Since the act of union, England and Scotland must be taken to be one country in support of the validity of letters patent. Roebuck v. Stirling, 45; Brown v. Annandale, 433.

Evidence of user in England admissible to invalidate a patent for Scotland. Roebuck v. Stirling, 46.

An invention being known and publicly practised in England before the date of letters patent for Scotland, the latter are void. Ibid. 48.

Previous public use in England will invalidate a patent for Scotland. Brown v. Annandale, 434.

England, Scotland, and the Colonies, became one realm by the act of union. Ibid. 448.

ENROLMENT.

The enrolment of a disclaimer or memorandum of alteration duly made cannot be expunged from the rolls of the court. Re Sharp's patent, 641.

The authority of the Master of the Rolls is limited to correcting clerical errors or errors of mistake. Ibid. 646.

An error in the enrolment of the privy seal bill will be amended. Re Nickels' patent, 655.

The enrolment is properly of the letters patent, and not of the privy seal bill. Ibid. 661.

An enrolment different from the letters patent will not be permitted to continue. Ibid. 661.

The letter having been written for f in the engrossment of the specification, and the enrolment made therefrom, the Master of the Rolls ordered the latter to be amended. Re Whitehouse's patent, 649, n. m.

The specification having recited the letters to have been granted in "October" instead of " November," the Master of the Rolls ordered the enrolment to be amended. Re Rubery's patent, 649.

The copying clerk, in making the enrolment of the specification, transposed certain numbers of reference to the drawings; the Master of the Rolls ordered the enrolment to be amended. Re Redmund's patent, 649.

Clerical errors in enrolments, or errors made by inadvertence, always amended, but under various authorities. Re Sharp's patent, 647.

Records amended, 647, n. l.

ERRORS.

Amendable at Common Law. See AMENDMENT AND ENROLMENT.

Amendable by Statute.

See AMENDMENT AND DISCLAIMER.

ESTOPPEL.

A patentee who has conveyed away his interest is estopped in an action of infringement by his assignee from denying his title to convey. Oldham v. Langmead, 291.

In an action of covenant on articles of agreement, which recited that the plaintiffs were assignees of letters patent, the defendant is not estopped from denying the novelty of the invention. Hayne v. Maltby, 291.

In an action of covenant on a license deed, reciting that the plaintiff had invented certain improvements, &c., the

Evidence of user in England admissible to show want of novelty in proceedings on Scotch patent. Roebuck & Garbett's case, 46.

The only evidence which the plaintiff can give on the issue of novelty is, that of persons who were in the way of hearing of the invention, not having heard of it. Cornish v. Keene, 509.

A plaintiff must give some evidence of the sufficiency of the specification if denied. Turner v. Winter, 81.

As, the evidence of persons of science and workmen, that they have read the specification and can understand it, and have practised the invention according to it. Cornish v. Keene, 503.

And in the absence of contradiction on the part of the defendant, such evidence will be sufficient. Ibid.

The defendant must show that persons have been misled by the specification, or incurred expense in attempting to follow it, and were unable to ascertain what was meant. Ibid.

The plaintiff can only make a primâ facie case of novelty by calling persons acquainted with the particular trade and manufacture, to prove that they never heard of any invention similar to the plaintiff's. Galloway v. Bleaden, 526.

If a whole class of substances be mentioned as suitable, the plaintiff must show that each and every of them will succeed. Bickford v. Skewes, 218.

The letters patent are prima facie evidence of the title of the party, and it is for the defendant to impeach their title. Minter v. Wells, 129.

In an action for the infringement of a patent, professing to be an improvement

EXPERIMENT.

An experiment found not to answer, and abandoned as useless, will not vitiate a subsequent patent for an invention in which the previous defects are remedied. Jones v. Pearce, 124.

A mere experiment or course of experiments, for the purpose of procuring a result which is not brought to completion, but begins and ends in uncertain experiments, will not prevent another person, who is more successful, from obtaining the benefit of his success. Galloway v. Bleaden, 525 & 529.

The question is, whether what was done rested in experiment, and unsucfull result, or whether it was a complete cessful experiment, not conducted to its discovery of that which forms the subject of the patent? Ibid. 526 & 529.

An invention abandoned must be presumed not to have been complete, but to have rested in experiment. The Househill Company v. Neilson, 713.

That which is merely experiment can never vitiate a patent; the experiments and patent go on together. Ibid. 704, 705.

See ABANDONMENT.

EXTENSION OF TERM.
By Act of Parliament.

The benefit conferred on the public by the employment of the poor, consenufacture, a ground for extension of quent on the importation of a new materm by the legislature. The Lustring patent (9 & 10 W. 3, c. 43, P.) 37. Itid. 37, n.

The increase of trade and the employ-
ment of the poor by the introduction of
new inventions from abroad, and the
expense incurred and difficulties en-
countered, a ground of extension of term
by the legislature. Lombe's patent
(5 G. 2, c. 8, P.) 38.

