Ar the present time naturally much interest is taken by all educated persons in questions relating to the rights and liabilities arising out of the state of war. In particular the rights of neutral powers, while several great powers are engaged in a war affecting their particular interests, and the interests of Europe generally, are the subject of serious consideration. On this subject we cannot do better, for the information of our readers, than to quote some passages from a most carefullyexecuted work lately published by Messrs. Hazlitt and Roche, members of the Bar*, on the Law of Maritime Warfare. At p. 138 occurs the following passage:"It has been shewn that while neutral powers are permitted to trade in innocent merchandise with the enemy, and to convey it to him, they may not convey it to him into places that are blockaded, with which all commerce is forbidden. It is expedient, therefore, next to explain what blockade is, and the manner in which it is considered by the law of nations. "Blockade is the carrying into effect, by an armed force, of that rule of war which renders commercial in COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. PRICE 18. Covas v. Bingham.-(County Court Appeal-Sale of Cargo afloat-Short Delivery - Construction of Contract) 596 The Governors of the Russell Institution, Apps., The Vestrymen of the Joint Parishes of St. Giles-inthe-Fields and St. George, Bloomsbury, Resps.(Poor-rate-" Russell Institution"-Library and Reading-room-Lectures-Purposes of Science, Literature, or the Fine Arts exclusively-Annual voluntary Contributions-6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, s. 1). 597 Heath v. Smith.-(Patent-Infringement-Prior public Use-21 Jac. 1, c. 3, s. 5).. Thompson v. Bell.-(Assignment and Re-assignment of Chose in Action abroad-Right to sue in this Country) 601 603 Stoessiger v. The South-eastern Railway Company.- The York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway Company, .... 608 tercourse, with the port or place blockaded, unlawful on the part of neutrals. "Amongst the rights of belligerents,' says Dr. Phillimore in his able work on Licenses, (p. 49), there is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and necessary as to its application, than that which gives rise to the law of blockade, as it has been ascertained, defined, and administered by the maritime tribunals of this country. The greater the research that shall be made into the principles of natural law, the more the details of the diplomatic and conventional history of Europe shall be studied, the more will it appear that this right has its origin in the purest sources of maritime jurisprudence, that it is sanctioned by the practice of the best times, and above all, that it is so essentially connected with the vital interests of Great Britain, that the renunciation of it, under any circumstances, must be regarded as the renunciation of one of the firmest charters of our naval pre-eminence, and as the surrender of one of the surest bulwarks of our national independence.' "If,' says Vattel, (b. 3, c. 7, s. 117), 'I lay siege to a place, or simply blockade it, I have a right to hinder any one from entering, and to treat as an enemy whom soever attempts to enter the place, or carry anything to 704 the besieged without my leave; for he opposes my undertaking, and may contribute to the miscarriage of it; and this involves me in all the misfortunes of an unsuo cessful war.' "There are two sorts of blockade," says Lord NEWSPAPER. Stowell, in The Neptunus, (1 Rob. 171), 'one by the Louis XIV, of 1681, the former rule was again estasimple fact only, the other by a notification accompa-blished. Valin and Pothier (De Proprieté, No. 96) nied with the fact. In the former case, when the fact are able to find no better argument in support of this ceases, (otherwise than by accident or the shifting of the rule, than that those who lade their goods on board an wind), there is immediately an end of the blockade; enemy's vessels thereby favour the commerce of the but where the fact is accompanied by a public notifica- enemy, and by this act are considered in law as subtion from the government of a belligerent country to mitting themselves to abide the fate of the vessel; and neutral governments, the blockade must be supposed Valin asks, (lib. 3, tit. 9, "Des Prises," art. 7), “How to exist till it has been publicly repealed, and notifi- can it be that the goods of friends and allies found in cation of such repeal made, in the same way, by the an enemy's ship should not be liable to confiscation, belligerent country which has notified the blockade. whilst even those of subjects are liable to it?" To which This notification it is the duty of the belligerent coun- Pothier himself furnishes the proper answer—" that in try to make immediately; as, to suffer the fact to cease, respect to goods, the property of the King's subjects, and to apply the notification again at a distant time, in lading them on board an enemy's vessels they conwould be a fraud on neutral nations.' travene the law which interdicts to them all commercial In a subsequent passage the question of free ships intercourse with the enemy, and deserve to lose their free goods is discussed: "The right to capture enemy's property on board a neutral ship has been much contested by particular nations, whose interests it strongly opposed. In 1780 the Empress of Russia proclaimed the principles of the Baltic code of neutrality, which she declared she would maintain by force of arms; one of the articles of that code being, that all effects belonging to the subjects of belligerent powers should be looked upon as free on board of neutral ships, except only such as were contraband. Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Germany, Holland, France, Spain, Portugal, and Naples, and also the United States, acceded to the Russian principle of neutrality; but, in consequence of the more effective resistance of Great Britain, the conventional term of neutrality thus attempted to be set up was abandoned in 1793, as not sanctioned by the law of nations, except in those cases where a positive compact had been made by treaty. In 1801 a second attempt was made by the Baltic powers to enforce the doctrines of armed neutrality asserted in 1780, but the attempt was again defeated by the undoubted naval superiority of Great Britain and Russia, by a convention with England, in June, 1801, expressly agreeing that enemy's property was not to be protected on board of neutral ships. The entire question of free ships free goods is thus ably reviewed by Mr. Wheaton, in his Elements of International Law, 162—183:— "Although, by the general usage of nations, independently of treaty stipulations, the goods of an enemy found on board the ships of a friend are liable to capture and condemnation, yet the converse rule, which subjects to confiscation the goods of a friend on board the vessels of an enemy, is manifestly contrary to reason and justice. It may indeed afford, as Grotius has stated, a presumption that the goods are enemy's property, but it is such a presumption as will readily yield to contrary proof, and not of that class of presumptions which the civilians call "presumptiones juris et de jure," and which are conclusive upon the party.' "But, however unreasonable and unjust this maxim may be, it has been incorporated into the prize code of certain nations, and enforced by them at different periods. Thus, by the French ordinances of 1538, 1543, and 1584, the goods of a friend laden on board the ships of an enemy are declared good and lawful prize. The contrary was provided by the subsequent declaration in 1650; but by the marine ordinance of goods for this violation of the law." The fallacy of the argument by which this rule is attempted to be supported consists in assuming, what requires to be proved, that by the act of lading his goods on board an enemy's vessel the neutral submits himself to abide the fate of the vessel; for it cannot be pretended that the goods are subjected to capture and confiscation ex re, since their character of neutral property exempts them from this liability. Nor can it be shewn that they are liable ex delicto, unless it be first proved that the act of lading them on board is an offence against the law of nations. It is therefore with reason that Bynkershoeck concludes that this rule, where merely esta blished by the prize ordinances of a belligerent power, cannot be defended on sound principles. Where, indeed, it is made by special compact the equivalent for the converse maxim, that free ships make free goods, this relaxation of belligerent pretensions may be fairly coupled with a correspondent concession by the neutral, that enemy ships should make enemy goods. These two maxims have been, in fact, commonly thus coupled in the various treaties on this subject, with a view to simplify the judicial inquiries into the proprie tary interest of the ship and cargo, by resolving them into the mere question of the national character of the ship. The two maxims are not, however, inseparable, The primitive law, independently of international compact, rests on the simple principle, that war gives a right to capture the goods of an enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend. The right to capture an enemy's property has no limit but that of the place where the goods are found, which, if neutral, will protect them from capture. We have already seen that a neutral vessel on the high seas is not such a place. The exemption of neutral property from capture has no other exceptions than those arising from the car rying of contraband, breach of blockade, and other analogous cases, where the conduct of the neutral gives to the belligerent a right to treat his property as enemy property. The neutral flag constitutes no protection to municates no hostile character to neutral property. an enemy's property, and the belligerent flag com States have changed this simple and natural principle of the law of nations, by mutual compact, in whole or in part, according as they believed it to be for their interest; but the one maxim, that free ships make free goods, does not necessarily imply the converse proposi lation that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods tion, that enemy ships make enemy goods. The stipu is a concession made by the belligerent to the neutral and gives to the neutral flag a capacity not given to it by the primitive law of nations. On the other hand, were glad to see that the intentions of the Government, in favour of a liberal view of the law of nations on this point, were adopted by the Legislature. the stipulation subjecting neutral property found in the vessel of an enemy