tualler.-Jas. Vincett, Northfleet Creek, Northfleet, foreman At the County Court of Warwickshire, at COVENTRY, Herbert Lane Sampson, Yardley, confectioner. James Rawlings, Blackfriars-road, Surrey, not in any trade, May 10 at 12, at Rooker & Co.'s, Plymouth, Devonshire, sp. aff. LAW PARTNERSHIP.-A Gentleman of good con nexions, admitted in 1846, who has had thirteen years' experience in one of the largest Offices in Town, is desirous of entering a Solicitor's Office, either in Town or Country, as a JUNIOR PARTNER, or of obtaining an engagement as Conveyancing Clerk, with the prospect of a Partnership at the end of two years. Address C. J. W., Mr. Blenkarn, Law Bookseller, 29, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. TO TOWN and COUNTRY SOLICITORS.-LEE & Co., Law Stationers, 39, Castle-street, Holborn.-Briefs and Abstracts, per sheet, 6d.; Fair and Draft Copies, per folio, 1d.; Full-length ditto and Ingrossments, per folio, 1d. Good writing, strict examination, and punctuality guaranteed. WANTED on MORTGAGE, 20,000%. and 700%., on firstrate Leasehold House Property in the best part of London, held direct from the freeholder, at very small ground-rents, for 60 and 90 years, producing a large surplus rental, after paying interest and all outgoings. Can be taken for seven years. Will answer an Insurance Company, as some Life Policies will be required. Principals, or their Solicitors, will only be attended to. Address A. B., 102, Piccadilly. LA AW REVERSIONARY INTEREST SOCIETY.— TWENTY SHARES for SALE, together or separately. Address to Civis, care of Houghton & Son, Stationers, Poultry, London. This day is published, in 12mo., price 10s. 6d. cloth, MR. SERJEANT STEPHEN'S NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE Just published, in 4 vols. 8vo., 41. 4s.cloth, (dedicated, by permission, to Her Majesty the Queen), NEW COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND, in which are interwoven, under a new and original Arrangement of the general Subject, all such parts of the WORK of BLACKSTONE as are applicable to the present times; together with full but compen dious Expositions of the Modern Improvements of the Law up to the latest period, the original and adopted materials being throughout the Work typographically distinguished from each other. By HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, Serjeant at Law. Third Edition. Prepared for the Press by JAMES STEPHEN, of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law, and Professor of English Law, &c. at King's College, London. From the Law Magazine.-"We have long regarded this as the most valuable law book extant. We make no exception. We believe, moreover, the labour saved to the student by this work to be invaluable. Nor are we sure that any amount of labour could give him the same comprehensive insight to the science he is about to enter upon. It is the grammar of the law. It is sheer nonsense to talk of the worth of Blackstone now-a-days. We undertake to say that the student who should read him now would have to unread half the work contains, and add as much more to his information when he had exhausted all that Blackstone knew. This results not merely from the changes which have since taken place, but from the diffuse and often verbose style in which Blackstone wrote his very faulty work, which it has been the fashion of a comparatively illiterate age to laud and extol. We venture to suggest to Serjeant Stephen to discard Blackstone altogether, and to rewrite the passages he has modestly but injudiciously interpolated in his own infinitely superior composition. We may here allude to the great care taken by Mr. James Stephen, to whom much credit is due for the intelligent zeal and diligence he has evinced in preparing this edition of Stephen's Commentaries for the press." From the Legal Observer.—“ We welcome a new and third edition of Mr. Serjeant Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England, founded on the text of Blackstone. In this edition the learned author has been ably assisted by his son, Mr. James Stephen. They have, with great diligence and accuracy, digested the chief alterations in the law since the last edition of the work-a task of great difficulty, requiring no ordinary knowledge of the law as it was and as it is, with an extraordinary power of condensing and arranging the changes which have been effected in nearly all departments of our judicial system from year to year. The arduous task of this new edition has been ably performed. We know A MANUAL of CIVIL LAW; or, Examination in the not any work which, taken as a whole, can be compared with the Institutes of Justinian: being a Translation of and Commentary on that Work. With an Introduction on the History of the Roman Law. By P. CUMIN, M. A., of Balliol College, Oxford, Barrister at Law. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. SMITH'S MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.- NEW This day is published, in 12mo., price 10s. boards, Commentaries as the first introduction to the study of the Laws of England, whether for the use of the lawyer, the legislator, or the private gentleman." From the Justice of the Peace.