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discretion it did not believe that it was entitled to a new trial.

§ 420. Limitations.-Sections 1043 to 1048, inclusive, of the 1878 statutes contain such general limitations as Congress has seen fit to make against the prosecution of Federal offenses, with the exception, of course, of such limitations as may be contained in many of the criminal statutes themselves. Where a statute, therefore, does not provide a limit within which prosecution thereunder shall be had, the general statutes here mentioned apply.

Section 1043 provides that no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for treason or other capital offense, wilful murder excepted, unless the indictment is found within three years next after such treason or capital offense is done or committed. Section 1045 provides that the statute of limitations should not apply to any person fleeing from justice and in Section 1046 the limitation for the prosecution of those violating the revenue laws was fixed at five years, and provided that no one should be prosecuted, tried or punished for any crime arising under the revenue laws or the slave trade laws of the United States unless the indictment is found, or the conviction is instituted within five years next after the committing of such crime. Section 1048 is not now interesting for the reason that it related to matters arising during the Civil War.

In United States vs. Green, 146 Federal, 804, the Court construed the fugitive exception to mean absence from the district in which the offense was committed. See also 154 Federal, 402, as to pleading.

Judge Pardee, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Carter vs. New Orleans, etc., 143 Federal, 99, held that Section 1047, which provided a period of five years for the commencement of suits for penalties, forfeitures, etc., accruing under the laws of the United States, would govern rather than a state statute in a suit brought for a Federal penalty under Sections 2 and 8 of the Act. regulating commerce, that is penalty for giving special rates, rebates, etc.

On July 4, 1884, 23 Stats. L. 122, 1st Vol. Supp. 463, Congress changed the statute of limitations as to revenue laws of the United States, and provided that no prosecution

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should be brought nor any person tried or punished for any of the offenses under the internal revenue laws unless an indictment is found or the information instrituted within three years next after the commission of the offense, in all cases where the penalty prescribed may be imprisonent in the penitentiary, and within two years in all other cases, provided that the time during which the person committing the offense is absent from the district shall not be taken as any part of the time limited by law for the commencement of such proceedings, and further provided that where a complaint shall be instituted before a Commissioner of the United States within the period above limited, the time shall be extended until the discharge of the grand jury at its next session within the district, and provided further that the act shall not apply to offenses committed by officers of the United States.

It must be borne in mind in this connection that the words "indictment found or information instituted" are not satisfied by the filing of an affidavit before a Commissioner. Such action by the government will not stop the running of the statute. Matter of Lacey, 1894, Okla., 4. A nolle prose qui'd indictment will not stop the running of the statute. United States vs. Ballard, 3 McLean, U. S. 469, 2nd Vol. Fed. Stats. Ann. p. 358. Limitation may be raised by demurrer, U. S. vs. Watkins, 3rd Cranch. C. 441; U. S. vs. Shorey, 9 Internal Revenue, 302, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16281. See also p. 349, Vol. I. Gould & Tucker Notes. For construction of the Act of Federal Limitations, see 91 U. S., 566. But see Revenue Statute.

§ 42p. Sherman Law-Trust Statute.-Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act of July 2, 1890, denounces monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and provides criminal punishments for those found guilty of such offenses. Section 1 provides that every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal and the violation thereof is declared to be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding $5000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments at the discretion of the Court. Section 2 provides, "Every person who shall monopolize

or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished as provided in the first section."

Section 3 declares every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, in any territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such territory and another, or between any such territory or territories, and any state or state or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal, and a punishment like that prescribed in the first section, is provided for. Page 3200, Vol. 3, U. S. Compiled Statutes 1901; 26 Stats. L. 209. The Act was amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stats. L. 504, and was later amended in minor as shown in Section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914, 7 Fed. Stats. Ann. 336, 346, 347, and p. 402, 1914, Supp. Fed. Stats. Ann.

In the Act of October 15, 1914, it is provided in Section 14, thereof that whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of the anti-trust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agent of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered or done any of the Acts constituting, in whole or in part, such violation, and such violation shall be deemed a misdemeanor punishable to the same extent as provided in Section 1 heretofore noticed.

