of any violation of this act, complaint may be made by summons or on motion to the Court of Common Pleas, or any judge thereof*, who may direct necessary inquiries to be made by engineers, barristers, or others, and restrain the company, by writ of injunction or interdict, from violating the act, and enforce obedience thereto by attachment of the directors, or some of them, or other person disobeying the writ, and direct payment of a sum not exceeding 2001. for each day, after a day to be named in the order, that the company shall fail to obey the writ, and the money shall be payable as the court or a judge may direct, to the party complaining, or into court to abide the ultimate decision, or to the Queen. Costs may also be awarded. (Sect. 3). A rehearing may be directed, and the order varied or rescinded. (Sect. 5).

For the purpose of obviating the effect of recent decisions, that railway companies may limit their liability as to animals and the like, even in cases of gross negligence, (Carr v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 17 Jur., part 1, p. 379; 21 L. J., Ex., 261; Chippendale v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 21 L. J., Q. B., 22; The Great Northern Railway Company v. Morville, 16 Jur., part 1, p. 528; Austin v. The Manchester Railway Company, 16 Jur., part 1, p. 763), it is enacted, that every such company is to be liable for the loss of, or any injury done to, horses or other animals, or to any goods, occasioned by the neglect or default of the company or its servants, notwithstanding any notice or condition contrary thereto, or in anywise limiting such liability, every such notice, condition, or declaration being declared to be void; but such conditions, with respect to the receiving, forwarding, and delivering the said animals, &c., may be made as shall be adjudged, by the court or judge before whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be just and reasonable; and no greater damages shall be recovered than as follow:For a horse, 501.; for any neat cattle, per head, 157.; for any sheep or pigs, per head, 21.; unless the person sending them declares them to be of higher value, in which case the company may charge a reasonable per-centage in addition to the ordinary rate, and such per-centage is to be notified in the manner prescribed by the Carriers Act, 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68+.

The proof of value, and of the amount of injury, is always to be on the party claiming compensation. No special contract between the company and any party respecting the receiving, forwarding, or delivering of animals, &c., shall be binding upon such party unless the same be signed by him, or by the person delivering the animals, &c. (Sect. 7).

General rules for carrying the act into execution may be framed. (Sect. 4).

Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 34, (Evidence), after reciting the inconvenience of the superior Courts not being able to compel the attendance of witnesses resident in one part

* This is the only mode of proceeding for a violation of the above enactments. Provision is also made for complaints in Ireland and Scotland. (Sect. 2).

Nothing in the principal act contained is to affect the rights or liabilities of any company under the Carriers Act with respect to articles of the descriptions therein mentioned.

of the United Kingdom at a trial in another part, provides for the issuing of process by special order for that purpose, and also, if sufficient money has been tendered for the expenses of coming, attending, and returning from the trial, for the punishment of the party disobeying such process, (sects. 1-4); but the act is not to affect the power of the Courts to issue a commission, or the admissibility of any evidence at any trial, where such evidence is now receivable, on the ground of any witness being beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. (Sects. 5, 6).

Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, "an act for preventing frauds upon creditors by secret bills of sale of personal chattels," enacts, that every bill of sale of personal chattels made after the passing of the act, (10th July, 1854), and every schedule or inventory thereto, or a true copy thereof, and of every attestation of the execution thereof, shall, together with an affidavit of the time of such bill being made or given, and a description of the residence and occupation of the person making or giving the same, and of the attesting witness to such bill, be filed with the Clerk of the Docquets and Judg ments in the Queen's Bench within twenty-one days after the making or giving such bill, (in like manner as a warrant of attorney in any personal action given by a trader*), or it shall be void against assignees in bankditors, and against execution creditors, so far as regards ruptcy or insolvency, assignees for the benefit of crethe property in such goods which at or after the time of such bankruptcy, &c., and after the expiration of the said period of twenty-one days, shall be in the possession or apparent possession of the person making such defeasance or condition or declaration of trust not bill of sale. (Sect. 1+). If the bill is subject to any contained in it, such defeasance, &c. shall be taken, for the purposes of this act, to be part of the bill, and shall be written on the same paper or parchment before the filing thereof, or the bill shall be void as if it had not been filed. (Sect. 2). The officer is to keep a book and any judge of the Court of Queen's Bench may containing the particulars of each bill of sale so filed, order satisfaction to be entered upon any bill of sale, if it appears to him that the debt has been satisfied. (Sects. 3-6). The interpretation clause shews what meanings are to be affixed to "bill of sale" and "personal chattels," and when the latter are to be deemed

in the "apparent possession" of the person making the bill of sale. (Sect. 7).

