Where it appeared in evidence that the
patentee himself invented and brought
into use the machine for which the
patent was granted, but before that time
several other persons had seen a model
and a specification of such a machine,
which were brought over from America;
held, that the patentee was, nevertheless,
to be considered the inventor within the
meaning of the statute, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3,
s. 6, no machine having been manufac-
tured and brought into use from the
model and specification, and there being
no evidence that the patentee had ever
seen them. Lewis v. Marling, 493.

He is not a true and first inventor
within the meaning of the statute who
has seen the model or specification of
a machine subsequently patented, but
which had not been in public use and
operation. Ibid. 496.

The party introducing an invention,
not before in public use, is the true and
first inventor, though others may have
received a private communication of the
invention from abroad. Ibid. 496.

The introducer of an invention is
prima facie the inventor. Minter v.
Wells, 131.

The person who suggests the principle
is the inventor, not he who as a work-
man carries out the suggestion into
effect. Ibid. 132.

And although a skilful mechanic be
employed to perfect the details. Ibid.
132, n. e.

In the case of simultaneous inventors,
the party first obtaining the letters pa-
tent is the inventor in law. Forsyth v.
Riviere, 97; Galloway v. Bleaden, 529.

The distinction between first inventor
and public use is, in the abstract, sound.
The Househill Company v. Neilson,

689.

The prior use of an invention, though
abandoned, is evidence to negative the
title of a party as the inventor. Ibid.
720.

Originality of invention not destroyed
by previous glimpses of the same thing.
Ibid. 690.

Semble, That the title of a party as
true and first inventor is not destroyed
by the fact of the same invention having
been previously made, if altogether lost
sight of. Ibid. 717.

JURY.

If the parties consent the jury may be
asked the grounds of their verdict, but
not otherwise. Walton v. Potter, 600.

Any specific question to be put to the
jury ought to be short, and must be with

their consent. Ibid. 612.

LETTERS PATENT.

See DATE.

Letters patent cannot be dated before
the delivery of the warrant into Chancery
(Stat. 18 H. 6, c. 1). 430, n. c.

The Chancellor will not alter the date
of the sealing so as to enlarge the term
for the enrolment of the specification.
Ex parte Beck, 430.

A recompence and reward for making
smalt within the kingdom. Baker's pa-
tents, 9 & 11.

To be construed favourably for the
grantee. Mansell's patent, 26.

Granted in order that the public may
learn the art. 36, n.

The term of fourteen years too long.
Ibid.

Adequate reward and remuneration
to the inventor the ground of extension
of term. Liardet's patent (Stat. 16 G. 3,
c. 19). 52.

See EXTENSION.

The granting and prohibitory part of
letters patent expressed in different
terms. 7, n., & Minter v. Williams, 138.

Semble, That letters patent contain-
ing a proviso more general than the
statute authorizes are voidable. Per Lord
Lyndhurst, L.C. 447.

The grant of letters patent not a mat-
ter of favour. Arkwright v. Nightin-
gale, 61.

There may be several patents for the
same object, the means of attaining the
object being different. Huddart v. Grim-
shaw, 92.

The letters patent are prima facie
evidence on the part of the person claim-
ing the right. Minter v. Wells, 129.

The letters patent and specification are
to be taken as one instrument in enforcing
the claim of the inventor. Crossley v.
Beverley, 117.

In concurrent applications for letters
patent, the party first clothing himself
with the legal right is the inventor.
Forsyth v. Riviere, 97.

LICENSE.

Money paid for a license to use a pa-
tent afterwards appearing to be invalid
cannot in general be recovered back.
Taylor v. Hare, 292.

The plea of the invalidity of a patent
may be an answer to an action for rent
agreed to be paid for a license under a
patent. Chanter v. Leese, 295.

The grant of an exclusive license to
use a patent does not invalidate the pa-
tent itself, although the patent may be
vested in twelve persons; and it is
wholly immaterial to its validity in what
number of persons such license is vested.
Protheroe v. May, 414.

Such a license would not be invalid if
the district or districts covered by the
license included the whole extent of the
patent. Ibid. 414.

LICENSEE.

A licensee under letters patent is a
competent witness for the plaintiff in an
action for an infringement. Derosne v.
Fairie, 155.

MAKING.

The making, prior to obtaining a pa-
tent, for the purpose of experiment or for

other purposes than those of sale and
commerce will not vitiate such patent.
Bramah v. Hardcastle,194.

Making without selling an infringe-
ment. Jones v. Pearce, 124.

MANUFACTURE AND NEW

MANUFACTURE.

The word 'manufacture' in the sta-

tute, must be construed in one of two
ways; it may mean the machine when
completed, or the mode of constructing
the machine. Morgan v. Seaward, 193.

A new principle developed, carried out,
and embodied in the mode of using the
principle, constitutes a new manufacture.
Walton v. Bateman, 620.

