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New Constitution of Holland.-The Pollorcing is a Sketch of the Plan of the New Constitution of HolImd, and an Account of the sucssive Proceedings relative to the Adoption of the said Plan.

Hogue, March 15th, 1805. This day the legislative body reived, from the state directory, a ote containing the following proitions:-1. That the plan of the Batavian Constitution (inserted in Pat note, and of which an abstract s given below) shall be proposed to Batavian people, for their approbation or rejection: and, 2. That it be proposed to the Batavian teople, at the same time, to appoint, the event of their adopting this nstitution, Rutger Jan Schimmeluninck, first pensionary of the Council, with such powers as are More fully stated in the said proposal: and, 3. That both the above wil be proposed to the Batavian Pople, in conformity to the preriptions published Sept. 14, 1801. The said note was, by the legislative body, referred to citizens Vanderraylen, Vau Hoof, Van Rhemen, Siderins, De Crane, Repelaer Van pykenisse, De Joncheere, De Sit. Ir and De Lange Van Wyngaercn, to take it into consideration, VOL. XLVII

and to report their opinion to the assembly.

The plan is divided into eightyseven articles. Articles 1 to 9, inclusive, contain general regulations: by articles 10 to 14, the territorial division of the republic is fixed, which is to be comprised, as hitherto, in eight departments, subdivided into districts. The exercise of the right to vote is to remain provisionally upon the present footing. No clergyman of any persuasion can be elected to any political office, and military persons are not to vote, but at the place of their fixed habitation, separate from that where they are in garrison. A.ticles 15 to 37 treat of the legislative body, which is to be styled their high mightinesses, representing the Batavian commonwealth: the assembly is to be addressed, high and mighty lords. This assembly, with the pensionary, represent the supreme power of the Batavian people, and the fixing of laws belongs to them. The assembly is to consist of nineteen members, elected for three years, and nominated by the administrations of the departments; viz. seven for Holland, one for Zestand, one for Utrecht, and two for each of the other departments. With rɔspect to their qualifications, they must be citizens who have a right to vote, be upwards of thirty years of age, born within one of the eight departments, or the colonies of the state, and have resided, for six years preceding their election, in the department for which they shall sit, unless absent in the service of the republic; and they must not be related to each other, up to the fourth degree of consanguinity. For each election the departmental adminis tration is to send four names to the X X pensionary,

pensionary, who will reduce that number to two, of whom the administration will elect one. The pensionary is to open the sitting of their high mightinesses, who next proceed to elect one of their members as president. They are to send two names, not of members, to the pensionary, who will elect one, a greffier, or secretary to the assembly. All resolutions are to be signed by the president, and countersigned by the secretary. The members will vote without instructions from the departments, to whom they are not accountable for their conduct in the assembly of their high mightinesses. Members of a departmental administration, secretaries of state, members of the council of the city, of finances, and of courts of justice, cannot sit in the assembly, while they retain their posts. The assembly consults on no other subjects than those which are proposed by the pensionary of state: it may approve or reject the laws proposed, but cannot make any alteration in them; if approved, the pensionary is immediately informed of it, who is charged with the promulgation and execution thercof: if rejected, the assembly will acquaint the pensionary with the reasons, who may propose the same plan a second time, either altered, or with the addition of new reasons. The assembly is exclusively charged with deliberating on the taxes proposed by the pensionary. It may, on his proposition, grant pardon or remission of punishment, sentenced by the courts of justice. When it does not sit, the pensionary can grant a reprieve, but must acquaint the assembly thereof, at the first ensuing meeting. It belongs exclusively to the assembly to confirm treaties of

