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Genoa,

2 months after date. Molloy. 3 months. Beawes. Bayley. Chitty.

Geneva, 1 month after date. Beawes.

Hamburgh, 1 month after date. Beawes. Camb. Comb. Holland, 1 month after date. Beawes. Camb. Comp. Leghorn, 3 months after date. Beawes. Molloy. Camb. Comp.

Lisbon, 2 months after date. Molloy. Beawes. In Cumb. Comp. said to be 15 days after sight.

Lucca,

Sometimes 3 months after date. Molloy.

Madrid, 2 months after date. Molloy. Beawes. Camb. Comp. 1 Wils. 185.

Middleburgh, 1 month after date. Molloy. Beawes.

Milan, 3 months. Beawes.

Rotterdam, 1 month after date. Molloy. Camb. Comp.
Palermo, 3 months or 90 days after date. Camb. Comp.
Petersburgh, None. Camb. Comp.

Rome,

Venice,

Trieste,

Vienna,

Zante,

3 months after date. Beawes.

3 months after date. Molloy. Beawes. Camb. Comp. See Vienna. Camb. Comp.

14 days after acceptance. Camb. Comp. 14 days after sight. Beawes.

3 months after date. Molloy. Zealand, 1 month after date. Beawes.

Excused-when, in general.] The bankruptcy or insolvency of the drawee or acceptor of a bill, or the maker of a note, is no excuse for not presenting it. Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East, 117. Russell v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 497. 515. 4th ed. In an action against the makers of a promissory note made payable in the body of it at a particular place, (Workington bank,) the declaration instead of stating a presentment at that place, averred that the defendants became insolvent, and until the commencement of the action, ceased and wholly declined and refused to pay at the particular place. In support of this averment, the plaintiff proved that the bank was shut up, and that no payments had been made there for some time before the action brought, upon which the plaintiff had a verdict, and the court of K. B. refused a new trial. Lord Ellenborough observed, that the mere allegation of insolvency, as an excuse for not presenting the notes for payment at the place, would be impertinent; but in this case the allegation (the truth of which was left to the jury and found by them), went further, that the defendants had ceased and wholly declined and refused payment of any of their notes at the place. How then could the question arise? The shutting up the house might be considered as a refusal to pay the notes there. Howe v. Bowes, 16 East, 112. But upon error brought in the exchequer chamber, the judgment of the court of king's bench was reversed. Per Mac

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donald, C. B. This question is extremely simple; it depends entirely on the force and effect of an allegation in the declaration, which it is said dispenses with the necessity of presenting the notes in question. The question then is, whether this allegation, that the plaintiffs in error ceased and wholly declined and refused to pay at Workington bank, any notes issued by them from such bank, carries the matter further than a mere allegation of insolvency; and it is not alleged that this declaration, that they would pay none of their notes, was made to the plaintiffs below; it is merely this, that they generally declared that they neither could nor would pay any of their notes. This allegation does not appear to the judges to be sufficient to enable the plaintiff below to maintain the action." Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30.

When a bill on a wrong stamp is indorsed in payment for goods, the party receiving it may treat such bill as a nullity, and need not present it. Wilson v. Vysar, 4 Taunt. 288.

As the crown cannot be guilty of laches, a party holding the bill on behalf of the crown need not present it when due. West on Extents, 29, 30. 1st ed.

The mere knowledge on the part of the drawer or indorser of a bill, that the bill when presented is likely to be dishonored, will not dispense with the presentment. Thus when the drawer of a bill, the day before it became due, said to the holder, that he hoped it would be paid; that he would see what he could do, and would endeavour to provide effects, there being no proof of due presentment, Lord Ellenborough held, that there did not appear to be a default on the part of the drawee, and the plaintiff was nonsuited. Prideaux v. Collier, 2 Stark. 57. So where in an action against the drawers of a bill, there was no proof of presentment or notice, but it appeared that the defendants had given orders to the drawees not to pay the bill if presented, and that those orders had been communicated to the plaintiffs Abbott, C. J. was of opinion, that the defendant's order to the payees [drawees] not to pay the bill if presented, amounted to a dispensation of the notice of dishonor, but that it formed no excuse for the non-presentment for payment. Hill v. Heap, Dow. & Ryl. N.P.C. 57.