to confiscation, as prize of war, is a concession made by the neutral to the belligerent, and takes from the neutral a privilege he possessed Surely this is not the time when a country placed, as under the pre-existing law of nations; but neither England is, at the head, and as it were in the active reason nor usage renders the two concessions so indisso-lead, of political civilisation, should rely upon rights luble that the one cannot exist without the other. It resting on those principles of policy which obtained in was upon these grounds that the Supreme Court of the periods when war was, not as it now is, the inevitable United States determined that the treaty of 1795, be- mode of settling the differences between the Governtween them and Spain, which stipulated that free ships ments of different countries on certain material subjects should make free goods, did not necessarily imply the of quarrel, but a bitter personal contest between the converse proposition, that enemy ships should make subjects of the respective Governments, in which perenemy goods, the treaty being silent as to the latter; sonal hatred led to the desire of mutual infliction of and that consequently the goods of a Spanish subject personal injuries, and when consequently a reckless found on board the vessel of an enemy of the United indifference to the private interests of the innocent States were not liable to confiscation as prize of war; subjects of belligerent countries, was one of the conseand although it was alleged that the prize law of Spain quences of war, and one of the supposed elements of would subject the property of an American citizen to successful warfare. At this day, with better means of condemnation when found on board the vessels of her information, we see that when two nations are at war enemy, the Court refused to condemn Spanish property to settle some quarrel, on which no intervening power found on board a vessel of their enemy, upon the prin- can adjudicate, the great object of each state is to deciple of reciprocity, because the American Government stroy or cripple the resources of the other, quâ state, had not manifested its will to retaliate upon Spain; and and no further. But we see also that to destroy the until this will was manifested by some legislative act, trade of either state with other states, not meddling in the Court was bound by the general law of nations, the contest, is not only grossly unjust, but injurious to constituting a part of the law of the land. (The Ne- both belligerent states, inasmuch as it inflicts injury reide, 9 Cranch, 388).' on those who have nothing to do with the quarrel, and, by reflection back, injures both the belligerent states long after they shall have settled their quarrel. Hence it is now beginning to be understood that the more the pernicious effects of war are confined to the actually belligerent states, the better it is for them; and that the more the exigencies of war can be allowed to permit the perfectly free action of neutral states with each belligerent state, the less will be the evil sustained by each at the conclusion of the war. We regret that our limited space prevents us from going more into detail on this subject, to which, however, we may have occasion to return; and we cannot conclude our observations better than by calling the attention of our readers to the work from which we have extracted the passages above quoted, from which they will derive abundant and accurate information on the law of nations as it affects the intercourse of states at war, first, as between themselves, and secondly, as between them and neutral nations. "The conventional law in respect to the rule now in question has fluctuated at different periods, according to the fluctuating policy and interests of the different maritime states of Europe. It has been much more flexible than the consuetudinary law; but there is a great preponderance of modern treaties in favour of the maxim, free ships free goods, sometimes, but not always, connected with the correlative maxim, enemy ships enemy goods; so that it may be said that, for two centuries past, there has been a constant tendency to establish by compact the principle that the neutrality of the ship should exempt the cargo, even if enemy's property, from capture and confiscation as prize of war. Consistent with this is the declaration of the Crown of this country issued on the declaration of war, (see p. 404 of Messrs. Hazlitt and Roche's work), which is as follows: "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the powers with whom she remains at peace. "To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, her Majesty is willing for the present to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations. "It is impossible for her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches; and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts. "But her Majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war. "It is not her Majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships; and her Majesty further declares, that being anxious as much as possible to lessen the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly organised forces of the country, it is not her present intention to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of privateers." These questions have been the subject of a very recent debate in the House of Commons, in which we REGULA GENERALIS. ORDER OF COURT.