that any people should find motives for fighting for a weak and oppressive government: but, however it may contradict our experience, or our theories, the fact is well established: and it is fortunate that it is so; since perhaps this blind and semibarbarous preference of a weak and wicked government, merely because it is the government of one's own country, is a more effectual safeguard against the intrigues and power of France, than the more enlightened and rational attachment to individual liberty: the latter is too apt to be deceived by French promises, and to expect from them a reformation of public abuses: the former has implanted in the breast such an instinctive dread of every thing foreign, and such an indifference about personal liberty and rights, that French intrigue must be displayed, and French promises made, in vain. The French, therefore, a very national people, and who had derived great advantages, in their wars, from this nationality, were now about to commence hostilities against the Russians, who were at least equally national: from this cause of their former suc cesses, therefore, the French in their contest with the Russians had little to hope.

Another cause of French success must be traced in the very decisive manner in which they conduct war: perhaps decision is not the term which most aptly and precisely designates what we mean: it is more than decision, it is the adoption of the most bold and apparently hazardous plan; a plan which, seeming to indicate a consciousness of superiority, in most cases has produced to the French all the advantages of superiority, by intimidating their opponents. Bonaparte well knows how difficult it is to distin

guish between rational boldness and rashness he acts on this principle, and has thus too frequently succeed ed in conquering his enemy by his own rashness. But this plan was not likely to succeed so well in, Russia, and among the Russian people, as it had done elsewhere: when he penetrated into the very heart of Germany, though he was thus placed at an immense distance from his own territories, he still was in the midst of a people at least not hostile to him, and of a country extremely fertile. The Austrian government issued no orders to impede his progress by laying waste the country; and if they had issued these orders, their subjects possessed too little attachment to them, and too small a portion of nationality, to have obeyed them:but in Russia the case would be completely reversed; he would be much further removed from his own territories and resources; he would be in the midst of a comparatively barren and uncivilized country, where the means of subsistence were neither so abundant, nor so easily and regularly procured; and above all, he would be in the midst of a people, who were naturally disposed to resist the French by all possible means, and who, at the command of their sovereign, would undergo the greatest privations for this, or any other purpose of his pleasure. The only hope of success, therefore, which Bonaparte could indulge, if he was fully aware of the character of the Russians, must have been from his knowledge of the emperor Alexander: him he had once already intimidated or cajoled; and he. must have expected, if he entered on the war, with such very formidable means, in a rapid and decisive manner; if he penetrated into the heart of Russia, so as to threaten

army along the Niemen, their line became very extensive, and in many places so little connected, or disadvantageously posted, that it was exposed to be attacked with every prospect of success. Bonaparte immediately perceived the error they had committed, and on it he founded his plan of the campaign. He was convinced, that if he could effect the passage of the Niemen at Kowno, he might push forward on the road to Wilna and Minsk, with such rapidity as to cut off such of the divisions of the Russian army as were to the south of the line be tween those two places. If he could thus succeed in this part of his plan, bis object next would be to attack the separate divisions, unsupported, and successively defeat them. In the former part of his plan he was completely successful; in the latter, the steady and persevering bravery of the Russians foiled him.

As soon as Bonaparte had crossed the Niemen, he pushed forward with great rapidity towards Wilna. On many accounts the occupation of this city was of the utmost consequence to him: the emperor Alexander was still in it; and though there was no chance of taking him, yet the circumstance of his flying before the French would give eclat to the commencement of the campaign; and probably Bonaparte was in hopes, that if he remained sufficiently long to witness the rapid advance and formidable numbers of the French army, he might be intimidated into a desire for peace. On the 28th of June Bonaparte entered the capital of Russian Poland; and from the measures which he immediately adopted, it was plain that the occupation of it was to him a desirable event, inasmuch as it gave him

an opportunity of exercising his usual talent of finesse. In the war in which he had just engaged with Russia, he expected considerable assistance from the Poles: he knew their enmity to Russia; and though he had already deceived them, in the expectations which he had led them to form of his erecting Poland again into a kingdom, yet he knew how to reinspire them with confidence in him: as soon, therefore, as he had entered Poland, he set about re-establishing the kingdom of Poland: his first public act there was to proclaim it anew. A diet was immediately assembled, and a constitution framed, and the name and form of liberty were restored to the Poles.