The Act was further aided by the Act of September 26, 1914, Section 8836-A, United States Compiled Statutes, by the establishment of a Federal trade commission. But the latter Act contains no additional criminal offense, save and except for failure to testify or to produce documentary evidence and for making false entries in reports or acounts of corporations, or for removal or mutilation of documents, and also for certain contempts. The statute is constitutional and reaches corporations. New York Railroad Co. vs. U. S.; 212 U. S. 481. It also reaches joint stock associations and partnerships. U. S. vs. Adams Express Co., 229 U. S.,

Prosecutions may be successfully had under the Act for cornering a commodity. That the immediate result of the corner advances rather than depresses the price of the commodity is no defense. U. S. vs. Patten, 226 U. S., 525, which reverses U. S. vs. Patten, 187 Federal, 664. An overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is unnecessary. U. S. vs. Patten, 187 Federal, 664. The continuance of a monopoly after the completion of the conspiracy, is itself an offense under this Act. U. S. vs. Patterson, 201 Federal, 698, in which case will be found the cash register indictment in full. This cause was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. A mere purchase of competing plants does not necessarily constitute a monopoly within the meaning of the statute. U. S. vs. Keystone Watch Company, 218 Federal, 502. A combination may be in violation of this statute even though the monopoly may not have been attempted to any harmful extent, but is potential only, and an elimination of competition between competing concerns, if illegal, is equally so, whether effected by an agreement or by a consolidation. U. S. vs. International Harvester Co., 214 Federal, 987.

There must not only be a restraint of trade, but an undue restraint, and to make a restraint unreasonable it must appear either that the normal volume of interstate trade has been interfered with by artificial agencies affecting to a substantial degree and to the disadvantage of the public the price or supply of the commodity, or that there has been a direct and intentional interference with the transportation of commodities in interstate commerce. Thus a purchase of an interstate milk business to the extent that the purchasers own 86 per cent of the business, are not merely unreasonable because of such purchase, but such question of unreasonableness was a question for the jury. U. S. vs. Whiting, 212 Federal, 467. The Act should be construed in the light of reason, and as so construed it prohibits all contracts and combinations which amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce. Standard Oil Co. vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 1.

A contract to strangle a threatened competition by preventing the construction of an immediately projected line of railway, which if constructed would naturally and substantially compete with an existing line for interstate traffic, is

one in restraint of interstate commerce and in violation of the Act. U. S. vs. Union Pacific, 188 Federal, 102.

On the other hand a combination cannot escape the condemnation of the Act merely because of the form it assumes and a single corporation, if it arbitrarily uses its power to force weaker competitors out of business or to coerce them into a sale to or union with such corporation, puts a restraint on interstate commerce and in a sense violates the Act. U. S. vs. DuPont, 188 Federal, 127. An indictment which charges that three distinct packing concerns, each one of whom was authorized to act for the others, and that such group acted for the three concerns, is sufficiently specific. U. S. vs. Swift, 186 Federal, 1002; 188 Federal, 92.

The test of the legality of a combination under this Act is its necessary effect upon competition; if its necessary effect is only incidentally or indirectly to restrict the competition while its chief result is to foster the trade and increase the business of those who make and operate it, it does not violate the law. United States vs. Standard Oil Co., 173 Federal, 177. U. S. vs. McAndrews et al. 149 Federal, 823.

In the Standard Oil case by the Supreme Court of the United States, 221 U. S. p. 1, the old cases of U. S. vs. TransMissouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, and U. S. vs. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, were limited and qualified because they did not permit an interpretation of each contract and agreement by the standard of reason. The Standard Oil case was followed by the Supreme Court in United States vs. American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S., 106.

An exception to a

§ 42-q. Verdict-Motion to Direct. refusal to direct a verdict at the close of plaintiff's case is waived if defendant thereafter proceeds to put in proof and the strength of plaintiff's case must then be tested upon a new motion to direct a verdict after both sides have rested on an examination of the entire record made. Collins vs. U. S., 219 Federal, 671. Leyer vs. U. S., 183 Federal, 102. When a motion to direct a verdict is not renewed at the conclusion of the defendant's testimony, the objection to the failure of the Court to grant the motion to direct, is waived. Gould vs. U. S., 209 Federal, 730. See Sections 166 and 25a.

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