-"To speak in terms of approbation of a work on which the fiat of public opinion has so unmistakeably set its stamp would be altogether an act of supererogation. Every one knows that the last four or five years have been a stirring time in the way of legal reform. He will therefore be quite prepared to learn that the present edition of the New Commentaries bears the mark of alteration, not in every page. We honestly and heartily advise him to turn to the work itself, and he will find that it not only contains the latest information upon almost every subject he may require to be informed upon, but that, as in former editions so in this, whatever is handled is treated in that perspicuous and scientific manner which has hitherto contributed to extend the reputation of the New Commentaries." A MANUAL of EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, founded either in text or note, in almost every chapter throughout the work. on Story's Commentaries and Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction; and comprising in a small compass the Points of Equity usually occurring in Chancery and Conveyancing, and in the general Practice of a Solicitor. By JOSIAH W. SMITH, B.C. L., of Lincoln's-inn, Esq., Barrister at Law. Third Edition. Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. OLIPHANT ON THE LAW OF HORSES, GAMING, &c. Recently published, in 1 vol. 12mo., the Second Edition, price 128. cloth boards, of From the Law Times.-" Assuming that all prudent practitioners and students will wash their hands of the past, and begin to form small practical libraries entirely of the recent law, they could not find a better foundation than this third and new edition of Serjeant Stephen's Com THE LAW of HORSES; including the Bargain and Sale mentaries, which has been moulded throughout to the present state of By of Chattels; also the Law of Racing, Wagers, and Gaming. GEORGE HENRY HEWIT OLIPHANT, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law, Author of "The Law of Pews and Prohibition," "The Law of Church Ornaments," &c. S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane. THE IRISH CHANCERY AND COMMON-LAW REPORTS. the law, and comprises all the recent alterations. Every lawyer knows the worth of this famous work as it came from the hands of its auther; we can assure them that it has lost none of its value in the hands of his son, who has performed his laborious task of editing all, and rewriting much, with the same care, the same industry, the same masterly of the principles of our law, and in the same clear and graceful style, that recommended the compositions of his father to popularity, even more than the fulness of learning, without its parade, that distinguishes these Commeasure the best book that has ever appeared to form a foundation for the study of the Law of England." THE IRISH CHANCERY and COMMON-LAW RE- mentaries. We heartily recommend these Commentaries as beyond PORTS; being a New Series, in continuation of the Irish Law and Equity Reports. Subscription, 31. per annum. The Judgments in these Reports are all revised by the Judges, and are the only authorised Reports of Irish Cases. Vols. 1 and 2 are now completed, and contain the Reports from 1850 to 1853, price (bound in 4 vols.) 61. Dublin: Hodges & Smith, 104, Grafton-street, Booksellers to the Hon. Society of King's-inns; and to be had of the London Law Booksellers. QUESTIONS ON STEPHEN'S NEW COMMENTARIES. Also, just published, Svo., 10s. 6d. cloth, QUESTIONS for LAW STUDENTS on the THIRD EDITION of Mr. SERJEANT STEPHEN'S NEW COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. By JAMES STEPHEN, of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law, and Professor of English Law, &c. at King's College, London. London: Published by Messrs. Butterworth, 7, Fleet-street, Law Publishers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty. Orders for THE JURIST given to any Newsman, or letter (postpaid) sent to the Office, No. 3, CHANCERY LANE, or to STEVENS & NORTON, 26, BELL-YARD, LINCOLN'S-INN, will insure its punctual delivery in London, or its being forwarded on the evening of publication, through the medium of the Post Office, to the Country. Printed by HENRY HANSARD, PRINTER, residing at No. 14. Park Square, Regent's Park, in the Parish of St. Marylebone, in the County of Middlesex, at his Printing Office, situate in Parker Street. in the Parish of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, in the County aforesaid; and Published at No. 3, CHANCERY LANE, in the Parish of St. Dunstan DEFECTIVE TITLES ASSURED, and rendered Mar- in the West, in the City of London, by HENRY SWEET, LA BOOK Mortgageable, by the LAW, PROPERTY, and LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, 30, Essex-street, Strand, London. EDWARD S. BARNES, Secretary. SELLER and PUBLISHER, residing at No. 41, Great Coram Street, in the Parish of St. George, Bloomsbury, in the County of MiddlesexSaturday, April 22, 1854. NAMES OF THE CASES REPORTED IN THIS NUMBER. In re The Winding-up Acts, and in re The Dover, Deal, VICE-CHANCELLOR STUART'S COURT. Voyle v. Hughes.-(Equitable reversionary Interest in VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. ..... 