CHAPTER IV.

DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS.

In the discussion and exhibition of truth, the shortest and clearest way is to begin with a good definition or description of the thing before you. Obscurity, contradiction, and, of course, much wrangling, even error itself, will almost always disappear, if you take care previously to fix the state of the question, and explain the point which you mean to establish. One single judicious definition throws light upon a whole speech, a dissertation, and even a whole work. False reasoning and absurd contentions generally spring from error in, or the omission of, a definition or description.

A good logical definition explains the thing that it defines in terms more clear than those in which it is conveyed. There must not be a single word of it without its use: it must comprehend all the thing that is to be defined, and that thing only; that is to say, that under what light soever you consider an object, its definition should agree to it, and to it alone.

The rules of an oratorical or poetical definition are the same as those of a logical definition; that is, both must give a clear and distinct idea of the things they define; but the orator and the poet, in place of confining themselves to the nature of objects, consider them sometimes in their causes, and sometimes in their effects. Thus it is, that by means of accessory ideas you will observe their definitions skirted with all the brilliancy of imagination.

Take, for example, a translation of Cicero's definition of praise it is oratorical :

"Praise is the well-merited applause for upright actions and public-spirited achievements, approved of not only by the good in particular, but by the world in general."

As a logician, Cicero would have reduced it to this: "Praise is honorable mention frequently made of a person." But as an orator, he is equally exact, and much more interesting, by the harmonious display of the causes of praise, and of those by whom it is given.

The following is a charming definition of thought:

"The hermit's solace in his cell,

The fire that warms the poet's brain;

The lover's heaven or his hell,

The madman's sport, the wise man's pain."

There are three different oratorical ways of defining.

The first, is to convey the thing to be defined to the understanding, by stripping it of its properties and qualifications.

Thus, Tully, in his oration for Cluentius, defines a mother by demanding,

"Is this a mother? A woman unsexed by cruelty and stained with murder; a woman, whose passions hurried through every species of turpitude; whose wretched folly is such that you can not give her the name of man, whose violence is such that she can not be called a woman, and whose barbarity is so great that nobody will dare to call her a mother?"

A second way of defining oratorically, is to divest the object of all that is foreign to it, and dress it in its own properties.

Thus Tully, again:

"For I do believe that men of your great birth and high views, however the credulous may suspect the contrary, have never set your hearts upon money, the contempt of the first in rank as well as of the first in power; nor property wrested from the lawful owners; nor excessive power, the abhorrence of the Roman people; but what you all thirsted after was the love of your fellow-citizens, and the glory of the Republic."

The third way of defining, is by expressing the contrary or opposite, as well as the inherent qualities.

"The very name of peace is sweet; peace itself is salutary. But there is a world of difference between peace and bondage. Peace is tranquil liberty; bondage the worst of all evils. We should not only rise in arms against it, but die the worst of deaths sooner than yield to it."

In the first of the above examples a mother is defined by those qualifications which directly oppose and destroy the softer ideas that nature has attached to that endearing name. This made for the orator's purpose. Had he simply defined Sapia to have been the woman who gave birth to Cluentius, he would not have rendered her the object of public execration, as he has most effectually done.

In the second example Tully defines a true lover of his country, by informing us what a man of this description would do, and what he would avoid doing, for the sake of his country.

In the third example he displays the nature of peace, by happily contrasting it with the very worst effect of an opposite situation, bondage.

The strictness required in logical definitions renders them extremely uncommon; hence the necessity of frequently having recourse to descriptions, which do not, like

the former, describe the nature of a thing, but present merely some discriminative qualities.

The general rule in describing an object is, strongly to characterize it in those parts which are of the greatest importance to your purpose.

Congreve thus, in part, describes a coquet, in accordance with this rule :

RULES FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A DISCOURSE.

[From Blair and Whateley.]

1. THE introduction should not be planned until the writer has considered the main body or substance of the discourse. Let that suggest the introduction, which will then be appropriate, natural, and easy.

2. Correctness should be carefully studied in the expression, yet too much art must be avoided, because hearers or readers are more disposed to criticise at first than at a subsequent period.

3. Modesty, united with becoming dignity and sense of the importance or interest of the subject, should characterize an introduction. It should not promise more than the body of the discourse will sustain.

4. It should usually be carried on in a calm manner. The exceptions to this rule are, when the subject is such that the very mention of it naturally awakens some passionate emotion; or when the unexpected presence of some person or object, in a popular assembly, inflames the speaker.

5. The introduction should not anticipate any material part of the subject, destroying or impairing the novelty of what follows.

6. It should be proportioned, both in length and in kind, to the discourse that is to follow.

VARIOUS KINDS OF INTRODUCTIONS.

1. Introduction Inquisitive.—The design of this is to show that the subject in question is important, curious, or otherwise interesting, and worthy of attention.-See the beginning of Paley's Natural Theology.

2. Introduction Paradoxical.-It will frequently happen, when the point to be proved or explained is one which may be very fully established, or on which there is little or no doubt, that it may, nevertheless, be strange, and different from what might have been expected.

In this case, it will often have a good effect in rousing the attention to set forth as strongly as possible this paradoxical character, and dwell on the seeming improbability of that which must, after all, be admitted.-See Paley's Mor. Phil., Book iii., Part i., Chap. i., ii.

3. Introduction Corrective. This is employed when you show that the subject has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented by others. This will, in many cases, remove a most formidable obstacle in the hearer's mind, the anticipation of triteness, if the subject be, or may be supposed to be, a hackneyed one; and it may also serve to remove or loosen such prejudices as might be adverse to the favora Able reception of our arguments.

4. Introduction Preparatory.It will often happen, also, that there may be need to explain some peculiarity in the mode of reasoning to be adopted; to guard against some possible mistake as to the object proposed; or to apologize for some deficiency.

5. Introduction Narrative.-There may sometimes be oc casion to put the reader or hearer in possession of the outline of some transaction, or the description of some state of things, to which references and allusions are to be made in the course of the composition.

Sometimes two or more of the introductions may advan tageously be combined.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE DIVISION OF A SUBJECT-RULES.

[Chiefly from Watts's Logic.]

RULE I. Take care that all the members of your division, when taken together, be equal to the whole which you divide, containing neither more nor less.

The ancient division of the earth into Europe, Asia, and Africa, was defective, because these three parts do not make up the world. If, in writing about a tree, you divide it into the trunk and leaves, the division is imperfect, because the root and the branches are needful to make up the whole.

A division may also be erroneous by exhibiting more parts than the object contains.

RULE II. In all divisions, present first the larger and more important parts of the subject.

In speaking of a kingdom, it would not be expedient to consider first the streets, lanes, or fields, but the provinces or counties. The counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c.; the towns into streets and lanes.

RULE III. One part of a division ought not to contain another.

It would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains are contained in the head.

This rule is violated in the following proposition: "William has done harm to the state, not only by his factious discourses, but also by his sowing every where the seeds of disturbance."

Here the error is, that you can not speak factiously without sowing the seeds of disturbance, so that, in fact, you seem to divide without really doing so.

RULE IV. Divisions and subdivisions, instead of being witty and florid, should be obvious and simple, and not too numerous.

They should never fatigue the mind nor confuse the memory; they should draw the subject forth, and not bury it; they should always interest, and never tire the reader or hearer.