It is remarkable, that although this act contains provisions so materially affecting the rights of parties taking bills of sale, and allows only twenty-one days for registration from the execution or giving thereof, no it thus took effect immediately from the time of its refuture period was fixed for its coming into operation: ceiving the royal assent, (10th July, 1854), and in consequence of this, there are doubtless many instances in which parties, ignorant of the enactment, have failed to register their bills of sale within the limited period.

SITIONS.

(From a Correspondent).

OUR literary privateers seem to have very much mistaken the scope of the letters of mart recently issued by the House of Lords in Jefferys v. Boosey. Up to the present moment the making prize of literary works of foreigners first published in this country after the 1st July, 1842, (when the stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, was passed), has not been sanctioned by a single decision of any Court, and it is not quite safe to assume either that the 4th section of the Alien Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, (cited below), is wholly inoperative, or that a construction of the repealed Copyright Acts which is not tenable on any ground, whether of criticism, of principle, of common sense, of policy, or of authority, will be imitated, to the further discredit of the Court of ultimate appeal, when judgment is to be given according to the effect of the very differently worded statutes which are now in force, and which were passed with the intention of making essential alterations in the law. If the commonly-received explanation of Jefferys v. Boosey-that it was decided with a view to the possible renewal of the late abortive negotiations with the United States for a copyright treaty, (a notion receiving some countenance from the ill-judged allusion to those negotiations made by Lord St. Leonards)-were correct, there might be some reason for fearing a second decision of the same quality; but if we reject that libel on the sense and honour of the Court, and are content to rank its late decision with Lord Lincoln's case, and other inexplicable though unquestionable blunders, there may be some hope that with a new case a better light may break in, and shew the way to a sounder conclusion. Before we consider the differences between the existing and the repealed statutes it will be useful to shew that the late decision, though binding and irreversible as regards all cases of the same kind which are governed by the repealed statutes, is (unless it be rested on an accidental objection to the plaintiff's title, which Lord St. Leonards relied on) wholly unsound and contrary to principle and authority, and therefore not to be followed in any case depending on the existing statutes. In doing this we shall avail ourselves of an article which appeared in THE JURIST (vol. 14, part 2, p. 46) shortly after the decision in Boosey v. Purday, (13 Jur., part 1, p. 918).

The common-law right of an author and his representatives to restrain others from selling copies of his unpublished works has always been recognised, and still subsists. Thus, in The Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, (2 Eden, 329), the publication of Lord Clarendon's History of the Reign of Charles the Second was restrained on the application of his executors, who had the MS., then nearly a century old. Other authorities to the same effect are Webb v. Rose, (cited 4 Burr. 2330; 3 Swanst. 674); Pope v. Curll, (2 Atk. 342); Macklin v. Richardson, (Amb. 694); Thompson v. Stanhope, (Id.737); Southey v. Sherwood, (2 Mer. 436); Pritchard v. Gee, (2 Swanst. 425); Paley's case, (cited 2 V. & B. 23); Perceval v. Phipps, (2 V. & B. 19); Morris v. Kelly, (1 J. & W. 481); and Abernethy v. Hutchinson, (2 L. J., O. S., Ch., 209). In Prince Albert v. Strange, (1 Mac. & G. 43), Lord Cottenham said, "The property of an author or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such work, unpublished, and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be disputed after the many decisions in which that right has been affirmed or assumed." That this right is a species of property, and not a mere right to privacy, is shewn by Paley's case, and by Macklin v. Richardson and Abernethy v. Hutchinson, where the publication of the work in a parish, on the stage, or in the lecture

the public representation of a play is by statute equivalent to publishing it as a book. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20).

