In order to prove the want of consideration, the declarations of a former holder of a bill are not in general admissible. Thus, in an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill, drawn by one Clifford, it appeared, that Clifford having been arrested, had applied to the plaintiff to become one of his bail to the sheriff, which he agreed to on being indemnified; Clifford then deposited the bill with him, on condition that it was to be returned, when the purpose for which it was deposited was answered. The action against Clifford was afterwards settled, and the plaintiff was discharged of his liability as bail. Clifford, however, was indebted to the plaintiff for goods sold, &c. For the defendant a witness proved, that he had heard Clifford say, that the bill had been accepted by the defendant for his accommodation, and without any consideration. It appeared, however, that the declaration had been made by him after the bill was indorsed to the plaintiff, and before it was due. The learned judge received this evidence, reserving its admissibility for father consideration. The court of K. B. held the evidence inadmissible. Per Bayley J., “I think the defendant had not laid a sufficient foundation to let in evidence of Clifford's declaration. If the plaintiff had brought the action as trustee for Clifford, and rested solely on the title of the latter, then a declaration of Clifford would have been admissible; but here the plaintiff rests upon the strength of his own title, as against Clifford, and therefore, it is not competent to the defendant to give in evidence the declarations of Clifford, made after he had parted with, and whilst the bill was current. If the plaintiff insisted upon recovering through Clifford's title, there are cases in which it has been held that such declarations are admissible." Shaw v. Broom, 4 D. & R. 730. Where the declarations of the former holder of a bill had been received in evidence, it not being shewn that he was in possession of the bill, at the time he made the declarations, the court of C. P. granted a new trial. Per Best, C.J. "In order to render these declarations receivable, it ought to have been shewn that the party making them was the holder of the bill at the time; they are admissions, and as such receivable only when they are supposed to be adverse to the interest of the party." Pocock v. Billing, 2 Bingh. 269. R. & M. 127. S.C. In an action by the indorsees against the acceptor of a bill, the defendant offered to give in evidence the declarations of the drawer, made while he was in possession of the bill; but the plaintiff's counsel relying on Shaw v. Broom, (supra), contended that they were not admissible; to which Abbott C. J. assented, and rejected the evidence. Smith v. De Wruitz, R. & M. 212. So in an action by the indorsee against the maker of a promissory note, payable with interest on demand, for which the plaintiff had, it seems, given value to the payee, evidence was offered for the defendant of de

clarations made by Arnitt the payee, when he was the holder of the note, shewing that he had given no value for it to the maker. The chief justice rejected this evidence, and the court of K. B. refused a new trial. Per Bayley J. "I am of opinion, that the declarations made by Arnitt are not admissible in evidence. The defendant did not identify Arnitt with the plaintiff. Had it been shewn, that the latter took the note without giving a consideration for it, or after it became due, the case would have been very different. Although there was no direct evidence of the consideration given by the plaintiff to Arnitt, yet dealings between them were proved, whence the existence of a valuable consideration might be fairly presumed. Neither does it appear to me that this note could be considered as over due." Burough v. White, 4 B. & C. 325. 2 C. & P. 8. S. C.

Where the title of the plaintiff, and of the party whose declarations are offered in evidence, is identified, as where the plaintiff took the bill from him after it became due, there such declarations are admissible, as in the following case: a bill or exchange had been given for the accommodation of the drawer; whilst in the hands of the latter he made a declaration, that it was an accommodation bill, and that the acceptor had received no value. Long after it was due, the drawer indorsed the bill to the plaintiff, all accounts between the drawer and acceptor being then closed. Upon which it was contended, that the declaration of the drawer was admissible to affect the plaintiff's title, on the ground, that what would be a good defence against the drawer would be equally a good defence against the indorsee; and for this reason Holroyd J. admitted the declaration of the drawer. Benson v. Marshal, cited, 4 D. & R. 732.

Where a witness states, that a bill was accepted for value received, but declines saying what the consideration was, on the ground that it may subject him to a qui tam action, this will not amount to proof of a good consideration. Dandrige v. Corden, 3 C. & P. 11.

Defence-statute of limitations.] The plea of the statute of limitations is a good defence to an action on a bill of exchange or promissory note. In general the statute only begins to operate from the time when the party might have sued upon the bill or note. Thus, where a bill is drawn, payable after date, for the amount of money lent by the payee to the drawer at the time of drawing, the statute only runs from the time of the bill becoming due. Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle, 1 H. Bl. 631. So, where a note was not to be delivered to the payee till certain conditions were performed, Lord Ellenborough ruled, that the statute did not begin to run till the delivery of the note. Savage v. Aldren, 2 Stark. 232. And so in an action, by an administrator, upon a bill of exchange payable to the testator,

but accepted after his death, it was held, that the statute begins to run from the time of granting the letters of administration, and not from the time the bill becomes due, there being no cause of action until there is a party capable of suing. Murray v. East India Co. 5 B.& A. 204. Upon a bill, payable after sight, no debt arises until a presentment for payment, and without such presentment, therefore, the statute does not begin to run. Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323. And, where a note was made payable "twenty-four months after demand," and dated more than six years ago, but had been presented within six years, Abbott C. J., on the authority of the above case, ruled that the statute was not a bar. Thorpe v. Booth, Ry. & Moo. 389. In the case of a bill or note, payable on demand, the statute, as it seems, begins to run from the date. It has been ruled by Sir J. Mansfield C. J., that a promissory note, payable on demand, is payable immediately, and that the statute runs from the date of the note, and not from the time of demand. Christie v. Fonsick, 1 Selw. N. P. 181. 4th Ed.; and see Capp v. Lancaster, Cro. Eliz. 538. Rumball v. Ball, 10 Mod. 33. So where the statute of limitations was pleaded to an action on a promissory note, payable on demand, and it was insisted that the note being payable on demand, made it an executory contract, and, therefore, no debt due till a demand, it was answered that is is a present duty without a demand, and the difference is, where the debt is to arise upon a collateral act to be done, and so the whole court held. Anon. 15 Vin. Ab. 103.