-July 3, 1854. I, ROBERT MONSEY Baron CRANWORTH, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, intrusted, by virtue of her Majesty the Queen's sign-manual, with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of persons found idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind, do, with the advice and assistance of the Right Hon. Sir JAMES LEWIS KNIGHT BRUCE and the Right Hon. Sir GEORGE JAMES TURNER, the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery; also being intrusted as aforesaid, and by virtue and in exercise of the powers or authorities in this behalf vested in me by the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853, and of every other power or authority in anywise enabling me in this behalf, order and direct as follows-that is to say, From and after the 5th July, 1854, all office copies and other copies of proceedings and documents in matters in lunacy shall be counted and charged for after the rate of seventy-two words per folio; and where such copies, or any portion thereof, shall comprise columns containing figures, each figure shall be counted and charged for as one word. (Signed) CRANWORTH, C. J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J. THE STATUTE-LAW COMMISSION. (Continued from p. 240). Sect. 11 purports to define the cases in which a married woman may exercise testamentary volition. The third case is, that "a married woman may make a will in exercise of such powers as she is empowered to exercise by will notwithstanding coverture." Either this is a circle, or it implies the necessity of an express dispensation of the disability in the power, and thus alters the law. It should be, "in exercise of a power." If the power is limited to discoverture, a will made during coverture is not made in exercise of it. run, in writing, signed by the testator, for the purpose of authentication," for the word "affix" can be significant only to the effect of raising a quibble on the distinction between affixing and suffixing. We dissent from Mr. Brickdale's criticism on Lord St. Leonards' Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24, that it "has proceeded in a wrong direction, and is not likely to produce beneficial results," and that the enumeration of certain particulars will exclude others. The act is correct in substance, though not a model of conciseness. It expressly provides that the enumeration of particulars shall not restrain the generality of the enactment which it follows; and in extenuation of the superfluities in the act, it may be urged that it was framed for the guidance of the very peculiar intellects of the Ecclesiastical Courts. Sects. 17 and 18 contain alterations of the law of evidence, which we do not propose to discuss. But the allowance as attesting witnesses of persons incompetent from crime, &c., to give evidence is omitted without any apparent reason. Sect. 20. "Wills in exercise of powers executed as required by this act are sufficiently executed, and the requisition of any additional or other form of execution or solemnity is of no effect." "Solemnity" is not a word of art, and it would be impossible to say, before a decision, whether it extended to registration, inrolment in Chancery or in the court rolls of a manor, &c. "Fourthly, a married woman who is an executrix may make a will appointing an executor or executors as to the personal estate of her testator." This should "who is or becomes a sole executrix." The exceptions in favour of married women are made in the Wills Act by leaving them as they stood before the act, which is the safe and proper course, as well as the easiest. The case of a will inade with the husband's consent is omitted from the draft, probably on account of the difficulty of expressing its conditions accurately at any rate, no satisfactory reason is given for abolishing the privilege. It is true that such wills are not often made, and when made stand on a precarious footing; but the existence of a head of law in relation to them shews that they are occasionally useful. In this, as in many other clauses of the draft, an In cases where the possession of separate estate or of a affected and inaccurate use of the present tense may be testamentary power enables the wife to put the hus-noticed. The present tense is only proper where the band to his election, the privilege may be not only con- enactment has an immediate transitory action, as where venient, but important. it is said that a certain custom is repealed. But to say of future wills that they are sufficiently executed, that a condition to be annexed to a future power is of no effect, &c., is to attain singularity at the expense of grammar. Mr. Brickdale's proposal to alter the law in respect of the wives of felons, by confining the exception to the husband's civil death, seems to have arisen from a confusion of conviction of felony with attainder, and of banishment for life, which is a species of civil death, with banishment for a term, which is not. A convict of felony forfeits his goods, and may be banished for a term without suffering civil death, and during the term his marital rights are suspended. (Ex parte Franks, 1 Moo. & Sc. 1). There is no reason for subjecting the wife of such a convict to testamentary disability. In Coombes v. The