impotent to face the mere idea of war, and have forced them to submit to humiliation and injury in order to avoid war. The Declaration of Paris, in short, has acted (as it was intended to act by the Russian Empress who invented it) so as absolutely to paralyze the sole force of England and to make her cease to be counted in the councils of Europe.

Confronted once again, and now most urgently, by these reflections, what would be the first thought of a British Cabinet ? With one enemy already on their hands, their main object would certainly be to avoid making others and to obtain allies for their country. But such allies could only be looked for among the neutral powers. But these neutral powers would (so long as the Declaration of Paris lasts) have the strongest interest in remaining neutral and refusing alliance with England-for they have been promised, in that case, a vast carrying trade to share between them, the carrying trade, certainly of the enemy, and possibly that of Great Britain herself, which means that of the world. The moment has now arrived to hand over this stupendous advantage to them-this immense bribe to them to avoid alliance with England (and therefore belligerency) and to adhere to neutrality. Is this the moment that any English Minister seeking allies would take in order to withdraw the advantage, to resume the bribe with one hand, while with the other he beckoned for alliance and assistance from the very Power or Powers thus dealt with?

Can an English Minister be conceived of capable of saying then in that situation, "You are a neutral "Power. I desire your alliance against my enemy. "We have undertaken, ever since 1856, that when "this present situation should arise, you should have

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"the carrying trade of the world to divide between 66 you and other neutrals. The situation having arisen, I must tell you, on the one hand, that I am "going to repudiate what I have undertaken in this respect, that I am going to refuse you that tre"mendous bribe; and at the same time I ask for your alliance and assistance in this deadly struggle"? It is not conceivable; and if it were conceivable, and were done, what would that terrible Opposition say and do? What would be the effect on European opinion, on our old friends the "Influences of Civilization," or, more important than all, on the credit and the votes of the Ministry?

Assuredly such language could not be held, such a course could not be so much as entertained.

The one moment when the Declaration of Paris cannot be repudiated, the one moment when no attempt to repudiate it could properly be made, is on the eve of an imminent war. If it is to be repudiated, as it must be unless Great Britain is to remain deprived of her chief offensive power in war, and as it can be consistently with all laws and all morality, it must be in time of peace and with due notice to all concerned.

THE DECLARATION CAN BE REPUDIATED IN
TIME OF PЕАСЕ.

The Declaration can be repudiated; it cannot be ignored. Whatever may be its want of authority, still it was signed with an affectation of authority by an English Secretary of State and an English Ambassador. By all therefore, except by those who would have Great Britain emulate certain other Powers in tearing up all engagements when it suits

her and when circumstances give her the power to do it, this Declaration must be accepted as being at present binding on Great Britain.

But though it is binding it is not irrevocable. The act that was done in the dark without authority may be undone in the day with authority. It is absolutely within the competency of the Crown, either of its own proper motion, or moved thereto by an Address from the Houses of Parliament, to declare that the Declaration of Paris is no longer accepted by it as the rule of maritime warfare, and thus to revert to the common rights of all warfare. But until the act of the two Plenipotentiaries who assumed to sign on behalf of Great Britain in a matter beyond their powers shall have been undone by a formal denunciation of the Declaration, and the Declaration itself openly declared to be no longer binding, so long must it and will it be binding on Great Britain.

CHAPTER XVI.

OBJECTIONS TO THE RESUMPTION OF MARITIME RIGHTS BY GREAT BRITAIN CONSIDERED.

AN INFINITESIMAL GAIN-AN IMMEASURABLE LOSS. ONE advantage, indeed, Great Britain gains, under certain circumstances and in certain times, from the Declaration of Paris. She gains the carrying trade of any nations which may be belligerent and exposed to maritime attack, while she remains neutral. But this gain is very small. The carrying trade of other nations is already to a large extent carried on for them by British vessels, and that additional trade which she can gain from any one other state is therefore but a small and comparatively insignificant addition to that which she already has. What there is to be gained, however, she gains; but on the other side of the account must be put that which she must lose when she herself becomes belligerent. That loss may probably amount to a large part or even to the whole of her own carrying trade, which is more than all that she could gain from other nations during a century of wars. And there is this further about it, that, while the infinitesimally small gain Great Britain may make as a neutral is made in times of prosperity, she must sustain an immeasurably greater loss as a belligerent in times of extremity. There can be no advantage in this.

THE FALLACY OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE CHANGES IN THE CONDITIONS OF SEAFARING RENDER THE DECLARATION ADVANTAGEOUS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

Another set of arguments, if arguments they can be called, in favour of the Declaration of Paris, is founded upon the change in the conditions of naval warfare resulting from the employment of steam and armour. This change, it is said, places Great Britain at a disadvantage, as compared with other nations, in fighting a conflict at sea. It is only necessary to say in answer to this that Great Britain has profited far more than any other nation by steam and armour; that all other nations are compelled to take lessons from her in both, or even to come to her to provide them, and that, therefore, whatever advantage she may have had before their introduction is very greatly increased since.

Those who affect to believe that the changes resulting from the use of steam have been disadvantageous to Great Britain can only entertain such a belief on condition of absolutely ignoring the facts. As might with certainty have been predicted, Great Britain has become far more marked in her superiority, relatively to the rest of the world, since the introduction of steam than ever she was before. Every material improvement in the construction of iron vessels and of marine engines has been first conceived and carried out in this country, which, in all the latest improvements is still far ahead of all other nations, and which in all future improvements must probably remain so. It was here that Steel was first introduced in 1876 as a substitute for Iron in shipbuilding; here that Steel has driven out Iron as