339 341 341 344 348 EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. PRICE 18. Heslop v. Chapman.-(Malicious Prosecution-Rea- Tetley v. Easton.-(Patent-Specification-Old Ma- COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 350 352 356 COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Hadley v. Baxendale.-(Duty of Judge at Trial-New 358 CONSISTORY COURT. 360 ADVERTISEMENTS. C v. C -.-(Misconduct of Husband-Cruelty unable to get to the Court before they have completed The Scale of Charges for Advertisements will in future be their work, it passes the power of the Court of Chanas follows: We continue in this part of THE JURIST the observations which were commenced in a former number, (see ante, p. 122), on the state of procedure in the Court of Chancery. The next material defect of the Court of Chancery is its want of power directly to compel an act to be done, and its total want of power to give damages. The Court of Chancery has continually to decide cases in which the question is, whether one person is doing some act in breach of his contract with another person, or another set of persons-as whether a railway company, in building a station on the edge of my meadow, or in throwing up an embankment right in front of my house, or the like, is committing a breach of its parliamentary contract with me, as one of the public. Now, if I can get to the Court of Chancery before the company has done anything material, I may obtain an injunction, and stop them from going on. But if, for any of the thousand reasons that in the business of this world cause delays, I have been VOL. XVIII. P cery to order them directly to remove it. True, the Court has got into the habit of granting what it terms mandatory injunctions-that is, injunctions restraining a party from continuing to let a thing remain in its existing state; but, independently of the theoretical clumsiness of the expedient, the practical enforcing of such an order is accompanied with so many difficulties, that we believe there is no instance on record of its operating otherwise than by bringing about a compromise. But however that may be, and assuming the mandatory injunction to be fully effective, there has been no attempt to carry it beyond ordering the restoration of things to a pre-existing state: thus, somewhat trifling repairs have been ordered by injunction; (Lane v. Newdegate, 10 Ves. 192); so, by injunction, excavations improperly made have been ordered to be filled up. (1 Railw. Cas. 159; Lord Mexborough v. Bowes, 7 Beav. 127). But we are not apprised of any attempt to enforce by mandatory injunction the performance of a specific, substantial, and extensive act agreed to be done. Thus, suppose a builder agrees to build a house according to a given plan and specification, there is no rational ground why he should not be compellable to perform that agreement, and no more real difficulty about it than in compelling a man to execute a conveyance; but such an agreement the Court of Chancery has no power specifically to enforce, directly or indirectly. in Now, it seems to us impossible to distinguish, on any sound and rational principle, this class of cases from cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of enforcing spe for instance, he has not so conducted his part of the transaction as to come up to that degree of equity which is required by the Court before it will give what it considers a special aid-a sort of indulgence; or because, perhaps, the defendant has put it out of his own power to perform the contract. In the former case the plaintiff may deserve damages; in the latter he must be deserving of them. But in either case all the Court of equity can do is to dismiss the bill, with or without costs. Then the plaintiff, having, if his bill is dismissed with costs, paid very heavily-if without costs, still heavily, for his mistake in coming to the wrong jurisdiction, goes to the right one, and then obtains damages, Now, why this circuity should prevail-for what good reason the Court of equity should not in such a case ascertain what is the damage suffered by the plaintiff, and give him what he is fairly entitled to in respect of such damage, nobody can say, except that it has always been so; and we say, the sooner it ceases to be so, the better for the public. Of course, upon the suggestion of such an alteration, as upon the suggestion of every departure from existing practice, objections would be raised. cific performance. A man is as much bound to build a house, if he agrees to do it, as he is to convey his estate, if he has agreed so to do. A company is as much bound to make its railroad on the wide gauge, if it has agreed so to do, as it would be to transfer Columbian bonds, if to do that was the contract; and it is as easy practically to enforce performance of the one contract as of the other. No doubt there are cases of exception, when the Court should abstain from attempting to enforce specific performance, because practically it cannot estimate what is performance, and therefore any order would be a perpetual source of conflict between the law and the subject, derogatory and injurious to the administration of justice. Of this class are the cases of acting, singing, writing a book, and