Queen's Proctor (16 Jur., part 1, p. 820) the Prerogative Court came to an erroneous conclusion, but we are not on that account to alter the law for the worse. The bill would also deprive the wife of an alien enemy of her power to make a will. All this is the result of undertaking to declare the common law. Sect. 12. "The preceding section applies to all wills by married women made after this act comes into operation, whether such woman [women] were married before or after the passing of the act.' If this is necessary, then innumerable titles supposed to be taken under the Fines and Recoveries Act are bad. Clause 21 is similarly superfluous. Sect. 13. "A will must be in writing, and the testator must affix his signature thereto for the purpose of authentication." Sect. 14. "The signature of the testator must be affixed or acknowledged by him in the joint presence of two witnesses." Sect. 15. "Both witnesses must attest that the signature of the testator was affixed or acknowledged in their joint presence by severally affixing their signatures to the will in the testator's presence," [signatures as significant as Lord Burleigh's shake of the head.] Sect. 16. "The testator may sign by the hand of another person, but the witnesses [a witness] may not." These clauses seem to deal satisfactorily with the difficult subject of execution and attestation. But it would be neater to say (sect. 13) that "a will must be Sect. 23. "It is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that all erasures, obliterations, and additions in a will were made after the execution thereof." Another illustration of the danger of attempting to fix the common law. An erasure or interlineation which gives sense to a passage otherwise insensible is not presumed to be made after execution: the proposed inflexible rule would defeat the will in such a case; for even if "evidence" could be held to include what is called "internal evidence," the fact that the will was insensible before the alteration affords no evidence of the date of the alteration. is Sect. 24. "All wills are revoked by marriage." The saving in the Wills Act of testamentary appointments of property which would not, in default of appointment, pass to the testator's heir or personal representatives, omitted on account of the "inconvenience of having a trivial exception to a general rule." A strange reason! This trivial exception has in a case within our knowledge been the means of saving a large family, brought up in opulence, from utter destitution. The exception is not trivial, but essential. Inconvenience is to be anticipated from a rule which operates in cases beyond its principle, but not from an exception that makes the rule harmonise with its principle. Sect. 28. "A specific gift by will operates as a gift of all the estate or interest of the testator at the time of his death in the thing given." Sect. 29. "A general or residuary gift by will operates as a gift of all the property of the testator to which the terms of the gift are applicable at the time of his death." These sections are intended to replace the 23rd and 24th sections of the Wills Act. The proper substitute for those sections is a blank. They were suggested by an unfounded distrust of the power of the general enabling clause. If before the Wills Act a testator be queathed his horse "Trajan" to his nephew, and in the interval between the making of his will and his death sold and repurchased Trajan, the bequest took effect. The extension of the devising power to all real estate belonging to the testator at his death necessarily sub1jected devises of real estate to a similar construction. The 24th section of the Wills Act might be better expressed, and would be better omitted; but, except for superfluousness, it is not objectionable in substance. Mr. Brickdale's 28th section would alter the law for the worse. "The thing given," being contrasted with the testator's estate or interest in it, must mean the land or chattel itself; so that if a testator, having a term of seven years in a farm, were to devise the farm even by the description of "his leasehold farm at A.," or "all his unexpired term in the farm at A.," and afterwards acquired the fee, (a case of frequent occurrence), the gift would pass the fee. In terms, indeed, the clause goes much further, for it makes a specific gift for life pass the fee, if the testator has the fee. The golden rule in dealing with questions of construction is, to abolish arbitrary regulations and irrational precedents, and leave the Courts to their own discretion. (To be continued). London Gazettes. FRIDAY, JULY 7. BANKRUPTS. JOHN WEBB, Rayleigh, Essex, grocer and general dealer, JOHN ELLIS WATKINSON, Halifax, Yorkshire, grocer, filed June 30. at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac. joint est., and aud. ac. sep. est. of Isaac Blackburn.-J. Denbigh, Bradford, Yorkshire, woolstapler, July 20 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.-James Townsend Wigney, Huddersfield and Wakefield, Yorkshire, wine merchant, July 20 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.-T. B. King, York, manufacturer of paper hangings, July 20 at 11, Abingdon, Berkshire, saddler, and Sunningwell, Berkshire, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.