Semble, That an expanding table, with-
out reference to the mode by which the
pieces are caused to diverge or expand,
is a manufacture. Jupe v. Pratt, 150.

The introducing cords or strands of
India rubber in combination with non-
elastic strands in making a fabric, is a
new manufacture, although similar cords
may have been introduced in pipes after
the fabric was complete. Cornish v.
Keene, 518.

A slight difference from what has ex-
isted before may not be a new manufac-
ture. Hastings' patent, 6; Matthey's
patent, 6.

The welding tubes by fixed dies in-
stead of rollers may be a new manufac-
ture. Russell v. Cowley, 466.

Tubes having been welded by grooved
rollers or a maundril, it is a new manu-
facture to weld them on grooved rollers
without a maundril. Ibid. 464 & 466.

The attaining the same result, or pro-
ducing the same effect, in a different
manner, is a new manufacture, as welding
by dies instead of by grooved rollers.
Ibid. 466.

The adaptation of a rotary cutter in a
machine, so as to shear from list to list,
a new manufacture, although the shearing
from end to end by a rotary cutter, and
from list to list by shears, are old. Lewis
v. Davis, 490.

A button and a flexible shank being
both old, their being simply put toge-
ther, without regard to the particular
means, is not a new manufacture. Saun-
ders v. Aston, 75.

MONOPOLY.

An allowance of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby persons are restrained of any freedom they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade. Darcy v. Allin, 5, n.

A grant of the sole making of cards void, as being a monopoly and contrary to law. Ibid. 2.

The power of exclusive sale of any commodity, a monopoly. Ibid. 5.

True tests or incidents of a monopoly, the price raised, quality of commodity inferior, and artificers impoverished. Ibid.

3.

All monopolies declared void except letters patent for the sole working or making of any manner of new manufacture to the true and first inventor. (Stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, s. 5, 6.) 30.

Monopoly patent in respect of a new trade or engine in furtherance of a trade for a limited period lawful. Darcy v. Allin, 6; Crane v. Price, 411.

A patent of monopoly and of privilege different. Darcy v. Allin, 5, n.

NEW TRIAL.

The fact of a sci. fa. pending is a ground for not entertaining a particular objection to the validity of a patent on a motion for a new trial. Haworth v. Hardcastle, 480.

New facts which would be ground for repealing letters patent by scire facias will not be received on motion for a new trial. Lewis v. Marling, 495.

MISTAKE.

Every mistake in a specification will not vitiate a patent. Neilson v. Harford, 340.

See AMENDMENT-WORD.

MODEL.

To be made, deposited, and preserved. Lombe's act, 39.

NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS.

In an action for the infringement of, and in a sci. fa. to repeal a patent, the defendant and plaintiff respectively shall give a notice of any objections on which he means to rely at the trial. (Stat. 5 & 6. W. 4, c. 83, s. 5.) 260, n. a.

If a defendant neglect to deliver the notice of objections with his pleas, he must obtain leave to plead de novo. Losh v. Hague, 203, n.

The notice of objections is intended to
apprise the plaintiff of what he is to meet
under the respective pleas. Ibid. 203.

It is not sufficient to state an objection
in the notice of objections, unless there
be a plea to which it can be applied.
Gillett v. Wilby, 270.

The notice of objections should be
drawn with reference to the pleas, or
notice given of the pleas to which the
objections are to be applied. Walton v.
Bateman, 616.

The notice of objections must be taken
to be part of the pleadings, and should be
treated as part of the plaintiff's case.
Neilson v. Harford, 309.

In actions for infringing a patent, the
notice of objection delivered by a defend-
ant under 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 83, s. 5, is not
conclusive at his peril: but the court un-
der its general jurisdiction may model its
proceedings and order a further and fuller
notice. Bulnois v. Mackenzie, 260.

Doubtful whether the statute requires
the names of those who have used the
invention to be given. Ibid. 263.

The notice of objections meant to af-
ford more specific information than the
plea. Ibid. 263.

The court may decide on the suffi-
ciency of the notice: this power is not
created by the statute. Ibid. 263.

The jurisdiction of the court as to
these questions is analogous to that of
set off; but to require the names and ad-
dresses of all persons who have used the
invention may prejudice the defendant.
Ibid. 263.

A particular of objections delivered by
the defendant in an action for infringing
a patent right must be precise and defi-
nite. It is not sufficient to say that the
improvements, or some of them, have
been used before; the defendants should
point out which. Fisher v. Dewick, 264.

The object of the statute not to limit
the defence, but to limit the expense, and
to prevent surprise on the plaintiff.
Ibid. 267.

The defendant is not limited to the
number of his objections, but he must
state them with precision. Ibid. 268.

The court refused to order a particular
of the names of the persons to whom sales
of the invention, prior to the date of the
patent, are alleged to have been made.
Carpenter v. Walker, 268.

The words 'divers other persons,'
struck out of an objection. Fisher v.
Dewick, 551, n.; Galloway v. Bleaden,
268, n. d.