The difficulties of establishing a new
manufacture, and insufficiency of the
original term to render the invention of
public utility and to afford adequate re-
muneration, a ground for extension of
term by the legislature. Cookworthy's
patent, assigned to Champion (15 G. 3,
c. 42, P.) 39. Ibid. 39, n.

Insufficiency of the original term for
the inventor to obtain adequate remu-
neration for his labour, expense, and
time, or for the public to reap the full
advantage of the invention in point of
utility and economy under special cir-
cumstances, a ground of extension. Li-
ardet's patent, 52.

cepting as to the former patent, except
the term. Ibid.

By Statute 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 83.

The crown on the recommendation of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council may prolong the term by grant-
ing new letters patent. (Stat. 5 & 6 W.
4, c. 83, s. 4.)

But application for such prolongation
must be prosecuted with effect before the
expiration of the term of the original
letters patent, unless the petition be
presented six months before such expi-
ration. (Stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 67.)

A strong case of hardship, and as to
the utility of the invention, must be
made out. Re Erard's patent, 559.

A prima facie case of the sufficiency
of the specification must in general be
made out; letters patent clearly bad
would not be extended. Ibid. 557, n. a.

A large sum of money and much time

extended term to be limited. Ibid. 52.

Privileges existing before the date of
the letters patent, preserved. Ibid. 53.
Objections to original letters patent
saved. Ibid. 53.

Proviso against transfer to more than
five persons, and for a new specification.
Ibid. 53.

The expenditure in perfecting an in-
vention, and the insufficiency of the or-
dinary term for rendering the invention
of the greatest utility to the public, or
for remunerating the inventor, grounds
of extension of term for thirty-one years.
Hartley's patent (17 G. 3, c. 6, P.) 55.

Objections to novelty of invention,

saved. Ibid. 55.

Use of invention in royal dock-yards
without license, saved. Ibid. 55, n.

Provisos limiting price, and against
transfer to more than five persons. Ibid.
55, n.

The superseding an article of impor-
tation from abroad by British manufac-
ture, the opposition of the trade, the
expenses of litigation, and the inade-
quacy of the remuneration, grounds for
an extension of the term. Turner's
patent (32 G. 3, c. 73, P.) 84.

Proviso as to the price, and limiting
the price, and saving all exceptions, ex-

fect the invention without any return,
the patent extended. Re Bate's patent,
739.

The invention being very meritorious,
the result of a great deal of labour, care,
and science, and extremely useful in its
effects, and the party having sustained
considerable loss, the patent will be ex-
tended. Re Swaine's patent, 560.

The misfortunes of the patentee and
those connected with him, and the na-
ture of the invention as affecting its
introduction into use, is to be con-
sidered. Re Southworth's patent, ex
parte Haworth, 487.

The new letters patent must be grant-
ed to the party in whom the subsisting
patent is legally vested. Ibid. 488.

In an application by an assignee the
title of the petitioner must be strictly
proved, although no notice of intention.
to dispute the title is contained in the
objections. Re Wright's patent, ex
parte Shuttleworth, 561.

The application for an extension post-
poned till near the expiration of the
patent, where the profits may be con-
siderably increased in the interim. Re
Macintosh's patent, 739.

Costs of opposition given, the applica-
tion being abandoned. Ibid.

Extension recommended in favour of
the parties having the legal estate, with-

5 D

Extension of term recommended, the
patentee having experienced great oppo-
sition from the existing interests, and
being a loser by the invention. Re
Stafford's patent, 563.

The words "prosecuted with effect"
of the statute (5 & 6 W. 4, c. 83, s. 4),
requires something more to have been
done than presenting the petition and
opening the case before the expiration of
the term of the letters patent. Re
Bodmer's patent, 740.

Semble, That "prosecuted with ef-
fect" means, obtaining the report of the
Privy Council. Ibid.

Patent extended under the provisions
of the statute 2 & 3 Vict. c. 67. Ibid.

The merit and utility of the inven-
tion, the merit of the petitioner in pa-
tronizing an ingenious inventor, and
liberally expending money to introduce
the invention, the amount of profit not
being greater than the ordinary profit
on capital employed in similar trades,
the annoyances, anxiety, and cost of
litigation, are several grounds of consi-
deration in recommending the extension
of letters patent. Re Whitehouse's pa-
tent, ex parte Russell, 477.

The extension of term recommended
to assignee on his securing an annuity
to the inventor during the subsistence of
the new letters patent. Re Whitehouse's
patent, ex parte Russell, 476 & 478.

The invention being meritorious, but
from circumstances beyond the control
of the patentee not sufficiently appreci-
ated, and unproductive of reward, the
extension will be recommended.
Kollman's patent, 565.

Re

The questions to be considered on ap-
plication for an extension are, the in-
genuity of the inventor, the want of
capital and means, the utility of the
invention, and the sufficiency of the re-
muneration. Re Downton's patent, 567.