Excused by part payment, or by subsequent promise to pay.] Payment of part of the money due upon a bill or note, or a subsequent promise to pay, with knowledge that the bill has not been duly presented, will dispense with proof of the presentment. Thus in an action upon a promissory note by an indorsee against the indorser, it was proved that the defendant had paid part of the money, and Lee, C. J. held that sufficient to dispense with the proving a demand upon the maker of the note. Vaughan v. Fuller, 2 Str. 1246. So in an action against the indorser of a note, there was no evidence of presentment or

notice, but it was proved that the defendant, two years after the note was due, being requested to pay it, promised he would, but prayed for further time, Bayley J. ruled, that where a party to a bill or note, knowing it to be due, and knowing that he was entitled to have it presented when due, to the acceptor or maker, and to receive notice of its dishonour, promises to pay it, it is presumptive evidence of presentment and notice, and he is bound by the promise so made. Taylor v. Jones, 2 Campb. 106. So where the indorsee of a bill, after it was due, being applied to for payment said, that if the witness would call again in a day or two and bring the account, he would pay it, it was held by the court of K. B. that this acknowledgment dispensed with proof of the presentment. Per Lord Ellenborough "When a man against whom there is a demand promises to pay it, for the necessary facilitating of business between man and man everything must be presumed against him. It was therefore to be presumed primâ facie, from the promise so made, that the bill had been presented for payment in due time and dishonored, and that due notice of it had been given to the defendant." Lundie v. Robertson, 7 East, 231; and see Haddock v. Bury, Id. 236. (n), post. Hodge v. Fillis, 3 Campb. 464.

In an action against an indorser of a bill, it appeared that the bill had been presented at Hammersley's bank after banking hours, but it was proved that after the declaration was filed, (which alleged the bill to have been duly presented), the defendant had applied for the indulgence of a further extension of time to pay the bill, but it did not expressly appear that when the defendant applied for the indulgence, he was apprised of the objection to the presentation. The plaintiff being nonsuited, on an application for a new trial, the court thought it should have been left to the jury to say whether, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant had notice at the time of his application for indulgence, that there had been no due presentation, and granted a rule for a new trial. Hopley v. Dufresne, 15 East, 275.

The following case, as reported, is at variance with the other authorities on the subject. The defendant was sued as indorser of a bill, but instead of proving presentment,, the plaintiff called a witness, who stated, that in a conversation with the defendant, he said he knew he was discharged, but that the plaintiff had behaved so well to him in many matters that he should take no advantage of it, but would pay the money. Lord Ellenborough is reported to have said, that this was not of itself sufficient; that it was necessary to prove a demand upon the acceptor, and a refusal by him to pay the money, as the liability of the defendant only arose by reason of his default. A subsequent demand being proved, the plaintiff had a verdict. Brown v. McDermot, 5 Esp. 265; see also Hill v. Heap, Dow. & Ryl. N. P. C. 57. ante, p. 167.

Excused by inevitable accident.] When the holder of a bill is prevented by accident, not arising from his own misconduct, from presenting a bill when due, he will not thereby discharge any of the parties, provided he present it as soon afterwards as he is able. Thus in a Scotch suit, the opinion of London merchants was obtained, who stated, that any cause which has prevented the holder of a bill or note from presenting it, without his fault, such as his detention by contrary winds, his being robbed of the bill, or the like, will excuse him equally from not protesting it. Young v. Forbes, Morr. 1580. Thompson, 483. So it is said by Molloy, pl. 27., that if a bill of exchange, by contrary winds, or other occasions, be so long on its way, that the usance or time limited by the bill be expired, and being tendered, acceptance and payment are denied, protests for both must be made, and the drawer must answer the value. And see Pothier, pl. 144. Where a bill payable at Leghorn was not presented when due, but the plaintiff proved, that owing to the state of the country, Leghorn being occupied by the enemy, it was impossible to present the bill, and had a verdict, on a motion for a new trial, the court refused to grant a rule. Per Lord Ellenborough, Duly presented, is presented according to the custom of merchants, which necessarily implies an exception in favour of those unavoidable accidents which must prevent the party from doing it within the regular time, and it was left to the jury to say, whether from the situation of the country it was possible for the plaintiff to present it in due time." Patience v. Townley, 2 Smith, 224.

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CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS.

By whom.

At what time.

Form.

Verbal.

What amounts to a good acceptance not on the bill.
What is a good acceptance on the bill.

What acts, when there is no express acceptance or promise
to accept, will amount to an acceptance.

Special acceptance at a particular place,

Conditional acceptance.

Acceptance varying from the terms of the bill.

Acceptance supra protest.

Liability of the acceptor supra protest.
Remedy of acceptor supra protest.

Cancellation of acceptance.

By whom.] Acceptance must be made by the drawee or by his agent duly authorised, or by some person, on the refusal of the drawee, for the honor of some other party to the bill. Acceptance for honor will be subsequently considered. Where the acceptance is by an agent, he must, if required, produce his authority to the holder, and if such authority be not clear and express, such holder may consider the bill dishonored and act accordingly. Beawes, pl. 87. Though it is said that when the authority is clear, the holder is bound to take such an acceptance. Ibid. But it seems that the holder would in any

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