the sense manifestabitur, there is no example. It is a mere arbitrary sense imposed upon the passage by Turretine, to avoid the contradiction of his favourite theory.

But to return from this examination. We have then one express reason for the appellation Son of God, as given to Christ; a reason too which has analogy to support it. But, in analogy with other cases also, there is more than one reason why he is thus named. Christians are the sons of God, as the author of their being.

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