No. 895-VOL. XVIII. MARCH 4, 1854. Price 18., with Supplement, 28. NAMES OF THE CASES REPORTED IN THIS NUMBER. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. In re The Joint-stock Companies Winding-up Acts, and in re The Northern and Southern Connecting Railway Company, (Mercer's Case).-(Alleged Contributory-Tender of travelling Expenses of, when summoned as a Witness before the Master).. 161 VICE-CHANCELLOR STUART'S COURT. Stone v. Godfrey.-(Equitable Estate-Tenancy by the Curtesy-" Equitable Seisin"-Next Friend -Mistake-Acquiescence-Bill of Review-Variation of original Decree). COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Frost v. Oliver.-(Ship-Agreement for Sale-Ven- ADVERTISEMENTS. 162 166 173 OUR last review of criminal cases was in October last*, and since that period several important decisions have proceeded from the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. Confession. The nature of the threat or inducement, and of the authority of the person using it, has been again considered in two recent cases. In one, (Reg. v. Sleeman, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1082), a daughter of the prosecutor, (the prisoner's master), but who did not live with her father, and was not the prisoner's mistress, whilst she had temporary charge of the prisoner, who had been previously taken into custody, said to her, "I am very sorry for you: you ought to have known better. Tell me the truth, whether you did it or no. . . . . Do not run your soul into more sin, but tell the truth;" when the prisoner made a full confession. The Court held that there was no threat or inducement held out to the prisoner, and that the confession was not made to a person in authority. In the other case, (Reg. v. Luckhirst, 17 Jur., part. 1, p.1082), a person, in the presence of the prosecutor, threatened to give the prisoner into custody unless he told him "what business he had" in a stable, (where the offence was alleged to have been committed); and in a subsequent part of the same conversation stated the nature of his suspicions, when the prisoner confessed. The confession was held to be inadmissible in evidence, although at the time when the threat was made the nature of the charge had not been stated. Before he made the confession, however, he had been told, in the presence of the prosecutor, what the charge was. The person using the threat was not a person in authority, but the prosecutor being present, it was the same as if he had used the threat himself. Embezzlement.-(See Larceny). False Pretences. (See Larceny).-In order to constitute the offence of obtaining money, &c. under false pretence, the "obtaining" must be in accordance with the wish, or for the advantage, or for the purpose of effecting some object of the party making the false pretence. Thus, where the defendant had fraudulently altered the amount of a letter of credit on a bank, and obtained large sums of money thereon, for which he had given drafts on the bank referring to the letter, and the drafts were presented, but not paid, the defendant was convicted of having attempted to obtain money from the bank by false pretences; but although the jury found that he meant the drafts to be presented, and the money paid thereon, the Court held, that if the money had actually been obtained, it would not have been an offence within stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 20, inasmuch as, so far from the defendant desiring that the drafts should be presented, he would have been better pleased if they had been destroyed, he having already received the money for them. If the drafts had been honoured, they said, it was not shewn that the defendant would have received the money; he would not have obtained it himself, nor by his agent; and the jury must be taken to have found that the defendant merely foresaw that the drafts would be presented. (Reg. v. Garrett, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1060). In this case one of the objections taken was, that the prisoner, being at St. Petersburgh when he passed off the letter of credit and when the drafts were presented in London, had committed no offence in this country; but the Court were clearly of opinion that "if a man employ a conscious or unconscious agent to commit an offence in this country, he is amenable to the laws of England, although at the time that the offence was committed he was living beyond the jurisdiction." Upon a charge of obtaining money by false pretences, it is sufficient if the actual substantial pretence, which was the main inducement to part from the money, he alleged and proved, although it may be shewn in evidence that other matters in some measure operated upon the mind of the prosecutor as an inducement for him to part from his money. (Reg. v. Hewgill, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 158). Forgery-Order for the Payment of Money.