The defendant may apply to a judge at
chambers to add the names of other per-
sons. Fisher v. Dewick, 551, n. ƒ.

The particular machines to which the
improvements are said to be inapplicable
must be specifically stated. Ibid. 551,n. f.

The part or parts in respect of which
an alleged discrepancy between the spe-
cification and letters patent exist must
be stated. Ibid. 551, n. ƒ.

The notice of objections intended to
give the plaintiff more information than
the plea; so that in general, a notice in
the terms of the plea will not be suffi-
cient. Neilson v. Harford, 370.

But the objection may be so fully ex-
pounded on the record, that a notice in
terms of the plea will be sufficient.
Ibid. 364 & 370.

At nisi prius the only question is,
whether the terms of the notice fairly in-
clude the objection taken. Ibid. 370.

If the notice be too general, previous
application should have been made to the
court. Ibid. 370.

It is not sufficient notice to say, that
the invention was wholly or in part used
before. Heath v. Unwin, 552.

It is a sufficient notice to state "that
the invention is not properly set forth in
the specification." Ibid. 552.

The notice of objections must point
out the defence with greater particularity
than the record. Books intended to be
relied on should be distinctly described.
The court will see that the objection is
stated with reasonable particularity, ac-
cording to the circumstances of the case.
Jones v. Berger, 544.

The objection, that the plaintiff did not
state the best mode with which he was
acquainted is sufficient. Ibid. 546.

Semble, That a notice of the invention
being known to persons of a particular
trade is sufficient. Ibid. 547 & 550.

Semble, The objection, that an inven-
tion was used by many would not be
supported by evidence of user by one
person. Ibid. 547.

The new rules being in operation be-
fore the statute, the legislature must have
intended that the notice of objections
should point out the defence with

The pleas may be narrowed by naming the person or limiting the nature of the inquiry. The words and elsewhere' not unreasonable. Ibid. 550.

An averment relating to a particular trade in certain towns is limited and definite, but under an averment about common forges, with a reference to numerous places all over the kingdom, it is impossible to tell what is intended to be proved. The Househill Company v. Neilson, 552.

The section of the statute (5 & 6 W. 4, c. 83), as to the notice of objections, does not apply to proceedings in Scotland, the same object being obtained by the closed record. Ibid. 552, 711, & 714.

A statement in the notices of objections, that the specification is calculated to deceive, is sufficient to let in evidence as to any particular passage being false. Neilson v. Harford, 324, 332, & 370.

See Russell v. Ledsam, 11 M. & W., 647.

NOVELTY.

The general question is, whether the invention was known and in use before the patent. Liardet v. Johnson, 53.

Two distinct issues-the one whether the invention was in use, the other, whether the party derived it from another person or from some public source. Cornish v. Keene, 507.

The distinction between the issues as

to the first inventor and public use by others of the invention, is in the abstract sound. The Househill Company v. Neilson, 689.

The grantee must be the first inventor, and the invention must not be in use at the time of the granting the patent. For the purpose of meeting the case, that the party is the inventor, evidence may be gone into to show that a person used the invention ten years ago, and then abandoned it. Ibid. 719-20.

Admitting that he is the inventor, if this invention be known and used at the time at which the patent is granted, the patent is void. Ibid. 720.

The notorious use of an invention, though discontinued, sufficient to invalidate subsequent letters patent. Ibid. 710.

The prior use of a perfected invention, if such prior use be publicly known, will vitiate the subsequent letters patent for the same invention. Ibid. 716.

Semble, That the prior use and abandonment of an invention, if lost sight of and not known to the public, will not vitiate letters patent for the same invention. Ibid. 717.

If an invention is in use at the time of the making the grant, the party cannot have a patent, although he is an original inventor; if it is not in use he cannot have a patent if he is not an original inventor. Ibid. 719.

The statute excludes from a patent the inventor who shall have made the invention so public, that others at the time shall use it. The consideration fails. Ibid. 719.

The sale of the article in the market by the patentee will vitiate letters patent obtained subsequently to such sale. Wood v. Zimmer, 44.

The making of two or three of the patent apparatus by the patentee prior to the date of the grant will not vitiate it, unless others shall use the invention. Bramah v. Hardcastle, 194.

The construction and sale, before the date of the patent, of the patent machine by the patentee for gain to any of the public who will buy it, invalidates the subsequent letters patent. Morgan v. Seaward, 194.

If such sale did not vitiate the subsequent letters patent, the inventor might practically have a monopoly of much than fourteen years. longer duration

Ibid. 195.

The manufacture of two pieces of machinery for a party connected in business with the patentee, under an injunction of secrecy, and their user abroad, may not be such a publication as will vitiate the subsequent grant. Ibid. 195 & 705.

The making of an article in this country, though for exportation, will vitiate a subsequent patent, unless under special circumstances. Carpenter v. Smith, 536.