While Bonaparte himself continued at Wilna, the different divisions of his army advanced, but in a different direction from that in which they had first moved: instead of proceeding directly from Wilna to the Dwina, on which the Russians had retired, they stretched to the south, towards the province of Mojilhow. Their object in tak ing this route appears to have been partly the pursuit of prince Bagra thion, who with the second corps of the Russian army had been separated from the first, and was endea vouring to rejoin it, and partly the design or the hope of being able to turn the Russian posts on the Dwina, and thus avoid the neces sity of attacking and forcing their entrenched camp on that river. Already the bulletins which Bona. parte issued put on a different character, and assumed a different tone, from those with which he had favoured and delighted the Parisi ans in his former wars: he boasted of no signal or decisive victory; of no rout or confusion of the enemy; of no cannon or colours taken; and

during a pursuit which lasted nearly a fortnight, of very few prisoners. On the other hand, by his repeatedly and emphatically asserting that immense quantities of provisions were arriving for his army, and by his explaining in a very minute and particular manner the route by which they were to be brought, it was evident that the country through which he was marching was not able to supply his troops. The climate of Russia also began to act against him, even in the month of July, and when he had not advanced further north than Wilna. A dreadful tempest arose; torrents of rain fell; thousands of his horses perished; and many pieces of his artillery were buried in the mud. His disappointment and chagrin were likewise manifest: he broke out into invectives on the barbarity of the Russians for laying waste their country, and into ridicule on them, for their cowardly and dis graceful flight, as he termed it.

Bonaparte, by his passage of the Niemen, had succeeded in separat ing two of the Russian divisions from the main army. The corps of Doctorrow, when this event took place, was stationed between Sida and Grodno. As soon as he was informed of the advance of the enemy, and that the main Russian army was proceeding towards the Dwina, he put his corps in motion for that river. His movement was attended with great difficulties, as the French followed him closely, and in one part of his route had got so near him, that he was obliged to turn to the right, and undertake a circuitous route to the Dwina, where he at last arrived, with the loss of a great part of his baggage. The other Russian corps which had been separated from the main army, was commanded by prince Bagra

thion. It was not so fortunate: the prince in vain attempted to join the main army at Wilna, Minsk, and Bobruysk. The French, by the rapidity of their movements, always anticipated him; and it was not till he had crossed the Dnieper and reached Smolensk that he succeeded in his object. It is even probable that this corps would have been entirely cut off, if prince Poniatowski, who commanded the Poles in the service of Bonaparte, had pursued him with sufficient alacrity and vigour.

On the 17th of July Bonaparte left Wilna, and put himself again at the head of his army, for the purpose of attacking the Russian entrenched camp at Drisna, on the banks of the Dwina. Previously to his arrival marshal Oudinot crossed that river at Dunaberg, a considerable way below the Russian camp: he was not strongly opposed, and immediately after he reached the north bank he moved on to Drouga. The main body of the Russian army at Drisna amounted to about 120,000: the fortifications of their camp were very strong; but as prince Bagrathion had not joined them, they resolved not to hazard a general battle. Before, however, they evacuated their camp, they suddenly threw a bridge over the river, and surprised the corps of Sebastiani, who had reached the left bank, and drove him back with considerable loss. After this partial but encouraging success, they moved from Drisna towards Witepsk; and Bonaparte, having demolished the entrenched camps, in which he boasted that he found immense stores of provisions and ammunition, followed them SO closely, that his advanced posts had frequent skirmishes with the rear of the Russian army.