-To constitute the offence of forging an order for the payment of money, within the stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 66, it is not necessary that the name of the party to whom it is addressed should appear upon the face of the order itself. The direction may be shewn by extrinsic evidence; as, for instance, by taking and presenting it to a party for payment. Thus, where the prisoner called at a bank, and said that she had been told by Mr. Ramsay that she was to have the sum of 8007. if she called for it; being told that his order was necessary, she went away, and returned, presenting a forged document, beginning, "Sirs, please to pay" &c. The names of the bankers did not appear on any part of the document; but their clerk said, if he had known that Mr. Ramsay had signed it, he should have paid it; and it was held, that she was properly convicted of forging an order within the statute. (Reg. v. Snelling, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1012). It was said by the Court, that the putting a mere signature to a bill may be shewn to amount to a receipt, although in itself it is no receipt, except as explained by usage; (and see, as to this point, Reg. v. Overton, post); and a request to deliver goods, although no request on the face of it, may be shewn by evidence to be one; that the same rule is applicable to orders for the payment of money; and that if the order had been genuine, and paid, it would have operated as a discharge to the bankers in respect of the payment. Parke, B., seemed to think that it might be an order within the statute independently of the prisoner's conduct in shewing to whom it was addressed. The case of Rex v. Clinch, (2-East's P. C. 938), in which it was held that an order to deliver goods must be directed to the holder of or person interested in the goods, if not overruled, was held to be no longer applicable, since the change in the law not requiring the instrument to be set out in the indictment. The prisoner was indicted for forging a testimonial to his character as a schoolmaster, and other counts of the indictment charged him with having uttered the forged document. The jury acquitted him of the forging, but found him guilty of the uttering with intent to obtain the emoluments of the office, and to to constitute an offence at common law, of which the deceive the prosecutor. The facts so found were held prisoner was properly convicted. (Reg. v. Sharman, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 157). Larceny.-Illustrations of the extreme subtlety prevailing in that portion of our criminal law which relates to larceny and embezzlement have been afforded in the following cases:-In Reg. v. Reid, (18 Jur., part 1, p. 66), the Court, after two arguments, and much time taken to consider, decided that the prisoner was guilty of larceny, and not embezzlement, under the following circumstances:-He had been sent with his master's cart for some coals, which were delivered to him, and deposited in the cart, their price being entered to the master's account. On the road home the prisoner disposed of a portion of the coals. The ground on which the judgment proceeded was, that the prisoner had determined his exclusive possession of the coals when they were deposited in the cart; and from that time, and therefore at the time of taking, the that direct authority was to be found for their decision possession was in the master. The Court considered in Spears's case, (2 East's P. C.568; 2 Leach's C. C. 825), especially as it is reported in the Black Book, v. 2, pp. 182, 183, which contains the decisions in Crown cases, and is deposited with the Chief Justice for the time being. In Reg. v. Beaumont (18 Jur., part 1, p. 159) the facts were as follow:-W. had contracted with a railway company to provide horses and carmen for the delivery of the company's coals, and for "collecting, receiving, and duly accounting for the monies received for the same;" such tarmen were to obey the orders of the delivery of the coals, and "receipt and payment the company's manager in all things connected with of monies" received by them, and W. or the carmen were daily "well and truly to pay, account for, and deliver to the said company's manager all cheques, monies," &c. which they might receive in payment of the coals. The course of business was for the carmen to receive delivery notes and receipted invoices from the company's office. The former they took to W. for the purpose of being entered in his books, but the invoices were left with the customer on payment of the account. The prisoner was a carman of W., and the case found that it was his duty to pay over direct to the company's clerks any money he received for coals. He, however, having delivered coals to a customer, received the money, and appropriated it to his own use, and was then indicted for embezzling the money of W., his master. It was held, by a majority of the judges, that there was a privity between the prisoner and the company, so as to make him their agent; that he agreed to pay it on account of W., and was wrongly convicted of emmoney to them, and therefore had not received bezzling his money. the The prosecutor gave some marked money to a friend to expend at his (the prosecutor's) shop, for the purpose of detecting a servant whom the master suspected; and the servant having received the money, it was found in his box, instead of in the till, where it was his duty to have put it. The jury having convicted him of embezzlement, the Court upheld the conviction. (Reg. v. Gill, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 70). The objection was, that it was the master's own money at the time of the receipt of it, and therefore the offence was thority of Rex v. Headge, (2 Leach's C. C. 1033). larceny; but the Court held otherwise, upon the au A prisoner was convicted of larceny on these facts. It was his duty, as bailiff to the prosecutor, to pay and receive monies. Upon an account thereof rendered, it appeared that he had charged his master with larger payments than had been actually made, and had thereby obtained more money than was actually due to him. The Court held that the offence, if any, was obtaining money under false pretences. (Reg. v. Green, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 158). By the