The absence of all profit during a
portion of the term is a ground for ex-
tension. Costs will be given where
there is no ground for the opposition.
Ibid. 567.

Letters patent being about to expire,
the application for an extension will be
heard during the pendency of legal pro-
ceedings as to the validity of the patent.
Re Kay's patent, 568.

It is sufficient to establish a primá
facie case of the validity of a patent on
an application for an extension. Ibid.
571.

The profits amounting to about £6000,
an extension of the term for three years
recommended. Ibid. 572.

The petitioner having purchased the
letters patent and stock in trade at a fair
price on the death of the patentee, and
sustained no loss, the application for an
extension of the term was refused. Re
Quarrill's patent, 740.

The actual expenses and receipts must
be shown; it is not sufficient to show
generally that there has been no profit.
Ibid.

The insufficiency of the usual term to
afford remuneration, regard being had
to the nature of the invention, is ground
for an extension. Re Jones's patent, er
parte Riddle & Piper, 579.

Semble, That it is not necessary to
show a probable ground for supposing
that the petitioners would be remune-
rated by the extension prayed. Ibid.

An invention as described in the spe-
cification, having succeeded at first to a
limited extent for certain patterns and
colours, but being inapplicable for the
more elaborate patterns and brighter
colours, until rendered so by means of
certain improvements introduced from
abroad, whereby it had become of great
value, an application for the extension
of the patent was refused. Re Wood-
croft's patent, 740.

The fact of an invention when known
not getting into general use, is a pre-
sumption against its utility. Re Simis-
ter's patent, 723.

Semble, That negligence on the part
of a patentee in restraining infringe-
ments is a ground of opposition. Ibid.

In an application by an assignee, his
title must be strictly proved. Re Gallo-
way's patent, 725.

The new letters patent are granted
subject to the same objections as the old,
and the questions of novelty and utility
will not be minutely entered on. Ibid.

It is for the benefit of patentees that
the assignee should represent the whole
merit of the inventor. Ibid.

The fact of great improvements hav-
ing been made on the original invention,
affords no objection to the extension of

the term. Ibid. 727.

The expense of litigation, and the cost
of the patents, and the expense of bring-
ing the invention into use, to be deduct-
ed in estimating profits. Ibid. 729.

A manufacturer's fair profit must be
deducted, and distinguished from the
profit of the monopoly. Ibid. 729.

In considering whether a patent
should be extended, a publication con-
tained in a foreign journal may be taken
into the account. Re Soames' patent,
733.

The merit of the importer is less than
that of the inventor. Ibid.

The petition for an extension is not
to be tried in the same manner as an
application to parliament. Ibid. 734.

The fact of a further improvement
having been made, is an argument in
favour of an extension. Ibid.

An inference against the merit of the
invention from the smallness of the step,
must be carefully guarded against. Ibid.
735.

The interest of the inventor is medi-
ately consulted through the assignee.
Re Morgan's patent, 738.

FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.

If the consideration fails, the letters
patent are void. 27, n.

Failure of execution a failure of con-
sideration. 27, n.

If an invention wholly fail, or be alto-
gether useless for the purpose described,
the letters patent are void. Manton v.
Parker, 192 & 484, n. m.

Partial and total failure of considera-
tion to be distinguished from each other.
484, n. m.

The failure of consideration in respect
of total want of utility different from
that in respect of partial want of utility.
109, n. k.

FALSE SUGGESTION.

False recital or suggestion a ground
for repealing the letters patent. R. v.
Mussary, 41.

But it must be in respect of some-
thing material, and part of the conside-
ration of the grant. Ilid.

Letters patent for certain improve-
ments in machinery are void on the
ground of false suggestion, if one of the
inventions claimed be not an improve-
ment. Morgan v. Seaward, 196.

Letters patent being for several things
by one single process, if the mode fail as
to one, the patent is void. Turner v.
Winter, 82.

Letters patent for a watch, the inven-
tion being only of a part, void for false
suggestion. Jessop's case, 42, n.

Letters patent for a new and improved
method of drying and preparing malt,
the invention being the making a co-
louring substance from malt, void for
false suggestion. R. v. Wheeler, 42, n.

Letters patent for sharpening knives,
razors, and scissors, the mode described
being inapplicable to scissors, void for
false suggestion. Felton v.Greaves, 42, n.

The novelty of every part of the in-
vention is the consideration of the grant,
so that if part of the consideration fails,
the patent is void for false suggestion.
Morgan v. Seaward, 196.

The suggestion in a Scotch patent,
that an invention was new within hæ
regna, when it was well known and in
public use in England, is false, and will
vitiate the grant.
Brown v. Annan-
dale, 443.

False recital in letters patent not by
way of suggestion, or any part of the
consideration, may not vitiate. Morgan
v. Seaward, 196.

False suggestion distinct from insuf-
ficient or incorrect description in the
specification, 42, n.