the like. The Court does not attempt to enforce performance of contracts to do these things, not because it would be more beyond its power or more absurd to commit a man for contempt for breaking such a contract than for breaking any other contract, but because it is impossible to ascertain what is wilfully breaking such a contract. There is a measure of what is breaking a contract to convey an estate, because what is requisite to be done for conveying it is perfectly well known, and the Court can judge whether the party ordered to convey does or does not do the requisite things. But if Mademoiselle Wagner had been ordered to sing, and she sang a little flat or a little sharp, or a little too fast or a little too slow for the band, or made a few mistakes, or introduced very ill-on which a man of common sense comes to the concluplaced roulades, &c., so that, in effect, her singing would be very unsatisfactory, how could the Court ascertain on what possible evidence could it ground a conclusion that she had or had not disobeyed the order? So, in the cases in which the Court has said it cannot order a performer to act; the reason is, because the acting is not a measurable thing, of the complete doing or not doing which the Court can form an opinion, and therefore it will not stultify itself by making an order which might be in practice laughed at. But no such difficulty occurs in enforcing a contract-say to build a house or a bridge, according to a given specification. Perfectly satisfactory evidence could be given on such a matter to enable the Court to say whether the thing agreed to be done had been done, and it could therefore just as well enforce its order as it can an injunction, strictly and properly so called. Next, as to the deficiency of power in the Court of Chancery to give damages. Why it should be oppressed by that infirmity it is difficult to conceive, but so it is. The Court did indeed once attempt it in Denton v. Stewart, (see 17 Ves. 276, notes), and that was followed in Greenaway v. Adams, (12 Ves. 395). But those cases were substantially overruled by Todd v. Gee, (17 Ves. 273), and have never since been treated as of any authority. So that now one has but to satisfy an equity judge that what is asked is damages, or even, as it is termed, sounds in damages, and he is forthwith seized with an equitable horror, which results in the peremptory refusal of the relief asked. Now, the way this works is simply to put the parties to expense, and nothing more. A plaintiff files his bill for specific performance; it turns out that he cannot have it, either from his own conduct or that of the defendant; because, It will probably be asked, how, by what machinery, is a Court of equity to assess damages? We answer, how does a jury do it? It hears the proof of the facts on which damage is established: it hears evidence to shew the amount of the injury; to shew the merits or demerits of the claimant; to shew everything, in fact, sion that the plaintiff has suffered wrong—that his wrong is represented by a given amount of money, and that, if he gets that money, he can no longer complain. Are, then, equity judges denuded of the faculties requisite to go through so simple a process? Are they less able, than the respectable individuals who compose a jury, to understand evidence, and to draw from it a common sense, business-like conclusion? The argument is really too trivial to require for its refutation more than to be stated. The machinery, which is adequate for taking the most intricate accounts, is surely sufficient to ascertain whether any and what damage has been suffered by any party to a suit, by his opponent not having done something that he ought to have done-that is, in any case in which a jury or anybody else could ascertain the damage. We will conclude by noticing a defect which is rather of the present structure of the Court than in its principles or procedure. We refer to the constitution of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in Chancery is a sort of dissolving view: sometimes it presents itself as two judges; anon that vanishes, and three appear; then that dissolves itself, and one only is seen. It is not of right that the suitor is heard on appeal by three judges, or even by two. To have three is an indulgence for which he must shew a special ground; and though two habitually do hear appeals, that is not at all of necessity. Now, this results simply from the habitual parsimony of the Legislature in relation to anything that has a useful purpose. The Legislature thought it had done a great thing in adding the two Lords Justices to the strength of the judicial staff in Chancery, and would not go a step further, although it was pointed out at the time, in and out of the House, that two is about the most inconvenient num--the mode to which the plaintiff is usually limited ber that could be selected for an appeal court, for of reaping the fruit of his judgment. What can be many reasons-one, of itself almost enough, being, more annoying than the ordinary practice respectthat whenever the two judges differ, as in the ordinary dered to be paid by instalments? But the principle ing the paying in and getting out of a debt