interpretation clause (sect. 47) of the stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, relating to offences against the Post-office, the expression" person employed by or under the Post-office" is to include "every person employed in any business of the Post-office." The prisoner was employed as a letter-carrier from A. to B., such employment being complete upon delivery of the letters at B. Upon one occasion, at the request of the postmaster at B., the prisoner assisted in sorting the letters at that place, and while so engaged stole one of the letters containing money. It was contended, that as this was not an ordinary or official, but merely a casual, employment, the prisoner did not come within the definition; but the Court held that he was properly convicted. (Reg. v. Reason, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1014). The proof of the corpus delicti in larceny was lately considered. The prisoner was found coming out of a warehouse, where a large quantity of pepper was kept, with pepper of a similar quality in his pocket. He had no right to be in the warehouse, and on being discovered / said, "I hope you will not be hard with me," and took, some pepper out of his pocket and threw it upon the ground. There was no evidence of any pepper having been missed from the bulk. It was objected that the prosecutor had failed to make out his case, and had not thrown upon the prisoner the onus of answering it, according to the maxim of the civil law, "Ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat." (Cod., lib. 2, tit. 1, 1.4; and see Dig., lib. 22, tit. 3, 1. 2). The Court, however, held that there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to go to the jury. (Reg. v. Burton, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 157*). Night Offences. By stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 1, "if any person shall be found by night armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon, with intent to break or enter any dwelling-house, &c., and to commit felony therein; or if any person shall be found by night having in his possession, without lawful excuse, (the proof of which excuse shall lie on such person), any picklock, &c., or other implement of housebreaking; or if any person shall be found by night having his face blackened or otherwise disguised, with intent to commit a felony," &c. It has been decided that an intent to commit felony forms no ingredient in the above offence of being found by night with housebreaking instruments without lawful excuse, and therefore that an indictment omitting such averment is good. (Reg. v. Bailey, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1106). Perjury. A Master Extraordinary in Chancery has no power to administer oaths in matters before the Court of Admiralty. It was therefore held, that a conviction for perjury in an affidavit so sworn, but used in the Court of Admiralty, could not be supported. (Reg. v. Stone, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 1106). It was said that the practice to receive such affidavits was as old as the Court of Chancery itself, which had a jurisdiction in matters within the Admiralty. Lord Campbell stated that in ancient times the Lord Chancellor issued letters of marque and reprisal. The Masters Extraordinary had also an old date assigned to them. Fleta (A. D. 1340) speaks of "clerici honesti ;" and Lord Campbell said they had existed from the time of the Anglo-Saxons, and that they were members of the Wittenagemote. Practice. The important question, how far a verdict The rules relating to the important subject of proof of the corpus delicti in different cases are accurately stated and clearly illustrated in Mr. Best's Principles of Evidence, pp. 503-515, 2nd ed. delivered by mistake may be amended in a reasonable time, was discussed in a recent case. (Reg. v. Vodden, 17 Jur, part 1, p. 1014). One of the jury pronounced a verdict of "not guilty," which was entered by the clerk of the peace, and the prisoner was discharged out of the dock, when other jurymen interfered, and said their verdict was "guilty;" whereupon the prisoner was brought back, and the jury were again asked for their verdict, when they all said it was "guilty," and that they had been and were unanimous. The verdict was amended, and the Court held properly so, and that the conviction must stand. It had been previously held (Reg. v. Parkin, 1 Moo. C. C. 45) that a verdict, having been recorded, might be amended, where the jury a few minutes afterwards expressed their dissent. Stamp. Two very important cases have been decided upon the stamp laws, which now seem to be applied without question to criminal cases, but our space will not permit of our doing more than merely referring to them. In one (Reg. v. Overton, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 134) it was held, that a document, not purporting on the face of it to be a receipt for the payment of money, may be. shewn to be one by evidence aliunde, and thus be brought within the stamp laws; and if it does require a stamp, and is unstamped, it cannot be given in evidence merely for the purpose of identifying the prisoner, if it also proves a material fact against him, e. g. the receipt of the money on a charge of embezzlement. In such a case the proper course is to shew that the money was paid to the party who signed the paper or book, and then to prove and put in only the signature. In the other, (Reg. v. Watts, to be reported in part 1 of our next number), an unstamped agreement was held (Parke, B., dissenting) to be within the rule of common law