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peace, alliance, or commerce, with the exception of the secret articles of a treaty, which must, however, not be contrary to the public articles, nor contain a cession of any Batavian territory. War cannot be declared, but by a previous resolution of their high mightinesses, on the report of the pensionary. The regular sitting is to be twice a-year, from the 15th of April to the first of June; and from the 1st of December to the 15th of January. The members may be summoned by the pensionary, and at his pleasure, for an extraordinary sitting. One third of the number of members are to go out on the 1st of December annually, to commence on the first of December, 1806. Their salary is 3000 florins a-year. The members going out are eligible to be rechosen. Articles 38 to 61, relate to the pensionary, who is to exercise the executive power, in the name of their high mightinesses, representing the Batavian commonwealth. He is to be elected by a majority of votes of the nineteen members of the assembly, for five years, and is always competent to be re-elected. But the first pensionary shall keep his place from the introduction of this constitution, to the expiration of five years after a peace with England. He may resign his post at any time, into the hands of their high mightinesses, whose president will, in that case, or in the event of death, occupy his place, and take care that a successor be speedily appointed; for which purpose he must summon the assembly immediately. The pensionary of the council must be a citizen who has a vote, past the age of thirty-five, born in the Batavian commonwealth, where he must have

resided

resided the six preceding years, not related to his immediate predecessor in the third degree of consan. guinity, or collateral relation (by marriage). If abroad in the service of the republic it is no impediment. The pensionary does not, in any case, exercise any legislative authority; he has no concern with any cause which is pending in a court of justice, established by law, nor with the application of the pecuniary ways and means of the state, otherwise than pursuant to the law. He appoints a council of state, of not less than five, nor more than nine members, whose qualifications must be like those of their high mightinesses. He lays no proposal for a law before the assembly, with out having previously consulted the council of state. In the assembly of their high mightinesses, he may either propose the laws in person, or through the members of the council in his name. He appoints a secretary-general of state, who is to countersign all public acts of the state. He also nominates five secretaries of state, one for foreign affairs, one for the navy, one for the war department, one for the interior, and one for the finances, with a council of finance, consisting of three members as counsellors. He appoints all foreign ministers, all officers of the army and navy, all national officers of state, and all members of the tribunals, except the members of the national court of justice, concerning whom there are regulations stipulated by article 79. He directs the fleets and camps of the Batavian commonwealth; settles the military ranks, provides for the security of the state, for the undisturbed administration of justice, for the execution of the laws, and

is charged with the highest political authority of the whole state, as well in civil as ecclesiastical affairs, and he appoints the magistrates for the place where the government resides. All acts of the government are made out in the name of their high mightinesses, representing the Batavian commonwealth, and signed by the pensionary, and countersigned by the secretary-general of state. The pensionary has the chief administration of the national pecuniary resources. He fixes the salaries of the officers of state. He also grants pensions pursuant to the stipulations made by law. He delivers annually to the assembly, a general account of the exigencies of the state, which their high mightinesses approve or reject, but they must make no alteration in it. In that account there is a head for objects not susceptible of specification, managed by the pensionary for the service of the state, and for defraying the expence of supporting the honour and dignity of his post, and the expenditure of his own offices, and of the persons there employed. In justfication of the demand of that sum, there shall only be required a declaration, signed with his own hand, that it has been used exclusively for the concerns and service of the state, and in no wise for enriching him or his relations. The financial means remain at first, as already established in each department, but the pensionary's first care will be, to consider every thing tending to increase the revenue of the state, to simplify the different branches of the administration, and to introduce the strictest economy every where; also to propose laws either for amending the established system of taxation, or for introduc

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ing a new system to replace the prosent one of departmental taxation. The remaining twenty-eight articles of the plan propose the establishment of a national office of accounts, to consist of not less than five, nor more than nine members; that the administrations of the departments shall provisionally retain their preSent organization, but subject to a revision; that the high military tribunal shall be established, and a national court of justice, of nine members. The appointments and functions of all those colleges are stipulated by separate articles; and the whole is concluded by the form of the oath to be taken by the legislative body and the pensionary.

Specch of M. Schimmelpenninck, at the opening of the Session of the States General, under the New Constitution, on the 15th of May,

1805.