orcourse of human events they must not only sometimes, of ordering payment by instalments at all is grossly but not unfrequently, there is practically no decision; absurd and unjust. It is the first duty of the State in another reason being, that as no two men are ever matters civil to enforce, as perfectly as may be, the found exactly equal intellectually, there is the greatest prompt and exact performance of every contract for probability, that when there are two judges, one will valuable consideration, which was not immoral or otherhabitually more or less influence the other-not in- sonable to a degree implying fraud on the other side at wise objectionable on the ground of policy, or unreatentionally of course, but in fact. The reason why the time of making it. When, by the tests provided by two, and no more, was the number selected, is ob- the bankruptcy and insolvency laws, it is ascertained, vious. It was necessary to have something more than or believed to be ascertained, that a man is really unable one judge as a permanent Court of Appeal; and to to fulfil all his pecuniary engagements, provision is made for applying his means as far as they will go, save the expense of even a single judge's salary was no and then for discharging him, either absolutely or conslight object with the Imperial Parliament of Great ditionally, from further liability. Whether this branch Britain: therefore the Court was composed of two, of our law is not too lax in favour of debtors I need and no more. That that number is not satisfactory is not now inquire; but I take it to be clear, that when, proved, however, by the continual struggle made by independently of the bankrupt or insolvent law, suitors to obtain the presence of the full Court; not a court of justice says to a creditor, after the time agreed day passes without some application to have a case take payment only by so many weekly or monthly for full payment of the debt has passed, "You shall heard by the full Court, all sorts of pretexts being instalments," it varies the contract between the parties, put forward for this special indulgence-all in general either wantonly, or on an assumption of reasons, the equally flimsy; the real and only ground being, that the existence and cogency of which are never ascertained, suitors feel (or their advisers feel for them, which is and are in fact unascertainable. the same thing) that a Court composed of three or four judges (and they would prefer four generally to three) is better than a Court composed of two; and they point, and with reason, to the Courts of law, to the Privy Council, and to the House of Lords, as examples of the prevalence in practice, everywhere but in the Court of Chancery, of a Court of Appeal being composed habitually of more than two persons. Thus, we contend, ought the Court of Appeal in Chancery to be constituted-it ought to have at least three, it would be better with four judges; whether they should be all permanent judges, or whether the third and fourth should be drafted for appeals from the other branches of the Court, according to the practice followed in composing the Exchequer Chamber, is a question of detail, with which we do not attempt here to meddle. But on the broad proposition we entertain no doubt, that no appeal should ever be heard by less than three judges. of paternal government. If the judge is soft-headed, We are indebted to the sentimentalists for this sample (and therefore supposed to be soft-hearted), the defendant asks for time as a matter of course, and obtains it as a matter of course, unless the judge has some private prejudice or grudge against him, (and experience proves that many of these grandees are much infested by Mordecais). If the judge inquires, he elicits at most an assertion on one side, (usually denied on the other), that the defendant is poor and unable to pay at once, and there the inquiry necessarily ends, the real ability of the defendant being left as doubtful as if the question had never been asked, while the possibly greater need of the plaintiff is regarded as wholly irrelevant. The result is, that in the majority of cases the county court, which is represented to be a court for the convenient and expeditious recovery of debts, acts as a court for the granting of protection to fraudulent debtors, its judgment for deferred payment amounting to protection in the meantime; sufficient to enable the debtor to decamp with his goods, or make them over to some accommodating relation or friend; for the county court, in exercising this kind of bankruptcy jurisdiction, omits the precaution of laying hands on the debtor's assets. If this form of relief is good for the small vulgar debtor, it should be equally good for the genteel one, who, in mental and corporal suffering, often feels a pang as great as when a smith is sued. Indeed, the jurisdiction seems more peculiarly suitable to that class of debtors who are accustomed to cover destitution with a varnish of gentility. I believe that the scamps form a much larger proportion of the defendants in the county courts than they do in the superior courts, because in the lower ranks of life the real circumstances and characters of debtors are less disguised, and