Judgment. To raise the question of the cification, and averring no other to have been enrolled, aver the letters patent to be void. declaration, and the issue joined on it is found against the defendant. I have heard no authority cited to show, that where a plea is found false in fact, the defendant may afterwards avail himself of another part of the plea, which was not put in issue, and on the allegation, that the facts alleged in that other part of the plea are before the court, arrest general judgment for the plaintiff (e). If the defendant had intended to avail himself of insufficiency of the want of a proper specification in point of law, or to have the specification contended that such specification would not support the patent in point of law, the defendant which had been granted to the plaintiffs, he might, after alleging should, after set- that such was the specification, and that no other specification ting out the spehad ever been used or filed by the plaintiffs, have stated in his plea, that the patent was therefore void in law; and then the question would have been raised upon the record, on which, if the defendant was wrong in his allegation, he would have been compelled to pay costs to the plaintiffs upon a demurrer, or if the defendant was right, he would have received them upon judgment being given in his favour. But now, after having put in a plea which goes to the whole right of action, which plea is found to be false in fact, upon an issue raised upon it, he seeks to use that plea-a confession in that plea-not merely for the purpose of the plea itself, but as a general answer to the right of the plaintiffs to recover. I observe the plea contains two allegations, one of which is, that this was the only specification that was put in by the plaintiffs; and another is, that it is not a sufficient specification for the purpose. True it is, when an issue is taken by the plaintiffs on one of those allegations, they do admit the other, viz. that it was the only specification; but then, they only admit it for the purpose of that plea, and the defendant has no right afterwards to use it as an argument against the plaintiffs, that they have virtually admitted, for all the purposes of the action, that there is no other specification than that which is put upon the record. I think, therefore, upon the strict legal notion of a motion in arrest of judgment, which proceeds upon the ground of a deficiency in the plaintiffs' right of action, that the defendant has no right, under the circumstances, to call upon us to stay the judgment of the jury; and it is enough to say, that on motion in arrest of judgment, the matter ought to be made out clearly to the satisfaction of the court, because, if they are wrong upon it, the party has a remedy in a higher quarter. As to the entry I come now to that which is the main and important question of the verdict on between the parties, that is, whether the defendant has, upon the special finding. the finding of the jury, the right to have the verdict entered for him upon the second and third issues. The second issue in (e) On this point, see the judgments of the court in Walton v. Potter, ante 598-613. this case is, "that the plaintiffs were not the true and first in- In the C. P. E. T., 1842. ventors;" and the third issue is, "that it was not a new invention at the time of the letters patent." The jury gave in this finding "That the invention is not new, but an improved process, and that it is not a new combination." They do, therefore, according to the plain meaning of these words, first find there is no novelty in the invention, that there is no new combination, and that there is no novelty in the process, but an improvement only. The question is, whether upon this finding, supposing it to be supported by the evidence in the cause, the jury have found these issues for the plaintiffs or for the defendant; and it appears to me, that the verdict ought to be entered upon these issues for the defendant. may be the Let us see what the patent is taken out for; and then, what it is the plaintiffs in their specification have declared to be the nature of their discovery. The patent is taken out "for a new or improved process or manufacture of silk, and silk in combination with certain other fibrous substances;" taken out, therefore, strictly for a process. On the present occasion it is not necessary to go into the question (upon the view I take of this specification), whether a patent can be granted for a process, in the strict and proper sense of that term, or not. Undoubtedly there is a very strong reason to suppose, if the A new process specification is carefully and properly prepared, so as to point subject of letters out, with great distinctness and minuteness, what the process patent. is, that such a patent may be good in law. Such certainly was the opinion of Chief Justice Eyre (ƒ), and such also appears to have been the opinion (carefully guarding against any abuse of that doctrine) of Lord Tenterden (g), who says-that "the subject-matter of letters patent, i. e. the word 'manufacture' as used in the statute of James, has generally been understood to denote either a thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed either in the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for raising water from mines; or it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better and more useful kind." And then he goes on to observe, that the specification of a patent or a process should be definite and precise; that as to a process, the (f) In Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 468500. (g) In The King v. Wheeler, 2 B, & A. 350. Judgment. specification should state the time and degree of heat, or other particulars, that would apply to the particular subject-matter under consideration. Now, looking at the specification in this case, it appears to me, that this patent cannot be supported at law, because the plaintiffs have, in the course of it, claimed more than they are entitled to; for I cannot read the description that they give of their invention, and the parts of their invention, without understanding them to claim improvements that are made upon the machine, which is used for the purpose of producing the desired result. Dismissing all the different heads of process from our consideration but the sixth and seventh, I cannot understand those two articles or heads of the process, when I consider the other parts of the specification, but as claiming either an improvement upon, or a new combination of, the throstle machine, by which the work is carried into effect. That the plaintiffs mean to claim those eight several and distinct parts of the process, according to the argument of my brother Bompas, as all combined together making one process, I think is abundantly clear from the last words of the specification, where they desire it to be understood that they "disclaim those parts of the process or mechanism, which may have been, previously to granting our patent, well known." And then they go on to say, "but we restrict our claims to the eight several heads of invention mentioned in the this specification, all of which we believe to be great public utility." Therefore it is, that the plaintiffs are bound to show that each of those eight several distinct