High and mighty lords,

For a long time have our countrymen felt the necessity of preventing, by the introduction of a new order of things, the downfal of the tottering edifice of the state. This necessity was so generally felt, and in so lively a manner, that I deem it superfluous and unfit to enlarge upon a truth universally acknowledged but it is this general conviction, which holds to us the rule by which we are to measure the hope which the nation has again recovered, and the expectation which it grounds upon our exertions. The burden which we take upon ourselves, and the most troublesome and painful part of which is to fall npon me, is heavy. The difficulties in which the state is involved are

manifold and great; the first proof of our courage will be, to dare to contemplate those difficulties, such as they actually exist; the second, not to despair of conquering them, that is to say, of the salvation of our country. In my opinion, it would be little consistent with that calm impartiality and unshaken integrity, which must be esteemed in a government, to ascend in any manner, either to the nearer or to the more remote causes to which we have to impute the present situation of our country. I deem this the more repugnant to wisdom and equity, because whatever partial inconveniencies may have arisen from individual misapprehensions, prejudices, or actions, yet the main source of our disasters is by no means to be looked for in our bo som, but in causes eutirely without us, and quite independent of us. Our country could not fail, by its situation and relations, deeply to partake of the great events which have changed the whole face of Europe; and the powerful impulses which have shaken the great bodies situated around us must naturally cause a sensible agitation in our contracted territory. And ought we then to continue searching into our entrails, or rendering the wounds of our state more incurable, by seeking after their causes in our own bosom; a search, the result of which would always be exposed to different judgments, always lead to dangerous reproaches, and would be always most adverse to a conciliation?-No, high and mighty lords, let us leave the causes, and let us only view the wounds clearly, solely with intention to heal them: and permit me, who am now placed at the head of the government, to

point out the means, and, on this solemn occasion, to state to your high mightinesses the principles by which I shall regulate my administration, and which I deem the most proper for securing our political existence abroad, and our tranquillity at home. Among the great acts which I imagine a wise nation expects of us, I principally have the following before my mind :- In the first place, the putting an end to that state of , uncertainty, with respect to our internal government, which has long since tired and fatigued the people, and which would have terminated in despair and dissolution. In the second place the improvement of the finances of the country, brought to the brink of absolute ruin by the consequences of internal troubles, and of ruinous wars. Aud, lastly, the embracing and maintaining a firm political system, calculated according to the situation of Europe, and fit to inspire our allies with confidence, our friends with good will, and our enemies with awe. When we shall have obtained the two former objects, the latter, (as far as depends on us, and not on events out of our power) will be easily attainable, provided we only take care, that we (always keeping in mind the great changes which have taken place in Europe, and in our relations with our neighbours) to convince all nations which surround us, that our welfare and our prosperity can never be detrimental to theirs, and that they may fully depend upon our good faith in fulfilling our en gagements. In order to restore the solidity and energy of our internal government, I deem nothing more fit, than an unchangeable attachment to the holy principles of justice; the doing equal justice to all,

without difference of rank or opinions; the restoring the necessary vigour to the laws, and the requisite authority, and the ancient respect to all the lawful authorities; homage to talents. bravery, and merit; every possible indulgence to misapprehension; inexorable rigour to misdeeds. The restoration of the finances of the country will be our most laborious branch. Can you deem it necessary, high and mighty lords, that a melancholy picture thereof should be exhibited to you on this occasion? or is that sad truth not sufficiently known, that all the present ordinary revenue of the state is hardly sufficient to pay the interest of our debts? and can it after this be required, to add any thing to make you feel the grievous state of our finances? without efficacious remedies, there is no possible salvation from so great an evil; and all the authority granted by the constitution to the executive power is absolutely necessary to arrive at these great measures, which, siuce the origin of the republic, at various periods, have always been desired by great statesmen, and recommended by some; but constantly frustrated by the clashing of the powers, and the eternal opposition, either of prejudice or of mean selfinterest, oftentimes badly understood. By those efficacious reme dies, high and mighty lords, I do not by any means aim at a violation of our engagements. As little do I aim at an order for new and extraordinary imposts. These would, in my judgment, either be politically impracticable, or end in a general emigration of all who can emigrate, and in a total corruption of those remaining behind. And, therefore, they shall never make a part of the X x 3

measures

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