consequently it more frequently happens that a creditor feels assured both that his debtor is unable to pay at once, and that he needs no judicial process to compel him to pay as soon as he can. But however that may be, it is an act of improvidence to contract debts without the means or prospect of paying them at the stipulated time; and to release or vary such contracts is, pro tanto, to levy an impolitic as well as an unjust poor rate on creditors. What I have said in qualification of your praise of the convenience of these tribunals will also tell It is impossible that a judge can long retain a clear against the attribute of expedition. I believe it is well known that they are not always exemplary on the score of cheapness; but I will pass that, and come to the important question of their efficiency. And, first, of the flagrant cases of prejudice and corruption which must have occurred to the observation of all who have had much experience in a variety of the courts. I do not at present refer to any case of pecuniary corruption, but to cases of prandial, choreal, comitial, ecclesiastical, and such like interests or predilections. That the " spes cœnatica" often suffices to disturb the balance of justice in the hands of a man supposed to possess an educated soul, (not to mention his income, for non constat that it is not more than effaced by his outgoings), is a sad truth, which it is of no use to ignore. Then there are the opinions which, in a country district, every man who is not a hermit forms as to the COMMISSIONERS TO ADMINISTER OATHS character, habits, and means of most of the people about him, including the labourers-opinions picked up for the most part in the college of Rumour. Add all those sources of prejudice suggested by Scott's story of the defeated chess-player, who ultimately enjoyed the satisfaction of checkmating his opponent by condemning him to death from the judgment-seat. The remedy is obviously that which you suggest. No judge must administer justice in the district where he permanently resides, unless he be a notorious hermit -i.e. live in London. The judges must be itinerant over every part of the country except their own districts. Such an alteration of the system would soon lead to other amendments not unimportant. At present the few county court judges who were originally tolerably well fitted for their office, and who have not suffered much from its deteriorating influence, sustain the reputation of the body. But if the opportunity of experiencing and criticising the qualifications of every individual member of the body in succession were afforded to every district in the kingdom, the lamentable average deficiency would become notorious, and some alteration, with a view to securing better appointments and permanent efficiency, would be insisted on; and then, perhaps, would be seen the necessity of adopting a proposition which at present I expect to be met only with ridicule. The evil is this-that in every judicial qualification the county court judges are, as a body, immensely inferior to the judges of the superior courts. From causes sufficiently obvious, the best men do not seek the appointments; the best of those who would accept them are not generally selected; and the nature of the duty, like that of a police magistrate, tends to deteriorate the functionary. It is not enough to have got rid of the nuisance of jury trial. The system does not work well, and in large commercial towns this is felt by those who are most affected by it. Nothing but extreme poverty can excuse a State from providing an equal amount of judicial efficiency for the dispatch of all its judicial business. If I lose 201. by an erroneous decision, I find no consolation in reflecting, that if 607. had been in question, I might have had a better judge. The question of expense in this case is no question at all; and here I would throw in the teeth of the Legislature the cost of their palace, and of its ventilation, if that missile had not been already so freely used by other projectors. Let the number of puisne judges be increased to seventy or seventy-five; let them interchange their districts at intervals of six or nine months, holding frequent sittings, according to the present county court practice, but at such sittings taking the whole of the civil business of the district, subject to regulations for the separate hearing of cases not argued by counsel; and let them in rotation sit in banco. We shall thus at once elevate the county courts, secure their judges from deterioration, raise the standard of the Bar, and greatly facilitate the trial of those civil cases which are now excluded from the county courts. IN CHANCERY. The Lord Chancellor, under the powers of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 78, intituled "An Act relating to the Appointment of Persons to administer Oaths in Chancery, and to Affidavits made for Purposes connected with Registration," has appointed the following gentlemen to be Commissioners for administering Oaths in Chancery: square. To be London Commissioners. London Gazettes. FRIDAY, APRIL 21. BANKRUPTS. GEORGE HARTSHORNE and GEORGE HARTS- JOHN AMEY, late of Brighton, Sussex, grocer, and now of |