which prevents choses in action from being the subject of larceny. He Mr. Field's pamphlet is his answer to the questions circulated by the Mercantile Law Commissioners. complains that those questions include points of pure economical science, which are outside any present legitimate investigation-such, for instance, as the inquiry whether legislative acts can afford undue facilities for the creation of unwholesome competition-questions which were included, and altogether disposed of, in the settlement of the general question of free trade; and in another place he insists on the laissez faire principle of commercial legislation as a thing absolutely settled, and not to be opened. But all that was settled, either in economical science or in legislation, in respect of the free-trade question, was, that native growers and manufacturers have no right to confine native consumers to * See the well-written article on the subject in the Westminster Review for October, 1853, and a recent pamphlet by Mr. W. Ffooks, "The Law of Partnership an Obstacle to Social Progress." Every partner is liable for the whole of the partnership debts duly contracted as above, except where his liability has been limited by special contract with the creditor, (as is common in insurance contracts), by a general notice which the creditor is bound to regard, (as by a clause in the registered settlement deed of a joint-stock company, if the doctrine in The Sea Fire and Life Insurance Company, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 118, is correct), or by charter or act of Parliament. What are called cost-book partnerships in mines are frequently instanced as customary exceptions to the general law of unlimited liability; but the only legal peculiarity of cost-book associations is, that they are expressly excepted from the operation of the act for the registration of joint-stock companies. If two tenants in common of a farm agree to cultivate it at their joint expense, and to divide the profits, neither of them is answerable for any debt contracted by the other for the purposes of the farm, unless he has given an express or general authority, or by his conduct has entitled the creditor to imply such authority. There is no general presumption that a farming business is conducted on credit. For the same reason the manager of a joint adventure in a mine, whether worked on the costbook principle or not, has no implied authority to contract debts. A mine is presumed to be a ready-money concern; and even debts contracted by the manager of a registered joint-stock mining company would not bind the shareholders, if the deed of settlement gave the manager no authority to contract debts. the home market; and the so-called laissez faire prin-binding on the firm. Thus a private shareholder in a ciple is obviously no scientific principle, but merely a joint-stock company has no power to bind the firm. statistical fact, that the history of legislation here and abroad affords many instances of interference in cases where the parties intended to be benefited would have done much better for themselves. It is not yet a settled principle that Government should leave people to take care of themselves in every particular. There are still economists who think that the law should interfere to prevent gambling and fraud, and to enforce executory contracts; but the expediency of interfering with mercantile transactions is denied. Be it so. But what if commerce is apt to slide insensibly into gambling and fraud? Is "undue" speculation with borrowed capital a purely mercantile transaction? Is the getting together of a flock of subscribers by means of a delusive prospectus, reports of "eminent scientific men," &c., and then using their capital as a means of attracting credit, and spending the whole upon a staff of lawyers, officers, and engineers, a mercantile transaction? We must leave the term "laissez faire" to its legitimate use, as a convenient expression, and inquire in each case what is right to be done. Mr. Field protests against what he calls "the empirical method of inquiry almost invariably pursued by commissioners." "To ascertain any scientific truth, (and I need not say that the question before us is a purely scientific one, containing a solution true for all people and times*, if we can arrive at it), it is a very unscientific way to ask the opinion of A., B., C., D., &c., and out of the average of their notions to think you get the truth required." Setting aside the large class of commissions issued with a view to the defending, continuing, or Partnership in an undertaking which can be carried creating of jobs, commissioners of inquiry do not pro- on without credit may be created without binding the ceed in the way described by Mr. Field. Their com- partners beyond the engaged capital. This consideramission assumes that the truth required is not to be tion answers most of the alleged examples of our found settled past dispute in a chapter of Mill, or else-law's discouragement of useful undertakings, such as where. It does not assume that the commissioners lodgings for the poor, gas companies, water-works, understand the subject better than the rest of the world, &c. No doubt the law does a little obstruct the or that they are the most competent persons to collect proceedings of those speculative gentlemen who for particulars, make observations, and go through the their own ends are always ready to provide a poprocess of induction or analysis, as the case may re-pular want or sentiment with the corporeal tenement quire, from the beginning. If it did, commissions