heads, into which they have divided the process, is new and of public utility. The specification begins first to describe the old method of working the silk waste; and then it goes on to say, "having thus explained the old or ordinary process of converting silk waste into yarn, I will proceed to describe our novel process, by which we produce our new or improved manufacIf the patent be ture of yarn or thread." Claiming, therefore, as they must for a new or im- claim, a novelty in the case, whether it be a patent taken out proved process, and the jury for machinery, or taken out for a process only, if we were to find the process stop there, when the jury have found that there was not a new but improved, process, but an improved process, although perhaps it would be a hard measure upon the plaintiffs, who call their manufacture, not to be new semble that the patent is invalid. early part of new and of our new or improved manufacture;' still, I think, there might be some doubt even upon that finding, with those words alone in the specification, whether it could be supported. Further on, after describing some portion of the process and machinery, the specification proceeds thus-"Having now explained the nature of the drawing and roving machinery, which we have found to answer best, and the several processes of drawing and roving silk waste alone, and of silk waste in combination with wool and with flax, I will proceed to describe the spinning machine, by which the rove is drawn or elongated into strands In the C. P. to be spun into yarn or threads." Now observe, he is about E. T., 1842. to describe a piece of machinery; he says, "The annexed drawings for the most part represent the well-known spinning frame, called a throstle, on the principle of the long ratch, as employed in the spinning of flax." "For the most part represents it." What is that but impliedly saying-" There is some part of that which I use, and which I am now about to describe, which is new and discovered by myself?" And he goes on, "which machine, combined with the improvements we have applied to it, we apply to the new and useful purpose of spinning silk waste of long fibres." Now pausing there only, I think it is impossible to read this without seeing that the party, who is now describing one of the heads of the process before set out, is claiming either a new improvement in the machine which he uses, or a new combination of the parts of that machine. A little lower down he gives the figures, by which he refers to the different parts of the machine. He tells you, "At N is a copper trough containing water, the application of which in this process is an important feature in our invention." Then he Then he says, "The letters 000 are pressing rollers, which are made of wood, and are partly immersed in the water wherein they rotate, and by their continuous action convey the fluid to the nip of the brass bosses PPP of the drawing roller G." Adding, of the spindles QQQ, "which for our new process we place (as will be observed in the drawing) much nearer to the drawing roller G than has heretofore been practised." "The other parts of the machine not adverted to, being quite familiar to persons employed in this branch of manufacture, it will be unnecessary to explain." I confess, I feel it impossible to apply this language in any other way than as a substantive claim on the part of these patentees, either to a new invention or new combination of the parts of the machine, by which they carried their work into effect. Now the jury have, on the evidence before them, distinctly negatived both. They say, there is no new invention and no new combination. Unless one could see, on the evidence in the cause, that they were wrong, the matter must rest where it is. For my part, I can only say, that there was a great deal of evidence on both sides; every point was urged before the jury by the several parties, and the jury, after some considerable hesitation, came to the finding which I have stated. On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion-first, that their finding, coupled with the language of the specification, entitles the defendant to a verdict on these issues; and secondly, I also say, upon the evidence before me, that I cannot feel myself dissatisfied with the verdict. Judgment. COLTMAN, J.: I am of the same opinion. On the material question-viz. the third issue, I think the defendant entitled to have the verdict entered for him. It is said, this is an ambiguous finding, upon which no verdict can be entered; for I think it impossible to contend, that it is a verdict for the plaintiffs, whose allegation in this third issue it expressly negatives. It seems to me, that in order to sustain the issue, that this was a new invention, the plaintiffs were bound to show that it was new in each of the eight parts which are set out in the specificaheads set out in tion, and which are claimed as parts of their process. the specifica The plaintiffs bound to sustain the novelty of each of the eight several tion. Unless each of them were new, the plaintiffs would not, in my judg ment, be entitled to a verdict. I am not prepared to say, that an improved process may not be the ground of a patent; and if the jury, therefore, had simply found that it was an improved process, and had found no more than that, I should at least have been under some difficulty in saying, what the effect of such a verdict would be. But the finding of the jury must be taken altogether, and then it amounts to this, that though there may be some improvement in the manipulation or otherwise in the process by which this matter is carried on, there is neither novelty in the invention, nor novelty in the combination. Looking therefore at the verdict only, it seems to me a verdict in favour of the defendant upon the third plea. But we may look into the evidence for the purpose of seeing, whether it was probable that there really was such an improvement in the process as might by reasonable construction amount, in the eye of the law, to a new invention; because, if it had been so, I should have thought that might be a ground for sending the case down again to a new trial. And looking at the evidence with this view, I am not able to find any novelty in the process, which would warrant us in saying, that the jury must have meant, by finding it to be an improved process, that it amounted to any thing which might properly be the subject of a patent. It seems to me to be nothing more than the application of an old and well-known machine, without any material variation, to the spinning of silk waste, in what we may call the natural state, discharging the gum from it in the ordinary manner, and dyeing it by the ordinary process. The only thing in which there is any novelty, that I can make out, is, that the plaintiffs do not cut the silk into small and minute portions; that they dye it in a different stage of the process, and that they appear also to discharge the gum in a different stage of the process-but altogether in a mode before known and used by the public; there is no alteration, except in point of time, as to either of these matters. Comparing the finding of the jury with the nature of the process as proved by the evidence, it appears to me, that all the jury can have meant to say on the |