even the hero or martyr made his memorable decisions by the strength of the motives resident in his breast, as he kept to them by the continuing strength of these same inner moral forces, which were only a happy and glorious grace of Nature or God vouchsafed to him. He felt as Lutherthis he must do and no other;-from the strength of the motive within, but not from the strength of his own freewill. This he felt, though we, on the other hand, cannot help having feelings of reverence, gratitude, admiration, which implicitly acknowledge a merit in him; feelings which, however, are ennobling to the possessor, as they were part of the sustaining motives to the hero's action. itself.

§ 10. Why, then, are men punished for actions injurious to others or to society, when they only act from the strongest motives? If the strongest motive or sum of motives invariably prevails and carries the volition with it, it is still a matter of chance whether the motives are good or bad ones, though, if bad or anti-social, we must necessarily act from them. Am I not compelled to act from the strongest motive as irresistibly as a steam-engine is urged forward by the mechanical forces animating it? and if compelled, are not merit and demerit alike removed? Why, then, should I be punished if the consequences of my action should happen to harm others? Why on any ground except the superior might of society and not on grounds of justice?

And the answer to such an objection usually urged against the motive theory is as follows:-"Doubtless you must always decide and act according to the strongest motive which for the time being is before you, unless you postpone your decision in order to allow other motives to

rise to view; but in either case there was supposed to have been present and included in your general circle of motives sitting in council, some degree of conscience, some regard for the rights, and if not, also some small desire for the good of others, at least no wish to do them harm. Further, even if all these good motives were absent, still a fear of punishment was very confidently calculated upon by society as being present in your case, as in all cases, amongst the other motives, to warn you off from actions hurtful to society. Some of these motives, prohibitory of injurious action to others, and very particularly the dread of punishment, were assumed as having been present to your mind as to all properly constituted minds; and if unhappily they were not present in due strength, if they were present but were not felt sufficiently strongly to deter you from wrong doing, society, also governed by motives directed to its own preservation and weal, is justified, through its arm of justice guarding its interests, in punishing you, so as to make the deterring motives stronger in future in you and others similar." In order to show the falseness of the theory, a burglar or murderer of a metaphysical turn of mind, who has adopted the necessitarian creed, is sometimes represented as urging:-"But is the punishment really just? How can it be just to punish me if my will has been coerced by the strength of the motives which were unfortunately present to me?" And the answer provided by Bishop Butler still holds good, even from the necessitarian point of view. "As if," says Butler, "the necessity which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it." But the burglar may be answered more fully from the point of view of his own creed, from the principles of Edwards and Priestley, of

Mill and Bain. We may suppose a necessitarian judge to have tried the necessitarian house-breaker, and to reply to his objection:-" It appears from the event that respect for the rights of others, for the just rights of property, were very feebly deterring motives with you when you committed this crime; further, that the fear of punishment was not so strong as it is desirable it should have been; it was calculated that, if not as a moral being, yet at least as a prudent one, mindful of your own interest and self-preservation you would have had the latter motive before you; it was even confidently assumed that you would have it before you in some degree, since you were forewarned of the penalty attached to your offence against the law; it now appears that, though you doubtless had it before you, you had it not in sufficient degree. This is unfortunate for you, especially since you have been convicted of the crime; and society in self-defence must make the fear of punishment stronger in your apprehension in future, as well as in others resembling you; and there is no other way in which this can be so effectually done as by making you experience punishment in severe and unpleasant form. You have attacked society in one of its essential foundations, the rights of property, and society is justified in repelling such attacks. It is just to defend just rights, and to do so by means of punishment, which is society's means of defence, is just. Further, it is not only just, but the general weal absolutely requires it; for all which reasons I, as the representative of society, and moved by considerations for its security, must pass such a sentence of punishment on you as the gravity of your offence justly deserves."

So much by way of answer to the metaphysical burglar. And most of the argument applies to the case of

him who has taken life; only that here the further and more special question of the justice of capital punishment enters a question which, however, does not concern us at present.

Thus punishment may be defended as just on the motive theory as well as on the rival theory of free-will. Mill goes even further, maintaining that it is only on the motive theory that punishment has any true significance or justification; that it would miss its aim if the will were not determined by motives. Punishment, in his opinion, owes its sole efficacy to its being a motive which will certainly have an influence amongst the others at work, which will certainly be taken into more or less serious account by all who meditate crime against society. "Punishment," he says, "proceeds on the assumption that the will is governed by motives. If punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would be illegitimate, however natural might be the inclination to inflict it. Just so far as the will is supposed free, that is, capable of acting against motives, punishment is disappointed of its object and deprived of justification." *

The final justification of punishment is the greater good to be attained, only by its infliction. It cannot be justified on grounds of vengeance, or of retaliation, or of a desire to inflict pain. The reformation of the individual and the larger good of society are the aims of punishment, but the latter is so much the more important that the former must give way to it in all cases where the two are incompatible, as in the case of the murderer, whose life is dangerous to the community. The aim of punishment is the prevention of crime, sometimes the improvement of

*Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 576.

the individual. The further question arises before it can be justified-Is it efficacious to its end? Does it prevent crime or improve the offender? And there can be no doubt what the answer should be. There is no doubt of the efficacy of punishment in general, sometimes for the improvement of the individual, but far more for the prevention of future crimes. There can be no question that the fear of punishment prevents innumerable crimes of all kinds. which nothing but such fear would prevent. Without going the length of Professor Bain, who affirms that "punishment or retribution in some form is one-half the motive power to virtue in the very best of human beings, while it is more than three-fourths in the mass of mankind," we have no doubt at least that the fear of punishment sits as a constant monitor and motive force in the general assembly of the criminal's motives. There can be no question that the dread of punishment is "very potent with such spirits," and that its monitions prevail to such an extent as not only to prevent many potential burglars, swindlers, and murderers, from becoming actual ones; but also that amongst actual criminals, the fear of consequences acting in the place of a conscience, in many cases turns away the current of the criminal's thought from the premeditated crime; so that the cunningly conceived fraud will not be carried out, the meditated murder will be only in imagination, the contemplated burglarious "enterprise of great pith and moment" will remain only a great idea which will never merit the name of action.

Responsibility, then, is not destroyed by the theory of motives. On the contrary, a practical sense of it is only to be brought home to the individual who has no conscience or regard for the rights of others, by punishment, that is, by a

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