Statute of limitations—revival of promise.] By stat. 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. no acknowledgment or promise by words only, shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of Statute 21 Jac. 1. c. 16. or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing to be signed by the party chargeable thereby. It is also enacted, That where there shall be two or more joint contractors, or executors, or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, executor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactment, (21. Jac. 1.) so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made, and signed by any other or others of them; provided always, that nothing herein contained shall alter or take away, or lessen the effect of any payment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever; provided also, that in actions to be commenced against two or more such joint contractors, or executors, or administrators, if it shall appear at the trial or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred by the said recited act, or this act, as to one or more of such joint con

tractors, or executors, or administrators, shall nevertheless be intitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise, or otherwise judgment may be given and costs allowed for the plaintiff as to such defendants, against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff.

And by the third section, it is enacted, That no indorsement or memorandum of any payment, written or made after the time appointed for this act to take effect, upon any promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on the behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment, so as to take the case out of the operation of the said statute.

This statute began to operate on the 1st January, 1829. Though it alters the law respecting verbal promises, it seems to leave the authority of the decisions relating to the payment of principal or interest untouched.

In an action on a joint and several promissory note, against the representatives of a surety who had signed the note, it was held, that payment of interest by the principal, within six years and during the lifetime of the surety, was sufficient to take the case out of the statute, as against the representatives. Burleigh v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36. So payment of a dividend, under a commission, against one of the makers of a joint and several note, has been held to take the case out of the statute, in an action against the other maker. Jackson v. Fairbank, 2 H. Bl. 340; and see Brandram v. Wharton, 1 B. & A.463. But where A. & B. made a joint and several promissory note, and A. died, and ten years after his death, B. paid interest upon the note; in an action against the executors of A., it was held that the payment of interest by B. did not take the case out of the statute, so as to make the defendants liable. Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 B. & C. 23.

For the law as it stood before the passing of the statute, 9 G. 4. c. 14; see Whitcombe v. Whiting, Dougl. 652. Halliday v. Ward, 3 Campb. 32. Holme v. Green, 1 Stark. 488. Leaper v. Tatton, 16 East, 420. Easterby v. Pullen, 3 Stark. 186. Pillam v. Foster, 1 B. & C. 248. 2 D. & R. 363. S. C. Perham v. Raynal, 2 Bingh. 306.

Competency of witnesses - drawer.] The drawer of a bill is in general a competent witness, either for the plaintiff or for the defendant. Thus, in an action against the acceptor of a bill, the drawer was called by the plaintiff to prove the defendant's handwriting, which was stated by the defendant to be a forgery, on it being objected that the witness was not competent, because in case the jury found the bill a forgery, he might be committed and tried for a capital offence; Lord Kenyon said, If any interest in the event of this cause could be brought

home to the witness, or the verdict on it could be given in evidence in his favor in another cause, that might disqualify him, but I see here no interest sufficient to impeach his competency. The objection to the competency of a witness, arises from his having a civil interest, not from any bias he may have from an apprehension that the testimony which he is about to give may have an effect in a criminal proceeding. That is matter of observation as to his credit, but it is no objection to admissibility." The witness was admitted. Dickinson v. Prentice, 4 Esp. 32. So in an action against the acceptor, the drawer and payee may be called to prove his own indorsement. Wellsheir v. Cox, cor. Abbott C. J. 1826. Chitty, 416. 7th Ed.

In an action against the acceptor of a bill, the defendant called the drawer (who had indorsed the bill to the plaintiff for an usurious consideration) to prove the usury, and Lord Kenyon thought that a release from the acceptor was necessary. Rich v. Topping, Peake, 224. But in a subsequent case where, in a similar action, the drawer was produced to prove usury in the indorsement of the bill by himself, Lord Ellenborough said, he was admissible on the ground of the verdict not being evidence in any trial against the witness, whose name was on it; that the usury did not destroy the bill, so that it could never be produced again, for that the plaintiff might sue on it, and recover against the witness. Brard v. Ackerman, 5 Esp. 119. In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill, the drawer was called for the defendant to prove that he had paid the bill. Lord Kenyon admitted his evidence, but it appearing that he had received due notice, and was therefore liable himself on the bill, his Lordship inclined to think this objection good. Humphrey v. Moxon, Peake, 52. But supposing him still liable, the verdict in this action would not be evidence in an action brought by the indorsee against himself; and in defeating this action, therefore, he would be rather speaking against his own interest. In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill, one Taylor, the drawer and first indorser, was called for the defendant to prove that he had paid the bill. Taylor was at the time a prisoner on a charge of forging the bill in question, but Lord Kenyon refused to reject his testimony. Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60. In an action by the payee against the acceptor, the defence was, that the plaintiff had discharged the drawer as to part of the bill, and the acceptor for the residue, to establish which the drawer himself was called, and upon argument admitted by Lord Ellenborough. Pool v. Bousfield, 1 Campb. 55.

But in an action against the acceptor of a bill accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, the latter, or his wife, is not a competent witness for the defendant, since, in case the plaintiff should recover, the drawer would be liable to the defendant