-G. Lawrance, brickmaker, July 28 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div. F. Quick, Bristol, jeweller, July 31 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-Robert Gillett the elder, Prince's-road, Lambeth, Surrey, flour factor, Aug. I at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-George Bender, Bristol, glass dealer, Aug. 4 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, div.John Roebuck and William Roebuck, Bank End Mill, near Holmfirth, Yorkshire, and Jonathan Roebuck, Austonley, and Eli Roebuck, Mossley Brow, Lancashire, woollen cloth manufacturers, July 28 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, div.-Thomas Broadbent, Halifax, Yorkshire, draper, July 28 ton, Bradford, Yorkshire, joiner, July 28 at 11, District Court at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, div.—Wm. Brunof Bankruptcy, Leeds, div.-Thos. Hind, Sheffield, Yorkshire, joiner, July 29 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Sheffield, div.-Charles Bramer, Sheffield, Yorkshire, wood dealer, July 29 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Sheffield, div. CERTIFICATES. To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or before the Day of Meeting. Robert Burr, Gosport, Southampton, shoemaker, Aug. 2 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Thomas Holland, Milnersquare, Islington, Middlesex, tobacco broker, Aug. 2 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Charles Henry May, Edgeware-road, Marylebone, Middlesex, jeweller, July 31 at halfpast 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-James Merchant, Foulmire, Cambridgeshire, grocer, July 31 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-B. R. Waite, Wormwoodstreet, London, butcher, July 31 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-John Wilson, Barking, Essex, corn dealer, Aug. 2 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Wm. B. George, Gloucester, scrivener, Aug. 1 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol.-James Nuttall, James Yates, and Charles Nutlall, Rawtenstall, Lancashire, cotton manufacturers, July 28 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester.-Wm. Dolton, Sutton St. Mary, Lincolnshire, common brewer, Aug. 8 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Nottingham.-James Potts, Stoke-upon-Trent, Staffordshire, confectioner, July 27 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham. -John Bates, West Bromwich, Staffordshire, builder, July 27 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham.-Thomas Hind, Sheffield, Yorkshire, joiner, July 29 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Sheffield.-J. Holmes and Robert Holmes, Sheffield, Yorkshire, builders, July 29 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Sheffield. To be granted, unless an Appeal be duly entered. W. Brown, Portsmouth, licensed victualler.-J. Whitehead, J. Whitehead the younger, and G. Wyatt, Prince's-street, Lambeth, Surrey, rectifiers.-Mary Long, Clifton, Bristol, hotel keeper.-H. E. Harries, Tredegar, Monmouthshire, draper. -Robert Williams, Mold, Flintshire, draper.-J. Howard, Great Grimsby, Lincolnshire, and Manningtree and Mistley, Essex, shipowner.-S. Sharp and W. L. Middleton, Leeds, Yorkshire, printers.-Thomas Booth, Halifax, Yorkshire, inn JOHN WILLIAM WILLIAMS and WILLIAM FISHER WARBRECK, Liverpool, manufacturing chemists, dealers and chapmen, (trading under the style or firm of Williams & Warbreck), July 21 and Aug. 10 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Turner; Sols. Evans & Son, Liverpool.-Petition filed July 1. JOHN GIBSON, Distington, Cumberland, grocer, dealer and chapman, July 14 and Aug. 15 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Off. Ass. Baker; Sols. Musgrave, Whitehaven; Griffith & Crighton, New-keeper. castle-upon-Tyne.-Petition filed June 26. MEETINGS. Henry Crane, Dudley, Worcestershire, grocer, July 27 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham, last ex.-Jas. Coupe, Preston, Lancashire, joiner, July 19 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester, last ex.-Henry Clayburn, Hulme, Manchester, builder, July 31 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester, last ex.-Robert Burr, Gosport, Southampton, shoemaker, Aug. 2 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Thos. Holland, Milner-square, Islington, Middlesex, tobacco broker, Aug. 2 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-John Wilson, Barking, Essex, corn dealer, Aug. 2 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-S. Clarkson Peters, Southampton, draper, Aug. 1 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Isaac Blackburn and Wm. Sigismund Stiebel, Leeds, Yorkshire, ironfounders, July 20 SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS. J. G. Taylor & Co., Edinburgh, wholesale jewellers.-T. Ross, Glasgow, commission agent.-Paterson, Macdonald, & Co., Glasgow, commission agents. PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED. James W. R. Hall and Henry Minett, Ross, Herefordshire, attornies and solicitors.-Charles Lees and George Humble, Bradford, Yorkshire, attornies and solicitors, (under the firm of Lees & Humble). INSOLVENT DEBTORS Who have filed their Petitions in the Court of Bankruptcy, and have obtained an Interim Order for Protection from Process. Thomas Ashley, Warboys, Huntingdonshire, labourer, July 22 at 10, County Court of Huntingdonshire, at Huntingdon. |