and the best proof that his method of warfare is the most humane: while the fact that he is one of the

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greatest scourges of war" is the best proof that nations can be scourged by attacks on the property, more heavily than by attacks on the lives, of their subjects.

The case for Privateers has indeed been adequately stated by President Jefferson:

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'What is war? It is simply a contest between nations of trying which can do the other most harm. Who carries on the "war? Armies are formed and navies are manned by individuals. How is a battle gained? By the death of individuals. What "produces peace? The distress of individuals. What difference "to the sufferer is it that his property is taken by a national or a private armed vessel? Did our merchants who have lost "917 vessels by British capture feel any gratification that most "of them were taken by his Majesty's men-of-war? Were the "spoils less rigidly exacted by a seventy-four-gun ship, than by "a privateer of four guns, and were not all equally condemned? War, whether on land or sea, is constituted of acts of violence on the "persons and property of individuals; and excess of violence is "the grand cause that brings about a peace-one man fights for wages paid him by the Government, or a patriotic zeal for the "defence of his country, another duly authorized, giving the proper pledges for his good conduct, undertakes to pay himself "at the expense of the foe, and serve his country as effectually as the former-and Government drawing all its supplies from "the people, is in reality as much affected by the losses of the one as the other, the efficacy of its measures depending upon "the energies of the whole. By licensing private armed vessels “the whole naval force of the nation is truly brought to bear on "the foe, and while the contest lasts that it may have the "speedier termination let every individual contribute his mite in "the best way he can-to distress and harass the enemy and compel him to peace."

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That the use of the auxiliary force furnished by

Article by Mr. Jefferson, 4th July, 1812. See History of the American Privateers. New York, and Sampson Low, London, 1857.

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privateers is essential to the development of the whole fighting force of the country is proved as soon as it is admitted that there is any force in privateers at all.

But there neither is nor ever has been any doubt that privateers do furnish a most efficient means of action against commerce. It is that indeed which explains the anxiety of the non-maritime nations to cause this terrible arm to be laid aside, and which equally explains the determination of such a maritime power as the United States to retain it.

That great jealousy of and dislike to Privateers prevailed among naval commanders during the Napoleonic war is undoubted. This jealousy and dislike were expressed by Nelson and by many other naval commanders, not only in words, but on many occasions by acts of hostility and injury to the Privateers themselves, for which they were seriously rebuked, and ordered to make amends by the High Court of Admiralty.'

The jealousy was not unnatural, for it arose from the fact that the Privateers were active competitors with the Navy for Prize-money, and that Prizemoney was a matter of the utmost importance to naval commanders, not alone, nor, we may well believe, principally because it enriched the commander himself, but also because it secured for him

See Robinson's Admiralty Reports, passim. See also the case of the "Eliza" Privateer, whose owners recovered in July, 1807, from Captain Blackwood of H.M.S. "Nautilus" the sum of £2,888 108. 6d. in satisfaction for illegal impressment of four of the Privateer's men, whereby she was deprived to that extent of her share of Prize-money, amounting to £151,000, the proceeds of the capture by the "Eliza" and the "Greyhound" (both Privateers) of the Spanish ship "Las dos Amigas" (History of the Liverpool Privateers, 1897, pp. 413-416).

the affection, confidence, and gratitude of his crew, and enabled him to command with certainty the services of other crews when fitting out other ships. The captains of the "Active" frigate and the "Favourite" sloop, on a May morning in 1761 captured the "Hermione," and each got as his share of that morning's work £65,000, while each of their commissioned officers got £13,000, each of their warrant officers £4,000, each of their petty officers £1,800, and each of their seamen and marines £480. These captains might well be jealous of any interference with the acquisition by the Navy of prizes so advantageous to themselves, and-which was more important so certain to facilitate the manning of the King's ships, and thereby to further the interests of the public service; and they would naturally regard Privateers as interlopers, whose numerous and often most valuable prizes were so much withdrawn from the King's ships and the encouragement of the King's service.

It must here be remarked that even the greatest commanders showed a constant jealousy, in this matter of Prize-money, not of Privateers alone, but of each other. Naval memoirs are full of quarrels and complaints relative to the selection of particular commanders for the particular stations where Prize and Prize-money were most to be expected. Nelson himself had bitter disputes on the subject with Sir John Orde, and criticised severely in connection with the same subject the conduct of Lord Melville himself. It was but natural; for every naval commander then knew, and nobody affirmed it more strongly than Nelson, that as Prize-money is the naval seaman's only reward, so it is a most potent incentive to his exertions.

Under the Declaration of Paris, however, Prizemoney (except in the rarest and most evanescent circumstances) is practically abolished altogether, since the enemy has afforded to him, in the neutral flag, an absolute protection against capture which he had not in the wars of Nelson's time. And with Prize-money Privateers too are abolished or affected to be abolished. Both stand or fall together, according to the Declaration. Consequently, if naval commanders still retain their dislike of Privateers, what they have now to ask themselves is this: whether it is better for the Navy to have no Prize-money at all, or to have Prize-money as in the old wars, coupled, as in the old wars, with the disadvantage of having to share some of it with Privateers? There can be but one answer to such a question.

CHAPTER X.

THE BRITISH METHOD OF WARFARE; ITS EFFECT.

THE British method of waging war was to assert and to establish a complete supremacy on the seas, and to utilize that supremacy for the distress of Britain's enemies by the extinction of their commerce. The establishment of the supremacy was no more than a means to the end. The end was the utilization of the supremacy, and the final object the material distress of the enemy to such an extent as to force him to a peace. By battle and by blockade was the supremacy established, in capture were its fruits reaped. No neutral flag then availed to cover enemy's property; so long as it was enemy's property it was exposed to the imminent risk of capture, and the certainty, if and when captured, of condemnation and confiscation. Moreover, the risk of capture was so great that few would face it. British supremacy at sea meant that the enemy could keep no ships at sea capable of doing battle with the British fleets, and could therefore offer no protection to his trade. That trade could not be carried on for him by neutrals. Consequently, it practically stopped altogether. In all things that had to come overseas there was a famine, and for all those things famine prices in every European country at country at war with England, so long as that war lasted. On the other hand, for all things that had to go overseas there was an arrest of trade, if not complete at least so consider