would seldom be issued to members of Parliament. It is not for their skill in such operations that men are sent there. The commissioners are selected for their general intelligence and impartiality: they are asked, not to fancy themselves Adam Smiths or Benthams, but to procure information from all who are likely to have thought and observed on the subject with effect. The abilities of the commissioners may give value to their report, but the main object of the commission is generally the appendix of evidence and information. By our law a debtor is under unlimited liability to pay the debt, unless the creditor has agreed to a limitation of the liability. When the profits of a business are shared by several persons, all are, in questions between them and the creditors of the business, considered as partners, whether their interest was known to the creditor at the time of giving credit or not. Every partner, whether secret or avowed, is considered to give to the persons who are publicly recognised as carrying on the business authority to contract on behalf of the firm all such engagements as are usually or reasonably necessary for the purpose. But any restriction placed on this implied power, by agreement between the partners, is binding on creditors who become such with notice of the agreement, and credit given to a dormant partner contrary to the intent of the partnership agreement would not generally be * Mr. Field here runs counter to a fundamental maxim of legislation that there is no abstract propriety in a law, apart from the actual condition of the people, morally and otherwise. of a joint-stock company. But no charter or limitation of liability is necessary for the making of a lodginghouse, or a hundred lodging-houses, of gas-works, or water-works, or any other undertaking of the like nature, which, as it requires no credit, needs never involve any liabilities beyond those distinctly provided for at the outset, and may be effected without authorising any person to trade on the account of the promoters. Mr. Neale's case of a lodging-house building society, chartered at the cost of 1400l., is the favourite instance to the contrary; but no practical man believes that that charter was wanted by any one except the lawyers concerned. A deed now before us, for establishing a similar association, provides completely for every object without even creating a partnership, and of course without exposing the subscribers to liability beyond their subscriptions. Gas. companies are almost invariably established with unlimited liability, and the fear of it has never yet kept a town in darkness. A charter or an act is not thought of, unless the undertaking is so large as to entitle the solicitor in courtesy to such a perquisite, or powers are required to break up high ways, &c. Such being the state of the law, it is proposed that the members of a firm should be allowed to limit their liability, by a public intimation annexed to the name nerally asked is the legalisation of partnerships en or the register of the partnership. What is most gecommandite, with the rule, that the active partners, and also every dormant partner who interferes in the management, should be fully liable. Mr. Field, however, considers that all the partners should be on the same footing with respect to liability, and asks that any two or more traders-nay, that any sole trader would exercise a wholesome control, and leaves the field shall be at liberty to announce to the world, with free to those who are reckless. The proposition does not effect, that only a certain capital is pledged for the look well in an à priori view. Effective control, whepayment of the trade debts. Our law does not say ther with limited or with unlimited liability, can only that this shall not be done, but it lends no special help be exercised by one who advances a considerable proto the doing of it in ordinary cases. Whoever thinks portion of capital-so much, that, being by the hypofit to make such an announcement is entitled to the thesis prudent, he would not venture it if he thought benefit of it as against those whom he can fix with there was any chance of the losses absorbing the whole. notice. If Sir J. Stuart, V. C., rightly held in the case The chance of their exceeding the amount of the capital of The Sea Fire and Life Insurance Company, (18 Jur., put in would, à fortiori, prevent his undertaking even part 1, p. 118), that notice of the registered settlement the limited liability. Mr. Field's first instance is that deed of a joint-stock company is notice of the contents of undertakings requiring a large capital to be raised of the deed to all persons dealing with the company, the by companies. "By saying that all such combinations law has already conceded all that is asked with respect shall be on the unlimited-liability principle, the law to joint-stock companies; and unless Mr. Field desires interposes an obstacle of risk which at once makes all that in other cases those also shall be bound whom the capitalists embarking require great returns-which, in announcement never in fact reached, we do not know other words, excludes the public from the benefit of what more he wants. It seems, then, that Mr. Field cheap capital in their undertakings." "Cheap capital" is saying to the Legislature, not "laissez faire," but means small profits; and as the rate of profits is not "interfere." regulated by the capitalist's notion of what is an adeThe advocates of limited liability say that it is un-quate return, but by the laws of demand and supply, just and tyrannical to hinder a man from employing