This right is not lost by publication. Publication in the lecture-room, or on the stage, did not destroy it; nor, in the case of letters, does the receiver take, with the right of property in the letter itself, a right to publish its contents; that remains with the writer. It is not lost by circulating manuscript copies, as in Paley's case; nor even by selling such copies, as in White v. Geroch, (2 B. & Al. 298). There is nothing in the act of selling printed copies which should have a different effect. It is a mode of enjoying, and not an abandonment of the property. The author gives the use of his work to the public in a modified manner, and upon certain terms, which cannot be varied without his consent, (see Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 2 L. J., O. S., Ch., 209), any more than (as was said in Tonson v. Collins) the borrower or purchaser of a key, admitting him to private grounds, can make other keys from that, and sell them. The early development of the law of copyright was impeded by many circumstances. In the infancy of the art of printing, the profits of authorship were not thought of; the value of the materials, and the labour and skill employed in setting up the types of a book, constituted the principal elements of its cost; and copyright was first claimed by the printer, who sought to be protected from rival editions until his own was sold off. This was secured, in individual cases, by exclusive license from the Crown, which assumed not only a right of censorship over the press, but also the sole use of the art of printing, pretending that it had been introduced into the realm at the expense of the Crown. When the author's copy became valuable, protection was sought for it from the same source. The preroga tive was then stronger than the law. These patents to individuals, the privileges of the Stationers' Company, (which was established in the reign of Philip & Mary as a kind of literary inquisition), and the several acts for licensing printed books, (the last of which expired in 1694), hindered the free application of the common law to this species of property; and the usurpations of the prerogative were scarcely abated before the common-law right was abolished, in respect of published works, by the stat. 8 Ann. c. 19; but its existence up to the passing of that act is clearly established. The exclusive licenses granted to individuals were always understood to be an exercise of the Crown's right of censorship, founded in each case on the author's title to his copy. They were never classed with the monopolies prohibited by the statute of James I. The inherent right of an author and his assigns to his copy, independently of royal grant, is assumed in all the acts of Parliament and ordinances for the regulation of printing which preceded the statute of Anne. Thus, in the Licensing Act of the 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, s. 6, it is enacted, that no one shall print any book " which any person, by force or virtue of any letters-patent granted as aforesaid, or (where the same is not granted by any letters-patent) by force or virtue of any entry thereof duly made in the register-book of the said Company of Stationers, or in the register-book of either of the universities respectively, has, or shall have, the right, privilege, authority, or allowance solely to print, without the consent of the owner of such book." Now, registry with the Stationers' Company conferred no property, but was merely a condition precedent to the liberty of publishing at all; and it was expressly held that this statute gave no new right, but only the new remedy of an action of debt. (The Stationers' Company v. Parker, Skin. 233). The preamble to the stat. 8 Ann. c. 19, is to the same effect:- "Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publish

ing books and other writings without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their very great detriment,' ," &c.; language clearly referring to the invasion of an existing right, though at that time the Licensing Acts had expired, and the notion and practice of obtaining a privilege of monopoly by royal grant were exploded. Indeed, the title of the Crown itself to what were called prerogative copies (such as law books, the translation of the Bible, almanacks, &c.) was always founded on the expense bestowed by the Crown, directly or indirectly, on the compilation of those works. Again: in the enacting part of the statute of Anne, the copyright in books then already printed was secured to the authors, if they had not transferred their copies, or to their assignees, for twenty-one years, "and no longer." There could be no assignees if there were no property to assign. The copyright in books then "already composed, and not printed and published, or that should thereafter be composed," is secured to the authors and their assignees for the term of fourteen years from the day of the first publishing the same, "and no longer." The leaving of a longer term to works already published than was allowed to future works, shews that the act was understood to be restrictive of an existing right. The original bill was intended to give better protection to the common-law perpetual copyright.

Before the ultimate decision in Donaldson v. Beckett (2 Bro. P. C. 129; 4 Burr. 2303) it was held in several cases that the statute merely gave additional remedies for a term, leaving the author to his right at common law after that term had expired. (Tonson v. Walker, 3 Swanst. 673, and the cases there cited; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303). In Tonson v. Collins, cited in Millar v. Taylor, the Court of Queen's Bench, and afterwards the Court of Exchequer Chamber, were prepared to decide unanimously to that effect, but the case was dismissed on the ground of suspected collusion. Those cases were overruled by the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett, as it seems on the satisfactory ground that the words "and no longer," in the statute of Anne, cut down the perpetuity of the common-law right, in cases within the statute, to the period therein specified. The ground of that decision can only be surmised; but as seven of the eleven judges who were consulted, and also Lord Mansfield, who did not speak, were of opinion that at the common law copyright was not destroyed by publication, it is plain that Donaldson v. Beckett did not overrule the prior decisions as to the effect of publication. Of the four judges who spoke the other way, one (Eyre, B.) thought that an author had not the sole right of printing even before publication; and two (Perrott, B., and Adams, B.) thought, that though he had that right, he could not bring an action against a person printing from his manuscript, unless the copy was obtained by fraud or violence errors so obvious as greatly to lessen the weight of the opinions with which they were associated.