part of his capital in trade without becoming liable for all the trade debts. It seems to us a perfectly reasonable rule. It is reasonable that a trader should be liable for his debts in solido. He may make a different contract with his creditor if he can; but when he asks the State to contrive machinery to assist him in making what primâ facie is an unreasonable arrangement, he must give better reasons than we have yet heard for the application. Interest is the return due to capital for its use, including also, in the common meaning of the term, insurance where the capital is risked, though that is rather to be reckoned as the profits of the trade of lending money. Profits are the returns, beyond interest on capital and insurance, due to sagacity, skill, prudence, honesty, industry, and enterprise. The object of legislation should be to encourage the exercise of those qualities wherever they exist. Those who have capital, and do not possess or exercise the faculties necessary to turn it to account, have no claim to share in the reward of their exercise by others. The idle capitalist should be content to circulate his capital through the channels of the 31. per cents. and mortgages. Even discounts are beyond his sphere. We are told that limited liability is necessary to protect small capitalists from the competition of large capitalists. This is the fallacy of changing the terms. There is no competition between large and small capitalists, to the peculiar detriment of the latter. On the contrary, the interest on small loans, like the rents of small houses, is always at the highest rate. If the small capitalist, seeking to eke out his interest with a share of the profits which he does not earn, finds that he must accept the risks incident to the pursuit of profits, he is not wronged. The real sufferer is the man who, possessing mercantile abilities with little capital, is prevented from exercising them by the competition of those who use both abilities and wealth. He would have reason to complain if the encouragement of mandatory partnerships superadded the competition of mere brute capital, and made his rise from the rank of clerk or gérant still more hopeless. Mr. Field says that there are cheap capitals and dear capitals, and that unlimited liability makes capital dear by raising the risk. The risk incident to the adventure per se cannot be affected by the law of partnership; and any difference of risk in favour of a limited liability must arise either from the risk being shifted from the debtors to the creditors, (who in their dealings will charge an equivalent insurance), or from the risk being actually diminished by the limited system, or from both causes. Mr. Field relies only on the second, insisting that our law repels prudent capitalists, who 66 (being always as much as he can get), the proposition amounts to this-that the risk in question either prevents a particular undertaking altogether, because the expected profits would be too small, or prevents the establishment of competing companies, and thereby enables one to enjoy a monopoly and high profits. There is no other possible mode of excluding cheap capital.” Mr. Field, therefore, asserts, that in this country, first, useful undertakings are checked by the difficulty of procuring subscribers to them with unlimited liability; and, secondly, successful undertakings, not being legally monopolies, become so practically from the absence of competition - assertions which are notoriously contrary to experience. In every mercantile country a glut of capital, followed by wild speculation, ending in a panic, occurs periodically, like the return of a comet. It is commonly said that the period in England is seven years, in America four years. A people whose ordinary mercantile transactions are so frequently deranged by panics can have no reason to complain of the discouragement of wholesome enterprise. If capital is found for wild speculations, while there is not enough for prudent ones, it is the fault of the public judgment, not of the law. Mr. Field's next objection to unlimited liability is, that it creates middlemen, whose profits must be charged to the public. "These middlemen are bankers, bill brokers, merchants, and others, who live on dif fusing (virtually on del credere commission) capital, from the cautious lender to the most wildly speculative borrower;" so that, after all, the cautious lender does contribute capital to wild speculations-capital dear to the speculator, but not dear to the public. This is all that Mr. Field says on that head. If he had only paused a little before flying off to another topic, he might have discovered the fallacy of all the objections to the law founded on its assumed interference with the free employment of capital, and he might also have thought of consulting Mr. Mill, who, we presume, agrees with other economists in regarding bankers, bill brokers, merchants, and the whole class of mercantile middlemen, as the means, and the only possible means, of keeping commerce, credit, and speculation in a healthy state. Not to mention that without this police of middlemen the honest and prudent trader would be undistinguishable from, and have no advantage over, the knavish or foolish adventurer, Mr. Field has only to recall his Anti-Corn-law rudiments to perceive how much more frequent, violent, and disastrous the fluctuations in the supply of capital would be if it were not regulated by a class of men performing the same service in the money market that the corn merchants do in Mark-lane. Next, the law of partnership overstocks certain trades. |