The objection so strenuously urged by Mr. Justice Yates and others, against including copyright in that notion of property which comprises such incorporeal rights as advowsons, tolls, and franchises, seems absurd enough. It was also beside the question, which was not as to the proper denomination of the right, but whether it existed by the common law in a book printed, as it certainly did in a book merely written, and whether it existed independently of the statute, as it certainly did by virtue of it. The common law recognises other rights than those of property, and has a scope as unlimited as that of the Legislature itself.

It was also urged that literary compositions ought to stand on the same footing as inventions in manufactures; but not to insist on the marked distinction between a literary work, which has an unmistakeable individuality both in itself and in its origin, and an

invention, which is a mere conception of a mode of action, that may, and generally does, occur independently to many minds, so that it would be impossible to distinguish between piracy and re-invention, the same considerations of expediency which are the grounds for giving protection in either case, and upon which the institution of property in general is founded, supply a reason for limiting the rights of the inventor more strictly than those of the author. Copyright merely prevents others from making a pecuniary profit of the particular work, and in no way limits the use of the ideas contained in it, or restrains others in the exercise of their own abilities; for two authors cannot write the same book, though two men may invent the same machine. A patent not only secures to the inventor the use of his invention, but prevents another, who may arrive at the same result by his own ingenuity, from turning it to account. To give a perpetual monopoly to the one who happens first to perceive and put in practice that which in the natural progress of the arts is sure to occur to many, would be to fetter and not to encourage improvement.

The right of an alien author to protection for his copies by the common law does not appear to have been expressly decided; but it is a necessary consequence of the rules of law with respect to aliens. With some exceptions as to land, founded on feudal and political reasons, an alien, whether resident here or abroad, has the same rights in respect of property and contracts as a natural-born subject would have under the same circumstances. It was resolved in Calvin's case (7 Rep. 17) that "an alien friend may by the common law have, acquire, and get, within the realm, by gift, trade, or other lawful means, any treasure or goods personal whatsoever, as well as any Englishman, and may maintain any action for the same; for if they should be disabled to acquire and maintain these things, it were in effect to deny unto them trade and traffic, which is the life of every island." (See Dy. 2 b; Cro. Car. 8; 2 Taunt. 37; Bac. Ab., “Alien,” D.; Com. Dig., "Alien," C. 5). So completely are all the personal rights of an alien, not involving the possession of land, or the exercise of constitutional privileges, recognised by our law, that an alien resident abroad may maintain an action for the slander of his reputation in this country: Tuerloote v. Morison, (Yelv. 198; Bulst. 134); Pisani v. Lawson, (8 Scott, 182), in which last case the doctrine was rested upon general considerations of justice, and not on the expediency of encouraging commerce. This maxim of the common law has been confirmed by a declaration in the recent Alien Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 4, (stated below). An alien author was therefore clearly entitled by the common law to the same protection of his property in his unpublished compositions as a native, and the act of publishing or procuring the publication of the work here could not be an abandonment of that right in the one case more than in the other. It seems to us that the right might have been carried further; for as publication here is not an abandonment of the copy, publication abroad, whether by a British subject or by a stranger, cannot be so, unless that interpretation is put upon it by the local law, in which case it might perhaps be thought to defeat the right everywhere. But see Beard v. Egerton, (3 C. B. 97). Subject, however, to the effect of any local law, it seems to be clear that by the common law an author, whether native or alien, and whether he first published here or abroad, had a perpetual copyright in his works.

The question remains, whether this right has been taken away by the Legislature in the case of an alien. The provisions of the Copyright Acts must be as extensively applicable as the common law which they superseded, unless their operation is limited by express words or necessary implication. The stat. 8 Ann. c. 19, after